Quick NFL draft update

New Orleans took Reggie Bush with the second pick, and that was not a surprise in light of the fact that Houston did not take Bush. Then, with the third pick, Tennessee, whose offensive coordinator is Norm Chow, who was the offensive coordinator at USC when Matt Leinart won the Heisman, took...Vince Young. That surprised me. So, the J-E-T-S, Jets, Jets, Jets picked next. And another surprised followed as the Jets passed on Leinart and picked OT D'Brickashaw Ferguson. It's not so much that the pick was a surprise. Rather, the surprise was that the multitude of Jets fans at the draft actually cheered and were happy with the pick. :-)

GIANTS UPDATE: After trading down to the last pick of the first round (and getting some additional picks), the Giants slelcted DE Mathias Kiwanuka from Boston College. I guess the Giants are looking to the time when Strahan retires. Maybe Kiwanuka can progress quickly enough to provide some rest for Strahan and/or Umenyiora during the season.

In the second round, the Giants used one of the picks they got in the first round trade with Pittsburgh to work a trade to move up in the second round, and then they selected Sinorice Moss, WR from Miami. I like this pick. He is the little brother of Sanatana Moss, and those speed genes run in the family. I see him as being able to provide an effective option that could take coverage away from Burress, Toomer, Shockey, et al. and open up the passing game in general. This pick gives the Giants one dangerous receiving corps.

OTHER UPDATE NEWS: Tennessee has now picked up Lendale White in round 2. What a great pick for the Titans. After getting Vince Young, can anyone say "healthy, new version of McNair and George?"

Well, what do ya know? The Stars win.

Finally. The Dallas Stars put together a complete game and beat the Avs 4-1. The Avs scored first and early on a shot that Turco really had no chance to block, but after that he finally showed up big in a playoff game. He made big save after big save. However, twice in the third period, he went behind the net to play the puck and almost caused disaster. He picked up a tripping penalty one time and barely got back in the net after giving away the puck the other time. Marty: STOP TRYING TO PLAY THE PUCK BEHIND THE NET WHEN OPPOSING PLAYERS ARE DEEP IN YOUR ZONE. Other than those two incidents, Turco was superlative.

It was a complete team effort tonight for the Stars. Now they go back to Big D for Game 5. Hey, the Red Sox came back from 0-3, so why can't the Stars do the same?

NFL Draft is tomorrow.

Who's going No. 1? Who will pick Vince Young? Will Matt Leinart go before Young? Who will the Giants take in the first round? These and many other questions will be answered tomorrow as the NFL Draft unfolds. It looks almost certain that the Texans will take Reggie Bush with the first overall pick. Fans in Houston want local hero Vince Young, but that was never going to happen. Houston already has a QB in David Carr, and if they ever get a decent offensive line so that Carr doesn't have take so much punishment, look out. Bush will give the Texans a "wild card" to keep defenses off balance, and that should help out the other skill players, who, if healthy, are good.

So where does Vince Young end up? I keep reading that the Raiders want him, and I think that could be an excellent fit. Tennessee appears to be another possibility, especially since the toughest QB of this era--Steve McNair--is just about done. Other mock drafts I have seen have Arizona picking Young. As much as I hate ut football, even I love watching Young play, and I really want to see him go someplace where his existing talents and skills will be enhanced rather than someplace that will try to make fit a preconceived mold of an NFL QB. I think Oakland would be best for Young.

The mock drafts I have seen have Leinart going to Tennessee at 3. This makes more sense to me than Young going to the Titans.

And what about the Giants at no. 25? Some mock drafts have the Giants taking an offensive lineman or a LB. With the signings of Arrington and Brandon Short, does it make sense to take a LB in the first round? The offensive line needs bodies, and I am one who thinks that the offensive line is the key to having a successful team. That was the case when I was in college at SMU--and I was there during the glory days of the Pony Express. As much talent as we had at the skill positions, it was the offensive line that really made the offense work. When the Cowboys were dominating the league in the 90's, they had arguably the best-ever offensive line. Everyone knew what the Cowboys were going to do in many situations, yet they were rarely stopped, and that was because of the line. Conversely, the offensive line for the Cowboys the last 5-7 years has been marginal at best, despite what all the analysts said, and just how many titles have they won recently? The Giants have some outstanding skill players, and Eli has shown that if he has protection, he can pick apart defenses. Put a solid o-line on the field, and the Giants' offense could be a machine--and that would be the case for several years to come. You can never have too many good offensive lineman. Thus, I favor taking a lineman with the first pick.

Still, my knowledge of the team and its needs is still in its beginning phase. Giants fans should feel free to enlighten me here.

UPDATE: As of approximately 11:30 p.m., it has been reported that Houston has signed not Reggie Bush but DE Mario Williams from North Carolina State. Wow.

The Dallas Stars are pathetic.

The Dallas Stars, for the second game in a row, snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Two nights ago, the Stars had a one goal lead with about three minutes left. They had a power play going. Easy, right? Wrong. They gave up a shorthanded goal, the game was tied, they went to overtime and lost. Tonight was just as painful. The Stars were up by one goal with about three minutes left AND on the power play. While on the power play, Brendan Morrow took a completely unnecessary and stupid penalty. Once the Colorado penalty was over, they immediately pulled the goalie, giving them a 2-man advantage. With just under a minute left in regulation, the Avs scored. And then in overtime, all 1:09 of it, the action was in the Stars' end, and they ended up losing.

Man, this Stars team has really sucked in this series. Turco has by and large continued his streak of playing poorly in the playoffs, and when he has been playing well, the rest of the team has done nothing to slow down the Avs.

Pathetic. Looks like it's the third year in a row that Dallas goes out in the first round.

Junior hockey playoff talk: Wildcats' season comes to an end.

Well, since I'm now talking about the NHL playoffs, I need to give an update on the Wichita Falls Wildcats.

The Wildcats made the NAHL playoffs, but lost in the first round to the two-time defending national champion Texas Tornado. The series went the distance, and the 'Cats had a chance to close out the series on home ice in Game 4, but let the opportunity slip away. After getting drilled in Game 1, our boys put up a great defensive effort, goalie Tom Billick was magnificient, and despite getting outshot 31-17, we came out with a win by the score of 2-1. In the process, the boys had to finish the game 4-on-6 because of a penalty and an empty net at the other end. That was the first win ever for the Wildcats on the Tornado's home ice, which has been a real house of horrors for us. Game 3 was on our ice, and the Wildcats dominated with a 3-0 shutout. Again we outshot by a wide margin (37-19), but the D was solid and Billick was brilliant. In spite of the difference in shots, that was probably the best 60 minutes of hockey the Wildcats played all season. Going into Game 4, we had all the momentum and jumped out to a 2-0 lead. And then, with less than 10 seconds left in the period, there was a defensive breakdown, and a Tornado shot from a sharp angle that found the top of the net. From that point, the Wildcats' mental state was shaky while the Tornado regained their confidence. We just missed on a beautifully set up 2 on 1 in the second period, and then the Tornado scored two quick goals to take a 3-2 lead. Then, just as in the first, we had a defensive breakdown with under 10 seconds. That allowed a skater an open lane right down the slot for a point blank shot which made the score 4-2. We put up 12 shots in the 3rd, but the Tornado goalie really found his game and stopped them all. That meant a deciding Game 5 on the road. The final score of that Game was 4-0, but the game was much closer than the score indicated. The game was scoreless until the 18:40 mark of the 2nd, and there was an empty netter at the end. The real difference was the Tornado goalie. He was less than good in Games 2-3 and the first two periods of Game 4, but from there on out, he was outstanding.

Still, the Wildcats took away a lot of positives from that series, and those will provide a great foundation for next season. We have a solid group coming back next year (as long as some don't get offered college scholarships, and there are couple of possibilities there), and new players that have already been signed for next year have plenty of size and skill. And most importantly, Tom Billick will be back. Tom was the best player on the team all season long. Due to a long stretch where the offense was not producing much at all and the D was not helping him out, his statistics do not show how good he was this year. His improvement from last season to this was big, and if that continues, he will be one of the premier goaltenders in the NAHL (and American junior hockey in general) next year.

The guys who aged out this year will be missed. A big thanks to Kyle "The Captain" Kraemer, Chris Ochoa, Dan Medenwaldt, Nicholas "The Minister" Ghidina, Nick Swinteck, Paul Velo, and Doug Robinson.

Any Hockey East fans can see Kraemer next year playing with the Northeastern University Huskies.

Playoff hockey!

I just finished watching Edmonton beat Detroit 4-3 in double OT. What a game! Man, I love playoff hockey--except for the sorry showing by the Stars so far. That has just been depressing. Oh well, winning two games in Denver is within the realm of possibility...

Andrew Sullivan succinctly explains "The Generals v. Rumskull"

Andrew Sullivan has a post which first described his reaction to the book Cobra II, which was that the Iraq war

was ruined almost single-handedly by one arrogant, overweening de facto saboteur. That man is Donald Rumsfeld. It's actually hard to fathom how one single man could have done so much irreparable damage to his country's cause and standing; and how no one was able to stop him.

My reaction to this was multi-faceted. I agreed with his basic assessment of Rumskull, but I was appalled at the implication that anyone had really tried to stop Rumskull. In my view, Rumskull was not stopped because the Bush administration (i.e., Bush, Big Dick, Wolfowitless, Feith, Perle, etc.) did not want him stopped. Moreover, other people (see names listed in previous sentence) took a direct and active role in causing the damage.

And then I read on and saw that while Sullivan did not directly blame any of the people I named, he also did not blame only Rumskull: "This is not to exonerate Bush and Cheney, who enabled and enable him."

And then Sullivan concluded his post with this:

And it's not to argue that the military shouldn't always ultimately defer to civilian leadership. But when that leadership has been this incompetent, this bull-headed, this reckless and malevolent and petty, the generals have a patriotic duty to speak out. Until this man is removed, we can have no confidence in the conduct of the war; and no confidence in the president as commander-in-chief. It's really as simple as that.

Indeed.

SMU Men's basketball talk

Big news from the Hilltop in Big D! Matt Doherty has been named new head coach of men's basketball at SMU. This makes me one happy camper. I have been and always will be a Mustang (both parents graduated from there, my father got his first graduate degree there, I went there for undergrad and law school, was a varsity athlete and a member of the Mustang Band, still have strong ties to the Band, etc.), but when it comes to college basketball, I am also a big Tar Heel fan (a story for another time). So I am happy that SMU is getting not just a former Tar Heel, but one that won a national championship and learned from a true master, Dean Smith. He then spent several years at KU as an assistant to another Tar Heel and coaching great, Roy Williams.

I know skeptics will point to his last year as coach at UNC, but he was a proven winner at Notre Dame and his first season at UNC, when he was the national coach of the year. All in all, I'd say this is great day for SMU basketball.

Rumskull: And then there were eight

As reported on Fox News and the Financial Times, an eighth retired general has called for Rumskull's resignation. That would be retired Marine Lt. General Paul Van Riper.

As retired generals started calling for Rumskull to step down, I kept expecting to see Van Riper's name added to the list. It is no surprise that he has added his voice to that call. An April 15, 2006, Washington Post article had some statements by Van Riper.

"I admire those who have stepped forward, and I agree with the arguments they are making," retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper said in an interview yesterday. "I count myself in the same camp."

Van Riper, a lifelong Republican who voted for Bush in 2000 but did not vote in the 2004 election, said Rumsfeld has failed in a number of ways, including "disastrous" war planning and execution and fostering a poor command climate.

At that time, Van Riper was not calling for Rumskull to go. Now he has.

You can see Fox News video of Van Riper in at least two places. On the Fox News web site, click on "Videos," then click on "Politics," and finally choose "Wartime Incompetence." Chances are that video will not be on the site too much longer (as would be the case on other network news sites). You can also find video of Van Riper's comments here.

Among Van Riper's comments are the following:

When I look at where we are in this war to date, and imagine where we could have been if the right number of troops had been put in at the right time and had been employed correctly, then I think we need new leadership.

If this leader is not capable of doing it, now going in excess of five years, has not demonstrated he is, then perhaps it is time to find a new one. If I was the president, I would have relieved him three years ago.

And just who is Van Riper? You can read his official biography to get a good idea. Once you have done that, swing over to Millennium Challenge 02 and the Iraq War for much more. MC 02 was the major war game prior to the Iraq war, and Van Riper was the commander of the Opposing Force, which was in a "de-stabled Middle Eastern nation..with a very strong, strong rogue commander, very strong, that commanded over half of the country's land mass and had strong loyalties -- religious, ethnic loyalties -- across that nation and region[.]" Gee, sound like anybody we know? Anyway, Van Riper from the outset was using tactics and strategies unlike anything used in the West. He implemented unconventional techniques and cultural differences--and they worked. The Opposing Force was wreaking havoc. And then bit by bit Van Riper was prohibited from using those techniques (see How MC 02 actually played out for the OPFOR). Although--as discussed in other sections of my MC 02 site--that did not necessarily make MC 02 a sham, the point here is that Van Riper's actions showed before the war that our forces would be vulnerable to unconventional tactics, and it seems to me that lesson was not heeded until after the end of major combat operations.

And that is yet another reason why military commanders might distrust the civilian leadership.

John Kerry: Where were you in 2004?

For those who have not been regular readers of this blog (which means most of the civilized world), I hereby inform you that I am no John Kerry fan (see A few post-election thoughts). Today's Washington Post has an article that further illustrates my dislike of him.

The article reports on a speech Kerry gave at Boston's historic Faneuil Hall in which he was talking tough about Iraq. My stomach started to churn when I read this paragraph:

Yesterday's address was the latest move in Kerry's shadow presidential campaign, launched in the aftermath of his 2004 defeat by President Bush. In a series of speeches, guest columns and television appearances, Kerry has sought to right what many Democrats regard as the defects of that race by outlining a clear exit strategy for Iraq and vowing to fight back against GOP attacks on his and other Democrats' patriotism. Kerry's aggressive attitude is also aimed at wooing liberal voters for a potential presidential bid in 2008.

The end of the article contained a quote from the Republican National Committee:

Tracey Schmitt, a spokeswoman for the Republican National Committee, said..."We do question John Kerry's motives, considering his eagerness to engage in political theatrics as he ponders a presidential run."

Things must be getting chilly in Hades because I agree with this assessment. Kerry had every opportunity to take such a strong stand in 2004, and instead he didn't do a damn thing. Now that the situation in Iraq is still horrible, Bush's numbers keep getting worse, and the public is getting increasingly unhappy, Kerry has decided it is safe to start talking tough.

Here is an example of what I'm talking about. From the article:

Although Kerry acknowledged that the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are not mirror images, he said that the conflicts are "now converging in too many tragic respects."

Among the similarities, according to Kerry: The justification for each war was "based on official deception"; the attempt to cast the struggles as part of a larger global conflict was a "misperception"[.]

(emphasis added). During the 2004 campaign, both of these matters were very clear--as in there was plenty of evidence establishing them--but Kerry said nothing. Indeed, when asked, he stated that the problem was bad intelligence and then blamed everything on the CIA. THAT WAS EXACTLY THE POSITION BUSH TOOK! By taking that position, Kerry missed a great opportunity to differentiate himself from Bush AND he threw away any chance he had to hammer Bush where he was most vulnerable.

On the one hand, I guess I should be glad that another Democrat is speaking up, but on the other hand, Kerry's actions seem to be primarily self-serving. The 2004 campaign showed that his priority was achieving his personal ambition of being President. Because of that I did not trust him during the 2004 campaign, and I do not trust him now. If he was not considering a run in 2008, I might feel differently.

Compare Kerry to the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Ted Kennedy. Love him or hate him, Kennedy is willing to take strong, controversial stands, and he does not sit by to see which way the wind is blowing so that he can take advantage of it to serve his personal ambition. Kerry still seems to be someone who is first and foremost out for himself.

In the midst of the Rumskull debate, someone makes a point I keep repeating.

Yesterday's New York Times had a very interesting article entitled "Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld." It is definitely worth reading. I will be writing more about the article, but for now I will discuss one passage which really caught my attention:

The debates are fueled by the desire to mete out blame for the situation in Iraq, a drawn-out war that has taken many military lives and has no clear end in sight. A midgrade officer who has served two tours in Iraq said a number of his cohorts were angered last month when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that "tactical errors, a thousand of them, I am sure," had been made in Iraq.

"We have not lost a single tactical engagement on the ground in Iraq," the officer said, noting that the definition of tactical missions is specific movements against an enemy target. "The mistakes have all been at the strategic and political levels."

(emphasis added). This is what I have been saying since August 2004. Moreover, I have explained in detail that under the official campaign planning doctrine for the Iraq war 1) the ultimate political objectives are the same as the strategic objectives, 2) the political/strategic objectives take precedence over the military objectives, 3) the military objectives and plans must be designed to meet the political/strategic objectives, and 4) the persons responsible for establishing the political/strategic objectives are the President and the Secretary of Defense. Since August 6, 2004, I have been saying that the persons responsible for the wonder that is the Iraq war are Bush and Rumskull. And now there is at least one military officer who has provided some support for my claim.

Football talk: Giants sign Arrington

As I am now a Giants fan, I took great interest in the news that the Giants just signed LaVar Arrington from the hated Redskins.

Just to recap, I will not be a Cowboys fan as long as t.o. is there. However, that does not mean I have to start liking the Redskins. I mean to say, my disgust for the t.o. signing can go only so far. ;-) Anyway, being a Giants fan means I can still hate the Redskins.

Back to the Arrington signing. This could be a brilliant move, or it could all go wrong. Even after a knee injury, Arrington is one of the most talented and imposing linebackers in the game. He is very big, fast, has a propensity to make big plays, and has a serious mean streak. One of the problems for the Giants last year was linebacker, mainly because of injuries. All of that falls into the "brilliant" side of the ledger.

In the "could all go wrong" side, there are two items. First, there is the injury possibility. Arrigton suffered a major knee injury in 2004, and his rehab was problematical. He passed the Giants' physical, so it appears that he is completely healthy, but injury remains a possibility. The second item is a potential attitude problem. Arrington had all sorts of problems with coaches and management at Washington last year. He is arrogant, and at times he seems selfish to me. In other words, he has some definite t.o. qualities.

But let's return to the "brilliant" possibilities. Arrington will get to play the hated Redskins twice a year, and his new team could play a role in keeping Washington out of the playoffs. In other words, he will have major motivation to stay focused and behaved. Also, as I have said in another discussion, head coach Tom Coughlin is not one to put up with any kind of crap from players. And after last season, you have to consider that the players are not going to let Arrington be a problem. Coughlin really had the players upset, but they seem to have worked that out. While Coughlin is still a hard ass, he has let up some, and the players have come to understand and appreciate Coughlin's ways. In other words, coach and players have come to trust each other and work together. There is a potential for something special to happen this season for the Giants, and I think that if Arrington starts to cause any trouble (and he might not), I think the players will take a primary role in solving the problem.

Then again, since I am a newcomer to the Giants fandom, I might need a little more guidance. I wonder if there is anybody who might provide that...

Rumskull defense #2: There has to be trust.

Overview

This defense is related to the concerns over a palace revolt. In an April 13, 2006, Washington Post article, Richard H. Kohn, a military historian at the University of North Carolina who writes frequently on civilian-military relations, said "I think it flatly is a bad thing," and went on to explain that

he worries that it could undermine civilian control of the military, especially by making civilian leaders feel that they need to be careful about what they say around officers, for fear of being denounced as soon as they retire.

"How can you prosecute a war if the military and civilians don't trust each other?" Kohn asked.

Has the possibility of retired officers denouncing civilian leadership arisen only now? This has never been a possibility before now? Of course it has been a possibility.

Moreover, any "civilian leader" who will not or cannot say some things around officers for fear of being denounced does not have the necessary backbone to be leading the military in the first place.

And that brings us to Kohn's question. Apparently the professor feels that it is only the civilian leadership which cannot trust the military officers. It is just as apparent that he has ignored the possibility that indeed the retired generals do not trust Rumskull and some of the other civilians in the Pentagon. Indeed, he seems to dismiss as impossible that the military officers have reasons to distrust Rumskull and the other neocons running DoD.

For those of you keeping score at home, here are a few reasons to distrust the civilian leaders:

• Shinseki is ridiculed.

You can read more about this in More on Wolfowitz and the blunders of the Bush administration and all of the posts list in the Cosmic Wheel Index under the topic heading of "Shinseki, Eric," but here is a synopsis.

Eric Shinseki was Chief of Staff of the Army when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003. Shinseki commanded the occupation forces in Bosnia, so he had experience in such matters. When asked about the troop requirements for any occupation of Iraq, Shinseki in part answered as follows:

We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so, it takes significant ground force presence to maintain safe and secure environment to ensure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.

*******

I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful.

And how did Wolfowitless respond two days later? He did not even wait to be asked a question before he went after Shinseki's estimates:

If I might digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman, from my prepared testimony, because there has been a good deal of comment—some of it quite outlandish—about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq.

*******

But some of the higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.

(emphasis added). As James Fallows put it in "Blind Into Baghdad," "This was as direct a rebuke of a military leader by his civilian superior as the United States had seen in fifty years."

Of course, Shinseki was right, and that fact was bloody obvious as soon as the occupation began. Actually, it was bloody obvious before the war ever started, but now I am digressing.

Indeed, by May 22, 2003, Wolfowitz was saying that the U.S. experience in Bosnia could prove helpful in Iraq. So, it turns out that once the facts showed that Wolfowitless was wrong, he conceded that maybe the experience of Bosnia--and thus the experience of Shinseki--was to be followed. And did I mention that Wolfowitless had ZERO experience in command, combat, post-war occupations, or any kind of military service?

As reported by Knight Ridder, Rumskull piled on by leaking "word of Shinseki's replacement 15 months before Shinseki was due to retire, both embarrassing and neutralizing the Army's top officer." By the way, while Rumskull was a Navy pilot, he never saw combat, and, although he was Secretary of Defense under Ford, he never had to be in charge of a war or its planning.

This is an example of how the completely inexperienced civilian leadership disregarded the experience and knowledge of a military commander--who turned out to be right--and then denigrated that commander publicly. So, what's not to trust?

• Rumskull scraps the original war plan.

Shinseki's correct projection about force size is particularly poignant when viewed in light of the changes made in the initial war plan. The Knight Ridder article referenced above tells this story.

Bush, Rumsfeld and other top officials insist that their military commanders were given everything they requested, and Franks wrote in his book, "American Soldier," that Rumsfeld supported his war plan. Technically, that's accurate. However, three top officials who served with Franks at the time said the plan was the product of a lengthy and sometimes heated negotiation between the Central Command and the Pentagon, in which Rumsfeld constantly pressed Franks and other senior officers to commit fewer troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

*******

Central Command originally proposed a force of 380,000 to attack and occupy Iraq. Rumsfeld's opening bid was about 40,000, "a division-plus," said three senior military officials who participated in the discussions. Bush and his top advisers finally approved the 250,000 troops the commanders requested to launch the invasion. But the additional troops that the military wanted to secure Iraq after Saddam's regime fell were either delayed or never sent.

So, the military commanders wanted many more troops, and Rumskull--the civilian leader with no experience at planning a war and occupation--made the commanders change those plans. As a result, we did not have enough troops in Iraq to control the place after Saddam was defeated.

• The insurgency was ignored.

To be fair, the blame for this does not rest entirely with the civilian leaders, for Tommy Franks is partly responsible. With that in mind...

As I said in Disagreements among military commanders over the war resurface,

As the coalition forces were on the way to Baghdad, intelligence officers and the commanders on the ground said that the Fedayeen and other paramilitary forces, not the Republican Guard, were the major threat and needed to be taken out instead of passing them by and proceeding to Baghdad. However, Tommy Franks and the Pentagon decided otherwise. And that turned out to be a mistake.

The New York Times article I cited contains more details.

The paramilitary Fedayeen were numerous, well-armed, dispersed throughout the country, and seemingly determined to fight to the death. But while many officers in the field assessed the Fedayeen as a dogged foe, General Franks and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld saw them as little more than speed bumps on the way to Baghdad. Three years later, Iraq has yet to be subdued. Many of the issues that have haunted the Bush administration about the war — the failure to foresee a potential insurgency and to send sufficient troops to stabilize the country after Saddam Hussein's government was toppled — were foreshadowed early in the conflict.

*******

After Nasiriya, Lt. Col. Joseph Apodaca, a Marine intelligence officer in that critical first battle, drafted a classified message concluding that the Fedayeen would continue to be a threat. Many had sought sanctuary in small towns that were bypassed in the rush to Baghdad. The colonel compared the Fedayeen attacks to insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia, and warned that unless American troops went after them in force, the enemy would continue their attacks after Baghdad fell, hampering efforts to stabilize Iraq.

*******

Even before the war, Mr. Rumsfeld saw the deployment of United States forces more in terms of what was needed to win the war than to secure the peace.

With the tide in the United States' favor, he began to raise the issue of canceling the deployment of the First Cavalry Division — some 16,000 soldiers. General Franks eventually went along. Though the general insisted he was not pressured to agree, he later acknowledged that the defense secretary had put the issue on the table. "Don Rumsfeld did in fact make the decision to off-ramp the First Cavalry Division," General Franks said in an earlier interview with The New York Times.

(emphasis added). Here is a case of the military commanders in the field being ignored and overruled by Rumskull. And Rumskull was wrong, and the insurgency blossomed. But what about Franks? Franks was not a field commander, and Franks was not going to oppose Rumskull. Remember how Shinseki was treated. And then there's the fact that Franks gave in to Rumskull's desire to not deploy the First Cavalry Division.

• Planning for the post-war period

There is so much to say about this, and I have in fact already said a lot. Go to the Cosmic Wheel Index subheading of "Planning for the post-war period" under the "Iraq" topic heading. Those posts will explain the following: 1) the planning for the post-war period was strictly a Department of Defense show; 2) the military commanders had nothing to do with it; 3) official campaign planning doctrine said planning for the post-conflict stage had to be included; and 4) according to that official doctrine, the overall plan had to be designed to meet the ultimate goals as established by the National Command Authorites--the President and the Secretary of Defense--and that would be Bush and Rumskull. You know, the civilian leaders of our military.

Thanks to the utterly stupid and horrendous lack of planning for the post-war period, we are still in Iraq three years later, the place is still a mess, and our troops are still getting killed.

• Lack of armor

I have written extenisively about the lack of armored vehicles in Iraq. The posts are listed in the Index under the "Armor for our troops" subheading under "Iraq." I will provide a summary here.

As discussed in Rumsfeld, armor, and reactions: Part 1, when the issue of armored vehicles became too great to be ignored, Rumskull said some really boneheaded things when quizzed by a soldier:

"You go to war with the Army you have..."

I will start with the comment that has received the most attention--"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time." Now I know that I am nothing but a freedom-hating, smart-ass heathen civilian, but it seems to me that when you choose to go to war and when you choose the time that you go to war, you should not go to war until you have the army you want.

Vehicles can still be blown up.

Rumskull talked about how every effort was being made to armor vehicles, and then he said, "And if you think about it, you can have all the armor in the world on a tank and a tank can be blown up. And you can have an up-armored humvee and it can be blown up." Why the hell did he say that? It seems like he was basically saying "Why are you soldiers so concerned about armored vehicles? You can still get blown up, so quit your whining." He was there to pump up morale, and these comments certainly don't measure up to "Win one for the Gipper."

The Pentagon Humvees

Rumskull closed with something that got applause and showed what a neat guy he is: "The other day...I looked outside the Pentagon and there were six or eight up-armored humvees. They’re not there anymore. They’re en route out here, I can assure you."

That's great, Don, but why were they at the Pentagon in the first place instead of in a war zone where our troops are getting killed? And why did it take until November 2004 for you to get them en route to Iraq?

In Part 3, I concluded there was a high probability that the powers that be knew about the need for more armored vehicles well before the effort was made to increase production.

The official company line is that there was no way to know that Iraq would require such a huge peacekeeping operation after the war, the only reason there is a need for armored vehicles is that the insurgents starting using roadside bombs, there was no way to foresee the effective use of roadside bombs, and the need for armored vehicles was not discovered until August/September 2003.

This post shows that 1) anyone could have foreseen that the peacekeeping operation would be huge; 2) before the war the CIA predicted the use of guerrilla tactics on rear area units (that use unarmored Humvees and trucks); 3) experiences in the major combat operations (which ended May 1, 2003) indicated that attacks on unarmored vehicles would occur; 4) no one was surprised when we faced such attacks during major combat operations; and 5) training for roadside bombs have been part of military war games since 1993.

In other words, the "basic explanation" does not have credibility, which in turn means that the "production and capability" explanation is weakened because while the lag time between demand and ability to ramp up production could not be avoided, that effort could have and should have started long before September 2003.

UPDATE: Back in Part 2, I said "remember that the shift of up-armored Humvees began in July 2003. I will explain the importance of that fact in a subsequent post." Here's the explanation. As shown above, Gen. Whitcomb said that the need for armored vehicles was identified in August 2003. If that was really the case, why then did the shift of up-armored Humvees begin in July 2003?

Part 4 addressed Rumskull's comment that "you can have an up-armored humvee and it can be blown up" and showed that even makeshift armor on a Humvee had saved lives. I ended that post with "Yo, Don...why don't you go over to Iraq and tell the troops again how it won't matter if they have armored vehicles?"

In Don't take my word for it..., I quoted the late David Hackworth:

Had a decent chunk of that dough been spent on the right stuff – supporting our troops – our warriors wouldn’t have fought in Korea in 1950 with World War I gear or be slugging it out in Iraq in scrounged “hillbilly armor” and told to go to war with the Army we have and to suck it up.

But of course, there is no reason why our military commanders should distrust the civilian leaders just because the troops are getting killed because of a lack of proper eqipment, right?

And I haven't even addressed the body armor issue.

Conclusion

The military commanders--including the seven retired generals who have called for Rumskull's resignation--have plenty of reasons to distrust the civilian leaders in the Pentagon. What I have presented here does not come close to telling the whole story. I find Professor Kohn's analysis to be so shortsighted as to be almost meaningless, and his implication that it is only the civilian leaders who have to worry about not trusting the military commanders is just plain stupid in light of the facts surrounding the Iraq war.

The foregoing analysis is relevant because of the building drumbeat for war with Iran. Unless changes in leadership occur, any such war would be promoted, planned, and run by the same civilian leaders that brought us the Iraq war and its aftermath. There are many reasons why the present military commanders would distrust that civilian leadership. Moreover, there is little or no reason for the American public to trust these neocon civilian morons. In my opinion, if there is to be war with Iran, Rumskull and his buddies should not be in charge of it. Somebody has to do something to stop these idiots or get them out of office. As I said in Some thoughts on retired generals calling for Rumskull's resignation, "The views and voices of these retired generals are important because there apparently is almost no one else with any credibility or authority willing to speak up and try to get Rumskull out."

Then again, a Rumskull resignation might not matter, for Bush and Cheney will still be in office.

Iran: We had a chance over three years ago for a peaceful option.

Kevin Drum has a MUST READ post about Iran over at Political Animal. Here's the summary...Before the Iraq war, Iran proposed to the U.S. to enter into negotiations to resolve differences between the two countries. The proposal had the approval of all the players in Iran. People like Powell and Armitage were in favor of it, but Cheney, along with his neocon pals, were hell bent on regime change, so they refused to talk with Iran. As Kevin points out,

since then things have only gotten worse: Iran has elected a wingnut president, they've made progress on nuclear enrichment, gained considerable influence in Iraq, and increased their global economic leverage as oil supplies have gotten tighter.

What is it with these neocon guys? I'll try to address that question in a subsequent post. Here's a hint: I think these guys simply want war, and regime change is not the reason. In the meantime, read Kevin's post.

Rumskull defense #1: He is a patriot with a good work ethic.

This defense comes from the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace. At a press briefing on April 11, 2006, Pace said the following when asked about the recent criticism of Rumskull:

As far as Pete Pace is concerned, this country is exceptionally well-served by the man standing on my left.

Nobody, nobody works harder than he does to take care of the PFCs and lance corporals and lieutenants and the captains. He does his homework. He works weekends, he works nights. People can question my judgment or his judgment, but they should never question the dedication, the patriotism and the work ethic of Secretary Rumsfeld.

For starters, I wonder if failing to provide the PFCs, lance corporals, etc. with adequate body armor and armor for vehicles comes under the category of "nobody works harder" for our troops. Second, it is good to see that Gen. Pace has learned to utilize the Bush administration SOP of stating as a defense something that is irrelevant, non-substantive, and incapable of being refuted.

J.D. Henderson at Intel Dump explains why this "defense" is meaningless:

This is a classic example of the bait-and-switch defense. Pace is defending Rumsfeld from those who "question the dedication, the patriotism and the work ethic of Secretary Rumsfeld." Great. Who the hell questions that? NOBODY. What they do question is his competence and his arrogance.

Yes, Rummy is dedicated, patriotic, and a hard worker. Good for him. Now how competent is he? Has he ignored advice that was later seen to be correct? Has he attacked generals who disagreed with him by publicly rebuking them? Has he bullied senior military officers and stifled dissent? Has his arrogance and micromanagement led to needless deaths of American troops and harmed our national security? Is he the worst secretary of war in the history of our nation? Most importantly, has he consistently been proven wrong by events on the ground turning out just as his critics predicted, instead of how he predicted? The answer to all these questions is clear.

(emphasis in original). I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that Henderson's answer for all but the first question is "yes." I, for one, am not to going to argue with him.

So long, Scotty Boy!

White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan just resigned. One of my favorite whipping boys is now gone--from the Bush administration anyway. I'm sure I will see and hear more of Scotty Boy because I'll bet that he will now become part of his mother's campaign for Texas Governor. This would be a new twist on the standard "I want to spend more time with my family" excuse. And to give you an idea of what I think about her, I would be far more inclined to vote for Scotty Boy than her.

Some thoughts on retired generals calling for Rumskull's resignation

Recently, seven retired generals have called for Rumskull to resign as Secretary of Defense. Some people have criticized the retired generals for varying reasons. The reason I will address here was stated thusly by Kevin Drum of Political Animal:

Regardless of whether or not we agree with the generals' criticism, I think it's wise to be uneasy about something that has a bit of a sense of a palace revolt against the current civilian leadership of the military.

Kevin immediately followed with this:

But has mismanagement of the war become so extreme that the usual rules simply don't apply anymore?

My answer is "yes."

As a general (so to speak) rule, we should be concerned about any conduct which could be construed as military commanders trying to take control from the civilian leadership. Civilian leadership of our military has been an element of our government from the beginning. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the exclusive power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and declare war. The exclusive nature of that last power is why I have always believed that the Iraq War Resolution was at most unconstitutional and at least an abandonment of duty by the Congress, but I digress. Over the years, various statutes, rules, and regulations have been established which prohibit active duty military personnel from seeking elected office and engaging in many political activities. The rationale underlying civilian control of the military is part of the separation of powers doctrine.

The current criticism of Rumskull does not seem to me to be the sort of "palace revolt" that threatens our democratic system of checks and balances. I will admit that in some ways I really don't care about this issue because Rumskull's ass should have been run out of the Pentagon years ago, and, as I have stated elsewhere on this blog, I think he has been criminally negligent. Thus, I have a bias. However, there are objective reasons supporting the opinion stated to begin this paragraph.

First, all the generals are retired. They are not part of the active military. Technically, then, they are not part of the "palace." They are civilians now, and they have every right to speak out as does any other civilian.

Second--and more importantly--under the current circumstances they seem to be about the only persons 1) willing to speak out who 2) have some credibility. For example, I have been complaining for a long time about Rumskull. But why should anyone in actual power listen to me? I have no military experience. The closest I have come to military experience is working at Sheppard Air Force Base for two summers. I'm just a lawyer in Texas. Compare my record with the generals:

• Wes Clark--4-star Army General and former Supreme Allied NATO commander.
• Anthony Zinni--4-star Marine General and former commander of Central Command.
• John Riggs--Army Lt. General; former commander of the Army 1st the first few months of Rumsfeld's term; thereafter was the director of an Army task force to transform the service's structure and weapons systems.
• Gregory Newbold--Marine Lt. General; served as chief of operations of Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2000 to October 2002; resigned in opposition to Iraq war.
  
• Paul Eaton--Army Maj. General; in charge of training the Iraqi army from 2003 to 2004.
  
• Charles Swannack--Army Maj. General; former commander of the Army 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq.
  
• John Batiste--Army Maj. General; former commander of the Army 1st Infantry Division in Iraq from 2004-2005; offered a third star to stay in Iraq, but instead retired rather than to continue to serve under Rumskull.

Of these seven, it appears that only Riggs might have a personal ax to grind. When he put in for retirement he was a Lt. (3-star) General, but just before he retired, he was demoted to Maj. (2-star) General for alleged misuse of military contractors.

Note that three--Eaton, Swannack, and Batiste--were commanders on the ground in Iraq, and two more--Newbold and Riggs--served in senior positions in the Pentagon under Rumskull.

The views and voices of these retired generals are important because there apparently is almost no one else with any credibility or authority willing to speak up and try to get Rumskull out. And anyone who thinks Rumskull has done a good job needs professional help--and I'm not kidding. Over the last few days Bush has repeatedly and emphatically said Rumskull is doing a great job and will stay on the job. There is no freaking way Bush is going to get rid of Rumskull because to do so would be viewed as an admission that major mistakes have been made, and Bush will NEVER do that. The GOP, which controls both houses of Congress, is not going to speak out against Rumskull. Indeed, this past Sunday, Sen. Richard Lugar, one Republican who has regularly taken issue with the White House over Iraq, said that keeping Rumskull is "a good call." With few exceptions (Sen. Evan Bayh being one), Congressional Democrats are doing next to nothing, and anyone who does speak out is quickly accused of "politicizing" the issue. No active duty military personnel are going to speak out publicly, and there are sound reasons why they will not and should not. Any speaking out has to stay "in house" and within the chain of command. However, when that chain of command ultimately goes to George W. Bush, speaking out does absolutely no good.

What I am saying is that the actions of these seven retired generals do not comprise a palace revolt that threatens the system of civilian control of the military. Instead, what I see is that the civilians in control of the military have done such a horrific job that it has damaged this country now and possible for years to come. Iraq has been a huge cluster f#@!, and Rumskull bears a great deal of the responsibility for that. Something has to be done to get rid of these assholes, and that--not doing away with civilian control--is the basis for the actions of these retired generals.

I am going to write more about this topic. I will address some of the responses in support of Rumskull and in criticism of these retired generals. In doing so, my intention is to support my answer of "yes" to Kevin Drum's question "But has mismanagement of the war become so extreme that the usual rules simply don't apply anymore?"

Another explanation why military action against Iran is a bad idea right now

Gregory Djerejian has a post on his site, The Belgravia Dispatch, which presents some good analysis on whether military action against Iran is a good idea. After setting out examples of how the Bush administration and the winger media are saying the same kinds of things now about Iran that they said about Iraq, Djerejian writes the following:

Yeah, methinks it could all happen again, even with so much unfinished business on the Administration's plate. Iraq is in a hugely perilous state and the situation in Afghanistan (and parts of Pakistan) is very problematic (by the way, where are Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri?). So please be patient with me, over the coming weeks, as I seek to bring the temperature down on Iran policy musings a degree or two. Look, a military strike on Iran might ultimately prove necessary, especially if Ahmadi-Nejad is in power at the time Iran is actually about to get a nuclear weapon. His aggressive rhetoric must be taken seriously, and we very likely cannot risk a nuclear Iran led by such an unstable leader. But an Iran led by another less radical regime could be a different story, especially given positive demographic trends that point to a more moderate generation in the wings.

The bottom line is that military action against Iran, if it comes, must be pursued only after the situation in neighboring countries is more stable (Iraq, Afghanistan), only after diplomatic avenues (and non-military punitive actions like freezing the assets of regime leaders and blocking key regime figures travel) have been pursued to the utmost, only when we have unimpeachable intelligence that Iran is truly on the cusp of wielding a nuclear weapon, and always, with all due consideration being given to the nature of the regime that is actually in power at the time the country is about to go nuclear. Until then, look for this blog to be concerned about the chances of another ill-considered, overly precipitous action in the region, especially given the incompetent civilian leadership currently in place at the Pentagon. And, no, I don't derive too much comfort from the Administration's protests that such an attack is not in the offing. Better to monitor going-ons rather closely, I'd think. As the old saying goes, trust but verify...with emphasis on the verification prong.

I look forward to Djerejian's thoughts over the coming weeks.

Why revisiting the Iraq NIE is important

Revisiting the Iraq NIE is necessary and important for several reasons. The NIE was part of the Bush administration PR campaign to convince Congress and the American public that we need to go to war with Iraq, and as I said on April 13, "This topic is relevant today because most of these same idiots are now building a case against Iran just like they did against Iraq." The story of the Iraq NIE and the 25-page white paper show just how the Bush administration manipulated almost all of the circumstances. Such manipulation was manifest in the NIE/sales brochure, but the timing of the introduction of the Iraq War Resolution, how quickly it was acted upon, and the fact that the white paper was created months before the NIE was even requested show further manipulation. This is how the Bush administration operates. They are trying to do the same thing now with Iran. We cannot allow this administration to take us into another war with the same bullshit they used before. Revisiting the Iraq NIE exposes the dishonest tactics and presents an opportunity to know how to keep them from being deployed again.

Based on the story of the Iraq NIE, I do not see that the White House is going to request an NIE on Iran. The Congress needs to make that request NOW so that we do not end up with an NIE that is done in three weeks instead of the customary 3-6 months. And if an NIE is done, every member of Congress needs to review it in detail.

UPDATE/CORRECTION: As it turns out, there has already been an NIE done on Iran. As reported by the Washington Post, that NIE was requested in January 2005 and completed in late July/early August 2005. I still think we need another one now.

A closer look at the NIE

Some further questions about the NIE were raised in the comments to the previous post, and I will attempt to address them in this post.

Question 1: Which version of the NIE did Congress see, the 90 or 25 pager?

When I first wrote about the NIE, I wrote that Congress got the 90-page version. At that time I thought that meant that the entire Congress got the full NIE. However, once I started looking into this yesterday, doubts arose, and I have yet to find a simple, definitive answer. Apparently, the entirety of the 90-page version is still classified, which seems odd if indeed the 90-page version was given to the entire Congress. Also, the rules of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (specifically Rule 9) generally do not allow classified testimony or material to be disclosed to anyone not a member of the committee. The Rules for the House Intelligence Committee were not available on the Committee's website. In any event, the general rule is that classified material does not go beyond the Senate Committee, and that would indicate that the 90-page version of the NIE did not go to the full Congress. Still, I seem to remember that the 90-page version was made available for review to all members of Congress.

If anyone has the simple, definitive answer, please clue me in.

Question 2: If those who wrote the report and knew the truth was not being presented, why didn't they speak up?

Now this is the really important question. Unfortunately, I once again do not have a definitive answer. However, based largely on the facts found by the Senate Intelligence Committee in its July 7, 2004, report I will present some possible answers.

Before presenting those possible answers, however, I am go to raise more questions. Question 2 could be asked of the 90-page NIE and the 25-page version separately, and that is what I will do.

• Question 2 and the 90-page NIE
  

Let's revisit the November 20, 2005, Washington Post editorial by former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, wherein he described how the NIE came to be written:

At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been requested by the White House and none had been prepared.

(emphasis added). Un-freaking-believable. The Bush administration had been talking increasingly about possible action against Iraq for most of 2002, and yet there had been no request for an Iraq NIE. This fact is all the more amazing given that Graham also described how in February 2002 Gen. Tommy Franks told him that the war effort in Afghanistan was being compromised because resiurces were being taken away to prepare for a war in Iraq.

As stated in the Senate Intelligence Committee's report,

A National Intelligence Estimate is the IC's [Intelligence Community's] most authoritative written judgment concerning a specific national security issue. The Estimates are intended to provide policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information - regardless of whether analytic judgments conform to any particular policy objective.

Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems to me that when one is contemplating going to war, a National Intelligence Estimate is absolutely necessary. And yet none had been requested by the White House. The NIE for Iraq was done only because four of the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee demanded it (and they were authorized to do so) after Tenet's September appearance. Sen. Durbin wrote a letter to Tenet on September 9, 2002. Graham wrote his letter to Tenet on September 10, 2002. On September 13, 2002, Sen. Feinstein wrote a letter to Bush requesting his assistance in the preparation of the NIE. And Sen. Levin sent a letter to Tenet on September 17, 2002. Remember those dates.

As described in the Senate Intelligence Committe's report, the Iraq NIE was put on a fast track of 2-3 weeks in spite of the facts that 1) completing an NIE in 60 days would be considered fast, and 2) NIEs typically take 3-6 months to complete.

The foregoing facts start to paint a more complete picture when one other fact is added. According to the legislative history, the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, a/k/a the Iraq War Resolution, was first introduced in Congress on September 19, 2002. So, just days after it was revealed that no NIE on Iraq had even been requested, and days after four Senators called for an Iraq NIE, the Iraq War Resolution was introduced in Congress. What this means is that the Bush administration, aided by members of Congress, rushed to get a Congressional resolution that would give Bush the blessing to wage war. However, given that an NIE had been requested, it was not feasible to get a vote on the resolution until the NIE was done.

The 90-page NIE was delivered on October 1, 2002, the 25-page version came on October 4, the House passed the Resolution on October 10, and it passed the Senate on September 11.

So, the NIE had to be a rush job, and even if members of Congress wanted to look it over in any detail, there was not enough time for all members to do so.

And do not forget the portion of Graham's editorial quoted in the previous post which showed that none of the information in the 90-page NIE had been independently verified by anyone inside Iraq.

Believe it or not, all of this does relate to Question 2, which asks why those who wrote the NIE did not speak up regarding its inaccuracies. It certainly seems to me that the 90-page NIE was never intended to be a true NIE. Instead, it was supposed to say what the Bush administration wanted it to say, which was provide support for everythin the administration had been saying and wanted to say to support going to war.

Support for this opinion comes from a November 9, 2003, article from The Independent, a British newspaper:

The man he picked to write it, the weapons expert Robert Walpole, had a track record of going back over old intelligence assessments and reworking them in accordance with the wishes of a specific political interest group. In 1998, he had come up with an estimate of the missile capabilities of various rogue states that managed to sound considerably more alarming than a previous CIA estimate issued three years earlier. On that occasion, he was acting at the behest of a congressional commission anxious to make the case for a missile defense system; the commission chairman was none other than Donald Rumsfeld, now Secretary of Defense and a key architect of the Iraq war.

Mr Walpole's NIE on Iraq threw together all the elements that have now been discredited - Niger, the aluminum tubes, and so on. It also gave the misleading impression that intelligence analysts were in broad agreement about the Iraqi threat, relegating most of the doubts and misgivings to footnotes and appendices.

In other words, the answer to Question 2 as it relates to the 90-page version of the NIE is that the people who wrote it did not care about the truth, but instead cared only about supporting the Bush administration's case for war.

NOTE: For more info on Walpole, check out this post at Daily Kos.

• Question 2 and the 25-page white paper
  

Much has been made of the differences between the 90-page version and the declassified, 25-page version. Implicit in Question 2 is why were there differences? The short answer is that the 25-page version was never a summary of the NIE in the first place. Consequently, the 25-page document hereinafter will be referred to as "the 25-page white paper" or "white paper."

Work on this document actually started in May 2002, as explained in the Senate Intelligence Committee's report:

The IC [Intelligence Community] started production of the white paper in May 2002, months before the classified NIE was requested by Members of the SSCI. On May 8, 2002, an assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) sent an electronic mail (e-mail) to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Near East and South Asia (NESA) asking him to prepare a white paper on Iraq's WMD programs. The NIO told Committee staff that the DDCI had recently attended a meeting at the White House, and the DDCI wanted the paper as a follow-up to the meeting discussions. The Deputy Director for Central Intelligence testified at a March 4, 2004 Committee hearing that the paper was requested by the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee.

So, work on the 25-page version started approximately four months before work started on the NIE. But wait, there's more...The task was given by the NIO to an Iraq specialist in NESA, and the first draft was completed on May 22, 2002. However, the CIA had not provided a deadline, so work continued intermittently over the next few months. Now here is where things get even more interesting. During this interval, the NIO decided that the summary of the white paper was weak and that there was a need for a "full blown" key judgments section. And it just so happened that the actual NIE was being written at that time.

The NIO said that because his staff had not yet drafted an unclassified key judgments the National Intelligence Council (NIC) staff decided to declassify the NIE key judgments to use as the key judgments of the white paper and to make the paper the unclassified equivalent of the NIE.

In other words, the 25-page whitepaper was 1) written before the NIE was completed, 2) written before work ever started on the NIE, 3) had the key judgments of the NIE simply slapped onto it; and 4) was a separate and distinct document from the NIE. Anyone who doubts any of this should read on...

When asked why the 25-page white paper left out a great deal of content in the 90-page NIE, the NIO explained that things were left out of the white paper

because they were outside of the scope of the tasking for the unclassified paper. The unclassified paper had been tasked in May 2002 at the request of the Deputies Committee and the classified NIE was tasked in September 2002 at the request of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Members. The papers' scopes were determined by those taskings.

And there you have it. Things like the caveats, quailifiers, and dissents never appeared in the white paper because they were never supposed to be part of the white paper. And that explains in part why nobody responsible for writing the 25-page white paper spoke up about any of its omissions, misstatements, or untruths.

Now add in that the NIE was supposed to be supportive of the war effort and that no one had time to give it a meaningful review before the vote on the Iraq War Resolution, and it would have been far more likely for people to read the 25-page white paper than the 90-page NIE. The white paper--with its complete lack of caveats, qualifiers, and dissents--would have made a much better sales tool than the 90-page NIE, and thus you have another part of the answer as to why those responsible for writing the white paper did not speak up.

Bush, Iraq, and WMD: some of the old news

As I said in the previous post, the latest news about the Bush administration not only failing to disclose intelligence about the alleged "mobile weapons labs" but to affirmatively and repeatedly assert that those trailers were bio weapons labs was just par for the course. I also said that I would briefly review much of what I had already posted on this blog, so here is the review. What follows are summaries of my previous posts (with one bit of new material). The actual posts are more detailed and contain links to my sources (some of which need updating).

The NIE, generally speaking

There were two versions of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the Bush administration used to build the case for war. The full version was 90 pages long. Although it was stacked with conclusions that Iraq had lots of WMD, the 90-page version never said that Iraq was an imminent threat to the U.S. Moreover, the 90-page version contained many caveats, qualifications, and dissenting views. However, the public never was aware of that prior to the war because the version of the NIE that was released to the public was a 25-page version which contained none of the caveats, qualifications, or dissents. The 25-page version basically declared that Iraq had lots of WMD and was an imminent threat to the U.S. And no one ever heard anyone from the administration talk about the caveats, qualifications, and dissents.

The public did not become aware of any of the caveats, qualifications, or dissents until portions of the 90-page version were declassified on July 18, 2003--almost three months after the end of major combat operations.

And here is some additional material on the NIE. On November 20, 2005, former Senator Bob Graham (and member of the Senate Intelligence Committee) had an editorial in the Washington Post about the NIE. Here are my favorite parts:

There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document. While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites, it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so unless he was first attacked.

Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.

The American people needed to know these reservations, and I requested that an unclassified, public version of the NIE be prepared. On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." It represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version.

(emphasis added).

The Air Force's position on Iraq's UAVs

UAVs are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The Bush administration publicly claimed that Iraq could use UAVs to attack the U.S. with chemical and biological weapons. However, it turns out that before the war the Air Force--the group with far and away the most expertise in the country on UAVs--thought that Iraq’s UAVs posed no threat to Iraq’s neighbors or the U.S. After the end of major combat operations, we obtained many of Iraq's UAVs, and guess what? Upon examination, the Air Force was right.

Some of the Air Force's conclusions were contained in one of the dissents noted in the 90-page version of the NIE (and left out in the 25-page public version), but the Air Force's report was even stronger than noted in the NIE.

The final paragraph of that post contained things applicable to many other areas:

Perhaps what is most unsettling is that, as noted in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace article, “This disclosure parallels other instances in which officials less expert in the field overruled the opinions of the most informed government intelligence experts.” Why did this happen?

The DIA and chemical weapons

The Defense Intelligence Agency issued before the war a report on Iraq's alleged chemical weapons, and that report did not come even close to supporting what the Bush administration kept saying over and over about the subject. As with the UAVs, the 90-page NIE contained a qualifier about chemical weapons, but the DIA report--completed before the NIE--went way beyond that qualifier. Here's what I wrote about the report, with the excerpts from the report in bold:

A substantial amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) actions.

So it seems that most of the “large stockpiles” had been destroyed before the war.

Nevertheless, we believe Iraq retained production equipment, expertise and chemical precursors and can reconstitute a chemical warfare program...

Oh my...this sounds serious...but wait...there’s more to this sentence:

...in the absence of an international inspection regime.

Read that again. Let it sink in. The Pentagon’s own intelligence agency concluded that Iraq could have reconstituted its chemical weapons program unless there was an international inspection regime in place. Gosh, that’s a rather inconvenient conclusion, don’t you think? After all, THERE WAS AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION REGIME IN PLACE BEFORE THE WAR. Let’s move forward, shall we?

Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G-series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections.

So the DIA concluded that Iraq could produce mustard gas. That’s not good. I can’t dispute that. But I don’t see how anyone could say mustard gas–a blister agent–compares in severity to nerve agents such as sarin and cyclosarin (which are G-series nerve agents) and VX. Read footnotes 1, 2, and 3 of the 25-page version of the NIE and see what you think. The DIA concluded Iraq lacked large quantities of the key chemical precursors for these chemical weapons AND that all known production facilities had been destroyed. Now, I know what some of you are thinking. What about all the unknown production facilities those sneaky Iraqis had built? Well, assuming that there were any, don’t you think that an international inspection regime would have found those and then destroyed them? The DIA apparently did. Perhaps this explains why the DIA also said this:

In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert Storm.

So, the DIA felt that Iraq would have trouble producing large quantities of the nerve agents unless it got help from outside Iraq. Does anybody really think that was likely to happen, especially with the U.N. inspection program ongoing?

And one last one:

Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX.

Man, these certainly are strong conclusions. “We lack direct information...Iraq probably possesses...” Gee, no wonder Bush, Powell, and Rumsfeld went before the American public and declared that, without any doubt, Iraq had mass quantities of chemical weapons and the ability to produce even more mass quantities. Seriously, look at what the DIA said and then go back and look at what Bush and the Boys said. Then try to reconcile them. Even a little. C’mon, it’ll be fun.

And--as was the case with the UAVs--the evidence gathered after the close of major combat operations showed that there were no chemical weapons, a subject covered also in a post entitled...

The CIA admits there were no chemical weapons

The basis for this post was an article from the L.A. Times which is part stated the following:

In what may be a formal acknowledgment of the obvious, the CIA has issued a classified report revising its prewar assessments on Iraq and concluding that Baghdad abandoned its chemical weapons programs in 1991, intelligence officials familiar with the document said.

*******

The new report from the CIA, which is dated Jan. 18, retreats from the agency's prewar assertions on chemical weapons on almost every front. It concludes that "Iraq probably did not pursue chemical warfare efforts after 1991."

Note that this basically corroborates the DIA's pre-war report.

Conclusion--for now

The foregoing shows examples of how the Bush administration either knew or should have known that the relevant intelligence did not support the public proclamations of WMD and in some instances directly disproved them. And there are even more examples. The point here is the Bush administration knowingly and intentionally misled this nation about Iraq and WMD.

Bush, Iraq, and WMD: new news same as the old news

Overview

Yesterday revealed even more news that the Bush administration knew before the Iraq war and the first few months after "Mission Accomplished" that there were no WMD in Iraq. In other words, George, Big Dick, Rumskull, Wolfowitless, and the rest of the gang basically lied--and knew they were lying.

This post will cover the latest news on the subject and set the stage for the next post, which will review (briefly) much of what has already been posted on this blog.

This topic is relevant today because most of these same idiots are now building a case against Iran just like they did against Iraq.

The "new" news: the mobile labs found in Iraq had nothing to do with WMD, and the Bush administration knew that before and after announcing to the world just the opposite.

Yesterday's Washington Post had an article by Joby Warrick entitled "Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War," which discussed a report that basically shows, in my opinion, that the Bush administration knew that the trailers found in Iraq after the war started were not "mobile labs" for producing biological weapons. The article does not state this conclusion, but rather says that there was substantial evidence that the trailers had no connection to biological weapons. Indeed, the article points out that both the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency issued a report claiming that the trailers were used to make biological weapons the day before Bush's first statements on the matter. That report said officials were "confident" that the trailers were mobile bio labs. However, as explained in the article,

A secret fact-finding mission to Iraq -- not made public until now -- had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons. Leaders of the Pentagon-sponsored mission transmitted their unanimous findings to Washington in a field report on May 27, 2003[.]

The date is significant because two days later Bush was in Poland for the annual G8 summit, and he gave an interview on Polish TV in which he made the following proclamation:

We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build biological weapons. They're illegal. They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so far discovered two.

Now I know what some of you are thinking. Golly, that fact-finding report came in while Bush was out of the country preparing for an important conference of world leaders, so it's perfectly undestandable that he "did not get the memo." And all I am going to say to that is "Bullshit." But if anyone wants to stick with the argument, I will play along.

On June 5, 2003--nine days after the fact-finding field report was delivered--Bush gave a speech and said "We recently found two mobile biological weapons facilities which were capable of producing biological agents."

And Bush was definitely not alone is repeating this disingenuous garbage. Here's a sampling:

• Rumskull radio interview on May 29, 2003

We have teams of people that are out looking. They've investigated a number of sites. And within the last week or two, they have in fact captured and have in custody two of the mobile trailers that Secretary Powell talked about at the United Nations as being biological weapons laboratories. We have people who are telling that they worked in these vehicles. And they look at panels and say, "That was my work station in that panel, and that's what it's for."

• Wolfowitless interview in Australia on May 31, 2003

We have found those biological vans that the defector in Germany told us about. They seem to be exactly what he said they would be. And I would think that would pretty well corroborate the rest of his story which is they were for the production of biological weapons.

• Wolfowitless press briefing in Tokyo, June 3, 2003

We -- as the whole world knows -- have in fact found some significant evidence to confirm exactly what Secretary Powell said when he spoke to the United Nations about the development of mobile biological weapons production facilities that would seem to confirm fairly precisely the information we received from several defectors, one in particular who described the program in some detail.

NOTE: The defector mentioned by Wolfowitless was the infamous "Curveball," who 1) was provided by Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, 2) turned out to be lying, and 3) became the prime example that the INC had produced almost nothing other than bogus information. Oh, but that is another story...

• Colin Powell interview with the AP, June 12, 2003

When asked if the U.S.'s credibility had been damaged because no WMD had been found, Powell said,

I think our credibility is intact. I think that we will be able to demonstrate convincingly through the mobile labs, through documentation, through interviews, through what we find, that we knew what we were speaking about.

(emphasis added).

And then, as reported by the Washington Post, the field report was followed three weeks later (approx. June 17, 2003) by a 122-page final report. So if there was any excuse (and I say there was not) for the false statements already listed, there was no excuse whatsoever after June 17, 2003. And yet the bullshit just kept coming.

• Doug Feith, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 7, 2003

Now in time, we’ll learn the truth about Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. But given what we knew the Iraqi regime had and did -- for example, its use of poison gas against Iranians and Kurds, its program to deceive the U.N. inspectors, its cooperation with terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, and its failure to account for known WMD items, including the mobile biological weapons labs -- the danger of WMD in Saddam’s hands appeared grave.

(emphasis added).

• Big Dick Cheney, "Meet the Press," September 14, 2003

Same on biological weapons—we believe he’d developed the capacity to go mobile with his BW production capability because, again, in reaction to what we had done to him in ’91. We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he had gone out and acquired. We’ve, since the war, found two of them. They’re in our possession today, mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing the capacity for an attack.

(emphasis added).

NOTE: Except for the Cheney MTP quote, I found the above quotes via Billmon's Whiskey Bar and the TPM Muckraker.

Details on the fact-finding team and its findings

To understand why all of the foregoing quotes are bullshit, one needs to know more about the fact-finding team and its findings. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) put together a team of nine "scientists and engineers with extensive experience in all the technical fields involved in making bioweapons...each with at least a decade of experience in one of the essential technical skills needed for bioweapons production."

Their actions and findings were described to a Washington Post reporter in interviews with six government officials and weapons experts who participated in the mission or had direct knowledge of it.

None would consent to being identified by name because of fear that their jobs would be jeopardized. Their accounts were verified by other current and former government officials knowledgeable about the mission.

These interviews revealed that the the team of experts unequivocally concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with manufacturing biological weapons. As one expert said, "There was no connection to anything biological." But wait, there's more...

By the end of their first day, team members still had differing views about what the trailers were. But they agreed about what the trailers were not.

"Within the first four hours," said one team member, who like the others spoke on the condition he not be named, "it was clear to everyone that these were not biological labs."

Not only that, but the team of experts further concluded that the trailers could not be easily modified to produce biological weapons.

More reasons why the administration statements were bullshit

• The report of the Iraq Survey Group on September 30, 2004
  

The Washington Post article said in several places that those interviewed would not discuss details of their report because it was still classified, BUT they did say that the final unclassified report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) from September 2004 reflected the same conclusions. This is significant for two reasons.

The first reason relates to the findings of the ISG. Those findings were discussed in Search for WMD is officially over. That post has a link to the ISG's report and explains that the linked document, though an interim report released on September 30, 2004, served as the final conclusions and findings of the ISG. This is particularly true as to the trailers. In March 2005, the ISG did issue an 84-page addenda to the September 30, 2004, report, but there was no mention of the trailers or "mobile labs." Indeed the Note issued along with the addenda said "ISG disproved much of the prewar reporting from a specific source concerning mobile BW capability[.]" Indeed, the ISG's Key Findings from September 30, 2004, said the following:

ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW program.

The rest of the ISG report on the trailers contains a detailed list of equipment which was 1) required to produce biological weapons, and 2) completely missing from the trailers. Again, remember that the fact-finding team's report over a year earlier came to these same conclusions. So, the Bush administration basically had this information--through the field report of May 27, 2003--and still publicly said that the trailers were biologigal weapons labs. Moreover, no public disclosure of the non-status of the trailers occurred until September 2004.

And that brings us to the second reason why the ISG's report is significant. The Washington Post article describes how members of the DIA fact-finding team felt that their report was simply shelved and ignored. Indeed, it seems to me that here is another case of the Bush administration manipulating the intelligence to suit its own decisions and needs. The administration was desperate to show some proof of WMD in May and June of 2003, and there was no way any report to the contrary was going to be tolerated.

Of course, this has been denied. A DIA spokesman had a creative denial:

A spokesman for the DIA asserted that the team's findings were neither ignored nor suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

There is a grain of truth in this denial, but the rest of the story exposes the bullshit. David Kay, the former director of the ISG, told the Washington Post he was not informed of the fact-finding team's report until late 2003. Kay said, "If I had known that we had such a team in Iraq, I would certainly have given their findings more weight." And the world would have known much sooner that a team of bio weapons experts ruled out the possibility of the trailers being used for bio weapons production. And this leads us to another issue...

• The manipulation of intelligence

Anyone who wants to argue that the fact-finding team's field and final reports were not suppressed for political reasons is hampered at the least by extreme naivete. As I stated earlier, by the end of May 2003, the Bush administration was desperate to find any kind of WMD somewhere in Iraq. Hopes were very high that the trailers would be the "smoking gun" the Bush administration had guaranteed for over a year. Two teams of military experts, relying on the statements from Curveball, examined the trailers and concluded they were capable of producing bio weapons, but once independent people with actual expertise in making bio weapons examined the trailers, they definitively ruled out such use. My, how terribly inconvenient.

So what happened next? Well, according to the Washington Post,

After team members returned to Washington, they began work on a final report. At several points, members were questioned about revising their conclusions, according to sources knowledgeable about the conversations. The questioners generally wanted to know the same thing: Could the report's conclusions be softened, to leave open a possibility that the trailers might have been intended for weapons?

In the end, the final report -- 19 pages plus a 103-page appendix -- remained unequivocal in declaring the trailers unsuitable for weapons production.

"It was very assertive," said one weapons expert familiar with the report's contents.

Then, their mission completed, the team members returned to their jobs and watched as their work appeared to vanish.

And now that it has appeared, the Bush administration is scrambling to minimize it. I can hear the excuses already:

• We didn't have time to know about the field report or the final report before we made all our statements.
• We relied on the CIA/DIA report, so it's not our fault.
• Other teams examined the trailers and said they were bio labs.

These excuses are bullshit, bullshit, and more bullshit. Does anyone truly believe that the President, Vice President, and senior White House and DoD officials knew nothing about the fact-finding team's reports? If that actually happened, that is inexcusable incompetence and ignorance. If it didn't happen, then all those officials were basically lying. The CIA and DIA obviously knew about the fact-finding team's field report before their Report was released (the team was assembled by the DIA, after all), and they tried to get the team to change its conclusions for the final report. And yet, neither the CIA nor DIA ever said anything about the work of the fact-finding team. The "other teams" were not experts in the production of bio weapons, and their conclusions were based on the bullshit information from Curveball. I simply do not see any plausible explanation for the suppression of the fact-finding team's field and final reports other than political reasons. To anyone who disagrees, feel free to provide another explanation.