Combat planning and post-combat planning

I am going to post some thoughts on the various "dissenting" intelligence reports I mentioned in my previous post, but before doing so, I want say something positive about General Franks, lest anyone think that I want to do nothing but bash him. In the Parade interview, Franks responded to criticism about the force being too small by saying that "having a smaller force gave the U.S. an element of surprise," and that he believes that the speed with which that smaller force got to and took over Baghdad prevented 1) damage to the oil fields and water supply and 2) missile attacks on U.S. forces. I think he is probably right about that. However, that does not address the post-end-of-major-combat-operations phase of the war (that is, the occupation and reconstruction phase). While I consider the job that Franks did in planning and executing the war itself to be superb--especially in light of the denial of a northern front through Turkey and the adjustments that were made during combat--the planning for the occupation and reconstruction--to the extent there was any--was an abysmal failure. In the August 9 issue of Time, Franks is the recepient of the weekly "10 Questions." The third question starts out with "In your book, you absolve yourself, President Bush, and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld of inadequate postwar planning." Well, I agree that Franks is not responsible for the "inadequate" postwar planning. That was not his job. However, as I will explain in a later post, the ultimate responsibility for that planning lies with the National Command Authorities, of which there are two: George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld.