Part 11 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

Goldberg's solution

After incorrectly defining the debate, ignoring facts, and belitting the antiwar crowd, Goldberg bestows upon us his solution to what we should do in Iraq:

According to the conventional script, if I'm not saying "bug out" of Iraq, I'm supposed to say "stay the course." But there's a third option, and, funnily enough, I found it in an old column of mine (journalistic taboos be damned!). I think we should ask the Iraqis to vote on whether U.S. troops should stay.

(emphasis added). I'm not saying that having a "stay or go" vote is a bad idea. Given what I said about what should be the parameters of this debate (see Part 8), this idea should be part of the discussion. So let's discuss a bit, shall we?

Some substantive discussion of Goldberg's proposal

Goldberg's next paragraph has some discussion.

Polling suggests that they want us to go. But polling absent consequences is a form of protest. With accountability, minds may change and appreciation for the U.S. presence might grow.

Indeed, recent polling does indicate Iraqis want us out. One poll was published one month ago and prompted much media coverage. It was done by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland. Here's the overiew for the poll.

A new WPO poll of the Iraqi public finds that seven in ten Iraqis want U.S.-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year. An overwhelming majority believes that the U.S. military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing and there is growing confidence in the Iraqi army. If the United States made a commitment to withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Support for attacks on U.S.-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten. Support appears to be related to a widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the U.S. government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq.

Sounds like things are just peachy, huh? Note that this poll surved the general public, not the politicians, not the government officials. In other words, the poll surveyed the people who would be voting in the election proposed by Goldberg. Since that proposed vote would be whether or not U.S. forces should stay in Iraq, the discussion of the poll results on that question are relevant to this post. Here are the basic numbers:

A large majority of Iraqis—71%—say they would like the Iraqi government to ask for U.S.-led forces to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less. Given four options, 37 percent take the position that they would like U.S.-led forces withdrawn “within six months,” while another 34 percent opt for “gradually withdraw[ing] U.S.-led forces according to a one-year timeline.” Twenty percent favor a two-year timeline and just 9 percent favor “only reduc[ing] U.S.-led forces as the security situation improves in Iraq.”

These figures alone indicate that Goldberg's proposed vote would result in a "get out" result, but a further breakdown of the poll results is warranted here.

There are significant variations between groups, though no group favors an open-ended commitment. Fifty-seven percent of Sunnis favor withdrawal in six months, with another 34 percent favoring it within a year. Shias are more evenly divided between six months (36%) and a year (38%). Few Shias favor two years (20%) or an open-ended commitment (5%). Only a third of Kurds favor withdrawal within a year or less, but two-thirds favor withdrawal within two years or less (11% six months, 24% one year, 34% two years). Thirty-one percent of Kurds favor an open-ended commitment.

Even with these variations, it is clear that a majority of Iraqis want U.S. troops out within a year. The Kurds are the only group who seem to favor withdrawal in two years or an open-ended commitment. However, keep in mind that the Kurds comprise only 20% of the population, meaning that even if all of the Kurds voted for the U.S. to stay, the election would still likely go the other way.

It is significant to note that this same organization conducted a similar poll in January of this year, and there was a change from then to now.

As compared to January 2006, there has been, overall, a growing sense of urgency for withdrawal of U.S.-led forces. In January, respondents were only given three options—six months, two years, and an open-ended commitment. In September, the one-year option was added, since it had been nearly a year since the last time they were asked. While in January 70 percent favored withdrawal within two years (35% six months, 35% two years), now— approximately a year later—71 percent favor withdrawal within a year (37% six months, 34% one year). Support for an open-ended commitment has dropped from 29 percent to 9 percent.

Again this indicates that Iraqis 1) want U.S. troops out sooner rather than later, and 2) they do not want an open, undefined period for American troops to stay in Iraq. There is one other change from the earlier poll I find interesting: "Within ethnic groups there have been some shifts. Shias show a growing sense of urgency, with the numbers calling for withdrawal in six months rising from 22 percent to 36 percent." There is a trend that more and more Shia want us out. Given that they are a large majority of the population, any continuance of this upward trend would further indicate that the result of Goldberg's vote would be "get out."

Regarding the poll results, Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, said this: "What we are seeing is a growing desire for U.S.-led forces to withdraw in the near future, greater confidence that the Iraqi army can deal with the situation, and continuing concern that the United States has no plans to ever leave." Combine these observations with what Iraqis had to say about a U.S.-led occupation prior to the war (see the "Overview" of Part 6), and the odds of "get out" seemingly grow.

And there is at least one other reason why "get out" would likely be the result of Goldberg's vote. The statements by Iraqis in Part 6 were part of something I wrote just before the war began. I include another part of that work here because it is very relevant to this topic. In Part 6, I quoted part of published an editorial by Kamil Mahdi, and now I will quote some more. Mahdi complains of the attitude that he felt was a basis for American and British plans.

In government comment about Iraq, the Iraqi people are treated as a collection of hapless victims without hope or dignity. At best, Iraqis are said to have parochial allegiances that render them incapable of political action without tutelage. This is utterly at variance with the history and reality of Iraq. Iraqis are proud of their diversity, the intricacies of their society and its deeply rooted urban culture.

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To assert that an American invasion is the only way to bring about political change in Iraq...is ignorant and disingenuous.

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Of course Saddam Hussain crushed all these challenges, but in every case the regional and international environment has supported the dictator against the people of Iraq...Iraq's history is one of popular struggle and also of imperial greed, superpower rivalries and regional conflict. To reduce the whole of Iraqi politics and social life to the whims of Saddam Hussain is banal and insulting.

In other words, before the war Iraqis felt like we were treating them like little children who just did not understand how the world works and could not do things for themselves. This perception was supported by testimony of the State Department's Marc Grossman before the Senate Foreign relations committee on February 11, 2003. In discussing Iraq's political future, Grossman concluded with the following statement:

And while we are listening to what the Iraqis are telling us, at the end of the day, the United States Government will make its decisions based on what is in the national interest of the United States.

With a tip of the cap to comedian Henry Cho, this is similar a familiar phrase in the American South: "Well, bless your heart." Seriously, how arrogant and condescending can you get?

Now let's look at what is going on now. As reported by the Washington Post, on October 24, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, "said the prime minister had agreed to timelines for accomplishing several critical goals, including developing plans to deal with militias, amend the constitution and equitably distribute Iraq's oil revenue." Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was not amused. The next day Maliki said to all of Iraq via television "I affirm that this government represents the will of the people, and no one has the right to impose a timetable on it. The Americans have the right to review their policies, but we do not believe in a timetable." Two days later, Maliki and Khalilzad met and issued a statement that indicated that the two sides were working together, but on Friday, one of Maliki's close aides, Hassan al-Suneid, told reporters that Maliki told Khalilzad "I am a friend of the United States, but I am not America's man in Iraq." On Saturday, Maliki met with Bush via video conference, and both sides were saying nice things afterward. Still, this series of very recent events matches up with the statements of Iraqis in Part 6 and the above statements from Mahdi and Grossman.

And when that observation is added to the recent poll results, it means that I think the chances are very good that if Goldberg's proposed vote took place, the vote would be for the U.S. to get out. That opinion is the basis for the concluding section of this series.

But before I get to the concluding section, Goldberg does offer a reason why he thinks the result of the vote would be the opposite of my opinion: "But polling absent consequences is a form of protest. With accountability, minds may change and appreciation for the U.S. presence might grow." I think what he is saying is that once the Iraqis start thinking about what their lives would be like without the U.S. in Iraq, they will realize that they really do want us there. Yeah, like things are so great now. The oil industry (which the neocons said would pay for most of the reconstruction) can't function well because of constant attacks and sabotage, the electricity situation is still below the pre-war levels, the security situation is getting worse, all the American contractors have not restored and improved the infrastructure (building schools does not count, by the way), Iraqis have not gotten those contracts and the jobs that go with them, and on and on. Saddam is gone, and that is a very good thing, but as the analysis in Part 6 and Mahdi's statements quoted in this post show, while the Iraqis wanted Saddam out, now that he is gone, they want foreign powers out of their country. I am not saying that I think Iraq would be better if we stay, nor am I saying I think Iraq would be better if we go. What I am saying is that it sure seems to me that Iraqis want us out and that that would be their decision if the matter was put to a vote.

Goldberg wants to "vote and run."

Just as with the term "Burning Bush doctrine," I thought I was oh so clever when I thought of "vote and run" only to find that at least one other person (and likely more) coined the phrase well before I did. But why would anyone use that label for Goldberg's proposed solution? The answer is within the penultimate paragraph of his editorial:

If Iraqis voted "stay," we'd have a mandate to do what's necessary to win, and our ideals would be reaffirmed. If they voted "go," our values would also be reaffirmed, and we could leave with honor. And pretty much everyone would have to accept democracy as the only legitimate expression of national will.

What a bunch of bullshit. First of all, if the result of the vote was for us to stay, that is not necessarily a mandate for the U.S. to decide what is "necessary to win" or decide how the "necessary" actions are to be carried out. Second, just what American values will be reaffirmed if the Iraqis vote for us to get out? I can think of one--democratic determination of a nation's future. Can anybody think of any others? Anybody? Bueller?

And anyone thinking I am being too harsh on Goldberg should take another look at his very last paragraph:

Finishing the job is better than leaving a mess. And if we can finish the job, the war won't be remembered as a mistake.

Let me see if I can follow Goldberg's arguments. I will list some of his main points, then restate them them along with my commentary.

• Regardless of the reason, we are in Iraq.
• We cannot pull out precipitously from Iraq because if we do, "jihadism will open a franchise in Iraq and gain steam around the world, and the U.S. will be weakened."
• We need to "finish the job" in Iraq.
• By holding a vote which will likely result in the Iraqi people saying "get out," we will "finish the job" regardless of what might be left to be done.

Goldberg's point: Regardless of the reason, we are in Iraq.
My comment: Recall that Goldberg said in the same sentence that the reasons we are in Iraq are both good and wrong ("We are in Iraq for good reasons and for reasons that were well-intentioned but wrong."). I need to stop smoking cigars and get some of whatever Goldberg is smoking.

Goldberg's point: We cannot pull out precipitously from Iraq because if we do, "jihadism will open a franchise in Iraq and gain steam around the world, and the U.S. will be weakened.
My comment: Aside from the fact that our presence in Iraq has already created a jihadi franchise and weakened the U.S., notice that Goldberg's concern is U.S. interests, not the well being of the Iraqi people. This is an example of the attitude described by Mahdi and expressed by Grossman.

Goldberg's point: We need to "finish the job" in Iraq.
My comment: Notice that he in no way says what would constitute "finishing the job." The only clue he gives is the following point.

Goldberg's point: By holding a vote which will likely result in the Iraqi people saying "get out," we will "finish the job" regardless of what might be left to be done.
My comment: Explain how this is not "cut and run." If the results of our leaving would be the same

Again, I am not saying that a vote and subsequent withdrawal prompted by the vote would be either good or bad. What I am saying is that Goldberg proposes it is okay and honorable for the U.S to get out of Iraq immediately if the Iraqis vote for us to get out. Goldberg proposes it is okay and honorable for us to get out immediately even if our departure would worsen the situation in Iraq.

In other words, if we get out of Iraq very soon, we will not do so "precipitously" as long as the Iraqis vote us out. See, if we choose to get out of Iraq now, that would produce really bad results, and that would be "cutting and running," and Goldberg would be against it. If, however, the Iraqis voted us out and our leaving produced the same really bad results, that would be honorable, and Goldberg would be in favor of that. He does not care one bit whether our departure would make things worse or better. Just about everything he and the rest of his winger media buddies ever spouted about Iraq has turned out to be wrong, and now he is just looking for some excuse to advocate getting out of Iraq without looking like he and all the other people who ignored the blatant facts and negligently engaged in delusional idealism were wrong.

And that is why Jonah Goldberg is a putz.