Monday, June 27, 2011

So much for the original intent of the Founding Fathers.

I. Introducing the Repeal Amendment

On November 30, 2010--after the mid term election and before the current session of Congress--a Republican in the House by the name of Rob Bishop introduced a proposed Constitutional Amendment that is likely the most ridiculous thing to come out of the collective GOP mindset in the last 10 years at least. This proposed amendment is ridiculous because it would negate core principles in the Constitution and would change government and politics for the worse.

Known as the "Repeal Amendment," here is what it says:
Any provision of law or regulation of the United States may be repealed by the several States, and such repeal shall be effective when the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States approve resolutions for this purpose that particularly describe the same provision or provisions of law or regulation to be repealed.
Read that again. Those who fully understand how this proposed amendment violates the structure of our government as established by the Founding Fathers can skip sections II-IV of this post. Anyone who does not have such understanding really should read sections II-IV.

Readers might be wondering why I am writing about this topic now when the Repeal Amendment instead of 6 months ago. I was aware of it back then, but, in my opinion, it was such an absurd proposal that I figured it would fade from the news quickly. And it pretty much did after about a month. And then last week, Bishop declared he was going to reintroduce the Repeal Amendment. That fact plus some of the support Bishop has received from Republicans in Congress make this topic a worthy and timely on for discussion. Among those Republicans are Sen. Orrin Hatch and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor.

The text of the Repeal Amendment was taken from the document Bishop submitted in Congress in November 2010. That text was also printed in most of the news articles I saw regarding the Repeal Amendment from November-December 2010. However, in the news articles I have found in the last week regarding the Repeal Amendment, the text of the proposed amendment is missing. There is a Repeal Amendment website, and as of today, the text they present is the same as what is printed above. Consequently, my analysis is all based on that text.

II. The Constitution and repeal.

This section will address the repeal of legislation and regulations because at first glance it would seem that the Repeal Amendment addresses only those two types of laws. However, as shown in section IV.C below, the Repeal Amendment would impact far more than legislation and regulations.

A. Legislation which becomes law and the repeal thereof

The Constitution can be found plenty of places online. I just happen to prefer the Law Information Institute of the Cornell University Law School.

Let's begin with Article I, Section 1, which says "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." This means that in our national government Congress--and only Congress--can create and pass legislation. Inherent in that power is the ability to repeal legislation through new legislation created and passed by the Congress.

Actually, Congress cannot always pass (and subsequently repeal) legislation on its own. The reasons for that are explained in Article I, Section 7:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.
In other words, the general rule is that legislation which passes both the House and the Senate does not become law unless the Presidents signs it. The primary exception arises when the President "returns and objects to the legislation (otherwise known as a veto), in which case the legislation can become law if both the Senate and House pass the legislation with at least a 2/3 majority. The secondary exception arises when the President does nothing, in which case Congress does not have to vote on the legislation again, but these days that just doesn't happen.

The main point for purposes of this post is that once a piece of legislation becomes law, the President cannot directly do anything to repeal that law. Congress can repeal that law, but the President cannot.

However, the third branch of the government established by the Constitution--the courts--can repeal laws. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution says "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution..." Thus, if a party to a lawsuit claims that a given law violates the Constitution, and if the courts agree, that law will in effect be repealed.

The point is that the Constitution provides the Courts and Congress with the authority and means to repeal any statute (that is, legislation which becomes law).

B. Regulations and the repeal thereof

Regulations are the rules and provisions created and implemented by the various federal agencies, which are part of the Executive branch of the government, established by Article II of the Constitution. Regulations are laws just as legislation from Congress is law.

Article II, Section 1 says that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The authority to create federal agencies and the President's power to select who is part of those agencies is established in Article II, Section 2:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
As it pertains to the agencies which create regulations, here's how the system works...Those agencies are part of the Executive branch, and the President is in charge of those agencies, but Congress gets to say what agencies are in the Executive branch. A good example is the Homeland Security Act, passed shortly after 9-11. That Act 1) created the Executive branch agency of the Department of Homeland Security , and 2) restructured a significant portion of the federal bureaucracy. Another example is the Department of Energy, which Congress created during the Carter administration.

Another part of the system is the creation of the regulations. Just as Congress determines the structure of the bureaucracy, Congress also determines the framework for regulations through legislation, and agencies must be authorized by Congress to create and enforce rules and regulations. For instance, many legislative acts include what is called an "enabling statute," which says something like "The appropriate federal agency is granted the authority to create and implement any and all regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act." And then the regulations must be in furtherance of the policies established by Congress. As an example, if an act says that a national energy policy is to be established and that the Department of Energy is to come up with regulations, the DOE cannot create regulations that concern the Social Security system.

That leads into the repeal of regulations. If a regulation is outside the authority granted by Congress or does not deal with the specific legislation to which it is supposed to apply or is otherwise illegal, it can be challenged in court, and the courts can repeal it (pursuant to Article III, Section 2). The agency which created the regulation can repeal it. The President, as head of the Executive branch, could make the agency repeal the regulation. And finally, Congress could pass a law which repeals the regulation.

The point is that the Constitution provides each branch of the federal government with the authority and means to repeal a regulation.

C. Does the Constitution allow the States to repeal federal law?

The answer is clearly "NO." Read Article I in its entirety. There is no mention anywhere of States repealing or ignoring laws established through the legislative process. Likewise, Article II (the basis for the Executive branch being able to create regulations) says nothing about the States being able to repeal regulations. As explained above, the Constitution establishes the authority and means by which all three branches of the federal government can repeal legislation and/or regulations. Thus, it is clear that the Founding Fathers knew how to include language to directly grant such powers. The fact that they deliberately chose to not include any language even implying that the States had any such power should resolve this question.

Just in case some people still need convincing, check out the second clause of Article VI, known as the Supremacy Clause:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
(emphasis added). Clause 3 of Article VI then says
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.
(emphasis added).

It is clear that the Constitution does not, in any way, give the States any power to directly repeal laws established by the federal government.

III. Does that really matter?

A. Overview

In one way, the fact that the Constitution does not give the States any power to repeal federal laws is irrelevant. Why? Because the Constitution also provides a process by which the Constitution can be changed via amendment. Any Constitutional provision can be changed as long as the amendment process is properly followed. Consequently it is possible that the current Constitution could be changed by the Repeal Amendment to do something it never has allowed before.

In another way, that is precisely why the current provisions of the Constitution do matter. The Repeal Amendment would completely alter our form of government that has been in place for over 220 years. You know, the form of government that so many Americans cite as evidence that we are the greatest democracy in the history of the world.

I am going to explain how the Repeal Amendment would result in such drastic alteration in the next section, but for now I want to focus on something that I think shows the hypocrisy of Bishop and probably most people who think this Repeal Amendment is a good idea.

I have grown tired of the right wing constantly harping on the "original intent" of the Founding Fathers as justification for so many items on their agenda. I bet that most supporters of the Repeal Amendment just love claiming that that they are all about "original intent." I know Bishop falls in that camp. As he stated on Sept. 17, 2009, “Today, on the 222nd anniversary of the signing of the Constitution, we would do well to remember and recommit ourselves to the original intent of the Constitution – to devolve power and to protect individual liberties.” And when he first introduced the Repeal Amendment, "Bishop, though, told KSL Radio the amendment is not about exerting states rights, but 'an effort to go back to the original intent of the Constitution...'" The Repeal Amendment would allow States to directly repeal any federal law, and as I have shown, there was no original intent in the Constitution that the States could in any way directly repeal any federal law. So just what is this "original intent" Bishop seeks to restore? He provided an explanation on December 16, 2010. His explanation is a mix of naivete, ignorance, and contradiction.

B. Bishop says one thing, then the opposite.

Let's start with a contradiction. Bishop says
Some critics argue that any constitutional amendment shows insufficient reverence for that original text. Some of the same critics argue that the Constitution is a "living document" that should change with the times to read new powers and interpretations into its text. I disagree. The Repeal Amendment follows a process consistent with the Constitution's original intent.

The Constitution established a national government that performed a limited range of functions and rarely intruded into everyday life. Times have changed. Now is the time to limit encroachment of power by the national government and restore the ability of the states to act on behalf of their citizens.
(emphasis added). Bishop first says that the Constitution should not change with the times and that its terms should not be reinterpreted to give them new meanings. And yet his Repeal Amendment would completely change the Constitution in that it would give the States the power to directly appeal federal laws. And he thinks this change is necessary because times have changed!

C. Bishop seeks to restore the "balance" that was in "original intent."

Bishop sees the Constitution as establishing a balance that transcends what some would call changes that he wants to make. According to Bishop, the Repeal Amendment does not change anything. Instead, it seeks to restore what he feels once was and has been lost:
The Founders designed a system of government where states would play a vital role in the governance of the American people. They envisioned a system where states had the capacity to restrain federal power. Unfortunately, that balance between national and state power has eroded.
*******
The sole purpose of the Repeal Amendment is to return our system of government to something closer to the balance of power provided for in the original Constitution.
Let's see how that balance is established in the Constitution. I am not saying this is the way things should be. I am not saying there is not a better way to set up our national government. I am just saying this is what is in the Constitution.

The Constitution establishes a strong federal government whose laws will control over those of the States. Article I, Section 8 contains a long list of matters that are solely within the power of Congress--as in the States have no authority. The States have no authority over those matters because of Article VI, which is quoted in II.C above. Article I, Section 10 contains limitations on States' powers, and even lists some things that States can do only with the consent of Congress (and one of those things will be addressed in IV.C.2 below). Article II vests all the executive power of the federal government in the President and does not grant the States any control over the Executive Branch. Article III, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, gives the federal judiciary ultimate authority in all matters involving federal laws and the U.S. Constitution. Although not mentioned in Article III, State courts can make rulings on such matters, but they are constrained by and required to follow the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. Article IV specifically addresses the States. Section 1, known as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requires each State to give "Full faith and credit...to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." Section 2 says "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." In other words, each State has to recognize and enforce within its borders the rights granted citizens in the U.S. Constitution. Section 3 says that only Congress can admit new States into the country, and that "no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress." Section 3 also establishes that "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state." In other words, when the United States has any property interest in a State, that State has no authority over that property. Section 4 says "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government[.]" That is a good thing, but note that it is the United States, not the States themselves, that has this responsibility.

On the whole, then, it can be said that the original intent of the Founding Fathers was that when it comes to the laws created by the federal government, the States have very little authority. That does not end this "balance" inquiry, however, because the Constitution does allow the States some control over the federal government.

That control is largely in the form of electing members of the federal government. For example, Article I, Section 2 says "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states[.]" Also, the States get to determine the qualifications to be a voter. Due to the 17th Amendment, Senators are elected the same way, but originally Article I, Section 3 required that "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof." Still, assuming that the legislature of each state was chosen through popular election, even in its original form, citizens of States had a role in electing Senators. Article II, Section 1 says that the President shall be elected by the votes of each State's "electors," who are to be chosen in the manner selected by each State. This is still done today via the Electoral College, and each State is free to determine not only how the electors are chosen, but also whether and how electors will be pledged to a candidate (usually based on the popular vote). Thus, the States have an indirect control over the laws of the federal government. The President and the members of Congress make most of those laws, and the States and their voters have control over who gets to be the President and the members of Congress.

States also have some power via the 10th Amendment, which says "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." However, for purposes of the Repeal Amendment, the 10th Amendment is irrelevant because the power to repeal federal laws has been delegated to the federal government, and, furthermore, the States are expressly required to follow and enforce those federal laws.

So here's the balance contained in the Constitution as written by the Founding Fathers: Only the federal government can create federal-level laws; only the federal government can directly repeal those laws, and the States' only means of controlling federal laws is through the electoral process. In no way, shape, form, or fashion did the Founding Fathers intend for any balance between the federal government and the States to include the States being allowed to directly repeal federal laws.

Bishop and anyone who supports the Repeal Amendment can argue all they want they the Repeal Amendment is a good and/or necessary provision, but they simply are wrong when they argue that it complies with the original intent of the Founding Fathers.

And they are also wrong in claiming it is a good idea.

IV. The Repeal Amendment would alter our form of government.

A. Overview

For over 220 years, our form of government has prohibited the States from directly repealing any federal law. The Repeal Amendment would give that power to the States. Those facts alone conclusively establish that the Repeal Amendment would fundamentally alter our form of government, and there are more reasons why the Repeal Amendment would in practice likely result in sweeping changes in our system of government.

I will argue that the Repeal Amendment will not result in any positive changes on a real world practical level. I recognize that some people will disagree with me on that, but I also know this: anyone taking that position cannot use "original intent" as any kind of argument. The Repeal Amendment would obliterate the original intent of the Founding Fathers. I have barely begun showing how it does not in the least comply with original intent. I will pick up that effort with discussing the first form of government this country had after the Revolutionary War.

B. The Constitution is great and all, but let's go back to what didn't work before.

By giving the States this direct power of repeal, the Repeal Amendment would significantly weaken the central (federal) government (which should become apparent as this post goes on). Guess what? A similar sort of arrangement was tried, found not to work, and the Constitution was established to correct what had been tried before. I'm talking about the Articles of Confederation. Now, Bishop claims that "this amendment has nothing to do with...returning to the Articles of Confederation." That may be literally true, but there is no question that under the Articles of Confederation the central government was weak. Here is a description of this state of affairs:
Under the Articles each of the states retained their "sovereignty, freedom and independence." Instead of setting up executive and judicial branches of government, there was a committee of delegates composed of representatives from each state. These individuals comprised the Congress, a national legislature called for by the Articles.

The Congress was responsible for conducting foreign affairs, declaring war or peace, maintaining an army and navy and a variety of other lesser functions. But the Articles denied Congress the power to collect taxes, regulate interstate commerce and enforce laws.
While the U.S. Articles of Confederation was a plan of government based upon the principles fought for in the American Revolutionary War, it contained crucial flaws. It had no power of national taxation, no power to control trade, and it provided for a comparatively weak executive. Therefore, it could not enforce legislation. It was a "league of friendship" which was opposed to any type of national authority. The Articles of Confederation's greatest weakness, however, was that it had no direct origin in the people themselves–it knew only state sovereignty. Each state, therefore, had the power to collect its own taxes, issue currency, and provide for its own militia. The government could not govern efficiently because of a general lack of power to compel states to honor national obligations.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the challenges to maintaining a unified nation--one where the States would not be engaged in constant competition with each other and the federal government--were immense. The Constitutional Convention was called in large part to change that situation.

The Constitution gave us a strong central government. Very good arguments can be made that it has become too strong, but the Repeal Amendment is not the way to change that. In any event, a strong central government was the original intent of the Founding Fathers. The Constitution was a big change from the Articles of Confederation. If the Founding Fathers had not intended a strong central government, they would have given us a revised version of the Articles of Confederation, not a significantly different structure. And this original intent--which Bishop claims he wants to maintain--would be disregarded by the Repeal Amendment.

Moreover, as I will eventually explain, the Repeal Amendment would go beyond the problems presented by the Articles of Confederation.

C. The language that is and is not in the Repeal Amendment shows it would fundamentally change our system of government.
  • 1. Overview
In order to justify my previous statement, I need to explain why the wording of the Repeal Amendment makes it a huge, steaming, stinking pile of crap. Seriously, whoever wrote this amendment should be banned from ever again drafting anything of legal consequence.

In our country, the one thing that is determinative in any kind of legal question regarding contracts, statutes, regulations, and Constitutional provisions is the language. If the words used are clear and unambiguous, then the language controls, and nothing can be used to alter the meaning of the language. For example, let's say you, dear reader, agree to sell me a box of widgets for $100, and we sign a contract that says just that. I then refuse to pay you more than $10. We end up in court, and I say to the judge, "Well, your honor, we never intended for me to pay $100. The truth is that we agreed I would pay only $10." The judge will then ask me "Why didn't you put that in the contract, and why did you sign the contract for $100?" No answer I could possibly give would change the inevitable result: the judge will rule that I have to pay you $100, and he might fine me for being a dumbass and wasting the court's time. With statutes, regulations, and Constitutions, it can be a little more complicated. Other laws can be examined that could have an impact on the meaning of a given provision. For instance, certain words or terms used in one specific statute might be defined in another statute. When the two statutes are read together, the language of both will decide the issue.

Bishop claims that the Repeal Amendment is a "a measured and targeted tool for states to reverse particular congressional acts and administrative regulations so long as two-thirds reach a consensus." One problem is that the language of the Repeal Amendment shows that it could easily become a tool of immeasurable impact that could target anything and everything. Notice that there is no express limiting language in the Repeal Amendment. For instance, it does not say that it will be limited to statutes and regulations. Instead, it says that it will apply to "Any provision of law or regulation of the United States..." That's a very target-rich environment.

Given the broad language of the Repeal Amendment and the lack of limiting language, the Repeal Amendment contains no real limitation in terms of scope and reach. That scope includes more than legislation and regulations. Concievably it could include almost every action taken by any branch of the federal government.
  • 2. The Repeal Amendment, as written, applies to the Constitution itself.
Take another look at the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land[.]" (emphasis added). The Constitution is a "law of the United States" and thus--under the express terms of the Repeal Amendment--any part or all of the Constitution would be subject to repeal.

Let that sink in for a moment...Take a deep breath. And anyone who might want to say that the Repeal Amendment is not intended to do that or that it would not be used for that, well, you need to take another breath and prepare yourself to be schooled. In other words, if that is what you think, you are mistaken.

Now let's apply the principles discussed in IV.C.1 above to the U.S. Constitution and the Repeal Amendment. The Repeal Amendment says it would apply to "Any provision of law of the United States." The word "any" is clear and self explanatory. Likewise for the word "provision." This is particularly true since the Repeal Amendment does not provide any definition for these words which would alter their plain meaning. The term "law of the United States" does not have an obvious meaning and is not defined in the Repeal Amendment, so could there be another law which could define that term? Why, yes--that would be the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which, as shown above, declares that the Constitution is a "law of the United States." So, the Repeal Amendment could be used to repeal all or part of the Constitution. If whoever wrote this piece of crap had not wanted it to apply to the Constitution, he could have--and should have--written that in the Repeal Amendment. The bottom line is that regardless of what the drafter intended, the Repeal Amendment could be used to repeal all or part of the Constitution.

Now I know what some of you are thinking...You're thinking that 1) the Supremacy Clause makes a distinction between the Constitution and "the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof," and 2) "law or regulation of the United States" as used in the Repeal Amendment does not mean the Constitution. Nice try, but you are wrong. In the Supremacy Clause, there are three items which, while separate, are nonetheless each listed as being "the supreme law of the land." That means that the Constitution and "laws of the United States...made in the pursuance thereof" are part of the same group, as in if one is considered a "law of the United States" for purposes of the Repeal Amendment, then so is the other. There are other arguments I can make, but I really don't see the need.

In any event, the way the Repeal Amendment is written, it applies to the Constitution. And that is a huge change in our system. You see, the Constitution already sets out a procedure for repealing its provisions. It's called the amendment process, and it is set out in Article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress[.]
Two things to note: 1) this is a two-step process--proposal of amendments and then ratification by the States, and 2) ratification must come from 3/4 of the States. The Repeal Amendment would basically reduce the process to one step AND would require approval of 2/3, not 3/4, of the States. The Founding Fathers' original intent for repealing Constitutional provisions was clearly to make it a difficult process and require approval by 3/4 of the States. The Repeal Amendment--despite Bishop's bullshit claims to the contrary--obliterates that original intent.

Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Repeal Amendment would be used to repeal provisions of the Constitution. Lest anyone think my efforts would be better spent searching for Bigfoot or investigating the Illuminati, read on...

As one would expect, there are various "conservative" groups in Texas which strongly oppose the current health care reform law. What makes that opposition relevant to this discussion is one thing they are advocating as "reform" for health care. One such group in the Texas Public Policy Foundation, which is openly calling for the Texas Legislature and our glorious governor (that's sarcasm, folks) to enact what is called the "Health Care Compact," which seeks to put control of health care in the States and would allow States to completely disregard any federal laws pertaining to health care. However, the Health Care Compact does call for all State-run health care laws to be funded by the federal government. I have not checked regarding any state other than Texas, but the Health Care Compact site has information on what states across the country are doing. The Texas House is attempting to pass a health care compact right now. A "compact" is "A voluntary arrangement between two or more states that is designed to solve their common problems and that becomes part of the laws of each state." Remember that I said earlier that Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution lists some things that States can do only with the consent of Congress? Well, one of those things is a compact. Under the Constitution, there can be no interstate compacts without the approval of Congress.

So, it doesn't matter how many states want to adopt the Health Care Compact because those compacts will be meaningless unless Congress approves them. In the case of health care, there is no chance that is going to happen unless there is a major change in Congress, and I don't see that kind of change happening. I could be wrong, but I don't think I am. However, if the Repeal Amendment is in place, the provision of the Constitution which requires Congressional approval could be repealed. And what do you know? The Texas Public Policy Foundation is advocating that State legislatures try to get the Repeal Amendment established (see the bottom of p. 1 and top of p. 2). Health care is one of the top "hot button" issues in this country right now, and one way to get rid of "Obamacare" (other than through the courts, and as I have discussed elsewhere, I don't think that is going to happen anytime soon, if at all) would be through compacts, but that can't happen unless the Constitutional provision requiring Congressional approval is eliminated. The Repeal Amendment could do that. Anyone who thinks that could not be done under the Repeal Amendment (as currently worded) is simply wrong, and anyone who thinks that there would not be an attempt to use the Repeal Amendment in this way on this issue is simply naive.

But wait...there's more.
  • 3. The Repeal Amendment would also apply to treaties.
Just as the language of the Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution and statutes are "laws of the United States," treaties are also such laws and thus subject to the Repeal Amendment as well. Now there's a good idea.

Under Article II, Section 2 the President is the only person or group authorized to make treaties on behalf of the nation. The only other group involved in the treaty process is the Senate, which must approve each treaty by a 2/3 majority before it becomes effective. Under the Constitution, the States have absolutely no authority of any kind to make or approve treaties. In fact, Article I, Section 10 expressly says "No state shall enter into any treaty[.]" In light of all of this, I would argue the Constitution shows clearly that the original intent of the Founding Fathers was that the States would have absolutely no role or power in the negotiation, making, approving, OR repealing of any treaties, and I challenge anyone to make a plausible argument to the contrary.

Anyone who might think about trying should first consider these statements from the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937):
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Convention, said that, if a treaty does not supersede existing state laws as far as they contravene its operation, the treaty would be ineffective. "To counteract it by the supremacy of the state laws, would bring on the Union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war." 3 Elliot's Debates 515. And see Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall.199, 236-237. And while this rule in respect of treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national government, and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316, et seq. In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.
Now does anybody want to argue that the Founding Fathers original intent was to let the States have any power regarding treaties?

To summarize, my argument is 1) treaties are "laws of the United States;" 2) the Repeal Amendment says it applies to any law of the United States; 3) since the Repeal Amendment does not contain any limiting language, it does not say that it does not apply to treaties; and thus 4) the Repeal Amendment could be used to repeal treaties of the United States.

Assuming that I am correct, the Repeal Amendment, by extending its reach to treaties, would once again affect a major change in our governmental system and violate the original intent of the Founding Fathers.

But wait...there's more.
  • 4. The Repeal Amendment might apply to Supreme Court decisions.
Under our system of government, rulings of the Supreme Court are also considered "the law of the land." The Repeal Amendment does not specifically mention Supreme Court rulings, so maybe it thus would not apply to the Supremes, but the absence of an express exclusion means that maybe the Repeal Amendment could be used to overturn Supreme Court decisions.

My use of "overturn" is an indication that perhaps the Repeal Amendment would not apply to court rulings. The term "repeal" is not used in relation to judicial decisions. They are overturned, vacated, and/or reversed. Also the Congress can effectively render a Supreme Court ruling ineffective by repealing legislation or passing new legislation which addresses the ruling. However, that is not referred to as a "repeal," nor is it a direct reversal of a Supreme Court decision. On the other hand, check out this definition of "repeal:" "to annul an existing law, by passage of a repealing statute, or by public vote on a referendum." And then there is this definition: "to rescind or annul by authoritative act[.]" The Repeal Amendment would require an authoritative act by State legislatures, and the legislative resolution called for under the Repeal Amendment would necessarily be granted the same effect as a statute passed by said legislatures. In other words, it seems that "repeal" depends on the nature of the action taken to annul a law, not the nature of the law sought to be annulled, meaning that perhaps the Repeal Amendment would apply to judicial decisions.

By the way, the nature of statutes and resolutions will be discussed in IV.C.8 below...

In any event, I would lay odds that Bishop and his supporters would love to overturn lots of Supreme Court decisions, starting with Roe v. Wade. Bishop is the founder of The Tenth Amendment Task Force, a group dedicated to reducing the power of the federal government and giving power to the States. According to most 10th Amendment advocates, the Supreme Court has long been a major culprit in what they see as the wrongful expansion of federal power. The temptation to use the Repeal Amendment to overturn those troublesome Supreme Court decisions might just be too great for Bishop and supporters of the Repeal Amendment.

But wait...there's still more.
  • 5. What about Executive Orders?
As explained here, an Executive Order is "A presidential policy directive that implements or interprets a federal statute, a constitutional provision, or a treaty," and in some instances it has the same force and effect as law. In other words, some Executive Orders could be considered "laws of the United States" pursuant to the Repeal Amendment. That would mean that the States could directly invalidate an action that is within the exclusive authority of the Executive Branch of the federal government. By the way, that same description is applicable to the Repeal Amendment's application to treaties.

Once again, this would constitute a power that never was contemplated by the Founding Fathers. See, they came up with a way to try to restrain such Presidential power. It's called the system of checks and balances. Under that system, the Congress could enact legislation to counter some Executive Orders, and the Supreme Court could rule such orders to be illegal.

Take a good look at that last paragraph because it foreshadows a discussion of one of the major problems with the Repeal Amendment...
  • 6. The Repeal Amendment has no limitation on how many times it can be used.
In his announcement about reintroducing the Repeal Amendment, Bishop says this:
The tenants [not a misprint, by the way] of the Repeal Amendment are simple: if two-thirds of the states collectively find a federal law or regulation abhorrent or misguided, they should have the power to repeal said law or regulation. The law would then be sent back to Washington for further consideration, at which time Congress may choose not to act again on the matter, or they may vote to override the states’ repeal and pass it in finality.
(emphasis added). I'm confused. Where does the text of the Repeal Amendment say that Congress can override the States' repeal and pass it in finality? Oh wait--I'm not confused because the Repeal Amendment says no such thing. Compare that to what the Constitution says about the President's veto power, namely that Congress can indeed repass the rejected legislation (by a 2/3 majority) and that such action is a finality. In other words, the Constitution expressly says that the President can use the veto power one time only for a given piece of legislation. The Repeal Amendment contains no language even implying a similar set up. And again, any intention by Bishop to include such a limitation is irrelevant because of the absence of such limiting language.

That means that--once again--the Repeal Amendment does not mean what Bishop says it means. Let's say that Congress passes a bill that the President signs, making it a law. 33 States don't like the law, so they invoke the Repeal Amendment. The bill goes back to Congress, and once again Congress passes it and the President signs it. Under the express terms of the Repeal Amendment, the same 33 States could once again repeal the law. And this could go on and on and on because the Repeal Amendment contains no language to stop it.

And that fact foreshadows another discussion of a major problem with the Repeal Amendment...
  • 7. The Repeal Amendment could distort the "will of the people."
Almost all the articles or columns I read about the Repeal Amendment highlighted the fact that it says only that it requires the action of 33 States. As Dana Milbank put it, "The mechanics of the amendment are also a bit odd. It would allow the repeal of any federal law - from civil rights to health care - if two-thirds of the states say so. But that could mean that the 33 smallest states, which have 33 percent of the population, have the power to overrule the 17 largest states, which have 67 percent of the population."

The Founding Fathers faced a similar problem, but their solution was part of the system of checks and balances. At the Constitutional Convention, some wanted a system of representation based only on population. However, others felt that this would marginalize the least populous states. So, the Founding Fathers came up with the "Connecticut Compromise." That gave us our bicameral legislature in which the House of Representatives is based on population and the Senate has two Senators from each State. That set up, plus the fact that legislation must pass both the House and the Senate, allows for the population majority to be heard while the population minority is protected from always being shut out.

What the Repeal Amendment would do is effectively create a unicameral overseer that could thwart the will of the majority of people in this country. I don't care how anyone tries to spin that. There is no way that is what the Founding Fathers intended, and it would constitute a fundamental change in our system of government.
  • 8. There would be no check or balance for the Repeal Amendment.
Given the scope of the Repeal Amendment in terms of how many laws to which it could be applied and no limit on how many times it could be invoked, there is nothing to act as a check or balance for it. Thus, the Repeal Amendment would directly affect the system of checks and balances which is in many ways the hallmark of our form of government. Such effect would necessarily occur because one other entity, the States, would be put in the system, and in some ways that new entity would have more power than than the three branches of the federal government. Why? The Repeal Amendment would give the States authority over all federal actions while no one branch has that authority. Also, under our current system, each branch of the federal government is subject to various checks and balances in the control of the other branches, while under the Repeal Amendment the power held by the States would not face any checks or balances. There is no way that the Founding Fathers intended for any entity or entities to have have such unchecked power.

I need to discuss a specific element of the checks and balances system, namely judicial review. Judicial review is the process by which the courts determine whether specific laws are legal. More specifically, courts will decide whether specific laws are Constitutional. The Repeal Amendment would not be subject to judicial review because it would be part of the Constitution, and the Courts have no authority to declare any part of the Constitution illegal. As a result, the only way to check or limit the Repeal Amendment would be to amend the provision to include limitations or repeal it via the amendment process of Article V. Of course, I am assuming that the amendment process would still be in place.

There is another aspect to this checks and balances analysis. Recall that under the Repeal Amendment 2/3 of the State legislatures must pass a resolution calling for the repeal of a given federal law. So, just what is a resolution? A full explanation can be found at The Free Dictionary, and I will quote excepts from that page. For starters, a resolution is "The official expression of the opinion or will of a legislative body." It is no more and no less. For purposes of this discussion, a fundamental point is that "Resolutions are not laws; they differ fundamentally in their purpose." As stated in the first quote, resolutions are basically opinions, and
When resolutions are mere expressions of opinion, they differ fundamentally from laws. In essence, laws are intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or issues in general; moreover, they are enforceable. By contrast, resolutions expressing the views of lawmakers are limited to a specific issue or event. They are neither intended to be permanent nor to be enforceable. Nor do they carry the weight of court opinions. In a certain respect, they resemble the opinions expressed by a newspaper on its editorial page, but they are nonetheless indicative of the ideas and values of elected representatives and, as such, commonly mirror the outlook of voters.
(emphasis added). So, the Repeal Amendment would allow something which has no legal effect to get rid of actual laws. In other words, something which did not have to go through the entire process of becoming a law and thus enforceable can be used to negate something which did have to go through a rigorous process in order to be enforceable, and I will soon show what that has to do with checks and balances.

The general rule is that resolutions do not have the effect of law. There is an exception.
When both houses adopt the same motion, it is called a joint resolution. Besides carrying the greater force of unanimity, the joint resolution also has a specific legal value in state and federal government. When such a resolution has been approved by the president or a chief executive—or passed with the president's approval—it has the effect of law. In some states a joint resolution is treated as a bill. It can become a law if it is properly passed and signed by the chief executive officer.
Here in America (at both the federal and State level) legislative actions become law if they are bills which pass the entire legislature and are either signed by the chief executive (President of governor) or passed again over a veto by the chief executive. That is where the American system of checks and balances comes into play. However, under the Repeal Amendment, none of that applies. A State legislature can pass a resolution, and without approval by the chief executive, that resolution in effect becomes something that can overturn a law that has gone through the normal legislative process. The State legislature gets to act completely on its own with nothing to check or balance that power. Just how American is that?

There is a greater than zero chance that someone will think that the Repeal Amendment simply mirrors a way that the Constitution can be amended. Indeed, Article V says that one of the ways proposed amendments can be created is "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states"--as in the legislatures acting alone without approval of the chief executive. However, such application is but one step in the process. It is not the only or final step, whereas under the Repeal Amendment, such action is the only step needed to repeal virtually any federal law. And that one step is not subject to any checks or balances at the State or federal level.

D. Summary

The Repeal Amendment would fundamentally change our system of government by giving the States direct power over federal laws--power that the States have never had under the Constitution, and power that the Founding Fathers never intended the States to have. Moreover, that power could extend to almost every action taken by any and all branches of the federal government. Indeed, the Repeal Amendment--as written--could be used to repeal all or part of the Constitution itself. The Repeal Amendment would not be subject to any of the checks and balances that have become a hallmark of American government. Not only that, but under the Repeal Amendment, it would be possible for 33% of the American population to dictate policy to the other 67%. Our Constitution and our form of democracy have never envisioned such a result, and yet that could happen under the Repeal Amendment.

V. The Repeal Amendment would produce bad results.

A. Overview

And now we get down to the real heart of the matter. I could maybe live with the fact that the Repeal Amendment would toss out most of the governmental system that has been in place for over 220 years if it is likely to result in something positive, but, as I said, the Repeal Amendment is a huge, steaming, stinking pile of crap, and that, my fellow Americans, will not produce good results.

If the Repeal Amendment actually becomes an amendment, I predict there will be gridlock and political bovine fecal matter the likes of which we have never seen. Take all the political strife and rancor we have now and multiply it by at least a factor of 10.

B. Gridlock

As for the gridlock, I'm sure some people would say it could not get any worse. One perpetual complaint (which has a lot of validity) is that there is too much red tape in our government. Now into that structure, throw in one more element--the States under the Repeal Amendment. How is that going to help the situation? Here's a clue: it won't.

Here are some gridlock scenarios:
  • As I described in IV.C.6 above, Congress could pass a law, the States repeal it, the Congress repasses the law, the States repeal it, and so on and so on. Nothing will get done by Congress. No progress will be made. That's gridlock.
  • Congress passes a law, the States repeal it, Congress tries to pass a new law that addresses the States' objections, but can't do it because of the regular gridlock that typically grips Congress.
  • Congress passes a law, the States repeal it, Congress passes a law which does address the States' concerns, but the new law--unlike the previous one--is objectionable to the President, so he vetoes it, and the Congress cannot override the veto. So we have a stalemate, otherwise known as gridlock.
And something close to these scenarios could play out in regard to regulations. A given federal agency goes through the entire required process of writing, proposing, publicly posting, investigating, allowing and receiving public comment, holding hearings, etc., enacts a given regulation, and then the States repeal it. The agency then goes through the process again, and the States repeal the regulation again, etc.

There are other ways in which the Repeal Amendment would likely cause massive gridlock, but I will describe them as I discuss some of the other adverse results sure to follow the Repeal Amendment.

C. Things will be worse than under the Articles of Confederation.

Recall that in III.C and IV.B I explained that
  • the "balance" in the Constitution is that there would be a strong central government in which States would have little to no direct control over federal laws;
  • under the Constitution the States are obligated to follow and enforce federal laws;
  • the Constitution was intentionally designed to correct the flaws in the Articles of Confederation, chiefly the lack of a strong central government
  • under the Articles of Confederation, the States retained full sovereignty, meaning that they were under no obligation to obey laws of the national government and the national government had no way to enforce any of its laws.
However, under the Articles of Confederation, the States had no power to directly repeal national laws, and that is why the Repeal Amendment would be worse in operation than the Articles of Confederation.

Before explaining myself, I need to explain the term "de facto." This is Latin for "in fact." In the legal world, this term is used to describe something that might not on its face or technically be a given thing but in operation--in fact--it is that given thing. For instance, a law might not be discriminatory in appearance, but the way the law actually works and the effects it produces could make the law "de facto" discriminatory.

I have already shown that the Repeal Amendment on its face would give the States powers they have never had before and violate the original intent of the Founding Fathers. What is not apparent on the surface is the degree to which the Repeal Amendment would weaken the federal government and cause huge problems in our nation. What I will show is that the Repeal Amendment is a de facto tool to severely weaken the federal government.

Basically, the Repeal Amendment could turn our whole system of government around and put the States in control of national law. This is not readily apparent because the Repeal Amendment on its face only gives the power to repeal federal law. It does not give the States power to create and enforce laws on a national level. However, its operation, as a practical matter, could give the States those powers.

Think I'm crazy? Granted, my aluminum foil hat might not be fitting properly, but that doesn't mean I am wrong about this.

Review my gridlock scenarios and then consider the following. The States, through their unchecked and unlimited power under the Repeal Amendment, could keep invalidating any law passed by Congress. The States could keep doing this until Congress enacted a law that met with those States' approval. If that happened, the States in fact would have forced Congress to do what they wanted. From then on, the States could do that with any federal law to which the Repeal Amendment applies (which I have shown is damn near all of them). Eventually Congress could end up seeking the approval of at least 33 States before drafting and or voting on any legislation, and if that happened, then once again the Repeal Amendment would be a de facto tool to get the federal government to take orders from the States.

Now, I know what some of you are thinking. You're thinking that there is no way I can prove that this will happen. That is true, but neither can anyone prove or guarantee that it won't happen--and that is the point. Because the Repeal Amendment has no limitations of the power it would grant, everything I describe in the previous paragraph could happen.

Moreover, I maintain all of that is more likely than not to happen. If the Repeal Amendment became law, it would do so by riding a wave of anti-Washington, pro-States sentiment, and I would bet that a lot of people would want to invoke the Repeal Amendment as soon as possible. I kid you not when I say that I think it would be somewhat like the Roman games as depicted in the movie "Gladiator"--"the people" will want Washington blood, the Repeal Amendment will be the most direct way to get it, and if they don't get it, things are going to get out of hand. Is that a little too harsh? Well, try this on for size...Making the Repeal Amendment law and then not using it will be similar to giving an 18-year old a brand new Porsche and telling him he can only drive around the block at 20 mph--but no one is going to make sure he only does that. It's just unreasonable to think he is going to comply.

Now back to why the Repeal Amendment will weaken the national government more than the Articles of Confederation. Under the Articles, the States did not have to follow national directives, but the States did not have the power to repeal national laws. Under the Repeal Amendment, the States would have that power, which means the States would have the ability to directly and indirectly dictate national law and policy (as described three paragraphs above). That will weaken the national government far more than the Articles of Confederation could have. Another way to view this is that under the Articles of Confederation, the national government was weak by design and at its creation. The Repeal Amendment would take the strong national government designed and established by the Constitution and erode it.

And this is just the start of what could happen under the Repeal Amendment.

D. Think "Washington" is bad now? Just wait until another layer is added.

Here are common complaints about "Washington:" too much red tape and inefficiency, lobbyists have too much influence, there is too much corruption, and members of Congress are too concerned about their own personal interests.

I have news for everyone...the Repeal Amendment will not solve these problems and will only make them worse. Think about it. "Washington" will still exist, even if the federal government is weakened. Since the Repeal Amendment would still leave the direct legislative and executive power in the federal government, there still have to be lawmakers in Washington, and that means there will still be lobbyists and corruptive influences there. However, there would also be new people who could have both a direct and indirect power over national law and policy--the legislators in each State. Overnight, lobbyists, corporate interests, fundraisers, and general douchebags would not limit themselves to Washington. Suddenly there would be 50 more places for these people to infest. Yes, I know that they are already there now, but the Repeal Amendment would give them another reason and another objective. Right now, State legislators have no power over what happens in "Washington," but under the Repeal Amendment they would. The Repeal Amendment would thus give lobbyists and other corrupting influences more opportunities to do that voodoo that they do so well--and more ways to mess up our national system, by subjecting it to more corruption and inefficiency. The Repeal Amendment will not streamline the federal lawmaking process. It will instead have the potential to bog it down and dirty it up even more.

As I said in V.B above, adding another element to the national governing structure would increase gridlock, and now I will say that adding that additional element would make things more "Washington"-like. Think about it. If "Washington" is already too complicated, layered, and inefficient, does it make sense to add another layer? How is that going to solve anything? And the reality is that the Repeal Amendment would add not just one element or layer, but more like 50, as in every single state. Every single State would have the ability to affect national policy. That means that not only would the country have to deal with 545 members of Congress but every single legislator in every single State. That would certainly add tremendously to the probability that "Washington" problems would spread and increase tremendously. That would, among other things, add to the inefficiency of government.

And by the way, an increase in inefficiency could lead to an increase in gridlock.

E. State governments will be less about their own States.

Furthermore, the Repeal Amendment would adversely affect the lawmaking process in the States. Once States--through their legislatures--have power under the Repeal Amendment, my guess is that the States' governments will increasingly be concerned with national laws and policies and less focused on what is going on at home.

Think about how much State campaigns and politics have been mostly about national issues. If you want to claim otherwise, you simply have not been paying attention. So many campaigns talk about what's wrong with "Washington," and candidates go to great efforts to convince voters that they are not like "Washington insiders." Candidates either try to hitch themselves to popular things about their party's performance in the federal government or they try to distance themselves from items in said performance that are not popular with their electorate. State elections are often analyzed as being some sort of referendum on either the Democratic or Republican party nationwide. States are now "Red" and "Blue," as in Republican or Democratic, and that has everything to do with national, not State, politics. In other words, politics at every level has become not just hyper partisan but has also become viewed as being tied to national politics.

And it is in this climate that the Repeal Amendment would take effect. Candidates for State office would no doubt promise voters that they would "fix Washington" because now they would have the power to do just that. This climate in combination with what I set out in V.D above would cause State governments to start focusing on and spending more time and effort on national matters, which would necessarily mean their time spent on State matters would decrease.

The Repeal Amendment would also require States to seek allies among and deals with other States. Those efforts will take up time and energy that could otherwise be spent on matters of State government that would actually affect individual States.

This increased emphasis on national policy, decreased attention to State matters, and need to make deals could also result in massive gridlock at the State level. For instance, some legislators in an individual State might not act on State-related legislation until they can get deals from other legislators on national Repeal Amendment issues, and vice versa. Other legislators in that State could refuse to act on all sorts of matters until some sort of deal was worked out with other States regarding Repeal Amendment issues. And while all of this would be going on, there would be the real potential of nothing much getting done in State legislatures. And there would be more wheeling and dealing within a single State's legislature. Why? Because there would be an increase in the number of matters subject to deal-making as a result of the effect of the Repeal Amendment, and that could once again lead to more gridlock.

F. Summary

I have not discussed all the possible effects of the Repeal Amendment. However, I will say that I feel it s probable that everything I have discussed will happen. To those who feel differently I say that the Repeal Amendment is at best a ticking time bomb of unintended consequences. This is particularly true because the Repeal Amendment contains no limitation as to its scope and reach and frequency with which it can be used. Because of those facts, I believe no one can make a credible claim that what I have described will not happen at all. It is also possible that somehow everyone would realize the need for control and discretion regarding the Repeal Amendment, but that would depend on a mass outbreak of common sense and civility, and sadly, I don't see that happening.

Unless I am wrong in my previous pessimistic pronouncement, the Repeal Amendment will not solve any problems and will in fact create more problems by eroding the national government structure as established by the Constitution, increasing gridlock at the federal and State levels, and turning the whole country into "Washington." The Repeal Amendment as it exists now is simply an extraordinarily bad idea.

Wednesday, June 08, 2011

Upcoming post and some random observations

For some time now I have been working on a lengthy (of course) post on something called the Repeal Amendment. It is one of the dumbest ideas I have seen in a long time. The Repeal Amendment would allow 33 States to repeal or otherwise get rid of just about any federal law (which includes so much more than statutes passed by Congress). As I will explain in the post, the Repeal Amendment obliterates the original intent of the Founding Fathers, would create chaos, and could start the dismantling of our form of government which has been in place for over 220 years.

Now for some random thoughts (which could be the fodder for future posts):
  • Anthony Weiner is a complete idiot. His stupidity could cause serious damage that goes way beyond his career.
  • Sarah Palin really needs to shut the hell up and go away.
  • Same goes for Michele Bachmann.
  • Wisconsin Republicans are pathetic.
  • This is one of my shortest posts ever. Don't get used to it.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

My favorite whipping boy declares for 2012.

Over the years, there have been more than a few people I have delighted in treating as whipping boys (damn near anyone in the George W. Bush administration) and some whipping girls (Hillary Clinton chief among them), but at the top of the list is Newt Gingrinch. Among all those people, he is, in my opinion, the biggest amoral, reprehensible, self-centered, hypocritical asshole.

Seriously.

And now he has decided to once again run for President.

I can't stand Donald Trump. I didn't think it possible, but his antics the last few months have made him an even bigger buffoon than he was before. And yet I would rather have him as President than Newt.

Seriously.

In December 2006, Newt was contemplating running for President in 2008, and that prompted me to write a 7-part series entitled "Newt Gingrich--what a swell guy!" Here are the links to that series:
I followed that up in March 2007 with Newt Gingrich admits past infidelity, but swears he's no hypocrite.

And just when I thought I was done with Newt for a while, last summer he started sending out signals that he was going to run in 2012, so I did a review and update on his abject lack of character.

And while I was writing that post, Newt had to go and spew all sorts of inaccurate and inflammatory bullshit about the so called "Ground Zero Mosque." I responded with three posts:
Here's what I wrote in the opening of the first of those posts: "His statements about the Muslim community center and mosque are complete bullshit and show what a bombastic, self-serving douchebag he is." And then I proceeded to back that up in a big way.

And now Newt is running for President again.

Josh Marshall had some interesting initial observations over at Talking Points Memo:

Jon Alter and David Corn are on Hardball right now working their way through Newt Gingrich's history of ferociously crazy and borderline eliminationist rhetoric going back 30 years. And it's almost comical: because watching, you can sort of see that they are defeated by the sheer volume of completely clownish and wildly intemperate statements. Where do you possibly start?

In recent history we know Obama as crazed machete-waving Luo tribesman, and the secular socialist, anti-colonialist version, the constant comparisons of Democrats to Nazis and Gulag operators.

But for me it all goes back to that epic moment on the eve of the 1994 GOP congressional blowout when Gingrich took that horrible tragic example of the Susan Smith murders -- the young woman who murdered her little kids down in South Carolina -- and used it as an example of the results of Democratic social safety net programs and the need to vote Republican to keep crazy young mothers from murdering their children and blaming it on black men. It was somewhere around then when he said that Democrats were "traitors" and the "enemy of normal Americans."

At some level this is what I almost admire about Gingrich -- in the face of the universe, in almost every waking moment, he announces that he is balls-up to shame. It just ain't his bag. 'Admiring' isn't the right word. It's more like the way that even though I don't like slasher films I can sort of get that there's a level of art or gory sublimity to it. And that's Gingrich, not a politician or even a mere huckster, but something much more than that, a right-wing performance artist who for a critical decade or so overlapped with the real world of electoral politics and ascended to the highest echelons of power. The almost appealing slasher barging in on the carefree picnic day of our political life.

In many ways, Josh summed up Gingrich, but I urge everyone to check out the links Josh provided for many more details about what Newt has been doing lately. This guy will never change.

During the 2008 campaign, I was on a mission to show people why Hillary Clinton should not be President. I will do the same regarding Newt for 2012.

Sunday, May 01, 2011

Bin Laden is dead, and somehow it will be declared a bad thing by the Republicans.

Obama just announced that Osama bin Laden is dead. I'm sure many Republicans and the idiots at Faux News will claim that the only reason Obama killed Osama is that bin Laden had the real Obama birth certificate showing that Obama was born in Indoghanistanipak or some such.

Thursday, February 24, 2011

"Curveball" finally confesses what we already knew.

As reported by MSNBC last week, "An Iraqi defector who went by the codename 'Curveball' has publicly admitted for the first time that he made up stories about mobile bioweapons trucks and secret factories to try to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime."

Then again, this really isn't big news, because it has been known for years that this man outright lied about the bioweapons. As I noted on April 13, 2006, Curveball (real name Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi) had been provided by the Iraqi National Congress, the group led by Ahmed Chalabi. This is important because, as I noted on February 22, 2005, Chalabi admitted that he and his group had lied about WMDs and Saddam having ties to Al Qeada. By the time of my April 13, 2006, post, it had already been established that Curveball had lied about the bioweapons.

My anger now, as then, is not directed at Curveball. Rather my anger is on the assholes in the Bush administration that used Curveball's lies to build the case for war. The April 13, 2006, post and a post from February 13, 2007, discuss how Curveball's "info" and other so-called "intelligence" was used by the Bush administration in spinning its false reasons for going to war. As I noted in that later post, Curveball--and many of the Iraqi defector sources--was considered unreliable by the U.S. intelligence community, but that didn't matter to Bush, Wolfowitless, Rumskull, and the others. Also seriously at fault are British and German intelligence officials, but I'll get to that part of the story later.

By the way, in 2007, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Bob Drogin published a book enititled Curveball--Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War. I bought it about a week before the story of Curveball's confession broke. I have yet to read it, but will get to it soon.

The MSNBC article gave some details about what was known about Curveball's lack of credibility before the war, including the fact that Tyler Drumheller, then the head of the CIA in Europe, warned Bush officials before the war that Curveball was likely lying. The rest of what is in the MSNBC article is a shorter version of what was in a February 15 article in the Guardian. That article was based in part on interviews with Curveball, and it painted an ugly picture.
In a series of meetings with the Guardian in Germany where he has been granted asylum, he said he had told a German official, who he identified as Dr Paul, about mobile bioweapons trucks throughout 2000. He said the BND (German Secret Service) had identified him as a Baghdad-trained chemical engineer and approached him shortly after 13 March of that year, looking for inside information about Saddam's Iraq.
*******
Janabi claimed he was first exposed as a liar as early as mid-2000, when the BND travelled to a Gulf city, believed to be Dubai, to speak with his former boss at the Military Industries Commission in Iraq, Dr Bassil Latif.

The Guardian has learned separately that British intelligence officials were at that meeting, investigating a claim made by Janabi that Latif's son, who was studying in Britain, was procuring weapons for Saddam.

That claim was proven false, and Latif strongly denied Janabi's claim of mobile bioweapons trucks and another allegation that 12 people had died during an accident at a secret bioweapons facility in south-east Baghdad.

The German officials returned to confront him with Latif's version. "He says, 'There are no trucks,' and I say, 'OK, when [Latif says] there no trucks then [there are none],'" Janabi recalled.

He said the BND did not contact him again until the end of May 2002. But he said it soon became clear that he was still being taken seriously.

He claimed the officials gave him an incentive to speak by implying that his then pregnant Moroccan-born wife may not be able to travel from Spain to join him in Germany if he did not co-operate with them. "He says, you work with us or your wife and child go to Morocco."

The meetings continued throughout 2002 and it became apparent to Janabi that a case for war was being constructed. He said he was not asked again about the bioweapons trucks until a month before Powell's (pre-war United Nations) speech.

After the speech, Janabi said he called his handler at the BND and accused the secret service of breaking an agreement that they would not share anything he had told them with another country. He said he was told not to speak and placed in confinement for around 90 days.
(emphasis added). Unbelievable. The man was caught lying by the British and the Germans, admitted that he was lying, and yet the Brits and especially the Germans treated his "information" as truth. And even though the Bush administration had been presented with warnings that Curveball was lying, they did nothing about that and continued for several years to claim that he was telling the truth.

Monday, January 24, 2011

Second post on the courts and the indvidual mandate

I. Overview

This post will examine the individual mandate in light of some of the law applicable to the question of its constitutionality. As I previously stated, "Anyone who wants to claim that this issue is simple and straightforward is, in my opinion, wrong," and I think this post will prove that.

Then again, this post will not be as complicated as it could be. I will examine the individual mandate under a Commerce Clause analysis only. That was the only issue decided by Judge Hudson in the Virginia case. He did not rule on--and I will not discuss in this post--the 10th Amendment issue. Instead, this post will analyze whether the individual mandate is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause.

As will be shown, the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause are often used in tandem in Commerce Clause cases. Often when a case is overall a Commerce Clause case, the Necessary and Proper Clause becomes the determinative factor. I believe that is true in the case of the individual mandate. Although much has been said about whether the individual mandate is proper under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, I believe that whether the individual mandate is constitutional depends on the Necessary and Proper Clause. In my opinion, the individual mandate, standing alone, does not comply with the Commerce Clause. However, I believe it is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Here 's a preview...I think that under current law, the individual mandate is constitutional. In addition to explaining my opinion, I will also present arguments based on current law that could be a basis for striking down the individual mandate. Sections II and III set out the legal basics. Sections IV-IX discuss the how current law favors the individual mandate. As will become apparent in that discussion, I think that how the argument in favor of the individual mandate is structured is very important. The focus needs to be on regulating health care, not health insurance. Sections V.C and D begin the explanation for that opinion and the discussion of how the individual mandate could be declared unconstitutional. That discussion continues in Section XI. Before that, in Section X, I will explain why I think Judge Hudson's ruling in the Virginia case is wrong. And finally, I will present a conclusion in Section XII.

Although I think that under current law the individual mandate is legal, I still am not sure how the Supreme Court will rule. The Supremes are free to make changes in some of the law, create some law, and rule the individual mandate unconstitutional.

Like I said, this is a complicated issue. Now for the proof...

II. There is a vast amount of precedent to evaluate.

The Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause have been interpreted and evaluated by our courts practically since the birth of our Constitution. That means there is a vast amount of precedent that is relevant to any question involving both of them.

For a primer on the Commerce Clause and the judicial precedent related to it, this Wikipedia article is good. If you read that and get a case of tired head, just realize that that article qualifies as the proverbial tip of the iceberg. You might instead want to start with this column by Stuart Taylor. It concisely discusses some of the factors at play in this litigation about the individual mandate.

So, generally speaking, there is a vast amount of precedent regarding the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. And there is a reason why much of it will necessarily have to be considered in this case. Judge George Steeh wrote the following in his order upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate:
The Court has never needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction advanced by plaintiffs because in every Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity. In this regard, the Health Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.
"Issue of first impression" is an issue that has never been presented to and decided by the Courts, especially the Supreme Court. There will be cases that have facts the same or similar to earlier rulings, or precedent. In those cases, precedent will be applied. However, sometimes issues arise in a case for which there is no precedent. In those cases of "first impression," Courts have to find reasoning from other precedent on which to base a ruling. This necessarily requires a wider review of precedent and more work. And that is pretty much what we have regarding the constitutionality of the individual mandate.

If you have read the Wikipedia article and the Stuart Taylor column, you should have an idea of just how complicated and challenging this task will be.

Just in case you might still doubt that a great deal of precedent will have to be reviewed, consider the basic argument against the individual mandate: the Commerce Clause permits regulation of economic activity, and since the individual mandate seeks to penalize people for inactivity, it is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause. Another way to state this argument is to say that the individual mandate is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause because it seeks to force people to engage in an activity. Those arguments are straightforward and make a lot of common sense. However, there is at least one potential problem. Here is the actual language of the Commerce Clause:
The Congress shall have power...To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
The Commerce Clause does not include the words "economic" or "activity." For those who like to take a literalist or strict constructionist view of the Constitution, this is a problem. One could argue that it only makes plain sense that "commerce" includes "economic activity"--and I would agree--but that does not change the fact that that is NOT what the Constitution expressly says. I submit that it necessarily follows that it was judicial decisions that defined "commerce" to include "economic activity." That means there is a need for those relying on this "economic activity" argument to examine and interpret lots of precedent.

And then there's the Necessary and Proper Clause, which says that
The Congress shall have power...To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
I will discuss this Clause in more detail in III.B and IV-IX below, but for now I will note that this provision basically addresses the means by which Congress manifests the powers of the federal government as granted by the Constitution. In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause deals primarily with the means, not the ends. This is an important distinction. As for the amount of precedent dealing with the Necessary and Proper Clause, that precedent goes back to the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which was decided in 1817. Also, as stated in this Wikipedia article, "Indeed, the influence of the Necessary and Proper Clause and its broader interpretation under McCulloch vs. Maryland in American jurisprudence can be seen in cases generally thought to simply involve the Commerce Clause." So, a great deal of the precedent involving the Commerce Clause also involves the Necessary and Proper Clause. I will discuss one such case in detail in IV-IX below.

III. The precedent is not exactly clear and narrow.

As mentioned, the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause--and the precedent related to them--have been used to greatly expand federal power over the years. And now the Virginia case and others are attempting to place a limit on those powers. The problem in that regard is there there are so many cases granting expansion that there is a lot of precedent which could be used to persuasively argue that the individual mandate is constitutional.

A. Commerce Clause

Part of that precedent includes decisions that something comes within the scope of the Commerce Clause if it has an "effect" on interstate commerce. Here's how the Supremes stated it in the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005):
...Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Ibid.; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)...Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128—129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the “ ‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U.S., at 154—155 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927)[.]
545 U.S. at 16-17. I'm not saying that's good or bad, right or wrong. I'm just saying that is the law.

On the other hand, maybe there is a potential flaw in a claim that the individual mandate is authorized by the Commerce Clause, which is used to regulate interstate commerce. Under current law, a person cannot purchase a health insurance policy in a state other than the one in which he lives. That would seem to indicate that purchasing a health insurance policy is strictly an intrastate matter. That means there is another common sense argument, but there's that "effect" business to deal with, and there is other law that--for now--says that the "business of insurance" is interstate commerce. Much more on that in XI.C below...

And then there's the "rational basis" analysis. As the Court said in Gonzales v. Raich,
In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.
545 U.S. at 22. Due to these concepts, the Supreme Court over the years has developed a level of deference to Congress when it comes to evaluating Commerce Clause cases. These excerpts from the Wikipedia article describes this deference:
The evolving level of scrutiny applied by Federal courts to Commerce Clause cases should be considered in the context of rational basis review. The idea behind rational basis review is that the judiciary must show deference to the elected representatives of the people. A respect for the democratic process requires that the Courts uphold legislation if there are rational facts and reasons that could support Congressional judgment, even if the Justices would come to different conclusions. Throughout the 20th century, in a variety of contexts, courts sought to avoid second guessing the legislative branch, and Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a part of this trend. Lawrence Tribe states:

Since 1937, in applying the factual test of Jones & Laughlin to hold a broad range of activities sufficiently related to interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has exercised little independent judgment, choosing instead to defer to the expressed or implied findings of Congress to the effect that regulated activities have the requisite "economic effect". Such findings have been upheld whenever they could be said to rest upon some rational basis.
*******
Since its decision in Gibbons, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial limitations on Congressional exercise of its Commerce Clause powers represent an invasion of the democratic process. Of course, in some sense, by its very nature, the Constitution represents a constraint on the democratic process, because the Constitution represents a set of rules which may not be overturned through ordinary democratic means. Nevertheless, the Court regularly points out that the primary limitation on unwise exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause must be found at the ballot box.
What all this means is that I think finding precedent to support a claim that the individual mandate is constitutional is going to be relatively easy. And even though the basic argument against the individual mandate makes common sense, the task for those on that side of the fence is explaining why that precedent should not apply.

Again, the most straightforward, common sense way to do that is to say that the individual mandate seeks to regulate inactivity as opposed to activity. However, since this is largely a question of first impression, there is no precedent regarding the type of inactivity present in this question and the Commerce Clause. There is precedent that, while not completely directly applicable, can be used to argue that the Commerce Clause can be used to regulate the "inactivity" of not buying health insurance, as discussed in V below.

B. Necessary and Proper Clause

As I said before, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been used many times to support expansions of federal power. That means there is a lot of precedent that could support the individual mandate.

Not only that, but I think whether the individual mandate is constitutional turns on the Necessary and Proper Clause, so the discussion here of that clause is going to be lengthier than that for the Commerce Clause.
  • 1. The lasting conflict in interpretation
As noted in the Wikipedia article, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been controversial from the very beginning, as in the debates prior to the ratification of the Constitution. James Madison argued that without the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Constitution would be a "dead letter," while Patrick Henry countered that it would lead to limitless federal power and would be a threat to individual liberty. To some extent I think Madison and Henry are both right, and therein lies the dilemma for Courts in making rulings involving the Necessary and Proper Clause.

On the one hand, the meaning of the Clause can be described by Madison's words in the Federalist Papers: "No axiom is more clearly established in law or in reason than wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power for doing it is included." (emphasis added). On the other hand, a case for limiting federal power under the Clause is found in the words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.
(emphasis added). The emphasized portion is basically the position taken by Judge Hudson in the Virginia case. (Hudson opinion, pp. 19, 24). However, as I will discuss in X.B and C below, the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich does not support Judge Hudson's ruling.
  • 2. Chief Justice Marshall's admonitions
At this point, however, a further discussion is warranted. For me, the most important phrase from Chief Justice Marshall is "not prohibited." The meaning of that phrase could be crucial in evaluating the individual mandate pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. As Justice Breyer wrote for the majority in U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010), the phrase means "not prohibited by the Constitution." But there has to be more to that definition.

Just what is prohibited by the Constitution? The powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution are known as "enumerated powers." These are found in Article I, Section 8, and they include the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article II, Section 9 contains a list of things that Congress cannot do, and thus constitutes a clear delineation of acts that are "prohibited by the Constitution" that could not be enacted via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Please note that Article I, Section 9 says nothing about laws that seek to regulate economic inactivity. But is there more to consider?

One could argue that any act of Congress that would not be allowed under one of the enumerated powers--such as the Commerce Clause--would also be prohibited by the Constitution. That makes sense, but, just as the Commerce Clause does not contain the words "economic activity," the Constitution does not expressly say that an act that does not match one of the enumerated powers is also prohibited. The Founding Fathers certainly knew how to include language which expressly prohibited acts--Article I, Section 9 has lots of such language. And yet there is no such direct statement in Article I, Section 9. This again points out the problem with taking a literalist/strict constructionist view of the Constitution.

The question really is "What is 'prohibited by the Constitution' in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause?" As will be shown in the discussion of Gonzales v. Raich (and more specifically in VI below) the answer is not crystal clear, to say the least.

However, as Chief Justice Marshall stated, even if something is not "prohibited by the Constitution," there is another part to his test under the Necessary and Proper Clause, namely that something must be "consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution." There is room for interpretation on that, and I will do some "interpretation" in VII below.

The problem for those wanting to invalidate the individual mandate is that there is precedent strongly in favor of the individual mandate being valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and it is almost time to discuss one of those decisions.
  • 3. Applications of the Necessary and Proper Clause/Commerce Clause combination and the limitations thereof
Supreme Court precedent shows there are three general circumstances in which Congress can exercise power under the Commerce Clause:
  1. Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce.
  2. Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce.
  3. Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 16-17 (citations omitted). Only the third circumstance was at issue in Gonzales and the Virginia case involving the individual mandate.

So why am I listing law about the Commerce Clause in the section on the Necessary and Proper Clause? As explained by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Gonzales,
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, as this Court has acknowledged since at least United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72 (1838), Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.
545 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted). Scalia went on to describe the types of things that could be regulated by the Commerce Clause via the Necessary and Proper Clause.
And the category of “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,” Lopez, supra, at 559, is incomplete because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.
*******
As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez, however, Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless recognized that it could be regulated as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 514 U.S., at 561.
*******
The regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Moreover, as the passage from Lopez quoted above suggests, Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. See Lopez, supra, at 561.
545 U.S. at 34-37 (footnote omitted). "Lopez" is United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a case that will be discussed in detail in X.C below. Note that the Necessary and Proper Clause can be used to ultimately apply the Commerce Clause to 1) activities that are intrastate, 2) activities that are non-economic, 3) intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce, and 4) activities that are necessary to implementation of an overall regulatory scheme that does regulate interstate commerce.

Note also that everything described by Justice Scalia involves "activities."

At this point I must add that the above rules of law apply to matters that are also private in nature. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976). That means that these rules apply to matters that are private even if they might not be considered intrastate.

If an activity sought to be regulated meets the factors listed by Scalia, then the final test for proper application of the Necessary and Proper Clause must be satisfied. Here are two ways of describing that test:
  • The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
  • [W]e look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (using term "[130 S.Ct. 1957] means-ends rationality" to describe the necessary relationship)[.] U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956-1957 (2010).
There are limitations on this Necessary and Proper power. In addition to the admonitions of Chief Justice Marshall, Scalia explained other limitations on the Necessary and Proper Clause :
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court–conscious of the potential of the “substantially affects” test to “ ‘obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local,’Lopez, supra, at 566—567 (quoting A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)); see also Morrison, supra, at 615—616–rejected the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences. Lopez, supra, at 564—566; Morrison, supra, at 617—618...Thus, although Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce is broad, it does not permit the Court to “pile inference upon inference,” Lopez, supra, at 567, in order to establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
*******
Lopez and Morrison affirm that Congress may not regulate certain “purely local” activity within the States based solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate market.
545 U.S. at 35-38 (emphasis added). "Morrison" is United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and that decision will be discussed in detail in X.C below. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Comstock, described the test as
requir[ing] a tangible link to commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation...The rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

And now it is time to apply all this law to the individual mandate, and I will do that by comparing it to the case of Gonzales v. Raich.

IV. An example of why the question of the constitutionality of the individual mandate is complicated: Gonzales v. Raich

As I said way back in the "first" post, I am not trying to present a detailed analysis of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause and their application to the individual mandate. I could write a very thick book on that subject and still not cover everything. Instead, I am going to compare the basic argument against the individual mandate to one previous decision by the Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Raich. That comparison will also include a case relied upon by the Court in Gonzales v. Raich--Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942). What I will try to do is show why this issue of the individual mandate is not an easy one to resolve. With that in mind...

A. Basic description of the case and decision


In Gonzales v. Raich "Gonzales" was the U.S. Attorney General, and the non-government party I want to focus on was named Monson. Monson was growing her own marijuana for her medicinal purposes, as was legal under California law. It was grown and used only for her personal and medicinal purposes. There was no attempt or intent to sell the marijuana. There was no attempt to put the marijuana into interstate commerce. In other words, there was no "economic activity" and any activity was strictly private and intrastate in character. The DEA seized the plants pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that such action was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, the Court's decision turned primarily on the Necessary and Proper Clause, as shown in the opening paragraph of the majority opinion.
The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, §8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 5. Immediately after the quote in III.A above describing the "rational basis" test, the majority opinion said
Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U.S.C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA...Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” U.S. Const., Art. I, §8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.
545 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). Again, to me this shows that the Court relied mainly on the Necessary and Proper Clause in making its ruling. More proof that the case was decided on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause is found in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion.

Other parts of the majority opinion show that the Court ruled that the Commerce Clause justified the DEA's action under the CSA because of the possibility that people other than Monson might grow their own marijuana and put it into the interstate market. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 28-33. In other words, the Court ruled that the Commerce Clause was applicable to Monson even though the evidence established that she was not involved in any kind of commerce or interstate activity. Another way to put this is that the Court ruled that the Commerce Clause was applicable to Monson even though the evidence established that she chose not to engage in commerce and her activities were strictly intrastate and private in nature.

The majority relied heavily on the Court's decision in the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn, and the reasoning of that decision is relevant to the instant discussion. Specifically, the reason for and effect of the law at issue there is analogous to that of the individual mandate.

In Wickard v. Filburn the law in question was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which had a formula which determined the maximum amount of wheat a given farm would be allowed to produce. Filburn, the farmer, was producing more than twice the amount called for under the law, and the federal government sought to fine him and destroy the "excess" amount of his wheat crop pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Filburn argued that the "excess" was grown for his own use only and thus was not part of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court rejected that argument.

The Court's opinion, by Justice Jackson, had this to say about the Agricultural Adjustment Act:
The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
317 U.S. 127-128. In other words, the objectives were to 1) regulate the total amount of wheat in the interstate market so as to control prices, and 2) make sure that everyone--including farmers--would have to buy wheat for their own use from that market. Only in that way could the purpose of the legislation achieve its goals. And the only way to achieve those goals was to force farmers to comply with the law, or stated another way, force farmers to do something, namely limit their wheat production. If they did not, they would be penalized by a fine.

The Court in Gonzales v. Raich ruled that
Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.
545 U.S. at 18. (emphasis added). In Gonzales the Court went on to rule that if Congress had any rational basis for concluding that certain conduct could undercut the overall goals and objectives of legislation, that conduct could be regulated or compelled.

Here's how I see the Court's reasoning: 1) there is an interstate market for marijuana; 2) the federal government has a legitimate interest in regulating that interstate market; 3) marijuana grown for private purposes could conceivably find its way into the interstate market; 4) the seizure of Monson's plants was a "necessary and proper" means to regulate the interstate commerce of marijuana by prohibiting any intrastate growing of marijuana because 5) without such prohibition, the entire regulatory objectives of the CSA could fail.

With the foregoing in mind, let's look at some of the similarities between Gonzales and the individual mandate.

B. The primary similarities


I stated the basic argument against the individual mandate as follows:
[T]he Commerce Clause permits regulation of economic activity, and since the individual mandate seeks to penalize people for inactivity, it is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause. Another way to state this argument is to say that the individual mandate is not within the scope of the Commerce Clause because it seeks to force people to engage in an activity.
And here's how Judge Hudson put it:
Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.
I think the big problem with Judge Hudson's ruling is the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of the individual mandate depends not on the Commerce Clause, but on the Necessary and Proper Clause. Judge Hudson did make a ruling on the Necessary and Proper Clause, but as will be explained in X below, his ruling is incorrect.

My opinion is that in light of the ruling in Gonzales I don't see how the individual mandate is not constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. A comparison of the facts in Gonzales and how the individual mandate would operate supports my opinion. For the individual mandate, people who would otherwise choose not to become part of commerce would be "forced" to become part of commerce by buying insurance or pay a penalty. To put it another way, a person who chose not to engage in an economic activity--buying health insurance--would be required to engage in an economic activity or pay a penalty. In Gonzales, Monson chose not to engage in any kind of commerce, but was nonetheless ruled to have an effect on commerce. Under the individual mandate, one must engage in commerce or get penalized. Monson was effectively forced into commerce even though she chose not to be and in fact was not engaged in any kind of economic activity and penalized by having her property seized. One could argue that Monson's fate was even worse than what would happen under the individual mandate. Under the individual mandate, one would get penalized for his own deliberate inaction. Monson got penalized in large part because of what other people might do. Not only that, but Monson was not given a choice in the matter, whereas under the individual mandate a person can choose between buying insurance or paying a penalty. And to top it off, Monson was engaged in wholly private and intrastate activity.

I'm not saying that Gonzales is exactly the same as any of the cases regarding the PPACA. I am, however, pointing out that Gonzales shows just how far the Supreme Court has been willing to expand justifications for federal law pursuant to the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. That same kind of rationale might be applied to the individual mandate.

V. Gonzales, the individual mandate, and activity

A. Overview


As shown above, there are strong similarities between the circumstances in Gonzales and the individual mandate. Moreover, the legal rationale used in Gonzales could be applied to the individual mandate in all regards--if not for one not-so-small detail. Recall that the main argument against the individual mandate is that it seeks to regulate inactivity rather than activity. Recall also that the law regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause as described by Justice Scalia involves activity.

Consequently, the legal meaning of "activity" is at the core of this whole matter, and for me, the core of that meaning is the overall regulatory objective of the PPACA. As I will explain, I think the "inactivity" argument fails if the overall regulatory objective is health care as opposed to health insurance. Conversely, I think the best way to try to invalidate the individual mandate is to show that the overall regulatory objective of the PPACA is health insurance.

B. Application of the Necessary and Proper Clause in Gonzales and how that compares to the individual mandate

Recall that in Gonzales Monson was not engaged in any commerce, was not engaged in any economic activity, and was engaged in activity that was completely private and intrastate in nature. That meant that the Commerce Clause was in no way directly applicable to Monson. Recall also that the Court found that the statute in question was an essential part of an overall regulatory scheme designed to regulate an interstate market. Because of all those factors, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute in question was constitutional and applicable to Monson because of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Now compare that with the individual mandate in the context of the primary argument against it. That argument is based on a person not being involved in an economic activity--just like in Gonzales. That argument is based on a person not being engaged in any commerce--just like in Gonzales. And the individual mandate is an essential part of an overall regulatory scheme.

As I stated in my (first) lengthy post on health care, "if insurance is to be the foundation of a health care system, having a mandate that everyone have insurance really is key to trying to manage the cost of the insurance and provide coverage to everyone." Now I will go even further. Although the "reforms" of the PPACA are (in my opinion) the insurance exchanges and the consumer protection provisions (such as no more "preexisting conditions"), the key to any success of the PPACA is the individual mandate. As I tried to explain before, without the individual mandate, there is little chance of the insurance exchanges succeeding. Without the individual mandate, the insurance companies will try to get rid of the consumer protections (and there are rational business reasons for that). The key for any possible success under the PPACA is that everyone has health insurance, and the only way to ensure that happens is the individual mandate. The federal government made basically the same claims in the Virginia case. (Hudson Opinion, pp. 12-16). However, the feds also claimed that the regulatory objective is the health insurance market (as shown in part in V.D below). I think this is a potentially fatal mistake, but I will discuss that later. For now, let's assume that there is an interstate health insurance market.

That means that almost all of the same factors that led the Supreme Court to uphold the statute in Gonzales are present in regard to the individual mandate. Almost. The one thing missing for the individual mandate--according to the argument against it--is "activity." Or is it?

C. What isn't an "activity" in one market might be in another.


I am not going to examine what "the meaning of 'is' is," but it might seem like I am.

This is going to be the first of several contentions by me that making the regulatory objective of the PPACA health insurance rather than health care is a way to get the individual mandate found unconstitutional.

As shown in III.B.3 above, in order for a law to be proper under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it has to have a rational basis of relation to a regulatory objective that is proper under the Commerce Clause. For instance, in Gonzales, the law which called for the seizure of Monson's marijuana plants was not itself allowable under the Commerce Clause (since Monson was not engaged in any commerce and her activities were strictly intrastate and private), but since that law was deemed to be essential to regulation of an interstate market that was subject to Commerce Clause regulation, the law was deemed proper because of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Furthermore, Monson did engage in an activity of some sort, namely growing the plants. Hence, her case fit all the elements of law set out in both the majority opinion and Scalia's concurring opinion.

However, if regulation of the interstate health insurance market (assuming it is an interstate market) is the overall objective of the PPACA, then how can there be "activity" by someone who does not participate in that market? How can someone who does not buy health insurance engage in "activity" in the health insurance market? That is the essence of the argument against the individual mandate. And if the overall objective of the PPACA is regulation of the health insurance market rather than the health care market, that argument makes a lot of sense, and it might provide a way to get around all the law interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause.

In my opinion, the situation changes if the overall regulatory objective of the PPACA is the health care market. Unlike health insurance, health care does not have to be purchased in the same state where a person lives. People can cross state lines to get health care. In other words, health care is an interstate market and is thus subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, then, Congress can pass laws which regulate some portion of the health care market which themselves are not proper under the Commerce Clause. Those laws can regulate non-commercial, non-economic, and private activities.

In the Virginia case, the feds argued that everyone is going to have to have health care at some point. I agree. That means that everyone at some point is going to get health care, which is going to need to be paid for. Today, the primary method of payment for health care is insurance, but that is not the only way, nor will it be the only possible way under the individual mandate. A person could choose not to get insurance, pay the penalty, and still pay for health care out of his own pocket. When all those factors are considered, then choosing not to buy insurance is a choice freely made. When combined with the fact that consumption of health care is inevitable, a case could be made that the decision to either acquire or forgo health insurance becomes an "activity" because it determines how one will pay for something--health care--that is part of interstate commerce. Stated differently, 1) obtaining health care is an activity in an interstate market; 2) that health care has to be paid for; 3) thus, paying for that health care is an activity in an interstate market; 4) deciding how to make that payment is necessarily an activity in an interstate market, and 5) deciding whether or not to buy health insurance is part of deciding how to pay for health and is thus an activity in an interstate market.

Here's the difference...As of now, everyone will necessarily participate in the health care market, while right now everyone does not have to participate in the health insurance market. If the health care market is the regulatory objective, then the individual mandate is not regulating whether someone enters that market. Instead, the individual mandate seeks to regulate a person's conduct after he enters that market. If the regulatory objective in the health insurance market, then the individual mandate does seek to regulate whether someone enters a given market.

There is a potential flaw in my analysis on this point. It depends in what Judge Hudson termed a "future contingency," namely people needing health care in the future. Admittedly, basing a regulation on what people might do in the future does not seem right (although it was not a problem in Gonzales). However, I think health care presents almost no future contingency. There are lots of people who need health care right now. There are plenty of people (such as people with chronic diseases or conditions) that we know will need health care in the future. And we all know that pretty much everyone alive now and in the future is going to need health care at some point. All of this is beyond dispute. To put it another way, needing health care is not a matter of "if" but "when."

And there is yet another potential problem with my analysis, naley that making decision is not the same as doing something. For instance, I might decide to go workout, but if I never get up to actually exercise, does my decision count as an "activity?" That sort of question is addressed in V.D.

D. But wait...there's more regarding "activity," or "fun with words."
  • 1. Dictionary definitions of "economic" and "activity"
There is yet another element to the "activity" argument. It relates to the meaning of "economic." In the Gonzales majority opinion, Justice Stevens, in discussing the decisions in U.S. v. Morrison and U.S. v. Lopez (see X.B below), wrote the following:
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25-26. It is possible that health care and health insurance are "commodities?" If so, then is the decision on how to pay for either health care or health insurance "economic" in nature? If the answer to that question is "yes," then does that decision become an "activity?" It seems to me that it does. The federal government raised this basic argument, although judging from Judge Hudson's opinion, the feds did not use the definition of "economics" cited by Justice Stevens. See Hudson Opinion, pp. 11-12. Here is the basic argument from the feds:
Critical to the Secretary's argument is the notion that an individual's decision not to purchase health insurance is in effect "economic activity." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. 35.) The Secretary rejects the Commonwealth's implied premise that a person can simply elect to avoid participation in the health care market. It is inevitable, in her view, that every individual”today or in the future”healthy or otherwise”will require medical care. She adds that a large segment of the population is uninsured and "consume[s] tens of billions of dollars in uncompensated care each year." (Def.'s Mem. Opp. 14.) The Secretary maintains that the irrefutable facts demonstrate that "[t]he conduct of the uninsured”their economic decision as to how to finance their health care needs, their actual use of the health care system, their migration in and out of coverage, and their shifting of costs on to the rest of the system when they cannot pay”plainly is economic activity." (Def.'s Mem. Opp. 16-17.)
*******
The core of the Secretary's primary argument under the Commerce Clause is that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is a necessary measure to ensure the success of its larger reforms of the interstate health insurance market. The Secretary emphasizes that the ACA is a vital step in transforming a currently dysfunctional interstate health insurance market. In the Secretary's view, the key elements of health care reform are coverage of those with preexisting conditions and prevention of discriminatory premiums on the basis of medical history. These features, the Secretary maintains, will have a material effect on the health insurance underwriting process, and inevitably, the cost of insurance coverage...Therefore, under the Secretary's reasoning, since Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to reform the interstate health insurance market, it also possesses, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the power to make the regulation effective by enacting the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision.
(Hudson Opinion, pp. 12-13)(footnotes omitted). I hope the reader now sees why I said in V.B above that the feds claimed that the overall regulatory objective of the PPACA is the health insurance market. There were points where the feds referred to the health care market, but, if Judge Hudson's Opinion accurately stated the arguments, the feds kept coming back to talking about the health insurance market.

In any event, the feds argued that deciding not to buy health insurance was an "economic activity," and under the definition of "economics" in Gonzales, an argument could be made that any decision made by a person regarding insurance is an "economic activity." I still think that is a stretch if the overall objective of the PPACA is regulating insurance, but the argument could be made.

That argument would be strengthened by another definition for "economic" found at Dictionary.com. That site had the same definition as used by Justice Stevens, but it also had this definition: "involving or pertaining to one's personal resources of money." Under that definition, a decision regarding whether or not to buy health insurance is an economic activity. However, that does not end the inquiry. Under that definition, potentially almost every decision a person makes would be an "economic activity." So where is the line to be drawn if there is to be any limit on the government's powers? Then again, it seems to me that sometimes a decision necessarily is an activity.

So let's look at a definition for "activity." I found this definition on Dictionary.com as well: "normal mental or bodily power, function, or process." And then there's this definition from the Merriam-Websiter site: "natural or normal function: as... a similar process actually or potentially involving mental function[.]" Under either of these definitions when one has a choice to make and makes a decision about that choice, one has engaged in an activity. Still the "line drawing" issue exists.

In the context of Commerce Clause/Necessary and Proper Clause questions, it seems to me that if a given decision is part of a direct line of circumstances that ends in having an effect on a market that is subject to Commerce Clause regulation, that decision is at least an activity and at most an economic activity. The decision cannot have an attenuated or highly inferential effect on an interstate market. And if that is the case, then the individual mandate does not seek to regulate inactivity.

Isn't this fun?

I have to admit that I have found no precedent that supports my little word game here. However, in Gonzales the Supremes did use a dictionary definition of "economics" as a key part of the reasoning for the decision. They did not do the same for "activity," and as I have framed the issue, the meaning of "activity" is central to determining whether the individual mandate comes within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
  • 2. More on health care as opposed to health insurance
I know I sound like a broken record, but I will say again that my view depends on the health care market being the regulatory objective of the PPACA. I will try to explain this in the context of my "line drawing" three paragraphs above. If the regulatory objective is the health insurance market, the analytical focus is too narrow. If the regulatory objective is the health care market, it is much easier to argue that the decision to buy or not to buy insurance has an impact on the market sought to be regulated because health care will be consumed by each person, that health care needs to be paid for, the decision regarding insurance determines how a person will pay for health care, and thus that decision is part of a direct line of circumstances that affects interstate market (health care) that can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.

If the regulatory objective is only the health insurance market, there is still the problem of the individual mandate basically compelling someone to enter a market. Assuming that the health insurance market is interstate, my "word game theory" could be used to rule that the individual mandate is constitutional. However, if a line is to be drawn, it is going to be a lot easier than if the objective is regulation of the health care market. Why? Because no one has to be forced or compelled into entering the health care market. That's the case now, and that will always be the case. By contrast, right now people do not have to enter the health insurance market. The individual mandate seeks to essentially change that. Regardless of the the legal technicalities, there is something about that change that doesn't seem right to a lot of people.

There is another problem concerning the health insurance market. I will discuss that in detail in XI.C, but for now I will say that there is a chance that the market for health insurance is not an interstate market, and if that is the case, AND the regulatory objective of the PPACA is the health insurance market, then the individual mandate is doomed.

VI. What about "prohibited by the Constitution?"

Recall that in order for a law to be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it must not be "prohibited by the Constitution." In discussing this element in III.B.2 above I said Gonzales would show that the precise meaning of this phrase is not crystal clear. I also noted that there is no express language in the Constitution which prohibits laws regulating economic activity, nor is there express language saying that laws which do not come within the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8 are prohibited.

And indeed, Gonzales shows that laws that do not by themselves come within the enumerated power of the Commerce Clause are not necessarily "prohibited by the Constitution." Recall that the law in question in Gonzales sought to regulate conduct that was non-economic, non-commercial, and completely intrastate. As such, there was no way that the Commerce Clause applied to that law or conduct. Moreover, I submit that that law--which made the growing of marijuana illegal--does not come within the express language of any of the other enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8. Yet the Supreme Court upheld that law via the Necessary and Proper Clause.

I see the same rationale applying to the individual mandate--as long as the overall regulatory objective of the PPACA is health care.

VII. What about "consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution?"

I think my analysis concerning "prohibited by the Constitution" applies equally to this question. Granted, the the basic argument against the individual mandate--regulating inactivity and forcing someone to do so something--at the least seems like a violation of the spirit of the Constitution. The principles involved in the argument against the individual mandate are personal liberty and the desire to be free from government intrusion on that liberty.

And to that I have three responses. First, in terms of violating personal liberty, I think the circumstances of Gonzales are worse than the individual mandate. In Gonzales, Monson was doing something that was strictly for her own personal purposes. Moreover, what she was doing was legal under California law, and she had no intention to do anything illegal. She was not involved in any kind of commerce and had no intention of changing that. She was basically minding her own business, not harming anyone, was not a threat to harm anyone, and she was acting within California law. Not only was her personal liberty basically violated, but the basis for that was what other people might do. And yet, the Supreme Court found that the federal law which effected such an encroachment on her personal liberty did not violate the spirit of the Constitution.

Second, although I think most of us view the Constitution primarily as establishing rights related to personal liberty (for example, the Bill of Rights). While the Constitution certainly does that, that is not all it does. The Constitution also establishes the responsibilities and powers of the federal government. Those also have to be enforced, and over the years, the Supreme Court has certainly done that. Again, I am not saying that is right or wrong. I am simply saying that's the way it is. I am also saying that the spirit of the Constitution also involves protecting the power and authority of the federal government. What I am trying to say is that even if the individual mandate is not within the Constitution's spirit of personal liberty, it could still be within the Constitution's spirit of preserving the power and authority of the federal government. Recall that I said this case is ultimately about drawing a line regarding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. Stated differently, it is about finding a balance between personal liberty and federal government power. Based on existing precedent--like Gonzales--I do not think that the individual mandate is sufficiently violative of the spirit of the Constitution to be illegal. However, the Supreme Court could feel otherwise, and the Justices are absolutely free to say so.

Third, under the applicable law on the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can pass laws that regulate private activities. One could strongly argue that the decisions on how to pay for health care and whether to buy insurance is strictly a private matter. If that argument is accepted, such private conduct is still within the reach of the Commerce Clause by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

In spite of the foregoing, I think that this aspect of the law could be a basis for overturning the individual mandate. The Justices of the Supreme Court do not bend with the political winds, as in they are not the poll-watching, pandering whores that some politicians are, but they are also not out of touch with common sense and a sense of fairness. The core argument against the the individual mandate contains a strong "it is against the spirit of the Constitution" element, and that could well provide the impetus for a majority of the Justices to modify existing precedent in order to declare the individual mandate unconstitutional. And, to continue my broken record, the "against the spirit of the Constitution" argument is much stronger if the purpose of the PPACA is regulation of health insurance.

VIII. What about the requirement that the individual mandate be “reasonably adapted” to the regulatory objective of the PPACA?


It seems to me that the individual mandate meets this requirement--as long as the focus is on regulating health care.

The individual mandate is "reasonably adapted” and "rationally related" to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power. The health care market is interstate in nature, and thus subject to Commerce Clause regulation. The PPACA seeks to regulate the health care market by making sure that more people have access to it. The PPACA seeks to regulate that market by instituting consumer protections regarding health insurance. The PPACA seeks to regulate that market by instituting measures intended to reduce costs (scant as they may be). And as I have said before, the individual mandate is the key to all of that. At least that's the argument. I am far from convinced that the PPACA is going to achieve those goals, but the way it is set up, the individual mandate is, as the feds argued in the Virginia case, the linchpin to the whole deal.

Getting back to my not being convinced that the PPACA will work...I still think the PPACA is not real reform of the health care system and that there is little in the PPACA that actually addresses reducing the actual cost of actual health care. However, the question as to the constitutionality of the individual mandate via the Necessary and Proper Cause is NOT whether the PPACA will actually work. I do not think the Supreme Court has the authority to try to determine whether the PPACA will work. The question is twofold: 1) does the PPACA seek to regulate the health care market (which is a proper objective under the Commerce Clause), and 2) is the individual mandate rationally related to that objective? I don't see how the answer can be anything but "yes."

IX. What about a "remote chain of inferences?"

In short, there is not one.

Again, my answer is based on the PPACA regulating health care rather than just health insurance. I explained some of the reasons why I think the argument for the individual mandate must be based on the PPACA regulating health care in III.A (purchasing health insurance is an intrastate activity and thus one could argue there is no interstate health insurance market), V.C (not buying health insurance is not engaging in "activity" in the health insurance market), and V.D.2 (easier to draw a line of limitation for health insurance), and a further explanation will come in Section XI.

My answer regarding a remote chain of references is based on the argument I made in V.C regarding "activity." Once again, here it is: 1) obtaining health care is an activity in an interstate market; 2) that health care has to be paid for; 3) thus, paying for that health care is an activity in an interstate market; 4) deciding how to make that payment is necessarily an activity in an interstate market, and 5) deciding whether or not to buy health insurance is part of deciding how to pay for health and is thus an activity in an interstate market.

To put it in the language of the test as set out in III.B.3 above, there is a tangible link between the individual mandate and interstate commerce. The individual mandate is about regulating the decision on how to pay for health care, and there's nothing more tangible than the payment for services and commodities. Also, there is no "remote chain of inferences" or "piling of inference upon inference." It is a fact that everyone either currently needs or will need health care. It is a fact that such health care is going to need to be paid for. It is a fact that, even under the individual mandate, people are going to have to pay for health care through insurance or some other means. There are no inferences there. Any decision as to how health is to be paid for is a demonstrable, empirical link to the interstate market of health care. And the individual mandate seeks to regulate that decision process.

X. Direct criticism of Judge Hudson's opinion regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause

A. Overview

In the "first post" I quoted the following statement from Judge Hudson's Opinion:
If a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at a particular point in time does not constitute the type of economic activity subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, then logically an attempt to enforce such provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution.
(Hudson Opinion, p. 19). Based on this reasoning, Judge Hudson's actual ruling on the Necessary and Proper Clause was as follows:
Because an individual's personal decision to purchase”or decline to purchase” health insurance from a private provider is beyond the historical reach of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a safe sanctuary. This clause grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its constitutionally enumerated powers. This authority may only be constitutionally deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch, it must be within "the letter and spirit of the constitution." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. The Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is neither within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution. Therefore, the Necessary and Proper Clause may not be employed to implement this affirmative duty to engage in private commerce.
(Hudson Opinion, p. 24). There are many problems with Judge Hudson's reasoning and ruling. First and foremost, Judge Hudson completely ignored Gonzales--as in his statements are contradicted by the law and facts in Gonzales and he did not even address Gonzales in a substantive way. In other words, his statements are wrong in light of Gonzales and he did not even bother to try to explain why Gonzales did not control. Instead, he accepted faulty arguments by Virginia and then incorrectly relied on two other Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Morrison and Lopez are distinguishable from the circumstances of the individual mandate, meaning they are not controlling on the question of whether the individual mandate is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

B. Judge Hudson ignored the law
.

As shown by the two above excerpts from Judge Hudson's Opinion, he basically ruled that since the individual mandate on its own violated the Commerce Clause, it also violated the Necessary and Proper Clause. Orin Kerr, a law professor, made the following comments about this part of the ruling:
Judge Hudson does not cite any authority for this conclusion: He seems to believe it is required by logic. But it is incorrect. The point of the Necessary and Proper clause is that it grants Congress the power to use means outside the enumerated list of of Article I powers to achieve the ends listed in Article I. If you say, as a matter of “logic” or otherwise, that the Necessary and Proper Clause only permits Congress to regulate using means that are themselves covered by the Commerce Clause, then the Necessary and Proper Clause is rendered a nullity. But that’s not how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause, from Chief Justice Marshall onwards. Indeed, as far as I know, not even the most vociferous critics of the mandate have suggested that the Necessary and Proper Clause can be read this way.
Some have said that Professor Kerr has misread what Judge Hudson wrote. They maintain that Judge Hudson was saying that while the means chosen by Congress to carry out a law do not have to be listed in the Constitution, that law itself must be constitutional when considered by itself. I agree with that assessment, but that does not make Judge Hudson's statement correct. Judge Hudson’s ruling ignores the law that says that even if a given law on its own does not come within the Commerce Clause, it could still be constitutional via the Necessary and Proper Clause.

The reason Judge Hudson did not cite any authority (that is, precedent or other law) is because the existing authority shows Judge Hudson was and is wrong. Judge Hudson's ruling completely ignores the law as clearly set out in Gonzales, in particular Justice Scalia's statements that "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and...Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce...derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause." Judge Hudson also apparently forgot about this part of the majority opinion in Gonzales: "Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity." In other words, the applicable law holds that conduct that, standing alone, cannot be regulated through direct application of the Commerce Clause can still be regulated through the Necessary and Proper Clause. In light of that law, Judge Hudson is simply wrong.

That Judge Hudson failed to apply the correct law is seen in this statement from his Opinion: "Whether the [individual mandate], which requires an individual to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, is borne of a constitutionally-enumerated power, is the core issue in this case." (Hudson Opinion, p. 17). He missed the point completely. The core issues were and are 1) whether the PPACA as a whole regulates an interstate market, and 2) whether the individual mandate is allowable under the Necessary and Proper Clause as part of the overall regulatory objective.

It seems to me that Judge Hudson considers the individual mandate the "end" rather than the "means." That might be fine if the true, overall objective of the PPACA is the regulation of the health insurance market. However, I think the overall objective of the PPACA is regulation of the health care market, which clearly is an interstate market, and that means the overall objective of the PPACA is allowable under the Commerce Clause. The individual mandate is a means by which to accomplish that objective, and thus is allowable under the Necessary and Proper Clause. This is the approach the Supreme Court used in Gonzales. The Court ruled there was an interstate market for marijuana, the CSA was an attempt to regulate that market pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and the seizure of Monson's plants was a "necessary and proper" means by which to carry out that regulation of an interstate market. Keep in mind also that the Court acknowledged that Monson was engaging in an intrastate activity, meaning that on the surface, the Commerce Clause (intended only for interstate commerce) could not apply to Monson. It was only through the "necessary and proper" step of the CSA which called for seizure of the plants that such seizure was constitutional.

Basically, it appears to me that Judge Hudson applied a Commerce Clause analysis to the individual mandate as if it was a stand-alone provision. To be fair to Judge Hudson, some of the language contained in § 1501 of the PPACA (the individual mandate) could be construed as Congress claiming that the individual mandate by itself is a proper exercise of power under the Commerce Clause (see XI.B below), but I don't think that conclusion is warranted when the PPACA is viewed as a whole. If the individual mandate had been a stand-alone piece of legislation, I don't think it could be constitutional under the Commerce Clause (see XI.C below)--and that would mean that the Necessary and Proper Clause would not even enter into the analysis. However, the individual mandate is not a stand-alone provision. It is one part of an overall regulatory scheme that has as its objective regulation of the health care market. As such the individual mandate does not have to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause because of the effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause. That is the reasoning in Gonzales.

There is another problem with Judge Hudson's ruling. If he was not merely viewing the individual mandate alone as needing to pass muster under the Commerce Clause, then Professor's Kerr's criticism is correct. It seems clear that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a provision of a law that is a means rather than an end does not have to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. If Judge Hudson was viewing the individual mandate as a "means," it seems to me that his reasoning would render the Necessary and Proper Clause--as applied in Commerce Clause precedent (such as Gonzales)--a nullity because it would require that "means" must by themselves comply with the Commerce Clause before they could be considered "necessary and proper." That simply is not the law, and Judge Hudson's rulings are wrong.

C. Hudson accepted faulty arguments and relied on inapplicable precedent.


For me the biggest weakness in Judge Hudson's opinion is that he did not address any of the arguments I set out above concerning Gonzales and Wickard. He stated the arguments each side made as to those cases. As noted earlier, the feds' arguments were close to the arguments I have made--with the exception of the feds basing the arguments on an interstate health insurance market, but Judge Hudson's opinion never explained why those arguments are incorrect. Instead, he stated Virginia's abbreviated arguments regarding Gonzales and Wickard, accepted them, and then made an incorrect statement about Commerce Clause precedent. Here's what Virginia argued regarding Gonzales and Wickard:
In their opposition, the Commonwealth focuses on what it perceives to be the central element of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, "economic activity." The Commonwealth distinguishes what was deemed to be "economic activity" in Wickard and Gonzales, namely a voluntary decision to grow wheat or cultivate marijuana, from the involuntary act of purchasing health insurance as required by the Provision. In Wickard and Gonzales, individuals made a conscious decision to grow wheat or cultivate marijuana, and consequently, voluntarily placed themselves within the stream of interstate commerce. Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision compels an unwilling person to perform an involuntary act and, as a result, submit to Commerce Clause regulation.
(Hudson opinion, pp. 17-18). In my view, Virginia's position is wrong as it relates to Gonzales. As explained in IV above, in Gonzales, Monson deliberately chose NOT to engage in any economic activity. Monson chose to engage in strictly non-economic and intrastate activities, and yet the Supreme Court ruled that activity ultimately to be subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, Monson was forced into "interstate commerce," and that was based not on what she did, but on what others might do. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gonzales acknowledged that Monson's activity was intrastate in character but ruled that that did not matter and still applied the Commerce Clause to her! In other words, there was nothing about Monson's conduct that was economic or interstate, and she certainly did not voluntarily place herself into interstate commerce. She deliberately kept from doing that. Thus, Virginia's characterization of Gonzales is simply wrong.

Hudson, however, apparently accepted that position and used it as a basis for this portion of his Opinion:
In surveying the legal landscape, several operative elements are commonly encountered in Commerce Clause decisions. First, to survive a constitutional challenge the subject matter must be economic in nature and affect interstate commerce, and second, it must involve activity. Every application of Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some form of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal entity.
(Hudson Opinion, p. 23) (emphasis added). The emphasized language disregarded the law set out by Scalia in Gonzales that even noncommercial activity is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Judge Hudson also disregarded what happened in Gonzales. He never mentioned the fact that Monson's conduct in Gonzales was non-economic. In short, he disregarded the facts and law in Gonzales relevant to the Necessary and Proper Clause and did not try to explain how those were not relevant or applicable to the individual mandate. Let me put this another way. If Judge Hudson's above statements are correct, then the result in Gonzales would have been the opposite of what it was. If Judge Hudson is correct, then Gonzales would have been reversed by now, but that has not happened. Gonzales is still current law, and Judge Hudson's "rulings" disregard that law without any attempt at an explanation.

Instead, Judge Hudson, like Virginia, relied on two other Supreme Court decisions, Lopez and Morrison. The arguments I have presented in favor of the constitutionality of the individual mandate are based on it being an essential part of an overall regulatory scheme. That is the same basis upon which the laws at issue in Gonzales were found constitutional. In his concurring opinion in Gonzales, Justice Scalia shows why Morrison and Lopez are not applicable when the individual mandate is evaluated on this basis:
Neither case involved the power of Congress to exert control over intrastate activities in connection with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation; Lopez expressly disclaimed that it was such a case, 514 U. S., at 561, and Morrison did not even discuss the possibility that it was. (The Court of Appeals in Morrison made clear that it was not. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 834-835 (CA4 1999) (en banc).)
545 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added). At this point, I remind the reader that the applicable law on the Necessary and Proper Clause applies not just to intrastate activities, but private activities as well (see II.B.3 above).

The law in question in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which was a brief, single-subject statute making it a crime for an individual to possess a gun in a school zone. In other words, the statute was a stand-alone law. It was not part of an overall regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intra-state activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U. S. at 561. Thus, while Lopez does set out limitations on the Commerce Clause power, those limitations are not applicable to the individual mandate.

In Morrison, the law at issue was part of the Violence Against Women Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. §13981, which created a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. The Supremes held that law not to be allowed under the Commerce Clause. Here's how Justice Stevens (in the majority opinion in Gonzales) described the ruling in Morrison:
Despite congressional findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on interstate commerce, we held the statute unconstitutional because, like the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded that "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision" in Lopez, and that our prior cases had identified a clear pattern of analysis: "'Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.'" Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25 (footnote omitted). At first that might seem to support an argument against the individual mandate, but a closer look shows that it does not. Remember that the argument I have presented in favor of the invidual mandate is based on the Necessary and Proper Clause. In Gonzales, the Supreme Court upheld the law in question even though the conduct involved was noneconomic. That was done because the law was part of an overall regulatory scheme that as a whole regulated economic activity that affected an interstate market. And that is the situation involving the individual mandate. Also, the statute in Morrison was part of a statutory scheme, but that statutory scheme did not regulate an interstate market. Hence, Morrison is irrelevant to the question of whether the individual mandate is constitutional via the Necessary and Proper Clause in connection with the Commerce Clause.

XI. Insurance and interstate commerce as defined by the Supreme Court

A. Overview


As mentioned in VI.C.3 above, there is law which declares that insurance is--to some extent--interstate commerce. I think that if the Supreme Court is to declare the individual mandate unconstitutional, that ruling will be based on changes or modifications in that law. Furthermore, that is why I think basing the argument for the individual mandate on the health insurance market is a mistake.

The Supreme Court consistently ruled that insurance was not part of interstate commerce and thus beyond federal regulation until 1944. That’s when the Supremes ruled in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 553 (1944), that the “business of insurance” was interstate commerce. That ruling has not been reversed, so it is still the law. That might at first indicate that there is thus no question that the individual mandate is constitutional, but that might not be the case now or in the semi-near future.

This subsection will examine the reasons for my previous sentence. I will be going into some semi-detailed legal analysis. If you should think that such analysis is getting too picky and technical and/or semantic, it is again the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Supreme Court rulings typically go into far more in-depth analysis than what you will see here.

B. Health insurance: intrastate or interstate commerce?

In South-Eastern Underwriters, Justice Black, writing for the majority, set out a number of reasons why "the business of insurance" was interstate commerce. All of those reasons make sense in light of the "effect" and "rational basis" tests for determining if something is subject to the Commerce Clause, but I eventually will focus on one specific sentence from Justice Black which could be the basis for ruling that in this case regarding health insurance the Commerce Clause does not apply. I also note that South-Eastern Underwriters did not address health insurance.

But first, let's look at the rest of Justice Black's reasoning. Here is a large portion:
Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance of the times in which the Constitution was written. To hold that the word "commerce," as used in the Commerce Clause, does not include a business such as insurance would do just that. Whatever other meanings "commerce" may have included in 1787, the dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other books of the period show that it included trade: business in which persons bought and sold, bargained and contracted. And this meaning has persisted to modern times. Surely, therefore, a heavy burden is on him who asserts that the plenary power which the Commerce Clause grants to Congress to regulate "Commerce among the several States" does not include the power to regulate trading in insurance to the same extent that it includes power to regulate other trades or businesses conducted across state lines.

The modern insurance business holds a commanding position in the trade and commerce of our Nation. Built upon the sale of contracts of indemnity, it has become one of the largest and most important branches of commerce. Its total assets exceed $37,000,000,000, or the approximate equivalent of the value of all farm lands and buildings in the United States. It annual premium receipts exceed $6,000,000,000, more than the average annual revenue receipts of the United States Government during the last decade. Included in the labor force of insurance are 524,000 experienced workers, almost as many as seek their livings in coal mining or automobile manufacturing. Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United States.

This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies' methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for the most part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from policyholders in every part of the United States flow into these companies for investment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states where the policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual policyholders living in many different states who own policies in a single company have their separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally dependent for payment of their policies. The decisions which that company makes at its home office -- the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it makes, the losses it pays -- concern not just the people of the state where the home office happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state.
322 U.S. 539-542 (footnotes omitted). Or put more succinctly, insurance companies engage in "activities which, as part of the conduct of a legitimate and useful commercial enterprise, may embrace integrated operations in many states and involve the transmission of great quantities of money, documents, and communications across dozens of state lines." 322 U.S. at 550. Like I said, all of that makes sense in light of the "effect" and "rational basis" tests. Also, as shown in Judge Hudson's ruling, the arguments raised by the feds in the Virginia case were similar.

Moreover, the PPACA itself contains statements echoing Justice Black's rationale. Section 1501 of the PPACA is the individual mandate (called "individual responsibility" in the PPACA). Section 1501 (a)(1) says "The individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section (in this subsection referred to as the ‘‘requirement’’) is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects described in paragraph (2). " Paragraph 2 contains all kinds of facts and figures showing how health insurance and all the integrated activities and decisions related thereto affect the national economy. Recall the discussion in III.A above about the Courts showing great deference to Congressional findings and declarations. By the way, these portions of § 1501 are those which could be construed as Congress claiming that the individual mandate by itself is a proper exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.

Again, on the surface, all of that reasoning makes sense under applicable precedent concerning the Commerce Clause, but now it's time to look at one other statement by Justice Black. In describing the nature of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, he said
its purpose is not confined to empowering Congress with the negative authority to legislate against state regulations of commerce deemed inimical to the national interest. The power granted Congress is a positive power . It is the power to legislate concerning transactions which, reaching across State boundaries, affect the people of more states than one[.]
322 U.S. at 511-552 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). And this is where 1) the nature of health insurance and 2) the basis for the government's arguments in the Virginia case could become important. As I have said several times, one cannot live in one state and buy health insurance in another state. A person can buy health insurance only in his state of residence. That makes purchasing health insurance strictly an intrastate matter, and Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate commerce. In other words, in a sense, purchasing health insurance, to use Justice Black's wording, is NOT a transaction reaching across State boundaries. Or as I put it earlier, it seems there is no such thing as an interstate health insurance market. And yet, according to Judge Hudson's Memorandum Opinion, the federal government's arguments are based on the claim that the PPACA is all about reform of the interstate health insurance market. My point is there is a basis for claiming that the health insurance market is an intrastate market not subject to federal regulation AND that it seems that the feds are putting all their eggs in an interstate health insurance market basket. Those two facts could present an opening for the Supreme Court to rule that the individual mandate is unconstitutional.

One might argue that I am splitting hairs, talking semantics, being hyper-technical, etc., especially in light of all the precedent applying the "effect" and "rational basis" tests, and that argument might be correct. However, what I am trying to point out here is that IF the Supreme Court wants to declare the individual mandate unconstitutional, what I have presented in the previous paragraph could be the way the Court gets it done.

There are plenty of counterarguments--and some of them I have already raised in arguing that the health care market is interstate in nature. Insurance pays for health care, and if health care is interstate, then health insurance clearly has an affect on interstate commerce. And like Justice Black stated in South-Eastern Underwriters, money paid for policies crosses state lines, home offices of insurers are located in various cities across the nation, those companies employ people in differing states, etc.

However, as alluded to in the last paragraph of the opening section of the "first post," this question of the individual mandate is ultimately about drawing a line regarding Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Given that this is a question of first impression, simply relying upon and applying previous precedent without any further explanation would not draw a line at all. And like I said, even if the individual mandate is upheld, there needs to be some further definition regarding application of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the simple form of the counterarguments mentioned in the previous paragraph might not be enough to uphold the individual mandate. And if a majority of the Justices want to use this question as an opportunity to narrow the scope of the Commerce Clause, they could very well look for a way to claim that health insurance is not interstate commerce, and I think what I have suggested is a start. They would have to modify previous precedent and its application to health insurance--and they are under no constraint in that regard. They can do whatever they want. I still think any ruling that the individual mandate is unconstitutional will be narrow in scope, but more on that later...

C. "The business of insurance"


Section 1501(a)(3) of the PPACA says "In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 (1944)), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation." That is not entirely accurate. What the Supreme Court ruled was that "the business of insurance" was interstate commerce. Thus, the effect of South-Eastern Underwriters on the individual mandate depends on the meaning of the phrase "the business of insurance."

Now here's where things get a little tricky. I have found some Supreme Court cases defining the term, but they define the term in the context of statutory law known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As explained by the Supremes in Humana , Inc. v. Forsythe, 525 U.S. 299, 306 (1999), "Concerned that our decision (in South-Eastern Underwriters) might undermine state efforts to regulate insurance, Congress in 1945 enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act." The first part of McCarran-Ferguson, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, says that
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
In other words, regulation of insurance is primarily left to the States, not the federal government. The next part of McCarran-Ferguson, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a), makes sure of this:
(a) State regulation

The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(emphasis added). 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), however, carves out an exception:
(b) Federal regulation

No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance[.]
(emphasis added). I will discuss McCarran-Ferguson in more detail later, but for now I point out that 1) McCarran-Ferguson was passed as a direct response to limit the effects of South-Eastern Underwriters, 2) that decision ruled that the Commerce Clause applied to "the business of insurance," and 3) McCarran-Ferguson repeatedly uses the phrase "the business of insurance. Consequently, I maintain that Supreme Court decisions defining "the business of insurance" as used in McCarran-Ferguson are equally applicable to any definition of the term outside of McCarran-Ferguson. With that in mind...

Here's how the Supreme Court defined the term in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969):
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement -- these were the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was -- it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance."
(emphasis added). I don't really see how the individual mandate fits into this definition of "the business of insurance." By the way, Virginia also made this claim (see footnote 6 of Judge Hudson's ruling), but Judge Hudson did not address this issue. It seems that this definition of "the business of insurance" has not changed. As the Supremes stated in the 1993 case of Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe,
508 U.S. 491 (1993),
This Court has had occasion to construe this phrase only once. On that occasion, it observed: Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship [between insurer and insured], directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance," within the meaning of the phrase.
508 U.S. at 501. Again, I do not see that the individual mandate falls within that category. The individual mandate seeks to create such a relationship. It does not affect that relationship once it has been created. A strong claim can be made that the consumer protection provisions of the PPACA certainly concern the relationship between the insurer and the insured, but in my opinion the individual mandate does not.

Back to the individual mandate...If the individual mandate is viewed alone, in my opinion it is not related to "the business of insurance" and thus does not come with the Commerce Clause. As a result, the individual mandate, standing alone, is not constitutional. So, the federal government is making a big mistake if it is arguing that standing alone the individual mandate is constitutional.

However, the individual mandate is part of an overall statutory scheme, and that means that even though it is not itself constitutional under the Commerce Clause, it could still be upheld via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Once again I say I feel the argument has to be properly structured to be based on regulating the interstate health care market. As I said, the consumer protection provisions of the PPACA are related to the "business of insurance," meaning the Commerce Clause is applicable to them. That means the Necessary and Proper Clause might be applicable to the individual mandate if the regulatory objective of the PPACA is regulation of the health insurance market. However, there is still the possibility, as discussed above, that the Supreme Court could rule that there is no interstate health insurance market, and then the Necessary and Proper Clause would not save the individual mandate. One could argue that it is unlikely the Supreme Court would make such a ruling, and that might be true, but why take the chance? Why give the Supreme Court a possible basis for making that ruling? By arguing that the purpose of the PPACA is regulation of the interstate health care market, the Necessary and Proper Clause would, in my view, unquestionably be applicable to the individual mandate. Otherwise, there is the possibility that "the business of insurance" could be used to declare the individual mandate unconstitutional.

D. McCarran-Ferguson


Now this is where things really get confusing.

Here's how McCarran-Ferguson works. If Congress passes a law that specifically relates to "the business of insurance," that law controls over any and all state laws, period. If, however, the federal law is not specifically related to "the business of insurance," AND that law invalidates, impairs, or supersedes any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating "the business of insurance," the federal law cannot be enforced. South-Eastern Underwriters placed a limit on Congress's Commerce Clause power by saying that it applies to "the business of insurance," and McCarran-Ferguson places a further limit on that Commerce Clause power.

Now let's look at the individual mandate again. As discussed above, I do not think the individual mandate has anything to do with "the business of insurance." As such, it cannot automatically control under McCarran-Ferguson. However, it could still be enforceable under McCarran-Ferguson if it does not invalidate, impair, or supercede any State law which regulates "the business of insurance." What this means is that if a State has a law that deals with the business of insurance AND is in conflict with individual mandate, the individual mandate cannot be enforced.

Virginia may have just such a law. It is called the Health Care Freedom Act, and here is what it says:
No law shall restrict a person's natural right and power of contract to secure the blessings of liberty to choose private health care systems or private plans. No law shall interfere with the right of a person or entity to pay for lawful medical services to preserve life or health, nor shall any law impose a penalty, tax, fee, or fine, of any type, to decline or to contract for health care coverage or to participate in any particular health care system or plan, except as required by a court where an individual or entity is a named party in a judicial dispute. Nothing herein shall be construed to expand, limit or otherwise modify any determination of law regarding what constitutes lawful medical services within the Commonwealth.
(emphasis added). This law clearly conflicts with the individual mandate, and clearly the individual mandate would invalidate, impair, or supercede this State law. But the analysis does not stop there. The question now becomes whether the Health Care Freedom Act regulates "the business of insurance." If I am correct that the individual mandate does not regulate "the business of insurance" because it concerns matters that exist before there is a relationship between an insured and insurer, then it seems to me that the same could be said about the Health Care Freedom Act. If that is the case, McCarran-Ferguson would have no impact on whether the individual mandate is enforceable.

Ain't law just a barrel of laughs?

But wait...there's even more potential chaos.

The Health Care Freedom Act became law in Virginia before the PPACA became law. What if other States begin passing laws now that would be invalidated, impaired, or superceded by the individual mandate? Does a State law have to be in existence before the federal law is enacted in order for McCarran-Ferguson to apply? I don't know the answer, but if the answer is "no," then all some other States have to do to stop the individual mandate is to now pass a law that does regulate "the business of insurance" that directly conflicts with the individual mandate. That could certainly muck up everything.

But wait...I'm not done yet.

Let's assume that, for whatever reason, the individual mandate is not enforceable because of McCarran-Ferguson. To me what that means is that the individual mandate cannot be constitutional under the Commerce Clause because 1) McCarran-Ferguson is a valid limitation of the Commerce Clause power, and 2) the individual mandate is subject to that limitation. However, the Necessary and Proper Clause is still out there. Recall that under that clause, a law does not itself have to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. And that raises a very interesting question. McCarran-Ferguson is a limit on the Commerce Clause, but is it also a limit on the Necessary and Proper Clause? If the individual mandate does not comply with McCarran-Ferguson, does that mean it cannot be enforced pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause? My opinion is "no" because
  1. South-Eastern Underwriters dealt only with the Commerce Clause.
  2. McCarran-Ferguson was a direct response to South-Eastern Underwriters.
  3. McCarran-Ferguson is on its face an express limit on the Commerce Clause.
  4. McCarran-Ferguson does not on its face apply to the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
  5. Generally speaking, Constitutional provisions control over statutory ones.
Stated differently, since Congress did not in McCarran-Ferguson expressly limit its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, I think the individual mandate is still enforceable under the Necessary and Proper clause even if the individual mandate is unenforceable under McCarran-Ferguson.

To be honest, I have not done any research on this theory, and I am not going to before publishing this post. For now I will simply say that this theory could seriously complicate this entire matter. It raises all kinds of questions about how any ruling should be structured and the possible long term effects of any ruling.

E. A little more on the Health Care Freedom Act

Virginia made the Health Care Freedom Act a main part of its case, claiming that because of that Act, the PPACA violated the 10th Amendment. As noted way back in section III of the "first post," Judge Hudson made no ruling on that issue. That means that a 10th Amendment issue could still be argued and determined by the Supreme Court. I have not mustered the desire or energy to look into that, and I likely won't any time soon. I just want to point out that such an issue presents another lengthy and detailed set of matters that could make this whole case even more complicated.

F. Conclusion as to the role of insurance


I think the best shot to have the individual mandate declared unconstitutional is to focus on the intrastate aspects of health insurance and the fact that the federal government is basing its arguments on what its claims to be an interstate health insurance market. Even so, this approach will require some modifications/alterations to existing precedent concerning insurance and the Commerce Clause and how McCarran-Ferguson has been interpreted and applied.

This approach could help in making a decision invalidating the individual mandate narrow. By focusing on what might be aspects unique to health insurance, the Supreme Court might be able to modify existing Commerce Clause precedent in a way that does not unravel much of that precedent AND helps to further define the scope of the Commerce Clause. By dealing with the meaning of "the business of insurance," the Supreme Court could further narrow its decision so that it does not have much effect beyond insurance. At least that's my story and I'm sticking to it.

XII. Conclusion

Still working on this...

Will update as soon as I have it finished.