Franks on Richard Clarke

From Franks’s book, it is clear that he does not like Richard Clarke. In both the Parade interview and his book, Franks says “I never received a single page of actionable intelligence from Richard Clarke.” My guess is that the Republicans will be repeating this on a regular basis since Clarke has been the most outspoken and most inside of the Bush administration’s critics regarding terrorism.

While Franks’s complaint might be literally correct, it could also be very misleading. The implication, intended or not, is that Clarke was responsible for gathering intelligence. If this implication is correct, then Franks’s statement stands as a justifiable indictment on Clarke’s job performance. The facts, however, show a different story. The 9/11 Commission Report discusses Clarke’s position, powers, and responsibilities. Clarke’s position as “counterterrorism czar” was created in 1998 by Bill Clinton via Presidential Directives 68 and 69. However, Clarke’s authority was limited “only to ‘provide advice’ regarding budgets and to ‘coordinate the development of interagency agreed guidelines’ for action.” Doesn’t sound like Clarke was responsible for gathering intelligence. The 9/11 Commission also found that “Taken together, the two directives basically left the Justice Department and the FBI in charge at home and left terrorism abroad to the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies, under Clarke’s and (National Security Adviser Sandy) Berger’s coordinating hands.” So, Clarke was a coordinator, and the FBI was responsible for gathering intelligence here, and the CIA, State, and “other agencies” (the DIA perhaps?) were responsible for gathering intelligence abroad. Thus, while it may be true that Franks never received any actionable intelligence from Clarke, that just might be due to the fact that Clarke never received any actionable intelligence from the FBI, CIA, and the “other agencies.”

In Parade, Franks also criticized Clarke for “being enamored of surveillance technology like the unmanned Predator drone” at the expense of human intelligence. According to Franks, “We can’t send a Princeton-educated lawyer to infiltrate al-Qaeda. To get information, we have to marry the devil or at least employ him.” I think Franks makes valid points, but to seemingly blame Clarke for these intelligence shortcomings might not be fair. In the words of the 9/11 Commission, “Thus, while Clarke might prod or push agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department.” Thus, it seems to me that the decision to use technology over human intelligence came from someplace other than Clarke’s office.

So while Franks is very critical of Clarke, and while that criticism may state truth and in some ways be valid, it does not refute Clarke’s claims about the Bush administration, nor does it impugn his credibility in that regard.