Part 6 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.

The real intelligence (as in ability to think and reason) failure, or what was known about what Iraq was and likely would become

Next Goldberg makes another lame ass argument:

Washington's more important intelligence failure lay in underestimating what would be required to rebuild and restore post-Hussein Iraq. The White House did not anticipate a low-intensity civil war in Iraq, never planned for it and would not have deemed it in the U.S. interest to pay this high a price in prestige, treasure and, of course, lives.

Only someone who is a moron or delusional would not have foreseen what a mess Iraq would become after Saddam was gone. In that sense, I guess Goldberg is correct is saying that if indeed the Bush administration "did not anticipate" the things he mentions, it was a failure of intelligence, but not "intelligence" in the sense of "information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area." We had plenty of information. Let's examine some of the factors known before the war that should have clued in all but the dullest of brains.

• Overview

Back in the early days of Cosmic Wheel, I wrote a post entitled Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong. I will begin this overview by quoting a certain report cited in that post.

"Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath," an October 1, 2002, report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), provided a good general statement of what was known before the war about how post-war Iraq might be.

Indeed, many tensions between opposition groups derive from deeper fault-lines that pre-date Saddam Hussein and are likely to survive him. These divides are principally along religious, ethnic and tribal lines, though class and ideology should not be neglected.

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After decades of power imbalance and discrimination, Shiites may seek to settle scores with Sunnis. Ethnic inequities and unresolved political and economic issues could ignite tensions and provoke violence between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans.

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Violent conflict between Arabs and Kurds has been a feature of Iraqi politics since the country’s formation as a British mandate in the early 1920s when hopes for an independent Kurdish state were dashed by post-Ottoman-era manoeuvring and double-crosses by the colonial powers.

(emphasis added). Note the date of the ICG report--October 1, 2002. Yet in spite of that date, Goldberg would have us believe that we knew nothing before the war about the possibility of a civil war of any kind.

For anyone thinking that the ICG must be some sort of crazy leftist group, perhaps this excerpt from a December 11, 2002, artice from the Wall Street Journal will be more credible:

If a U.S.-led force succeeds in ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the victors would inherit a traumatized society full of festering conflicts that didn't start with him and wouldn't suddenly fade with his departure. That raises some big questions: How can a stable new order take hold in Iraq? How can the nation avoid being dismembered by its neighbors or breaking up in spasms of violence like the former Yugoslavia?

[The link I had for the article is no longer any good. The only place I can find the complete article now is the WSJ archive. The title of the article is "Ethnic, Religious, Political Rifts Test U.S. Hopes for Stable Iraq," and the reporters are Hugh Pope and David S. Cloud.]

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said this in early March, 2003:

The possibility of ethnic fighting, with Turkish and Iranian complications, cannot be dismissed. There are major tribal and clan fault lines. There are serious Arab-Kurd-Turcoman-Assyrian fault lines. There are Sunni vs. Shi'ite fault lines, and deep fault lines within the Kurdish and Shi'ite populations plus problems like the Iraq-armed Iranian MEK and Iranian-armed Iraqi Badr Brigades. There are cities, agricultural area, and oil to fight over and there are real questions about revenge killings.

Should you think that Cordesman must be another one of those freedom-haters, check out his bio. Also in March 2003 Cordesman identified in a different paper for CSIS some other factors which would make post-war Iraq problematical.

In the case of Iraq, the U.S. and Britain are dealing with a highly nationalistic society with little tolerance of any vestiges of colonialism, but with deep divisions, many reasons for internal feuds and revenges, and tensions with its neighbors that will not disappear with Saddam Hussein.

It is a reality that unless the U.S. and Britain approach any victory as partners in allowing Iraqis to shape their own destiny, they are likely to quickly be seen as enemies. Even the best intended effort can make enemies out of some factions, and the Arab world and the rest of the world will set very demanding standards.

(emphasis added). Aside from pointing out the problem with good intentions, Cordesman noted that the historic nationalistic feelings of Iraqis would cause them to reject outside control.

And how about some pre-war views from Iraqis? Faleh A. Jabar, an Iraqi sociologist who was living in London before the war, was quoted in a March 3, 2003, article as saying "There will be wild jubilation" if Saddam is overthrown, "but it could quickly turn into wild opposition." On February 20, 2003, The Guardian published an editorial by Kamil Mahdi, who at the time was an Iraqi political exile and a lecturer in Middle East economics at the University of Exeter in England. In his editorial he said, "[U.S.] policies are rejected by most Iraqis and others in the region. Indeed, the main historical opposition to the Ba'ath regime--including various strands of the left, the Arab nationalist parties, the Communist party, the Islamic Da'wa party, the Islamic party (the Muslim Brotherhood) and others--has rejected war and U.S. patronage over Iraqi politics. The prevalent Iraqi opinion is that a U.S. attack on Iraq would be a disaster, not a liberation[.]" Jabar and Mahdi were not in or close to Iraq at the time, but a leader of another Iraqi group was in the area, and he held a rather prominent position. On February 25, 2003, MSNBC had a report entitled "Stark Warning for U.S. Military," which featured Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of Iraq's Shiite exile community and heads the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, by some accounts the most significant of the Iraqi opposition groups. Hamkim's warning included the following:

1. A U.S. military presence in post-war Iraq would not be welcome.
2. A post-Saddam U.S. military presence will offend "national sensitivities."
3. Even a temporary U.S. military government would undermine efforts to transition Iraq to a truly elected government.
4. "Muslim countries will refuse any foreign administration of Iraq. This could start a religious war in Iraq and neighboring countries."
5. Even the appearance of a U.S. occupation of Iraq would destabilize Iraq and the region. "This will open the door to violence and terrorism against the United States. This extremism will be very dangerous to Iraq and its neighbors."

[I have been unable to find a working link for this MSNBC story.] Boy, I sure am glad that nothing Hakim said turned out to be true, especially that last thing. But seriously, note that these Iraqis supported Cordesman's warnings about nationalistic feelings. Moreover, what this paragraph shows is that a common opinion within much of the Iraqi opposition was that a strong U.S. occupation would not be “welcomed” by Iraqis.

One of the points I want to make with this post is that there never were any good answers to the questions asked in the above excerpt from the WSJ, but for now I will emphasize that Iraqis and even an ultra-right wing publication like the WSJ raised facts before the war that should have caused the Bush administration to have a good idea of what Iraq could become.

• Sectarian strife and basic human nature
  

Sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shia is a huge problem in Iraq. It has been a part of the Islamic world for about the last 1350 years. An excerpt from the ICG report referenced above provides an explanation that, while adequate for the purposes of this post, does not begin to describe the depth and complexity of the conflict:

There is little doubt that a religious schism exists and dates back to the earliest days of Islam when what is now Iraq served as a battle ground for many of the seminal events that have defined the Sunni-Shiite division. The ascendancy of Sunnis during the Ottoman period was perpetuated in modern Iraq, and Sunni political figures and officers have held a disproportionate share of power since independence.

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During the 1990s, the rift between Sunnis and Shiites deepened, and overall religious tensions intensified.

Thus, it was well known before the war that there was a very good chance that there would be violence between the Sunnis and Shia once Saddam was overthrown.

Saddam is Sunni, and the ruling Ba'ath party was overwhelmingly Sunni. Indeed, Sunnis ruled and dominated Iraq and had done so for many years. In so doing, the Shia were persecuted and abused. Most people would understand that any group who had been so persecuted would, once the persecutors were removed from power, seek retribution against the persecutors. Most people would understand the chances of this happening would be even greater if the persecutors were a minority of the population. However, the members of the Bush administration were and are not most people. The December 10, 2002, WSJ article provided an explanation of the facts on the ground prior to the war:

The U.S.-led coalition would encounter some of its toughest challenges in the center of Iraq -- in Baghdad and across the heartland occupied by the minority Sunni Muslim population. There the Sunni elite would find themselves threatened as they haven't been since the British took the region away from the Ottoman Turks after World War I. Although Sunni Muslims make up no more than 18% of Iraq's population, they have dominated the country's affairs for centuries. From their ranks have come not only Mr. Hussein but also a long line of sheiks, monarchs and strongmen stretching back through British rule to the administrations of the Ottoman Turks. Sunnis play crucial roles in operating the country day to day, from holding key positions in its military to overseeing public services such as water and health care.

And yet Goldberg asserts we did not have knowledge of any facts prior to the war that could have led us to anticipate problems.

• Ethnic strife

Indeed, I wrote Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong to show that Wolfowitless was wrong in claiming that there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq. Before the war, there certainly was evidence of ethnic strife and the great potential for it in a post-Saddam Iraq. The WSJ article focused on southern Iraq:

A ground invasion of Iraq probably would include a force pushing northward from the Kuwaiti desert through the vast plains and occasional marshes of southern Iraq to Baghdad. The invading forces would pass through one of the country's most complex and brutalized regions, known for its volatile mix of tribal and ethnic allegiances.

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Perhaps the biggest concern in the south would be heading off the sort of brutal revenge-seeking that marked the 1991 uprising. In the course of the rebellion, the local populace viciously attacked loyalists to the regime. While residents of the south don't possess heavy weapons, Mr. Hussein's regime has armed them with plenty of guns to fight the U.S. If central control is smashed by U.S. bombing, in remote places such as this, the weapons could be turned on fellow Iraqis to settle old scores or protect territory.

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"I am sure there's going to be revenge-taking," says Dr. Azzam al-Wash, an Iraqi exile who maintains ties to southern Shiites. "The problem for the U.S. will be how to establish law and order to prevent this cycle from becoming civil war."

(emphasis added). In north Iraq, Saddam embarked on a program of "Arabization" which consisted of forcing Kurds and Turkmen from their homes and moving Arabs in and forcing non-Arabs to change their names to Arab names. This was definitely ethnic in nature. You can read more about this program in the ICG report and this report from the State Department. Maybe I am wrong, but I think most people who were victims of this policy would be plenty angry and eager for retribution once Saddam was gone. And guess what? That is exactly what happened.

• Tribal conflict

As shown generally in the Overview above, tribal allegiances were and are very strong in Iraq. As the December 11, 2202, WSJ article put it,

Another potential powder keg: As civil order unravels, many Iraqis are likely to retreat into the protection of tribal clans. These play a major role in Iraqi society, and their intensely protective tribal codes could bring quick violent retribution for threats or injury to their members.

The October 1, 2002, ICG report explianed that "Tribal identities have largely survived modernisation and the growing role of the central state and remain important social and political units in Iraq," and "The tribal ethos...currently is the principal dispenser of people’s identity, of regulation, and of authority." Why does this matter? Well, among other reasons, the Iraqi tribal system was "replete with shifts in allegiances, betrayals, conditional alliances and, above all, men in arms[.]" So, before the war we knew there was a system that had long existed in Iraq which presented all kinds of potential for strife.

• Kurdish conflict

After the first Gulf War, no-fly zones were established in south and north Iraq. In the north, this enable the Kurds to basically establish an autonomous zone in which they were basically the government. Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong (heading "Breakdown 4: Reasonably stable? Yeah, right.") disucusses the autonomous zone and the Kurdish activity therein. What follows is a synopsis. For more details-and links to sources--follow the link in the previous sentence.

During this time, two major Kurdish parties emerged, the KDP and PUK. They ended up at war with each other. There was a power sharing agreement in which the two parties would each have 50% of the government, but that agreement fell apart within two years, resulting in a civil war, and the autonomous zone was divided in two, with KDP and PUK each controlling one half. The leaders of the parties met in Washington in September 1998 and reached an agreement to merge their administrations, but little progress was made over the next two years. After 2000 there were positive steps taken, but the hostilities between the two parties had not been eliminated. That meant that before the war there was evidence--which was known--that there could be conflict among Kurds.

Even as there was progress toward some unity among the KDP and PUK, another potential problem was emerging, as described in a December 2002 article from the Kurdistan Observer.

Free and fair local elections, under international observation, were conducted in dozens of municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK, particularly in their dealings with the Bush administration and U.S. Congress, as well as with states in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal relationship with the central government under a new constitutional arrangement.

(emphasis added). See, the Kurds--an ethnic group without their own homeland--had had a taste of independence and autonomy, and they did not want to lose that if Saddam was gone. Such feeling is completely undrestandable, and it was known before the war, and it was an indication that achieving real and lasting unity throughout all of Iraq was going to be a challenge. The Kurds' desire for continued autonomy also had a very practical basis. The north part of Iraq, the one where the Kurds were and are located, has vast oil reserves. The Kurds wanted to control those reserves rather than have a central government keep all the money from oil production. This, too, was known before the war.

There were other known potential problems in the Kurdish areas, but I will discuss those in a separate post about the well-known-before-the-war problems with two of Iraq's neighbor's, Turkey and Iran.

• Iraq's borders

I wrote about this topic on May 10, 2005. I will repeat much of that analysis here, only this time I will not be as accomodating to the wingers.

As I said almost a year and a half ago, Iraq is approximately the size of California. Even Texans have to admit that is a large area. Maybe I'm crazy, but it seems to me that if you invade a country with that much area, in order to secure the country--which is to say, prevent or minimize things like insurgencies--you need to control more than just a few cities. In particular, securing the borders would seem to be rather important in order to, oh I don't know, keep out people and supplies that would aid the insurgents.

Now for some data--otherwise known as "facts." Iraq's total border is approximately 2251 miles long (3631 km x .62). That's a lot of border. Perhaps there was no great need to secure all of that border. Two of Iraq's neighbors are Jordan and Kuwait, solid U.S. allies. Assuming no need to control those borders, the total is reduced by approximately 262 miles (150 for Kuwait and 112 for Jordan). Iraq is bordered on the north by Turkey, another U.S. ally. One might assume that the total could be reduced by another 205 miles, but probably not due to the hostility between the Turks and the Kurds, which will be discussed in a separate post (and is discussed in Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong and Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong). That leaves 1989 miles of border to secure. Iraq's largest neighbor to the west is Saudi Arabia, another U.S. ally, with a border of 505 miles. However, given that 1) bin Laden is Saudi, 2) most Saudis were against the war, and 3) Saudi Arabia is the home of Wahabbism, a radical form of Islam that is strongly anti-U.S., and many other factors, I will not say there was no need to secure the border with Saudi Arabia. And there will be no further subtractions, for the remaining neighbors are Iran and Syria. 1989 miles is a significant distance, particulary considering that 904 of those miles belong to a definite non-friendly (Iran) and the remaining 375 miles (605 km x .62) belong to the country from which we have always claimed there is a flow of foreign fighters (Syria).

Indeed, Syria was long identified as a problem in the context of Iraq. Prior to the war there were two Arab countries ruled by the Ba'ath party. Iraq was one, and after the war the remaining one was Syria. There were differences between the party structures, but nonetheless, there were political ties between the two countries prior to the war. Also, on April 13, 2003, the BBC quoted then Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying the following:

Syria has been a concern for a long period of time. We have designated Syria for years as a state that sponsors terrorism, and we have discussed this with the Syrians on many occasions. We are concerned that materials have flowed through Syria to the Iraqi regime over the years.

In other words, we knew that prior to the war, Saddam has received materials via the Syrian border. Around the same time, Rumskull had much more to say. He discussed Syria in a press briefing on April 11, 2003 and on "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" on April 13, 2003. Each time he spoke of how weapons, supplies, and people had been coming into Iraq through Syria. Granted, Rumskull was speaking of events after the war started, but the point here is that the Bush administration knew of facts before the war showing that the Syrian border would be a problem, and that problem arose immediately. Yet nothing was done about this extremely foreseeable occurrence--which, by the way aided the insurgency.

We knew before the war that there would be a need to secure Iraq's borders in order to secure the country and help prevent or defeat any insurgency, and yet...well, the title of my May 10, 2005, post pretty much says it all: In Iraq, an offensive to secure the border...two years after the insurgency began.

• Summary

Actually, I'm not sure how to neatly summarize the foregoing other than to say there was nothing neat about Iraq before the war, and there was a veritable plethora of known facts that should have caused "the White House to anticipate[] a low-intensity civil war in Iraq" at the very least AND to plan for it. For him to even imply otherwise is complete and utter bullshit.

Also, keep in mind that this post has not presented a conclusive list of facts known before the war which showed that a civil war was likely and that post-war Iraq in general would be a mess.

Another thing to keep in mind that while any one of the factors discussed above could have caused major problems in post-war Iraq, the truth is that all of them were present before the war, and every one of them was present after the war.

Of course, we all know that the White House did not plan for any of the possibilities presented before the war, nor did the White House plan for much of anything for post-war Iraq, but that is another story. If you want to know more about that, I have three suggestions:

1. Go to the Cosmic Wheel Index, main heading "Iraq," subheading "Planning for the Post-war period."
2. Read The Assassins Gate: America in Iraq by George Packer.
3. Read Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas Ricks.

Up next: The pre-war interests of Turkey and Iran.