This is just too good...

This post at Talking Points Memo just makes me chuckle. See, RNC Chairman Ken Mehlman greenlighted a commercial paid for by the RNC that attacked Harold Ford, Jr.--the Dem candidate for Tennessee Senator--for taking contributions from "porn movie producers." And now Josh Marshall has detailed how Mehlman accepted money from not only a big time porn producer and distributor, but a big time gay porn producer and distributor.

Part 11 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Goldberg's solution

After incorrectly defining the debate, ignoring facts, and belitting the antiwar crowd, Goldberg bestows upon us his solution to what we should do in Iraq:

According to the conventional script, if I'm not saying "bug out" of Iraq, I'm supposed to say "stay the course." But there's a third option, and, funnily enough, I found it in an old column of mine (journalistic taboos be damned!). I think we should ask the Iraqis to vote on whether U.S. troops should stay.

(emphasis added). I'm not saying that having a "stay or go" vote is a bad idea. Given what I said about what should be the parameters of this debate (see Part 8), this idea should be part of the discussion. So let's discuss a bit, shall we?

Some substantive discussion of Goldberg's proposal

Goldberg's next paragraph has some discussion.

Polling suggests that they want us to go. But polling absent consequences is a form of protest. With accountability, minds may change and appreciation for the U.S. presence might grow.

Indeed, recent polling does indicate Iraqis want us out. One poll was published one month ago and prompted much media coverage. It was done by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland. Here's the overiew for the poll.

A new WPO poll of the Iraqi public finds that seven in ten Iraqis want U.S.-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year. An overwhelming majority believes that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing and there is growing confidence in the Iraqi army. If the United States made a commitment to withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Support for attacks on U.S.-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten. Support appears to be related to a widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the U.S. government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq.

Sounds like things are just peachy, huh? Note that this poll surved the general public, not the politicians, not the government officials. In other words, the poll surveyed the people who would be voting in the election proposed by Goldberg. Since that proposed vote would be whether or not U.S. forces should stay in Iraq, the discussion of the poll results on that question are relevant to this post. Here are the basic numbers:

A large majority of Iraqis—71%—say they would like the Iraqi government to ask for U.S.-led forces to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less. Given four options, 37 percent take the position that they would like U.S.-led forces withdrawn “within six months,” while another 34 percent opt for “gradually withdraw[ing] U.S.-led forces according to a one-year timeline.” Twenty percent favor a two-year timeline and just 9 percent favor “only reduc[ing] U.S.-led forces as the security situation improves in Iraq.”

These figures alone indicate that Goldberg's proposed vote would result in a "get out" result, but a further breakdown of the poll results is warranted here.

There are significant variations between groups, though no group favors an open-ended commitment. Fifty-seven percent of Sunnis favor withdrawal in six months, with another 34 percent favoring it within a year. Shias are more evenly divided between six months (36%) and a year (38%). Few Shias favor two years (20%) or an open-ended commitment (5%). Only a third of Kurds favor withdrawal within a year or less, but two-thirds favor withdrawal within two years or less (11% six months, 24% one year, 34% two years). Thirty-one percent of Kurds favor an open-ended commitment.

Even with these variations, it is clear that a majority of Iraqis want U.S. troops out within a year. The Kurds are the only group who seem to favor withdrawal in two years or an open-ended commitment. However, keep in mind that the Kurds comprise only 20% of the population, meaning that even if all of the Kurds voted for the U.S. to stay, the election would still likely go the other way.

It is significant to note that this same organization conducted a similar poll in January of this year, and there was a change from then to now.

As compared to January 2006, there has been, overall, a growing sense of urgency for withdrawal of U.S.-led forces. In January, respondents were only given three options—six months, two years, and an open-ended commitment. In September, the one-year option was added, since it had been nearly a year since the last time they were asked. While in January 70 percent favored withdrawal within two years (35% six months, 35% two years), now— approximately a year later—71 percent favor withdrawal within a year (37% six months, 34% one year). Support for an open-ended commitment has dropped from 29 percent to 9 percent.

Again this indicates that Iraqis 1) want U.S. troops out sooner rather than later, and 2) they do not want an open, undefined period for American troops to stay in Iraq. There is one other change from the earlier poll I find interesting: "Within ethnic groups there have been some shifts. Shias show a growing sense of urgency, with the numbers calling for withdrawal in six months rising from 22 percent to 36 percent." There is a trend that more and more Shia want us out. Given that they are a large majority of the population, any continuance of this upward trend would further indicate that the result of Goldberg's vote would be "get out."

Regarding the poll results, Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, said this: "What we are seeing is a growing desire for U.S.-led forces to withdraw in the near future, greater confidence that the Iraqi army can deal with the situation, and continuing concern that the United States has no plans to ever leave." Combine these observations with what Iraqis had to say about a U.S.-led occupation prior to the war (see the "Overview" of Part 6), and the odds of "get out" seemingly grow.

And there is at least one other reason why "get out" would likely be the result of Goldberg's vote. The statements by Iraqis in Part 6 were part of something I wrote just before the war began. I include another part of that work here because it is very relevant to this topic. In Part 6, I quoted part of published an editorial by Kamil Mahdi, and now I will quote some more. Mahdi complains of the attitude that he felt was a basis for American and British plans.

In government comment about Iraq, the Iraqi people are treated as a collection of hapless victims without hope or dignity. At best, Iraqis are said to have parochial allegiances that render them incapable of political action without tutelage. This is utterly at variance with the history and reality of Iraq. Iraqis are proud of their diversity, the intricacies of their society and its deeply rooted urban culture.

*******

To assert that an American invasion is the only way to bring about political change in Iraq...is ignorant and disingenuous.

*******

Of course Saddam Hussain crushed all these challenges, but in every case the regional and international environment has supported the dictator against the people of Iraq...Iraq's history is one of popular struggle and also of imperial greed, superpower rivalries and regional conflict. To reduce the whole of Iraqi politics and social life to the whims of Saddam Hussain is banal and insulting.

In other words, before the war Iraqis felt like we were treating them like little children who just did not understand how the world works and could not do things for themselves. This perception was supported by testimony of the State Department's Marc Grossman before the Senate Foreign relations committee on February 11, 2003. In discussing Iraq's political future, Grossman concluded with the following statement:

And while we are listening to what the Iraqis are telling us, at the end of the day, the United States Government will make its decisions based on what is in the national interest of the United States.

With a tip of the cap to comedian Henry Cho, this is similar a familiar phrase in the American South: "Well, bless your heart." Seriously, how arrogant and condescending can you get?

Now let's look at what is going on now. As reported by the Washington Post, on October 24, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, "said the prime minister had agreed to timelines for accomplishing several critical goals, including developing plans to deal with militias, amend the constitution and equitably distribute Iraq's oil revenue." Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was not amused. The next day Maliki said to all of Iraq via television "I affirm that this government represents the will of the people, and no one has the right to impose a timetable on it. The Americans have the right to review their policies, but we do not believe in a timetable." Two days later, Maliki and Khalilzad met and issued a statement that indicated that the two sides were working together, but on Friday, one of Maliki's close aides, Hassan al-Suneid, told reporters that Maliki told Khalilzad "I am a friend of the United States, but I am not America's man in Iraq." On Saturday, Maliki met with Bush via video conference, and both sides were saying nice things afterward. Still, this series of very recent events matches up with the statements of Iraqis in Part 6 and the above statements from Mahdi and Grossman.

And when that observation is added to the recent poll results, it means that I think the chances are very good that if Goldberg's proposed vote took place, the vote would be for the U.S. to get out. That opinion is the basis for the concluding section of this series.

But before I get to the concluding section, Goldberg does offer a reason why he thinks the result of the vote would be the opposite of my opinion: "But polling absent consequences is a form of protest. With accountability, minds may change and appreciation for the U.S. presence might grow." I think what he is saying is that once the Iraqis start thinking about what their lives would be like without the U.S. in Iraq, they will realize that they really do want us there. Yeah, like things are so great now. The oil industry (which the neocons said would pay for most of the reconstruction) can't function well because of constant attacks and sabotage, the electricity situation is still below the pre-war levels, the security situation is getting worse, all the American contractors have not restored and improved the infrastructure (building schools does not count, by the way), Iraqis have not gotten those contracts and the jobs that go with them, and on and on. Saddam is gone, and that is a very good thing, but as the analysis in Part 6 and Mahdi's statements quoted in this post show, while the Iraqis wanted Saddam out, now that he is gone, they want foreign powers out of their country. I am not saying that I think Iraq would be better if we stay, nor am I saying I think Iraq would be better if we go. What I am saying is that it sure seems to me that Iraqis want us out and that that would be their decision if the matter was put to a vote.

Goldberg wants to "vote and run."

Just as with the term "Burning Bush doctrine," I thought I was oh so clever when I thought of "vote and run" only to find that at least one other person (and likely more) coined the phrase well before I did. But why would anyone use that label for Goldberg's proposed solution? The answer is within the penultimate paragraph of his editorial:

If Iraqis voted "stay," we'd have a mandate to do what's necessary to win, and our ideals would be reaffirmed. If they voted "go," our values would also be reaffirmed, and we could leave with honor. And pretty much everyone would have to accept democracy as the only legitimate expression of national will.

What a bunch of bullshit. First of all, if the result of the vote was for us to stay, that is not necessarily a mandate for the U.S. to decide what is "necessary to win" or decide how the "necessary" actions are to be carried out. Second, just what American values will be reaffirmed if the Iraqis vote for us to get out? I can think of one--democratic determination of a nation's future. Can anybody think of any others? Anybody? Bueller?

And anyone thinking I am being too harsh on Goldberg should take another look at his very last paragraph:

Finishing the job is better than leaving a mess. And if we can finish the job, the war won't be remembered as a mistake.

Let me see if I can follow Goldberg's arguments. I will list some of his main points, then restate them them along with my commentary.

• Regardless of the reason, we are in Iraq.
• We cannot pull out precipitously from Iraq because if we do, "jihadism will open a franchise in Iraq and gain steam around the world, and the U.S. will be weakened."
• We need to "finish the job" in Iraq.
• By holding a vote which will likely result in the Iraqi people saying "get out," we will "finish the job" regardless of what might be left to be done.

Goldberg's point: Regardless of the reason, we are in Iraq.
My comment: Recall that Goldberg said in the same sentence that the reasons we are in Iraq are both good and wrong ("We are in Iraq for good reasons and for reasons that were well-intentioned but wrong."). I need to stop smoking cigars and get some of whatever Goldberg is smoking.

Goldberg's point: We cannot pull out precipitously from Iraq because if we do, "jihadism will open a franchise in Iraq and gain steam around the world, and the U.S. will be weakened.
My comment: Aside from the fact that our presence in Iraq has already created a jihadi franchise and weakened the U.S., notice that Goldberg's concern is U.S. interests, not the well being of the Iraqi people. This is an example of the attitude described by Mahdi and expressed by Grossman.

Goldberg's point: We need to "finish the job" in Iraq.
My comment: Notice that he in no way says what would constitute "finishing the job." The only clue he gives is the following point.

Goldberg's point: By holding a vote which will likely result in the Iraqi people saying "get out," we will "finish the job" regardless of what might be left to be done.
My comment: Explain how this is not "cut and run." If the results of our leaving would be the same

Again, I am not saying that a vote and subsequent withdrawal prompted by the vote would be either good or bad. What I am saying is that Goldberg proposes it is okay and honorable for the U.S to get out of Iraq immediately if the Iraqis vote for us to get out. Goldberg proposes it is okay and honorable for us to get out immediately even if our departure would worsen the situation in Iraq.

In other words, if we get out of Iraq very soon, we will not do so "precipitously" as long as the Iraqis vote us out. See, if we choose to get out of Iraq now, that would produce really bad results, and that would be "cutting and running," and Goldberg would be against it. If, however, the Iraqis voted us out and our leaving produced the same really bad results, that would be honorable, and Goldberg would be in favor of that. He does not care one bit whether our departure would make things worse or better. Just about everything he and the rest of his winger media buddies ever spouted about Iraq has turned out to be wrong, and now he is just looking for some excuse to advocate getting out of Iraq without looking like he and all the other people who ignored the blatant facts and negligently engaged in delusional idealism were wrong.

And that is why Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Part 10 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Goldberg promotes the Burning Bush doctrine and again fails to see the practical and the big picture.

Goldberg next tries to salvage his claim that the war has not really been a mistake by saying the following:

Bush's critics claim that democracy promotion was an afterthought, a convenient rebranding of a war gone sour. I think that's unfair, but even if true, it wouldn't mean liberty isn't at stake. It wouldn't mean that promoting a liberal society in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world wouldn't be in our interest and consistent with our ideals. In war, you sometimes end up having to defend ground you wouldn't have chosen with perfect knowledge beforehand. That's us in Iraq.

The promotion of democracy was not an afterthought (as discussed below), but it definitely was a rebranding. And let me tell you, "rebranding" is such an appropriate term. This war was a sales job and PR campaign from the get go. As I previously pointed out, WMD was pushed as the reason for the war, the reason we just had take out Saddam. Right before the war, as the Bush administration knew that there was no evidence of WMD, there began to be little statements about freeing the Iraqi people, and that is when the rebranding began. As the war began to "turn sour" and the truth about WMD could no longer be concealed, the PR image became more about spreading democracy. Moreover, as discussed on August 29, 2004, Wolfowitless disclosed that WMD was chosen as the #1 public justification for the war because that was the only reason upon which everyone in the Bush administration agreed. He did not even mention promoting democracy. In fact he gave four reasons, and only the third one--freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam--comes close to promoting democracy. About that third reason, Wolfowitless said, "The third one by itself, as I think I said earlier, is a reason to help the Iraqis but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale we did it." Here was my response:

Wait a minute...Wasn't this war called "Operation Iraqi Freedom?" So the Bush Administration named this war for something that was not worth risking American lives? Now I'm really confused. Well, there is one thing about which I am not confused. Once no WMD were found, and once it became impossible to ignore the lack of evidence of Iraqi ties to 9-11 or Al Qaeda, the Bush administration decided to make this war all about liberating the Iraqi people. This is a prime example of how the Bush administration has been dishonest. As the other reasons for going to war were exposed as incorrect, these "leaders" increasingly claimed that the war was justified for a reason that they felt was never worth risking American lives.

Later, I concluded that spreading democracy probably was the real reason for the war. As I said on May 15, 2005,

I remember hearing a news report about three weeks before the war in which someone said that the people calling the shots (that means the Department of Defense) truly believed that getting rid of Saddam via force would cause democracy to spread throughout the Middle East. My reaction was that these people were truly delusional. I mean around the bend, over the edge in-freaking-sane. I simply did not believe that that could possibly be the reason for going to war.

I still can't believe it. However, Goldberg appears to be a true believer. And I think he just bought a ticket to out where the buses don't run. Goldberg says he believes that "promoting a liberal society in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world" will further American interests, and thus the Iraq war was not really a mistake after all.

Take the blue pill, Jonah. [There is an explanation of this line in the comments.]

Goldberg is trying to apply the Burning Bush doctrine (spreading democracy, freedom on the march, etc.) as a justification for the Iraq war and the reason we cannot leave (and the reason why the "antiwar crowd" is wrong). That doctrine was fully put forth in Bush's second inaugural address on January 20, 2005. I have written extensively about this doctrine, beginning with America's new calling. That post contains explanations about how the doctrine is logistically unrealistic and impractical, will cause us problems in relations with countries such as Russia and China, sets us up to be big time hypocrites, sets impossibly high standards, and will produce results that are contrary to our interests (which is precisely what has happened in Palestine, Lebanon, and for that matter Iraq).

Now I know what some of you are thinking: 1) the Burning Bush doctrine was not announced until 2005, meaning my criticisms of the doctrine do not apply to knowing beforehand that the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) those criticisms are general in nature and do not apply to Iraq. Well, as shown above, Bush was citing the spread of democracy as the reason for the war as it was beginning. Also, the general criticisms of the Burning Bush doctrine were just as valid before the war, and time has shown that the Iraq war has harmed the spread of democracy in the Middle East. This harm is discussed in Freedom is on the march...or is it? Also, the exercise of democracy in the Middle East has actually hurt American interests. One of the sections of America's new calling is entitled "The 'be careful what you ask for' problem," wherein I said "a true democracy could very well result in a government 'by the people and of the people' that is anti-American." We asked for democracy in the Middle East, and it resulted in anti-American groups coming to legitimate power--Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon (see The Burning Bush doctrine and the Palestinian election, Follow up on the Burning Bush doctrine and the Palestinian election, and Hamas--who knew? Well, the Bush administration should have known). Both of those results were predictable and foreseeable. Bush and his supporters--like Goldberg--instead thought that "democracy" would be some sort of magical formula which would automatically transform the Middle East into a pro-American haven.

This was a delusional vision from the outset, including before the Iraq war. And yet Goldberg claims that there was no way to know this before the war, meaning that we had "[im]perfect knowledge beforehand."

What a putz.

And now we are having to defend ground that we knew or should have known we should not have chosen in the first place. That is us in Iraq.

Up next: Goldberg's proposed solution.

Part 9 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Iraq as the central front in the war on terror

In his next paragraph, Goldberg does get something right, but then he gets something very wrong. Let's start with what he gets right:

Those who say that it's not the central front in the war on terror are in a worse state of denial than they think Bush is in. Of course it's the central front in the war on terror. That it has become so is a valid criticism of Bush...

(emphasis added). That is indeed a valid criticism of Bush, assuming, of course, that Iraq is indeed the central front in the war on terror. It was not the central front in the war on terror until after we invaded. Furthermore, as I and others more knowledgeable have said before, 1) Iraq became the best--and free--training ground terrorists could have hoped for after the fall of the Taliban in Afganistan, and 2) the Iraq war (which is still ongoing) is helping, not hurting, terrorists. So Goldberg makes an accurate assessment, but then he goes and says something stupid again, namely that Iraq's status as the central front in the war on terror is

also strong reason for seeing our Iraqi intervention through. If we pull out precipitously, jihadism will open a franchise in Iraq and gain steam around the world, and the U.S. will be weakened.

Here's some more news flashes, Skippy:

1. Jihadism has already opened a franchise in Iraq. How do you think Iraq became the central front in the war on terror?
2. Jihadism has gained steam around the world because of the Iraq war.
3. The U.S. has already been weakened.

Up next: The Burning Bush doctrine and more disregard for facts.

Part 8 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Once again, Goldberg defines the debate and relies on good intentions.

This is truly one of the goofiest paragraphs of Goldberg's column:

According to the goofy parameters of the current debate, I'm now supposed to call for withdrawing from Iraq. If it was a mistake to go in, we should get out, some argue. But this is unpersuasive. A doctor will warn that if you see a man stabbed in the chest, you shouldn't rush to pull the knife out. We are in Iraq for good reasons and for reasons that were well-intentioned but wrong. But we are there.

(emphasis added). I remind the reader that Goldberg is the one who has set the parameters of his debate. Once again, he is defining the parameters in inflexible extremes--something that will come back to bite him in the ass, as I will show in the last post of this series.

If we should get out, it is not because it was a mistake to go in. If we should get out, it will be because it is a mistake to stay. How about looking at that possibility? Seemingly, Goldberg won't even consider that. We should also look at what would be good results and then determine whether our continued presence is needed to achieve those results, and if so, how that presence should be structured and executed. We should also look at possible negative consequences to pulling out now. In other words, this "debate" is not limited only to stay or completely get out, and yet that is how Goldberg defines it.

And just what is Goldberg trying to say with his "man stabbed in the chest" analogy? Is he saying that by going to war we put a knife in Iraq and leaving it in is the way to keep Iraq alive? I keep having this vision of the Comic Book Guy from "The Simpsons" saying "Worst analogy ever."

And then with the good intentions again. So I guess Goldberg would consider it O.K. if one intended to do a good deed for someone while plunging a blade into that person's chest. And then I guess Goldberg would consider it helpful to then twist the knife.

Up next: Iraq as the central front in the war on terror.

Part 7 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Involvement of two of Iraq's neighbors

This topic is not necessarily directly related to a civil war in Iraq, and thus it is perhaps outside the scope of Goldbrg's editorial, but it is one that nonetheless deals with matters that were known before the war showing that post-war Iraq was going to be a mess.

While this topic could have been included in the preceding section, it addresses more than just the potential for civil war; thus I am devoting a separting section to it. Some of the facts known before the war also showed the strong possibility of two of Iraq's neighbors becoming involved in ways that, to put it mildly, would not be helpful.

• Turkey
  

Turkish interests and involvement in north Iraq are discussed in greater detail in Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong (heading "Breakdown 4: Reasonably stable? Yeah, right."). Turkey was--and still is--very much concerned about the Kurds and the ethnic Turkomans in north Iraq. Turkomans are a Turkic ethnic group, which gives Turkey some interest in north Iraq. Melik Kayan, a former senior editor at Forbes and a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal, warned of this issue in a January 5, 2003 editorial:

The Iraqi Turkomans complain that their share of the population is being deliberately underrepresented. They and their neighbors the Christian Assyrians are angry that their urban districts--still under Saddam Hussein's control--are being pre-emptively gerrymandered by the Kurdish factions to carve out a greater Iraqi Kurdistan in a future grab for oil terrain.

It bodes ill for the region's stability that virtually no one outside of Turkey is conscious of the plight of the Turkomans. They, like the Bosnians, are kith and kin to the Turks. They claim to number some 12% of Iraq's total population and the current Iraqi opposition alliance concedes them only 6% of representation.

The Turkomans might be driven to take up arms to protect their rights once the enforced Saddam umbrella disappears. The internal strife could draw in the Turkish military. The last time the Turks waited for international intervention to protect their cousins--the Bosnians--what they witnessed instead was unrelieved slaughter.

Thus, there were known facts about a possible source of ethnic strife in post-war Iraq that would also involve Turkey.

However, the bigger issue for Turkey was the Kurds and their drive for autonomy. Turkey has a sizeable Kurdish minority, and any kind of autonomous Kurdish government in Iraq would cause concerns for the Turks that the Kurds in Turkey would want the same thing.

Indeed, there has been a Kurdish group in Turkey fighting for that cause. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is a

an armed militant group, whose stated aim is to create an independent Kurdish state in a territory (sometimes referred to as Kurdistan) that consists of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. Its ideological foundation is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. It is an ethnic secessionist organisation that uses force and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation internationally by a number of states and organisations, including the USA and the EU, and Turkey blames it for the death of more than 30,000 people.

Note that the PKK operated in northeastern Iraq. That is part of the reason why Turkey was very interested in that area. The Turkish government was engaged in open military conflict with the PKK from 1984-1999. Violence decreased after that, and a government-declared state of emergency based on PKK activities was lifted in late 2002. However, according to the link above, fighting never completely stopped and began to increase again in 2004.

Even while the fighting in Turkey decreased greatly, it increased in north Iraq. The PKK established a presence in Iraq, and the Turks followed by making raids in Iraq. There were also allegations that the PUK was aiding the PKK, but the PUK subsequently sought to drive the PKK out and ended up fighting the PKK.

The situation on the ground between the Turks and Kurds--be that Turkish or Iraqi--was described on March 5, 2003, by General Tommy Franks:"[A]ll recognize that there have been frictions between the Kurds and the Turks up in northern Iraq, we certain believe that that is a factor...We're aware of history, and so we'll be working in order to mute whatever problem may arise." Based on his experience in Operation Provide Comfort, a senior U.S. commander said just prior to the war "If you put Turkish troops on the ground, they will get in a fight with the Kurds. The Kurds have had their own world down there, and they want to keep it, and the Turkish tendency is to solve their own problems with force."

I guess that for Goldberg, none of this qualifies as anything that sould have caused any concern.

• Iran

Now this one is the biggie. I will try to be semi-brief.

All of the matters stated in this paragraph, whether put in present or past tense, existed prior to the war. To understand the Iran factor, we have to go back to the Sunni-Shia factor. I think it is fair to say that there is tremendous enmity between the Sunnis and the Shia. That has been the case since the death of Mohammed. Iran's population is 90% Shia, and Iran has the largest Shia population of any country in the world. Also, Iran is the only country in the world wherein the official state religion is Shiism, and it is the only country in the world with a Shia government. Keep in mind that approximately 65% of Iraq's population is Shia, and 30% is Sunni. Also, remember that the Sunni minority dominated Iraq and persecuted the Shia under Saddam. Indeed, some of the top Iraqi Shia religious leaders were exiled to Iran. Now add into the mix the longstanding bad blood between Iraq and Iran. After all, they fought a brutal war for eight years.

Before our Iraq war, what you had was a country, Iran, with motive to meddle in Iraq once Saddam was gone. If Iraq came to be contolled by Iran, or even if Iraq simply became Iran's ally, Iran would expand its power base. Iran then would control or influence as much oil and gas reserves as Saudi Arabia. Iran would also have a geographical buffer between it and the the Sunni-dominated Arab world. I have mentioned this before, but it should be restated. Iran is not an Arab country. It is Persian, and through history the Arabs and Persians have not been the best of friends. Consequently, having a buffer between Iran and the Arab Middle East is highly desireable to Iran. Also, what better way to exact revenge on your country's most hated enemy--Saddam--than basically taking over his country?

Before the Iraq war, what you had was a long repressed majority in Iraq, the Shia, with motive to take control of Iraq and suppress and exact revenge on the Sunni minority. The Iraqi Shia were naturally going to turn to Iran, the lone Shia government in the world and their next door neighbor, for assistance and guidance.

Simply put, there was never any way that Iran was not going to "meddle," and there was never any way the Iraqi Shia were not going to seek and accept help from Iran.

This situation was then accelerated and legitimized by the democratic elections in Iraq. Did anyone think that there was any possible micron of a chance that the Shia would not win a democratic election? Gee...the Shia outnumbered the Sunnis by more than 2-1, so, no, there was never any chance the Shia would not win an election, meaning that there were facts known before the war that should have made the White House anticipate that with the establishment of democracy (more on that later) would come an increased chance for Iran to influence affairs in Iraq. It is true that no one Shia party won a majority of the seats in government, but overall, the Shia won a majority. After that, Iran had a more conventional means of influencing matters in Iraq. After all, now that there had been an election by the Iraqi people, how could America tell the parties elected by Iraqis that they could not deal with Iran?

Up next: Back to the words of Jonah Goldberg as he again tries to limit the debate and rely on good intentions.

Part 6 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

The real intelligence (as in ability to think and reason) failure, or what was known about what Iraq was and likely would become

Next Goldberg makes another lame ass argument:

Washington's more important intelligence failure lay in underestimating what would be required to rebuild and restore post-Hussein Iraq. The White House did not anticipate a low-intensity civil war in Iraq, never planned for it and would not have deemed it in the U.S. interest to pay this high a price in prestige, treasure and, of course, lives.

Only someone who is a moron or delusional would not have foreseen what a mess Iraq would become after Saddam was gone. In that sense, I guess Goldberg is correct is saying that if indeed the Bush administration "did not anticipate" the things he mentions, it was a failure of intelligence, but not "intelligence" in the sense of "information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area." We had plenty of information. Let's examine some of the factors known before the war that should have clued in all but the dullest of brains.

• Overview

Back in the early days of Cosmic Wheel, I wrote a post entitled Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong. I will begin this overview by quoting a certain report cited in that post.

"Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath," an October 1, 2002, report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), provided a good general statement of what was known before the war about how post-war Iraq might be.

Indeed, many tensions between opposition groups derive from deeper fault-lines that pre-date Saddam Hussein and are likely to survive him. These divides are principally along religious, ethnic and tribal lines, though class and ideology should not be neglected.

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After decades of power imbalance and discrimination, Shiites may seek to settle scores with Sunnis. Ethnic inequities and unresolved political and economic issues could ignite tensions and provoke violence between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans.

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Violent conflict between Arabs and Kurds has been a feature of Iraqi politics since the country’s formation as a British mandate in the early 1920s when hopes for an independent Kurdish state were dashed by post-Ottoman-era manoeuvring and double-crosses by the colonial powers.

(emphasis added). Note the date of the ICG report--October 1, 2002. Yet in spite of that date, Goldberg would have us believe that we knew nothing before the war about the possibility of a civil war of any kind.

For anyone thinking that the ICG must be some sort of crazy leftist group, perhaps this excerpt from a December 11, 2002, artice from the Wall Street Journal will be more credible:

If a U.S.-led force succeeds in ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the victors would inherit a traumatized society full of festering conflicts that didn't start with him and wouldn't suddenly fade with his departure. That raises some big questions: How can a stable new order take hold in Iraq? How can the nation avoid being dismembered by its neighbors or breaking up in spasms of violence like the former Yugoslavia?

[The link I had for the article is no longer any good. The only place I can find the complete article now is the WSJ archive. The title of the article is "Ethnic, Religious, Political Rifts Test U.S. Hopes for Stable Iraq," and the reporters are Hugh Pope and David S. Cloud.]

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said this in early March, 2003:

The possibility of ethnic fighting, with Turkish and Iranian complications, cannot be dismissed. There are major tribal and clan fault lines. There are serious Arab-Kurd-Turcoman-Assyrian fault lines. There are Sunni vs. Shi'ite fault lines, and deep fault lines within the Kurdish and Shi'ite populations plus problems like the Iraq-armed Iranian MEK and Iranian-armed Iraqi Badr Brigades. There are cities, agricultural area, and oil to fight over and there are real questions about revenge killings.

Should you think that Cordesman must be another one of those freedom-haters, check out his bio. Also in March 2003 Cordesman identified in a different paper for CSIS some other factors which would make post-war Iraq problematical.

In the case of Iraq, the U.S. and Britain are dealing with a highly nationalistic society with little tolerance of any vestiges of colonialism, but with deep divisions, many reasons for internal feuds and revenges, and tensions with its neighbors that will not disappear with Saddam Hussein.

It is a reality that unless the U.S. and Britain approach any victory as partners in allowing Iraqis to shape their own destiny, they are likely to quickly be seen as enemies. Even the best intended effort can make enemies out of some factions, and the Arab world and the rest of the world will set very demanding standards.

(emphasis added). Aside from pointing out the problem with good intentions, Cordesman noted that the historic nationalistic feelings of Iraqis would cause them to reject outside control.

And how about some pre-war views from Iraqis? Faleh A. Jabar, an Iraqi sociologist who was living in London before the war, was quoted in a March 3, 2003, article as saying "There will be wild jubilation" if Saddam is overthrown, "but it could quickly turn into wild opposition." On February 20, 2003, The Guardian published an editorial by Kamil Mahdi, who at the time was an Iraqi political exile and a lecturer in Middle East economics at the University of Exeter in England. In his editorial he said, "[U.S.] policies are rejected by most Iraqis and others in the region. Indeed, the main historical opposition to the Ba'ath regime--including various strands of the left, the Arab nationalist parties, the Communist party, the Islamic Da'wa party, the Islamic party (the Muslim Brotherhood) and others--has rejected war and U.S. patronage over Iraqi politics. The prevalent Iraqi opinion is that a U.S. attack on Iraq would be a disaster, not a liberation[.]" Jabar and Mahdi were not in or close to Iraq at the time, but a leader of another Iraqi group was in the area, and he held a rather prominent position. On February 25, 2003, MSNBC had a report entitled "Stark Warning for U.S. Military," which featured Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of Iraq's Shiite exile community and heads the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, by some accounts the most significant of the Iraqi opposition groups. Hamkim's warning included the following:

1. A U.S. military presence in post-war Iraq would not be welcome.
2. A post-Saddam U.S. military presence will offend "national sensitivities."
3. Even a temporary U.S. military government would undermine efforts to transition Iraq to a truly elected government.
4. "Muslim countries will refuse any foreign administration of Iraq. This could start a religious war in Iraq and neighboring countries."
5. Even the appearance of a U.S. occupation of Iraq would destabilize Iraq and the region. "This will open the door to violence and terrorism against the United States. This extremism will be very dangerous to Iraq and its neighbors."

[I have been unable to find a working link for this MSNBC story.] Boy, I sure am glad that nothing Hakim said turned out to be true, especially that last thing. But seriously, note that these Iraqis supported Cordesman's warnings about nationalistic feelings. Moreover, what this paragraph shows is that a common opinion within much of the Iraqi opposition was that a strong U.S. occupation would not be “welcomed” by Iraqis.

One of the points I want to make with this post is that there never were any good answers to the questions asked in the above excerpt from the WSJ, but for now I will emphasize that Iraqis and even an ultra-right wing publication like the WSJ raised facts before the war that should have caused the Bush administration to have a good idea of what Iraq could become.

• Sectarian strife and basic human nature
  

Sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shia is a huge problem in Iraq. It has been a part of the Islamic world for about the last 1350 years. An excerpt from the ICG report referenced above provides an explanation that, while adequate for the purposes of this post, does not begin to describe the depth and complexity of the conflict:

There is little doubt that a religious schism exists and dates back to the earliest days of Islam when what is now Iraq served as a battle ground for many of the seminal events that have defined the Sunni-Shiite division. The ascendancy of Sunnis during the Ottoman period was perpetuated in modern Iraq, and Sunni political figures and officers have held a disproportionate share of power since independence.

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During the 1990s, the rift between Sunnis and Shiites deepened, and overall religious tensions intensified.

Thus, it was well known before the war that there was a very good chance that there would be violence between the Sunnis and Shia once Saddam was overthrown.

Saddam is Sunni, and the ruling Ba'ath party was overwhelmingly Sunni. Indeed, Sunnis ruled and dominated Iraq and had done so for many years. In so doing, the Shia were persecuted and abused. Most people would understand that any group who had been so persecuted would, once the persecutors were removed from power, seek retribution against the persecutors. Most people would understand the chances of this happening would be even greater if the persecutors were a minority of the population. However, the members of the Bush administration were and are not most people. The December 10, 2002, WSJ article provided an explanation of the facts on the ground prior to the war:

The U.S.-led coalition would encounter some of its toughest challenges in the center of Iraq -- in Baghdad and across the heartland occupied by the minority Sunni Muslim population. There the Sunni elite would find themselves threatened as they haven't been since the British took the region away from the Ottoman Turks after World War I. Although Sunni Muslims make up no more than 18% of Iraq's population, they have dominated the country's affairs for centuries. From their ranks have come not only Mr. Hussein but also a long line of sheiks, monarchs and strongmen stretching back through British rule to the administrations of the Ottoman Turks. Sunnis play crucial roles in operating the country day to day, from holding key positions in its military to overseeing public services such as water and health care.

And yet Goldberg asserts we did not have knowledge of any facts prior to the war that could have led us to anticipate problems.

• Ethnic strife

Indeed, I wrote Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong to show that Wolfowitless was wrong in claiming that there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq. Before the war, there certainly was evidence of ethnic strife and the great potential for it in a post-Saddam Iraq. The WSJ article focused on southern Iraq:

A ground invasion of Iraq probably would include a force pushing northward from the Kuwaiti desert through the vast plains and occasional marshes of southern Iraq to Baghdad. The invading forces would pass through one of the country's most complex and brutalized regions, known for its volatile mix of tribal and ethnic allegiances.

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Perhaps the biggest concern in the south would be heading off the sort of brutal revenge-seeking that marked the 1991 uprising. In the course of the rebellion, the local populace viciously attacked loyalists to the regime. While residents of the south don't possess heavy weapons, Mr. Hussein's regime has armed them with plenty of guns to fight the U.S. If central control is smashed by U.S. bombing, in remote places such as this, the weapons could be turned on fellow Iraqis to settle old scores or protect territory.

*******

"I am sure there's going to be revenge-taking," says Dr. Azzam al-Wash, an Iraqi exile who maintains ties to southern Shiites. "The problem for the U.S. will be how to establish law and order to prevent this cycle from becoming civil war."

(emphasis added). In north Iraq, Saddam embarked on a program of "Arabization" which consisted of forcing Kurds and Turkmen from their homes and moving Arabs in and forcing non-Arabs to change their names to Arab names. This was definitely ethnic in nature. You can read more about this program in the ICG report and this report from the State Department. Maybe I am wrong, but I think most people who were victims of this policy would be plenty angry and eager for retribution once Saddam was gone. And guess what? That is exactly what happened.

• Tribal conflict

As shown generally in the Overview above, tribal allegiances were and are very strong in Iraq. As the December 11, 2202, WSJ article put it,

Another potential powder keg: As civil order unravels, many Iraqis are likely to retreat into the protection of tribal clans. These play a major role in Iraqi society, and their intensely protective tribal codes could bring quick violent retribution for threats or injury to their members.

The October 1, 2002, ICG report explianed that "Tribal identities have largely survived modernisation and the growing role of the central state and remain important social and political units in Iraq," and "The tribal ethos...currently is the principal dispenser of people’s identity, of regulation, and of authority." Why does this matter? Well, among other reasons, the Iraqi tribal system was "replete with shifts in allegiances, betrayals, conditional alliances and, above all, men in arms[.]" So, before the war we knew there was a system that had long existed in Iraq which presented all kinds of potential for strife.

• Kurdish conflict

After the first Gulf War, no-fly zones were established in south and north Iraq. In the north, this enable the Kurds to basically establish an autonomous zone in which they were basically the government. Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong (heading "Breakdown 4: Reasonably stable? Yeah, right.") disucusses the autonomous zone and the Kurdish activity therein. What follows is a synopsis. For more details-and links to sources--follow the link in the previous sentence.

During this time, two major Kurdish parties emerged, the KDP and PUK. They ended up at war with each other. There was a power sharing agreement in which the two parties would each have 50% of the government, but that agreement fell apart within two years, resulting in a civil war, and the autonomous zone was divided in two, with KDP and PUK each controlling one half. The leaders of the parties met in Washington in September 1998 and reached an agreement to merge their administrations, but little progress was made over the next two years. After 2000 there were positive steps taken, but the hostilities between the two parties had not been eliminated. That meant that before the war there was evidence--which was known--that there could be conflict among Kurds.

Even as there was progress toward some unity among the KDP and PUK, another potential problem was emerging, as described in a December 2002 article from the Kurdistan Observer.

Free and fair local elections, under international observation, were conducted in dozens of municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK, particularly in their dealings with the Bush administration and U.S. Congress, as well as with states in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal relationship with the central government under a new constitutional arrangement.

(emphasis added). See, the Kurds--an ethnic group without their own homeland--had had a taste of independence and autonomy, and they did not want to lose that if Saddam was gone. Such feeling is completely undrestandable, and it was known before the war, and it was an indication that achieving real and lasting unity throughout all of Iraq was going to be a challenge. The Kurds' desire for continued autonomy also had a very practical basis. The north part of Iraq, the one where the Kurds were and are located, has vast oil reserves. The Kurds wanted to control those reserves rather than have a central government keep all the money from oil production. This, too, was known before the war.

There were other known potential problems in the Kurdish areas, but I will discuss those in a separate post about the well-known-before-the-war problems with two of Iraq's neighbor's, Turkey and Iran.

• Iraq's borders

I wrote about this topic on May 10, 2005. I will repeat much of that analysis here, only this time I will not be as accomodating to the wingers.

As I said almost a year and a half ago, Iraq is approximately the size of California. Even Texans have to admit that is a large area. Maybe I'm crazy, but it seems to me that if you invade a country with that much area, in order to secure the country--which is to say, prevent or minimize things like insurgencies--you need to control more than just a few cities. In particular, securing the borders would seem to be rather important in order to, oh I don't know, keep out people and supplies that would aid the insurgents.

Now for some data--otherwise known as "facts." Iraq's total border is approximately 2251 miles long (3631 km x .62). That's a lot of border. Perhaps there was no great need to secure all of that border. Two of Iraq's neighbors are Jordan and Kuwait, solid U.S. allies. Assuming no need to control those borders, the total is reduced by approximately 262 miles (150 for Kuwait and 112 for Jordan). Iraq is bordered on the north by Turkey, another U.S. ally. One might assume that the total could be reduced by another 205 miles, but probably not due to the hostility between the Turks and the Kurds, which will be discussed in a separate post (and is discussed in Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong and Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong). That leaves 1989 miles of border to secure. Iraq's largest neighbor to the west is Saudi Arabia, another U.S. ally, with a border of 505 miles. However, given that 1) bin Laden is Saudi, 2) most Saudis were against the war, and 3) Saudi Arabia is the home of Wahabbism, a radical form of Islam that is strongly anti-U.S., and many other factors, I will not say there was no need to secure the border with Saudi Arabia. And there will be no further subtractions, for the remaining neighbors are Iran and Syria. 1989 miles is a significant distance, particulary considering that 904 of those miles belong to a definite non-friendly (Iran) and the remaining 375 miles (605 km x .62) belong to the country from which we have always claimed there is a flow of foreign fighters (Syria).

Indeed, Syria was long identified as a problem in the context of Iraq. Prior to the war there were two Arab countries ruled by the Ba'ath party. Iraq was one, and after the war the remaining one was Syria. There were differences between the party structures, but nonetheless, there were political ties between the two countries prior to the war. Also, on April 13, 2003, the BBC quoted then Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying the following:

Syria has been a concern for a long period of time. We have designated Syria for years as a state that sponsors terrorism, and we have discussed this with the Syrians on many occasions. We are concerned that materials have flowed through Syria to the Iraqi regime over the years.

In other words, we knew that prior to the war, Saddam has received materials via the Syrian border. Around the same time, Rumskull had much more to say. He discussed Syria in a press briefing on April 11, 2003 and on "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" on April 13, 2003. Each time he spoke of how weapons, supplies, and people had been coming into Iraq through Syria. Granted, Rumskull was speaking of events after the war started, but the point here is that the Bush administration knew of facts before the war showing that the Syrian border would be a problem, and that problem arose immediately. Yet nothing was done about this extremely foreseeable occurrence--which, by the way aided the insurgency.

We knew before the war that there would be a need to secure Iraq's borders in order to secure the country and help prevent or defeat any insurgency, and yet...well, the title of my May 10, 2005, post pretty much says it all: In Iraq, an offensive to secure the border...two years after the insurgency began.

• Summary

Actually, I'm not sure how to neatly summarize the foregoing other than to say there was nothing neat about Iraq before the war, and there was a veritable plethora of known facts that should have caused "the White House to anticipate[] a low-intensity civil war in Iraq" at the very least AND to plan for it. For him to even imply otherwise is complete and utter bullshit.

Also, keep in mind that this post has not presented a conclusive list of facts known before the war which showed that a civil war was likely and that post-war Iraq in general would be a mess.

Another thing to keep in mind that while any one of the factors discussed above could have caused major problems in post-war Iraq, the truth is that all of them were present before the war, and every one of them was present after the war.

Of course, we all know that the White House did not plan for any of the possibilities presented before the war, nor did the White House plan for much of anything for post-war Iraq, but that is another story. If you want to know more about that, I have three suggestions:

1. Go to the Cosmic Wheel Index, main heading "Iraq," subheading "Planning for the Post-war period."
2. Read The Assassins Gate: America in Iraq by George Packer.
3. Read Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas Ricks.

Up next: The pre-war interests of Turkey and Iran.

Part 5 of a retrospective series on why 1)the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Goldberg says WMD are not important. Goldberg is wrong.

Goldberg's next two sentences are real doozies:

The failure to find weapons of mass destruction is a side issue. The WMD fiasco was a global intelligence failure, but calling Saddam Hussein's bluff after 9/11 was the right thing to do.

Side issue, my ass. As detailed in Iraq and WMD: Quick, go back and check the spider hole! Iraq's WMD, the threat they presented to the U.S., and the need to disarm Saddam were given by the Bush administration as the reasons for going to war. Consequently, the failure to find WMD is no mere side issue. It is at the very core of why the war was a mistake.

And the claim that it was all due to a "global intelligence failure" is bullshit. By claiming otherwise, Goldberg is himself engaging in "cowardly buck-passing." It has been proven that there were no WMD or even viable WMD programs. Moreover, that was pretty much known before the war. Want proof? Go the Cosmic Wheel Index. Go the the main heading of "Iraq," then the subheading of "WMD, intel related thereto." Read the proof for yourself. Follow the links and you will see that our own intelligence largely disproved the claims of WMD. Our own intelligence showed that the primary reason given for the war was crap. Moreover, the Bush administration manipulated the NIE and what was presented to Congress so that much of that intelligence was not disclosed.

But let's move on to Goldberg's assertion about calling Saddam's bluff. News flash--that bluff was in the process of being called through the U.N. inspections. Hans Blix kept saying there was no evidence of WMD. Had the inspections continued, in all likelihood what was proved by David Kay after the war would have been established by Blix. Yet the U.N. inspections were halted because we went ahead and started the war. Let me put this another way. There was a way to "call Saddam's bluff" other than the war, and that way was to continue the inspections.

It was known before the war that U.S. intelligence indicated there were no WMD. It was known before the war that the U.N inspections were showing that WMD did not exist. I would thus maintain that, contrary to Goldberg's lames ass assertions, Bush went to war precisely because of what was known.

Up next: Facts known before the war showing that post-war Iraq was going to be a mess.

Part 4 of a retrospective series on why 1)the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

It was a mistake...but it wasn't really.

Next Goldberg foists what he wants everyone to believe is a mea culpa:

But that's no excuse. Truth is truth. And the Iraq war was a mistake by the most obvious criteria: If we had known then what we know now, we would never have gone to war with Iraq in 2003. I do think that Congress (including Democrats Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Jay Rockefeller and John Murtha) was right to vote for the war given what was known — or what was believed to have been known — in 2003.

(emphasis added). Goldberg is saying that the only reason the war was a bad idea is that we did not know it was a bad idea at the time. That is one of the dumbest arguments I have ever heard. I will agee with him that truth is truth, and the truth is that we knew plenty in 2003 that established that going to war was a stupendously bad idea. I will present a partial list of things we knew before the war, but before that there is one other matter to address.

Goldberg actually gets one thing right.

Goldberg says that "the claims from Democrats who voted for the war that they were lied to strikes me as nothing more than cowardly buck-passing." I almost entirely agree with him on this point. Congress and the public were lied to, but the Democrats who voted for the war 1) knew that; 2) should have known that; or 3) knew or should have known there were many other reasons to vote against the Iraq War Resolution. Instead, they were too cowardly to make a stand, or they were too cowardly to want to risk their electoral chances (Kerry and Edwards come to mind).

Up next: Matters that were known before the war, beginning with WMD.

Part 3 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

I guess it's not just about Clinton. It's also about those of us who "hate" America.

Right after he mentions Clinton, Goldberg reveals that he knows what we in the

"antiwar crowd" really think: In other words, their objection isn't to war per se. It's to wars that advance U.S. interests (or, allegedly, President Bush's or Israel's or ExxonMobil's interests).

In other words, we in the antiwar crowd hate America. Quite to the contrary, many in the antiwar crowd objected to this fiasco precisely because we felt from the start that it would harm America's interests, and guess what? We were right. America's standing in the world and our ability to influence events have been diminished because of the Iraq war and everything connected with it.

And I am so sick and tired of some in the "pro-war faction" claiming in essence that anyone opposing the war hates our troops, hates our freedom, hates our way of life, etc.

Goldberg's "distaste" is unfounded.

Goldberg next offers a truly ridiculous reason for not previously admitting that the Iraq war was a mistake:

I must confess that one of the things that made me reluctant to conclude that the Iraq war was a mistake was my general distaste for the shabbiness of the arguments on the antiwar side.

Goldberg's "distaste" shows what a spineless, arrogant chickenshit he is.

Apparently, Goldberg never thought that reviewing the arguments for the war to see if they made sense or were supported by the facts should be part of deciding whether the war was a mistake. Instead, in his little neocon world, almost the only criteria needed for determining if something was a mistake are the arguments of others (another criterion is, of course, good intention). In other words, he never has to support, much less prove, his own arguments. That might work in a high school debate tournament, but when we are talking about going to actual war, when we are talking about killing people and having our people killed, when we are talking risking our vital national interests now and in the future, Goldberg's reasoning is not just stupid--it's reckless and appalling.

Also, notice that he does not list any of those "shabby" arguments. One is left to assume that in his mind any and all arguments against the war were and are shabby; therefore, he does not have to address any of them. Now there's some solid sophistry. Since Goldberg was unwilling to do so, I will list a few of the arguments raised by us anti-U.S.-interests freedom-hating Clinton lovers:

1. There were no WMD. As I have written extensively on this blog, there was of plenty of evidence showing this before the war. This, of course, was conclusively established after the war, meaning that all the pre-war evidence was correct.
2. The UN inspections program was in the process of proving there were no WMD.
3. As long as the UN inspections were ongoing, Saddam was not going to be able to use any weapons he had.
   
4. There was no meaningful link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. There was evidence of this before the war, and, more to the point, there was almost no evidence that there was such a link. Of course, this is another issue which has been proven since the "end" of major combat operations.
   
5. Post-war Iraq was going to be a complete mess given the existing circumstances (centuries of Sunni-Shia discord, presence of Iran and Turkey, Kurdish reluctance to give up autonomy, conflicts among the Kurds, infrastructure, large borders that would need security, and on and on).
6. There was no true international coalition.
7. Invading Iraq would harm our efforts in Afghanistan (which also turned out to be true).
   

None of those are shabby now, and they were not shabby before the war. And some of them will be discussed in more detail in subsequent parts of this series.

Up next: Goldberg's lame mea culpa and one thing he actually gets right.

Part 2 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Goldberg's framing of the debate is self-serving and false.

Anyhoo, after Goldberg says "The Iraq war was a mistake," he says he doesn't care if the "antiwar crowd" thinks this is too little too late. And then he states the following:

In the dumbed-down debate we're having, there are only two sides: Pro-war and antiwar. This is silly.

Yes, it is silly, but Goldberg is the one making it silly, using part of the Bush SOP, namely define any issue as only involving two extremes. Goldberg's "dumbed-down" debate is in tone the same thing as "Either you're with us or against us" and "either you are for the Iraq war or you support the terrorists." This tactic was employed by Bush and the Republicans right from the start, and they are continuing to use it today. This tactic is such f-ing bullshit, and Goldberg uses it more than once.

Once again, it's all about Clinton.

After Goldberg's self-serving definition of the debate, he says this:

First, very few folks who favored the Iraq invasion are abstractly pro-war. Second, the antiwar types aren't really pacifists. They favor military intervention when it comes to stopping genocide in Darfur or starvation in Somalia or doing whatever that was President Clinton did in Haiti.

(emphasis added). Here is yet another example of the winger obsession with Clinton. It is a reflex action for them--anytime they are wrong, the first thing they do is blame Clinton. Hey, it just happened with the Foley Follies and after North Korea's nuclear test. And now here is Goldberg--trying to look like he is admitting a mistake and then implying that going to Iraq was better than "whatever that was that President Clinton did in Haiti."

What a pathetic hack.

Up next: Goldberg incorrectly asserts the views of the "antiwar crowd" and declares (but does not substantiate) his distaste for the antiwar arguments.

A retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

If I have not said it on this blog, I know I have said it somewhere else on the wide world interweb...There are a few right wing pundits that I will actually pay attention to. In listing those people previously, I included Jonah Goldberg.

He is now off that list (and I am sure he is oh so concerned about that) because last Thursday, I read his editorial about Iraq in the L.A. Times. Goldberg's column is a prime example of the sort of revisionist history, arrogance, and sophistry that supporters of the Iraq war and the Bush administration have displayed since 2002. It is a big, steaming pile of crap.

I began writing a response to his editorial when I realized I could use it as a basis for writing something I have been contemplating for some time. One of Goldberg's main points is that "If we had known then what we know now, we would not have gone to war." As I have tried to point out in numerous posts, we knew plenty before the war that showed that going to war was a really stupid choice. However, I have wanted to write something which would tie together my earlier efforts in a semi-direct and accessible way. This series of posts is an attempt to do just that. I was going to put everything in one post, but it was way too long--even by my standards. Thus, I will publish a series of posts.

Even though I will address some matters not discussed in Goldberg's column, the framework for this series is a direct response to Goldberg. There is so much bullshit in the editorial that organizing a response is problematical. Consequently, I am just going to respond to matters as they appear in the column. I will be linking to and reproducing liberally ;-) from my previous writing.

Before I start tearing apart Goldberg's column, I will say it proves something I said recently about Republicans. In one of my comments to an earlier post, I said that Democrats were too cowardly to make a stand on many issues and that Republicans were too cowardly to admit mistakes. Goldberg's editorial proves my point quite nicely.

With all that in mind, I will finish this first post in the series by analyzing the editorial's title and summary, and that should provide an overview of what will follow.

The fun starts with the title and summary.

The title of Goldberg's folderol is "Iraq Was a Worthy Mistake," and his summary is "We know now that invading Iraq was the wrong decision, but that doesn't vindicate the antiwar crowd."

As shown in the rest of his column, Golderg is admitting a mistake while saying he and those who supported the war are also right.

Contrary to Goldberg's assertion, once it is established that the war was a mistake, the "antiwar crowd" has been vindicated. Goldberg is basically saying "we did the wrong thing, but since we did it for the right reasons, you antiwar people are still wrong." Perhaps Goldberg has never heard the saying "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." By the way, one website says "This proverbial idiom probably derives from a similar statement by St. Bernard of Clairvaux about 1150, L'enfer est plein de bonnes volontés ou désirs ("Hell is full of good intentions or wishes"), and has been repeated ever since." In a bit of synchronicity, Bernard was the driving force behind the First Crusade, the present-day war in Iraq was referred to by Bush as a "crusade," and now parts of Iraq are certainly rather hellish.

Up next: Goldberg attempts to narrow the debate to only extremes, and then--what a surprise--invokes the name of Bill Clinton to criticize those of us who oppose the Iraq war.

A good Monday night for football...

With 2:33 left in the game, the Giants are spanking the Cowboys 36-15, and other than watching Eli Manning throw some inexplicably errant passes, I have enjoyed this game.

The only down point was that t.o. scored. However, he dropped an easy pass that would have converted on a 4th down, after which the Giants marched down the field and scored a TD. Also, t.o. got drilled on some plays.

[With 2:03 to go, the Cowboys just scored, but they are still down 14 points.]

Cowboys fans got their wish in the second half as Tony Romo took over at QB, and then on his very first play threw an interception. He went on to throw two more interceptions on two really bad passes, the second of which was returned for a TD.

Other than Eli being less than sharp, the Giants' offense looked pretty good. Brandon Jacobs is a short-yardage beast.

Unfortunately, Lavar Arrington is now gone for the season with a ruptured achilles tendon. I just hope the defensive line keeps up its excellent play. If that happens, the Giants' D will be in good shape.

The Giants now lead the NFC East at 4-2.

Some conservatives say the GOP should lose in November

Overview

The October 2006 issue of Washington Monthly has a series of articles written by conservatives collectively entitled "Time for us to go; Conservatives on why the GOP should lose in 2006." While I am certainly glad to see actual conservatives feel this way, I still pose the question I asked on September 22, 2005, namely "What took you so long?"

The articles make for very interesting reading--for both Republicans and Democrats. There are some explanations as to why it is better for the country if one party does not control the government and some arguments as to why losing in 2006 will actually be a good thing for the GOP in 2008.

For now I will highlight three of the seven articles.

Joe Scarborough

Joe Scarborough (host of MSNBC's "Scarborough Country" and Congressman from 1994-2000) called his article "And we thought Clinton had no self-control." Scarborough details how under the Bush administration and the Republican-controlled Congress spending has gone out of control, whereas under Clinton and a divided Congress, spending was controlled and the budget was balanced. According to Scarborough, discretionary spending under the Clinton administration "grew at a modest rate of 3.4 percent," and then he compared the recent Republican performance:

But compare Clinton’s 3.4 percent growth rate to the spending orgy that has dominated Washington since Bush moved into town. With Republicans in charge of both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue, spending growth has averaged 10.4 percent per year. And the GOP’s reckless record goes well beyond runaway defense costs. The federal education bureaucracy has exploded by 101 percent since Republicans started running Congress. Spending in the Justice Department over the same period has shot up 131 percent, the Commerce Department 82 percent, the Department of Health and Human Services 81 percent, the State Department 80 percent, the Department of Transportation 65 percent, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 59 percent. Incredibly, the four bureaucracies once targeted for elimination by the GOP Congress—Commerce, Energy, Education, and Housing and Urban Development—have enjoyed spending increases of an average of 85 percent.

Scarborough is just reiterating a theme that has been expressed for quite some time now, namely that George W. Bush is no conservative, and the "conservative" Congress has been anything but conservative. Scarborough's focus is on spending, as establsihed early in the article through his reponse to being asked to write the article:

“Count me in!” was my chipper response. I also seem to remember muttering something about preferring an assortment of Bourbon Street hookers running the Southern Baptist Convention to having this lot of Republicans controlling America’s checkbook for the next two years.

I went a little further just over a year ago (see A possible reason why it took so long for some conservatives to become disenchanted with Bush).

Jeffrey Hart

"Idéologie has taken over," by Jeffrey Hart (senior editor at National Review and a speechwriter for Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan) laments how 1) under Bush our government has come to be controlled by ideologues, and 2) their ideology has no connection to true conservatism. As Hart explains,

Never before has a United States president consistently adhered to beliefs so disconnected from actuality.

Bush’s party has followed him on this course. It has approved Bush’s prescription-drug plan, an incomprehensible and ruinously expensive piece of legislation. It has steadfastly backed the war in Iraq, even though the notion of nation-building was once anathema to the GOP. And it has helped run up federal indebtedness to unprecedented heights, leaving China to finance the debt.

The issue of China financing our debt has been a concern for quite a while now [see Paying for Katrina (not to mention Rita)], but Hart points out the biggest problem with Bush's ideology, Iraq:

The more we learn about what happened behind the scenes in the months leading up to the war in Iraq, the more apparent it becomes that evidence was twisted to fit preconceived notions. Those who produced evidence undermining the case for war were ignored or even punished. It was zealotry at its most calamitous.

I think "zealotry" is a most accurate word to describe the Bush administration and the Congress that has gone along with him on almost everything. There is no true ideology other than zealotry, and Bush and those who have supported and enabled him are zealots for power (as I explained in detail on September 23, 2005).

Hart opines that "[I]deological government deserves rejection, whatever its party affiliation. This November, the Republicans stand to face a tsunami of rejection. They’ve earned it."

Bruce Fein

Bruce Fein is a constitutional and international lawyer with Bruce Fein & Associates and The Lichfield Group. He served as associate deputy attorney general under President Ronald Reagan and was a member of the ABA Task Force on presidential signing statements. His article has the title of "Restrain this White House." The theme of the article is that George W. Bush has consistently violated the Constitution, usurped legislative power, and the Republican-controlled Congress has allowed Bush to do this. Among Fein's examples are the following (and each is discussed in further detail in the article):

• "President Bush has flouted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) for five years by directing the National Security Agency to target American citizens on American soil for electronic surveillance on his say-so alone."
• "Republicans in Congress have bowed to the president’s scorn for the rule of law and craving for secret government."
• "Republicans in the House and Senate have been equally invertebrate in the face of presidential signing statements that usurp the power to legislate." [I totally agree with Fein on this issue, as seen here and here.]
  
• "In the aftermath of 9/11, Mr. Bush maintained that he could pluck any American citizen out of his home or off of the sidewalk and detain him indefinitely on the president’s finding that he was an illegal combatant. No court could second-guess the president. Bush soon employed such monarchial power to detain a few citizens and to frighten would-be dissenters, and Republicans in Congress either cheered or fiddled like Nero while the Constitution burned."

Fein concludes that "Republicans have shied from challenging Bush by placing party loyalty above institutional loyalty, contrary to the expectations of the Founding Fathers. They do so in the fear that embarrassing or discrediting a Republican president might reverberate to their political disadvantage in a reverse coat-tail effect."

Is it possible to be a zealot for power and spineless at the same time?

Something to keep in mind...

While all of the Washington Monthly articles make a case that there needs to be a GOP loss in November, remember that most of them also say that a government divided among the two parties is best. That means the writers are also making a case that a government controlled completely by the Democrats would not be good thing. Democrats would be well advised to consider the reasoning and facts stated in the articles and at the very least try to apply the lessons stated thereby.

Some thoughts on Kinky and the two-party system

NOTE: This post could be part of the ongoing discussion in the preceding post, but I decided to make it a separate post. And to those participating in the ongoing discussion, don't get too cocky after reading this. ;-)

Saturday afternoon before the SMU game (won by the 'Stangs, giving them a 4-3 record), I was having a political discussion with two of my good Mustang Band friends. One of them is a staunch Democrat who has been very active in Democratic political organizations. When the conversation turned to the governor's race, he said that Kinky really needs to drop out. I told him that I had been supporting Kinky from day one, and he said I might as well be voting for Perry (the Republican incumbent).

My dear Democratic friend (and I am being sincere, as we have known each other for 30 years and he is one of the finest persons I know) is laboring under a misconception, namely that everyone supporting Friedman would vote for the Democratic candidate, Chris Bell, if Kinky were not in the race. See, many of Kinky's supporters are Republicans, and if Kinky were not in the race, it is highly unlikely they would vote for Bell. So while my friend believes that a vote for Kinky is taking away a vote for Bell, I think that Kinky is taking votes away from Perry.

If Kinky wins--and there is a chance he will--it will be a historic event which will maybe--just maybe--shake up our screwed up two-party system.

Some questions for conservative Christians (and others)

The main question--and a bit of explanation

NOTE: I use the terms "conservative Christians," "religious conservatives," and "evangelicals." I do not mean to imply that these terms are completely interchangeable. However, from my experience, "evangelicals" tend to be "Conservative Christians." Some people might collectively refer to all of these groups as the "religious right," but I won't use that term here.

I began thinking about this post Monday morning after reading an article from that day's New York Times. And then I saw a report on MSNBC covering the same subject (scroll down to the report by Martin Savidge). Since then, I have seen other reports and articles that, while directly addressing other topics, are nonetheless related to the NYT article and MSNBC report. All of those reports and articles prompt me to ask one basic question of conservative Christians:

What is it going to take to for you to stop voting for Republicans?

Before proceeding, I need to explain my intentions. The NYT article and the October 9 MSNBC report discussed how some evangelicals are still going to absolutely vote Republican in light of the Foley Follies. My first reaction was to be stunned. However, I soon realized that I had also engaged in similar behavior. There has been discussion as recently as last Friday about evangelicals voting for Bush because they just could not bring themselves to vote for Kerry, and I have said several times that I never wanted to vote for Kerry, but there was no way whatsoever that I could vote for Bush. Thus, although the results were different, the sentiment and basis for our votes were the same. In other words, 1) I can on one level understand why evangelicals would continue to vote Republican, and 2) I cannot criticize them as much as I might want to because I have acted in a similar manner.

Because of that, my intention is get a thoughtful answer to my basic question.

Secondarily, I hope to get some idea of where all of us go from here. I have written semi-extensively about my displeasure with the Democratic party (go to the Cosmic Wheel Index, main heading of "Democratic Party" for a list of such posts), and I certainly feel that the party often does not represent me. I pretty much say so in the the description of this blog. What's more, my voting record and campaign efforts in Presidential elections reflect that. I described some of that history in a comment yesterday, but here's a recap and more info. 1980 was my first election, and I wanted to vote for George H.W. Bush, but he dropped out before the Texas primary, and I voted for Anderson. I voted for Mondale in 1984 because there was no way I was voting for Reagan and Fritz had experience and knowledge relevant to the job of President. In 1988 I didn't vote. George H.W. was nowhere close to the same guy I wanted to vote for in 1980, and Dukakis had none of the knowledge and experience that prompted me to vote for Mondale. In 1992, I was supporting Perot, and then it became apparent that his only reason for getting in the race was not to win, but to make sure Bush lost, and I voted for Clinton. I also voted for Clinton in 1996. Then came 2000. I again considered crossing party lines, this time to vote for McCain, but he dropped out before the Texas primary. There was no way I was going to vote for George W. because he simply did not have the experience, knowledge, or intelligence to be President (and I reiterate that I voted for him when he ran for reelection as Texas governor). However, Al Gore did not exactly excite me. Talk about running one of the dumbest campaigns in history--but that's another story. In 2004, I supported, campaigned for, and gave a lot of money to Wes Clark, and after what happened to him and how we ended up with Kerry and Edwards on the ticket, my previous annoyance with the party became rage and disgust. In 2004, I did not vote for Kerry. I voted against Bush.

There is a point to the rambling of the previous paragraph. While I do not share many of the beliefs and social and political positions of Republicans in general and religious conservatives in particular, I sense that I do share a sense of not being represented, and I sense that many other Americans feel the same way. So what do any of us do from here on? Stated differently, although my basic question is directed at conservative Christians, the "spirit" of the question can be directed at traditionally Democratic groups.

With all that in mind...

The NYT article and MSNBC report

The NYT article is entitled "Evangelicals Blame Foley, Not Republican Party." The reporter interviewed evangelicals in Virginia, and for purposes of this post, one sentence sums up the article: "Most of the evangelical Christians interviewed said that so far they saw Mr. Foley’s behavior as a matter of personal morality, not institutional dysfunction." I must note that the article contains quotes from evangelicals who are concerned about the scope of the Foley Follies and what they say about the GOP, but that admittedly is not the focus of this post. Anyway, the article does mention that some evangelicals do not see the Foley Follies as any reason to stop supporting the Republican party. Instead, they see Foley's transgressions as nothing more than transgressions limited only to Foley.

The MSNBC report showed similar views from conservative Christians in Tennessee. The reporter said "But here in Tennessee, at least, Christian conservatives blame former congressman Foley, not the party," and then showed one lady who said "I think (Foley's) actions are horrendous. And—but I don’t see its involvement in the political process. That was an individual, not the political party itself."

Here's what I don't understand. When there is extensive evidence that the leadership of the Republican party knew about Foley's activities, did not try to stop Foley, tried to cover up Foley's activities, and did so for the sake of worldly power (something which is discussed below), how can anyone say that all of this is only Foley's fault? How is it possible to keep from laying some blame on the party?

And then when the nature of Foley's transgressions are taken into account, how is it that some conservative Christians--who I think by and large consider homosexuality a sin--won't hold the Republican party accountable at all? That is why I asked my basic question. If a matter such as the Foley Follies is not going to produce a demand for institutional accountability, then what is it going to take?

And I will add that continually voting Republican is not going to magically produce accountability. As long as the same people get to keep their jobs, nothing is going to change.

Ah, but herein lies the dilemma. Does one vote for the opposition when one feels the opposition has different positions on fundamental matters? Does one just not vote and thus increase the chances of that opposition winning? This is not a simple matter. And yet I still wonder what it will take for evangelicals to stop blindly supporting Republicans.

A theological matter to consider

In addition to being foreshadowed above, this topic was actually raised by my "opposition" in another discussion we had recently--and which will likely become part of this discussion--in which he noted that his faith teaches "to be in the world, not of the world," and that is why conservative Christians generally did not get heavily involved in politics in the past.

In an October 9 online commentary for Newsweek, Jon Meachum wrote the following:

The secular can tend to caricature religious activists in politics as determined theocrats—and Lord knows some Christian leaders (Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson come to mind) say and do things that make the secular case almost too easy to advance. But there is another important milieu within the American religious community which holds that politics is intrinsically sinful—that, in theological terms, one must, as the Psalmist said, “put not thy trust in princes.” Cal Thomas and Chuck Colson—the former worked for Falwell; the latter for Nixon—are exemplars of this view, as is the distinguished historian of religion and evangelical Christian Mark A. Noll. (Noll wrote the seminal text on this subject, “The Search For Christian America,” with Nathan O. Hatch and George M. Marsden; I cannot recommend the book highly enough for anyone who wants to understand religion and politics in our nation and in our time.) Thomas’ book on this subject, written with Ed Dobson, is also essential: “Blinded By Might: Why the Religious Right Can’t Save America,” as is Colson’s “Kingdoms in Conflict.”

Broadly put, the theological case for the religious to steer clear of politics, or at least to avoid believing that the accumulation and exercise of earthly power should be one’s focus, lies in words Jesus spoke to Pilate. “My kingdom is not of this world …” he said to the proconsul, a point echoed by St. Paul, who said that, for Christians, “all are one” in Jesus, and that God favors no nation or class or race or sex. “We have no lasting city,” writes the author of Hebrews, “but seek the city which is to come.” Politicians can be false gods; for believers, the argument goes, there can be no other god before God.

By the way, this blog's conservative Christian participant has criticized Pat Robertson here.

Meachum also could have cited Jesus's admonition to"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." (Matthew 22:21).

In any event, Meachum does bring up a theological dilemma. However, this is like the dilemma I described in the previous section of this post. Still, it seems to me that the House Republican leaders--and, frankly, any other House Republicans who are defending Hastert--are pursuing ends that relate only to worldly power without regard to spiritual matters. If that is indeed the case, is that the tipping point for conservative Christians in terms of supporting the Republican party?

If not, then there is a more practical matter to consider...

What if you are used and treated disdainfully?

Yesterday Kevin Drum posted this excerpt from an exchange between Tucker Carlson and Chris Mattews:

CARLSON: It goes deeper than that though. The deep truth is that the elites in the Republican Party have pure contempt for the evangelicals who put their party in power.

MATTHEWS: So this gay marriage issue and other issues related to the gay lifestyle are simply tools to get elected?

CARLSON: That's exactly right. It's pandering to the base in the most cynical way, and the base is beginning to figure it out.

Drum also made note of a book by David Kuo called Tempting Faith, in which Kuo pretty much blasts the Bush administration. Kuo details how conservatives Christians have been used, abused, and dismissed by the Bush administration. Read Kevin's post for more info. You can also go to the Countdown website to see the video of the first part of a report on this subject. The first part aired last night, and the second part airs tonight.

Then again, you can read what I wrote on March 18, 2005 (scroll down to "The faith-based initiative" section for info about Kuo).

Conclusion

So, what is it going to take for conservative Christians to stop reflexively voting Republican? While I certainly think there exist ample reasons to stop, it is very easy for me to reach that conclusion. As I said, this presents a serious dilemma, and it is one that those of us who are not conservative Christians likely have faced, are facing, or will face in the future. So, what to do?

Well, my reaction in the past has been to vote for Anderson, not vote, and work like crazy for an outsider candidate in whom I truly believed (Clark) only to get completely crapped on by my own party. And look at all the good that has done me.

And in November, I will vote for Kinky Friedman for governor. At least I will be smiling instead of holding my nose when marking my ballot.