The Air Force's position on Iraq's UAVs

The Bush administration claimed publicly that Iraq posed a threat because of its ability to deliver chemical and biological weapons via unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. In a speech on October 7, 2002, President Bush said “We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS for missions targeting the United States.” Then he said the following in a speech on February 6, 2003: “Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland.” In his February 5, 2003, presentation to the United Nations, Colin Powell spoke of Iraq’s success in converting an aircraft known as the L-29 to a UAV and Iraq’s efforts in developing smaller UAVs with shorter wingspans and “spray devices” for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. Powell’s ominous message included the following: “According to Iraq's December 7th declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot...The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq's UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs...to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or, if transported, to other countries, including the United States.”

The apparent basis for these assertions was the NIE–or at least the 25-page public version–which made the following “judgments:” 1) “Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents;” and 2) “Baghdad’s UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.” What the public version did not contain was this dissenting opinion: “The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.”

And the fact of the matter is that the Air Force opinion was much stronger than what was stated in the NIE. So why does it matter what the Air Force thinks? Well, according to this AP article, the Air Force controls most of the military’s UAV fleet. And, according to this article from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Air Force is “the US government organization with the most experience in UAV programs and development.” And, as stated in this Washington Post article, the Air Force is the “government organization most knowledgeable about the United States’ UAV program[.]” And then there’s this statement by Bob Boyd, the Air Force’s top intelligence analyst: “UAVs are our core business.” Indeed, that raging liberal rag, The Wall Street Journal (and that’s sarcasm, just to be clear), stated that “the Air Force’s judgments appear to reflect its special expertise with UAVs[.]” That’s why it matters what the Air Force thinks.

And just what did the Air Force think when the NIE was published? In a nutshell, the Air Force thought that Iraq’s UAVs posed no threat to Iraq’s neighbors or the U.S. The assertions made by Bush, Powell, and agencies such as the CIA were based on six factors: the L-29 conversion program, the development of smaller UAVs, the development of “spray devices,” the extended range of the smaller UAVs, Iraq’s efforts to obtain route-planning software that contained U.S. topographic data, and the testimony of Iraqi expatriates.

As for the L-29 program, the WSJ reported that by early 2001 “the Air Force had concluded that design problems, including guidance-system failings, made the program unworkable.”

In the Washington Post article, Bob Boyd explained that the “spray devices” were weighty tanks intended for jet fighters and thus too heavy for Iraq’s UAVs. This would cut into the extended range argument as there was no evidence that the smaller UAVs could carry such a heavy payload.

Regarding the smaller UAVs, the Air Force always thought they were meant for reconnaissance, not weapons delivery, primarily because, as Boyd explained to the AP, the intelligence suggested that there was room to carry a camera and a video recorder and not much else. The Washington Post quoted Boyd as saying “What we were thinking was: Why would you purposefully design a vehicle to be an inefficient delivery means? Wouldn't it make more sense that they were purposefully designing it to be a decent reconnaissance UAV?"

The Air Force also gave little weight to the fact that the software Iraq sought came bundled with U.S topographic data. In the WSJ Boyd said, “We didn’t see anything all that sinister. It was commonplace that that would happen when you were getting that software.” For the Washington Post article, Air Force analysts noted that such topographic data was available on the Internet and from other sources.

And finally, Boyd told both the Washington Post and WSJ that Air Force analysts considered the testimony of Iraqi expatriates and defectors to be outdated and/or not credible.

That explains the Air Force’s position on Iraq’s UAVs at the time of the NIE, but I want to stress that, as explained by the WSJ, “In this same period, top policy makers would have known that the Air Force disagreed” that the UAVs could be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons. Again, this is evidence that General Franks is incorrect in his assertion that “every sign” indicated that Iraq had weaponized WMD.

That, however, is not the end of this story. Since the end of major combat operations, we have actually obtained many of Iraq’s UAVs for examination and analysis. Guess what? The Air Force was pretty much right. All of the articles cited herein discuss what has been discovered, but I think this excerpt from the AP article sums it up nicely:

Postwar evidence uncovered in July in Iraq supports those assessments, according to two U.S. government scientists assigned to the weapons hunt. "We just looked at the UAVs and said, `There's nothing here. There's no room to put anything in here," one scientist said. The U.S. scientists, weapons experts who spoke on condition of anonymity, reached their conclusions after studying the small aircraft and interviewing Iraqi missile experts, system designers and Gen. Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, the Iraqi head of the military facility where the UAVs were designed. None of the Iraqis questioned are in U.S. custody. While the weapons hunters can't be sure they've recovered all of Iraq's UAVs, the evidence amassed so far, coupled with the interviews, has led them to believe that none of the drones are designed for unconventional weapons.

Perhaps what is most unsettling is that, as noted in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace article, “This disclosure parallels other instances in which officials less expert in the field overruled the opinions of the most informed government intelligence experts.” Why did this happen? Why is it that this disagreement took place almost six months before the war started, but was not disclosed until more than a year after the end of major combat operations? These are questions for another time. Until then, we have plenty other dissenting views to examine.