More on Wolfowitz and the blunders of the Bush administration

In the post Where this blog is going in regard to Iraq, I said the following:

However, the sad truth is that the Bush administration has screwed up just about everything. Seriously--pick any issue, and the facts, not any bullshit spin, will show that BushCo has done one boneheaded (and that's the nicest phrase I can use) thing after another.

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For now I am going to stick with the planning for the post-war period.

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Part of what I will show is that practically every problem that has been encountered in this period was predicted or known ahead of the war. I will initially broach this topic by focusing on some truly astounding testimony before the war from Paul Wolfowitz.

Well, I managed to sidetrack myself by examining the "Mission Accomplished" banner (George's Aircraft Carrier Carnival), Wolfowitz's explanation for war (Paul Wolfowitz: prime example of everything wrong with the Bush administration), Bush's moral hypocrisy (Bush and the moral obligation to intervene), and Bush's statement that he does not think the war on terror can be won (Bush: Of course we can win, but I don't think we can win, so we will win).

Now it is time to get to the Wolfowitz testimony I referenced back on August 21. The testimony occurred on February 27, 2003, two days after Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the Army's Chief of Staff, testified regarding the number of troops he thought would be needed for post-war Iraq. Wolfowitz treated Shinseki's tesimony with utter disdain, and then he gave several reasons why Shinseki was wrong. Each of those reasons appeared to be more answers to "what's brown and sounds like a bell?" at the time Wolfowitz uttered them. This post will examine the first of Wolfowitz's reasons.

Shinseki's testimony

On February 25, 2003, Gen. Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. On the subject of the occupation of Iraq he said this:

We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so, it takes significant ground force presence to maintain safe and secure environment to ensure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.

(emphasis added). Senator Carl Levin asked him to give a range of the number of troops he thought would be needed for the occupation of Iraq. Here's what Shinseki said:

I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful.

The sources from which I got these quotes are: "Blind Into Baghdad;" this New York Times article; this AP article; and this Washington Times article. I have been unable to find an official transcript of Shinseki's testimony. The Senate Armed Services Committee's website only has Shinseki's prepared statement, and the transcript is nowhere to be found on either the Department of Defense's site or the Army's site.

Before setting out Wolfowitz's response, I will give a little background on Shinseki. He served as the first commander of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, a post he held from June 1997 through November 1998. That means that at the time of his testimony, Shinseki was a general with actual real-world experience in commanding military occupation forces in a country riddled with ethnic strife. On the other hand, Wolfowitz was--and still is--a civilian with no such experience.

At the risk of getting ahead of myself, I note here that by May 22, 2003, Wolfowitz was saying that the U.S. experience in Bosnia could prove helpful in Iraq.

Mr. Wolfowitz also said that the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo underline the importance of forces "so big and strong that nobody would dare pick a fight with us."

"I think there may be something to the notion that the more you have at the beginning, the faster you can draw down," said Mr. Wolfowitz.

With that in mind, let's examine what Wolfowitz said on February 27, 2003.

Wolfowitz's response in general

On February 27, 2003, Wolfowitz testified before the House Budget Committee. Although he did not mention Shinseki by name, Wolfowitz made a point of addressing Shinseki's estimates.

If I might digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman, from my prepared testimony, because there has been a good deal of comment—some of it quite outlandish—about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. That great Yankee catcher and occasional philosopher, Yogi Berra, once observed that it is dangerous to make predictions, especially about the future.

That piece of wise advice certainly applies to predictions about wars and their aftermath, and I am reluctant to try to predict anything about what the cost of a possible conflict in Iraq would be—what the possible cost of reconstructing and stabilizing that country afterwards might be. But some of the higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.

(emphasis added). Even though I am a Red Sox fan and thus reflexively despise the Yankees, I like Yogi Berra. However, when an official that is directly responsible for our national defense bases his policy on Yogi Berra, I get nervous. I guess it could be worse. After all, Yogi Berra usually makes more sense than George W. Bush. For that matter, so does Yogi Bear.

After giving all his reasons for claiming Shinseki was wrong, Wolfowitz said, "[W]e can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark." Look closely at that statement. Now look closely at Shinseki's comments. Did Shinseki say several hundred thousand American troops? NO. He was addressing the overall size of an occupation force, not the composition of that force. He said the size of that force would need to be the size of the forces that had been mobilized--and the U.S was not the only country that had mobilized forces at that time. Furthermore, Shinseki's statement about assistance from others shows he was not talking about American forces only. For Wolfowitz to insinuate that Shinseki was talking exclusively about American troops is just more evidence of the Bush administration's chicanery.

Wolfowitz's Reason 1 why Shinseki was wrong.

After declaring Shinseki to be "wildly off the mark," Wolfowitz gave his first reason for this inescapable conclusion:

First, it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.

That is the full explanation of the first reason. Really. I think even Yogi Berra would be shaking his head over this one. Wolfowitz again mischaracterized what Shinseki said. Here Wolfowitz spoke about more troops than it would take to win the war. However, Shinseki's estimate on troops needed for the occupation was equal to "what's been mobilized to this point." In other words, the same amount of troops needed to conduct the war itself. Furthermore, Wolfowitz offered no evidence, no data, no reasoning. In essence, he asserted that he was right because "I said so."

Hmmm. Something about that seems familiar--seems like someone else recently used similar "reasoning." Ah, yes...now I remember. On June 17, 2004, George W. Bush uttered this intellectual tour de force: "The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda, because there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda."

To quote Yogi Berra, "It's like deja vu all over again."

Prime example of how the Bush Administration operates

I have previously written about the Bush administration's standard operating procedure, and Wolfowitz has provided a great example of the SOP. Notice that while his comments were obviously in response to Shinseki's statements, Wolfowitz did not mention Shinseki by name, meaning that the Bush administration could claim that Wolfowitz was not really talking about Shinseki. Next, Wolfowitz mischaracterized Shinseki's testimony twice, making it appear that Shinseki said things he did not say. Then Wolfowitz proceeded to attack the things that were not said. If he was ever questioned about this, Wolfowitz could fall back on the bogus claim that since he did not mention Shinseki, he did not micharacterize what Shinseki said. Such argument would not change the fact that no one made the statements Wolfowitz attacked (i.e., that several thousand American troops would be needed and that the occupation force would have to be larger than the combat force), meaning that Wolfowitz was knocking down arguments that had not been made. And then came the unsubstantiated bluster. Wolfowitz made bold declarations without providing any evidence or support. This is how the Bush administration has handled and continues to handle its business, and I am damn sick and tired of it. It is dishonest, arrogant, stupid, and reckless, and it has cost lives.

Why is any of this important now? There are at least six reasons:

1. Shinseki turned out to be right.
2. There was plenty of evidence as of February 25, 2003, to support Shinseki.
3. As shown here and in subsequent posts, the reasons given by Wolfowitz were unsubstantiated.
4. The Bush administration ignored relevant opinions and evidence and instead based actions on opinions which at best were not supported by the facts and common sense.
5. This issue of the number of troops needed for the occupation is indicative of the utter stupidity and incompetence of the Bush administration.
6. This issue shows that these fools do not deserve to left in authority. They have to go.
   

Next up: Wolfowitz's Reason 2--there was no evidence of ethnic strife in Iraq like in Bosnia and Kosovo that would require a large occupation force.