Official campaign planning doctrine and the post-war period

I concluded the previous post by saying that official campaign planning doctrine placed the responsibility for post-war planning on George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, and that official doctrine is found in...

Joint Publication 5-00.1; Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning

Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning was published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 25, 2002. This section is going to include lots of excerpts from the publication. The excerpts will be in block quote format, and the bold type is in the original. Any italics will be added by me. All excerpts printed here will appear in the order in which they come in the original publication.

Preface (p. i)

I begin the excerpts with the entire preface (with emphasis added):

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidance and principles governing the planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint force levels. It focuses on the methodology for translating national and theater strategy into planning actions required to design and synchronize a campaign plan. It describes joint campaign planning across the full range of military operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It discusses campaign planning within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and guides planners to necessary planning references.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN P. ABIZAID

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff

From the preface, it is clear that Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning was supposed to be the template for all planning for the Iraq war, and, as will be shown, that includes the planning for the post-war period as well. Some might argue that the last half of 3.b precludes the primacy of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning for Iraq. I have two responses. First, there is no question that the US was in charge of the “coalition.” Anyone who thinks otherwise–and thinks that US doctrine and policy were going to be compromised--needs a serious reality check. Should anyone doubt this, consider what Tommy Franks wrote on p. 352 of his book regarding the late December 2001 briefing he gave the President and others: "Regarding the end of the briefing, I outlined the three options I'd first presented to Rumsfeld a few weeks earlier--the ROBUST, REDUCED, and UNILATERAL OPTIONS--and the implications of each. 'Even in the Unliateral Option,' I explained, 'the Brits and Australians would be with us.'" (emphasis added). Who were the two countries who provided the significant amounts of troops? Here's a hint: the answer is not Spain and Poland. The answer is Britain and Australia. The point is that Franks considered having Britain and Australia as part of a coalition to still be a "Unilateral Option." This indicates that the US never really considered ceded any amount of control over an invasion of Iraq. Had the UN or NATO had forces in the war, the last half of 3.b would have been relevant. However, Bush and Rumsfeld expressly rejected any participation by NATO, and the UN was in no way involved. The second response is that the US has also been in complete control of the occupation and reconstruction effort. I must concede that I do not know if any “multinational doctrine and procedures” were utilized in Iraq, but my guess, based on the conduct of the Bush administration both before and after the war, is that this was totally an American show.

In any event, my analysis is based on the applicability and primacy of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. With this in mind, let’s take a closer look at this official doctrine.

Excerpts from the Executive Summary (pp. vii-xiii)

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Military campaigns are not conducted in isolation of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power— diplomatic, economic, and informational — to achieve strategic objectives.

Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Combatant commanders and other JFCs may develop campaign plans for peacetime, conflict, or war.

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic aims or objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is commonly referred to as the desired “end state.” The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action; they should address both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. Although it has often been the case in past military operations other than war (MOOTW) situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well.

Take a good look at these excerpts, for they are a summary of the key concepts discussed below. One definitional note: “NCA” stands for National Command Authorities. The definition of that term soon follows--once we get into the details of campaign planning in the next section.

Chapter II: Campaign Plan Design (pp. II-1 -II-20)

The key elements of operational design are: (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objectives(s)); (2) identifying the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic COGs (Centers of Gravity), and weaknesses); and (3) developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s). (p. II-1)

Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning next addresses Strategic Guidance.

In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory,” or success (ends), describe the method of employing military force (ways), and allocate adequate forces and assets (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The NCA or the combatant commander promulgate strategic guidance (see Figure II-1). (p. II-1)

The definition of “National Command Authorities” (NCA) is “The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.” Thus, we see that the President and the Secretary of Defense are responsible for “strategic guidance.” Moreover, even though the last excerpt quoted above also says the combatant commander (who is military) also promulgates strategic guidance, the remainder of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning makes it clear that it is the civilians who really call the shots in this regard.

For instance, Figure II-1 contains the following sentence: "Before forces are committed, the combatant commander must know how the National Command Authorities intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that stategic design at the operational level." (p. II-2)

The next excerpt from Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning at first seems to place primacy on the military aspects, but then shows a different priority.

Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. (p. II-2)

The fact that the military objectives are just part of the national objectives provides a further indication that the political objectives determine the military objectives. Further indication is seen in the next excerpt:

This focus on the military strategic objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the stakes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the opponent in order to arrive at reasonably attainable national military objectives. The strategic guidance must establish whether the combatant commander is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective. This distinction is absolutely essential to ensure the right match between political and military objectives. (p. II-2)

This excerpt seems to indicate that “strategic objective” = “political objective,” which again indicates that the military plan must serve the political plan and that the civilians determine the political plan.

The next concept is Desired End State:

The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is the desired “end state.” A strategic end state simply means the required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. Normally this constitutes crisis resolution and the disengagement of the military instrument of national power from the contingency. The NCA should clearly describe the desired end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an action. The desired end state should include both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. The desired end state is usually determined at the national-strategic level, preferably with input from the supported combatant commander. Although the combatant commander could define the end state, it would have to be formally approved by the NCA. (p. II-3)

This excerpt shows again the primacy of the civilians (the NCA) in the campaign planning process, but there is another highly significant point established, namely that the campaign plan needs to address desired objectives after the military action has ceased.

The next excerpt is particularly applicable to the Iraq plan given that the operation involved a “coalition” of nations other than the U.S.

It is especially important in multinational situations, therefore, that the combatant commander and planners clearly understand the conditions that the country’s (and/or alliance or coalition) political leadership wants the military instrument to establish in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, geopolitics, and so forth. When objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the combatant commander or subordinate JFC must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the NCA. (p. II-3)

The first sentence establishes that the military planners very much need to know the geopolitical goals of the overall operation, as well as the objectives regarding internal power and security within the theater of operations and that such goals and objectives must come from the political--not military--leadership. In other words, the civilians set these goals which must then be addressed by the military planners. The second sentence shows that the military planners are subordinate to the civilian authorities in that it establishes that the military personnel MUST seek clarification from the civilians (the NCA).

The “desired end state” can also involve what is known as a Military Operation Other Than War, or MOOTW for short.

Although it has often been the case in past MOOTW situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well. In that event, the combatant commander and planners will have to solicit additional guidance from the NCA and through the interagency process to ensure that the intent is clear and an end state is clearly defined. And while there may not be an armed adversary to confront in a MOOTW situation, the combatant commander still has to think in terms of causes and effects that will lead to success. Examples of a military condition that would have to be achieved to support the strategic end state might be something like “restoration of basic services;” “formation of a professional anti-drug force;” or “mitigation of the consequences of a nuclear accident.” While these examples are probably more typical of a major operation with joint forces in a supporting role, they serve to illustrate the link between military and strategic objectives. (p. II-4)

Although all of these principles are applicable to the Iraq plan and circumstances, I want to emphasize that they hold that a campaign plan has to include MOOTW and that “restoration of basic services” is expressly stated as an example of something that needs to be done to reach the desired end state.

Defining the end state — which may change as the operation progresses—and ensuring that it supports the achievement of national objectives are critical early steps in the operational design process. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing the strategic objective(s), clearly defining the end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign. (p. II-4)

The use of the term “national objectives” seems to me to emphasize the political goals of a campaign.

Conflict termination is another term explained in Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.

Just as the combatant commander must clearly understand the desired end state, so too must the termination criteria for the campaign be understood. If the NCA do not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the combatant commander should request further guidance or clarification, as appropriate. The decision as to when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate combat operations is a political decision. (p. II-4)

Once again, here are statements showing that the military planners must have primary guidance from the civilian authorities and that key decisions are to be made by the civilians, not the military.

Campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves. To maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-military end state; i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of combat operations. (p. II-4)

This requirement is important because of the bold face sentence. The reason that sentence is important in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom is seen in the italicized portions of the next excerpt.

When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to postconflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Planners must also anticipate the nature of postconflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to MOOTW; for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones. (pp. II-4-5)

The coalition efforts regarding force protection and postconflict operations have been less than stellar. Why that shows poor planning is that those responsible for the Iraq plan had ample information on what was needed in these areas. These are issues to address in future posts.

In formulating the theater campaign plan, the combatant commander and staff should ensure the following:

•• Conflict termination is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.

•• Emphasizing backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.

•• Defining the conditions of the termination phase. The military objectives must support the political aims[.]

•• Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems. (p. II-5)

In other words, campaign planning must include planning for the post-war operations and the transition thereto, and consideration of those operations (such as restoring basic services, humanitarian aid, etc.) must be done on the front end, that is well before hostilities begin. And, once again, we have a statement that the military aspect of the plan must support the political objectives (that is, the objectives determined by the civilian authorities).

The next concept is Military Conditions.

Strategic (political) objectives describe in broad terms where the United States wants to go. Military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. (p. II-5)

This shows that 1) “strategic objective” = “political objective,” and 2) the political objectives take priority over the military objectives.

However, it is increasingly common that military operations are so closely integrated with other government activities that these nonmilitary actions have to be considered an integral part of the campaign. (p. II-6)

This statement in part reiterates the message of the last group of excerpts under Conflict Termination, but it also establishes another key point regarding the plan for Iraq. Nonmilitary and other government activities have to be factored into and integrated in the campaign plan.

And then Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning gives a summary of the overall Operational Concept:

Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross purposes. (p. II-11)

This excerpt should eliminate any doubt that the political goals must be given priority over the military goals. At another time, there might a discussion of the last sentence...

Corroboration from another publication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In order to conclusively remove any doubt about the political (civilian) goals having priority over the military goals, one only needs to check out another publication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1, November 14, 2000. JP 1 states the following:

National political objectives guide military action. This includes establishment of supporting military objectives, development of strategies and plans to achieve the objectives, conduct of operations, and definition of criteria for cessation of operations. These national objectives also influence requirements for military operations and support to achieve the desired end state and maintain it in the theater following cessation of operations.

Military plans and operations serve to support the attainment of the overarching political objectives that give rise to military involvement. Therefore, military plans and operations must focus both on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. (p. II-5)

Conclusion

Military planning must meet the strategic/political goals. Indeed, the strategic/political objectives must dominate in the planning process. The desired end state and the conditions for conflict termination have to be part of the campaign plan. Campaign planning must also address the post conflict situation, including security and restoration of basic services (like electricity and water). These factors must be considered and addressed from the very beginning of the planning process. And who is responsible for determining and defining these matters? Well, here's a hint: it ain't the military personnel. Official doctrine expressly says that the people responsible for these matters are the National Command Authorities--the President and Secretary of Defense. That means that in terms of the Iraq war, the people responsible for these matters were George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld. Should Tommy Franks be held responsible to some degree for the poor planning for the post-war period, as argued by Phillip Carter? Perhaps, but my point is that the primary and ultimate responsibility for that planning rests with Bush and Rumsfeld.

With that in mind, review the previous post, look closely at what Franks says in his book, and then decide whether there was adequate planning. If your answer is "no," at least now you have some information to help determine who is at fault. There are plenty of other facts that show that Bush and Rumsfeld really screwed the pooch on this (check out "Blind Into Baghdad" by James Fallows for many of the details), but that discussion will have to wait.