Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong

Reason 2: Operation Provide Comfort

Wolfowitz’s first reason as to why Shinseki was wrong was the completely unsupported assertion that “it [was] hard to conceive” that Shinseki could be right. After uttering that finely crafted bit of sophistry, Wolfowitz took a stab at explaining a reason why Shinseki was wrong:

Second, in making predictions, one should at least pay attention to past experience. And in the case of Iraq, we have some recent experience to look to. The northern third of Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein’s grasp since Operation Provide Comfort, which we undertook just 1 month after the cease-fire of the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

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After that operation, we withdrew our ground forces from northern Iraq completely in the fall of 1991, and in the 12 years since then, we have not had any forces—emphasize, ‘‘any forces’’—on the ground there. And yet the northern third of Iraq has remained reasonably stable even though, sadly, it is subjected to the same economic sanctions that have been applied to the rest of the country, and even though the people there live under daily threat from Saddam’s military, from Saddam’s security forces, and for the last year and a half, from an al Qaeda cell that operates in northeastern Iraq called Ansar al-Islam.

In fact, even the U.S. air presence, which we have maintained over northern Iraq, is not necessary to keep peace among the people of northern Iraq, but to keep Saddam Hussein out.

So, Wolfowitz is saying basically that since there were no troops in Northern Iraq for 12 years after Operation Provide Comfort ended in the fall of 1991 and that region was stable during that time, Shinseki was wrong.

Why has Wolfowitz ever been allowed to speak in public, and why has he ever been entrusted with the defense and security of this nation to any degree? To understand why I ask this question, one first needs to know some facts about Operation Provide Comfort.

The basics of Operation Provide Comfort

So what was Operation Provide Comfort? Here’s a description from www.globalsecurity.org:

Following Desert Storm, the entire Kurdish population of Iraq attempted to flee the country to the north out of fear that Saddam Hussein would attempt to exterminate their entire population. Because of political concerns, Turkish officials refused to allow these desperate people permission to cross the border into Turkey. The result was that hundreds of thousands of Kurds were essentially trapped on barren and rocky hillsides, vulnerable to not only Hussein’s forces, but to the harsh elements as well. Without basic necessities, to include access to water, food and medical supplies, hundreds of Kurds were dying each week. In April of 1991, President George Bush made the decision to provide relief and protection for these beleaguered people...Literally overnight, Operation “Provide Comfort” was born. In less than 48 hours from receiving the order to “do something,” cargo and fighter aircraft were re-deployed to bases in southern Turkey where they began delivering humanitarian supplies. Over a period of a few weeks a US led coalition force was deployed into northern Iraq, resettlement areas constructed and a de-militarized zone established for the protection of the Kurds.

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Task force members on the ground built refugee camps and maintained a security zone in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi military. Air units operating from Incirlik enforced a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel while providing air cover for friendly forces on the ground. Aircraft from Incirlik and other bases in eastern Turkey dropped desperately needed supplies to the Kurds.

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Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) sought the achievement of two goals: To provide relief to the refugees, and to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort. These two goals were maintained from April to September 1991 by the CTF.

From this summary it appears that Wolfowitz was correct in saying that we withdrew our forces from northern Iraq in the fall of 1991. Most of the rest of what he said, however, is basically bullshit. Let's break it down.

Breakdown 1: No forces on the ground in Iraq

Wolfowitz cited Operation Provide Comfort becvause--according to him:

"After that operation, we withdrew our ground forces from northern Iraq completely in the fall of 1991[.]"

It seems that Wolfowitz was saying that Operation Provide Comfort ended in the fall of 1991. Well, that is wrong. As noted by www.globalsecurity.org, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT I ended on 24 July 1991, and PROVIDE COMFORT II began." (caps in original). Now I know what some of you are thinking: Operation Provide Comfort II surely ended in fall 1991, meaning Wolfowitz was correct. Think again as you check out this article at www.globalsecurity.org, which says that "Operation Provide Comfort II, a show of force to deter new Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, began 24 July 1991 and had only limited humanitarian aspects to its mission. It ended 31 December 1996." (emphasis added).

Now I know what some of you are thinking. Surely Wolfowitz was simply saying that all U.S. ground forces were out of northern Iraq by fall 1991. After all, he did say

"in the 12 years since then, we have not had any forces—emphasize, 'any forces'—on the ground there."

The problem is that Wolfowitz was wrong. From the first www.globalsecurity.org article, we learn the following: "By mid-July, the task force pulled out of Iraq but left a residual force in southeastern Turkey to keep the Iraqis in check. A military coordination center remained in Iraq to liaise between the armed forces and civilian relief workers." (emphasis added). But wait--perhaps the "military coordination center" did not have "any forces on the ground." Should any of you want to actually make that argument, then explain how there were no "forces on the ground" on December 21, 1993, when, according to the second www.globalsecurity.org article, "Iraqi troops fired on a patrol from CTF Provide Comfort's Military Coordination Center near Faydah in northern Iraq." Do either of these facts show that there was a significant U.S. military presence in Iraq after fall 1991? No, and under different circumstances I might not even mention them. However, Wolfowitz made a point of stressing that there were absolutely no U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq. The facts I cited show that he was wrong. Either he was ignorant, stupid, or a liar. Take your pick--or just choose all three!

Let's assume for a moment that Wolfowitz was accurate when he said there were no U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq after fall 1991. The implication which follows is that since we had no troops in Iraq after Operation Provide Comfort, there would be no need for troops in northern Iraq after this war. With such an argument, Wolfowitz was once again being disingenuous or stupid or both. There were in fact U.S. and allied troops involved in Operation Provide Comfort, even after most of those forces were pulled out of Iraq in July 1991. Operation Provide Comfort was based at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey. Check out this map to see the location of Incirlik and the north No Fly Zone, which is basically the area covered by Operation Provide Comfort. So, we needed troops to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, and we obviously needed them close to northern Iraq. However, we had just finished a war with Iraq, and keeping large amounts of troops in northern Iraq was not part of the cease fire agreement, meaning that keeping troops in northern Iraq could have started another war. Thus, the reason we did not not have lots of troops in Iraq after the fall of 1991 was not because they were not needed but because we did not have the option of keeping lots of troops in Iraq.

Breakdown 2: Operation Provide Comfort was not an occupation mission.

There is actually another reason why there were not lots of troops in northern Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort (hereinafter referred to as "OPC") did not require them. As noted, OPC I had two goals: "to provide relief to the refugees, and to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort." The mission started changing once OPC II began. The second www.globalsecurity.org article contains a timeline of both phases of OPC which shows how the mission changed over time. The timeline's first mention of OPC II says it was "a show of force to deter Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, and had only limited humanitarian aspects to its mission." Above the timeline, the article notes that "In October 1995, the UN assumed the responsibility of the humanitarian portion of OPC while the CTF (Combined Task Force, a/k/a the military) focused solely on the security portion." But what was the "security portion?" Department of Defense Public Affairs official Kenneth Bacon explained in a September 12, 1996, press briefing: "The mandate of Provide Comfort is to administer a no-fly zone north of the 36th Parallel in order to prevent Iraq from using its air power against Kurds. And that's the mandate we are enforcing." All this certainly seems to be in line with Wolfowitz's statement that

"In fact, even the U.S. air presence, which we have maintained over northern Iraq, is not necessary to keep peace among the people of northern Iraq, but to keep Saddam Hussein out."

So, by Wolfowitz's own admission, the objective of enforcing the No Fly Zone was NOT occupation and securing peace and stability in the area. In other words, the objective of OPC II was not the same as the necessary objectives of a post-war occupation--you know, the kind thatwould have to take place after invading Iraq.

The point here is that comparing OPC to a full-scale occupation and reconstruction mission is pretty much an "apples and oranges" fallacy, meaning that Wolfowitz's that the experience of OPC showed that Shinseki was wrong was just more disingenuous bullshit.

Breakdown 3: One third of the coutry was liberated after OPC?

Recall that Wolfowitz said "The northern third of Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein’s grasp since Operation Provide Comfort[.]"

The problem with Wolfowitz's statement is that--once again--he is wrong. Look at this map and then this map. Now tell me that the Kurdish-controlled area comprises one third of the country. Moreover, look at this map again and take note that the Northern No Fly Zone also does not comprise one third of the country. Still don't believe me? Then here it is writing:

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the area of Iraqi Kurdistan under KRG administration (the area "liberated from Saddam Hussein's grasp") amounts to 9% of the total land area of Iraq, which is 437,400 square kilometers. This makes KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan approximately 40,000 square kilometers which is roughly the same area as Switzerland (39,800). To compare with states in the United States, KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is double the area of the State of Massachusetts (20,300 square kilometers).

(emphasis added). One third≈33.3%. 9%≠33.3%. In other words, Wolfowitz's one third was in reality less than one tenth.

Breakdown 4: Reasonably stable? Yeah, right.

Now I know what some of you are thinking...Even if everything I have said is right, Wolfowitz was still right because, after all, he reasoned that few troops would be needed for the occupation because even though there were not any U.S. forces--and I emphasize "any forces"--in northern Iraq after the fall of 1991,

"the northern third of Iraq has remained reasonably stable[.]"

Given that Wolfowitz thinks 9%=on third, I am scared to know what he considers unreasonable. Oh, but perhaps I am just being too negative. Perhaps a review of the history of the Kurdish region since 1991 will prove Wolfowitz right.

• Relations between the ruling parties

Here's an opening summary by Carole A. O'Leary(published in December 2002):

In April 1991, following the March uprising of Kurds in the north and Shi'a Arabs in the south against the central government, Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two parts. Relying on UN Security Council Resolution 688, military forces from eleven countries, including the United States and Turkey, implemented Operation Provide Comfort to give security and humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps along the Iraq-Turkey border. The so-called Kurdish safe haven and northern no-fly zone were established in this context. Under considerable constraint and against strong external and internal opposition, the Kurdish safe haven has been successfully governed for a decade by the Kurds themselves. This part of Iraqi Kurdistan is roughly 40,000 square kilometers, or about half of Iraqi Kurdistan. The rest continues to be directly governed by Baghdad.

In October 1991, the Government of Iraq (GOI) voluntarily withdrew its civil administration and the citizens of the Kurdish safe haven were left to govern themselves. Elections were held in May 1992 and the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were created. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) entered into an equal power-sharing arrangement, with 5 of the 105 KNA seats allocated to members of the Assyrian-Chaldean Christian community. Turkomans boycotted the election, although efforts were made to include representatives from all ethnic and religious communities.

Participatory processes were instituted to develop experience with the requirements, and systems and procedures of democracy. These elections were deemed to have been free and fair by international observers. Regional governance has been based on the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with the GOI. Four provinces were established, each headed by a governor.

The regional government, headed by a prime minister with a cabinet of ministers, was established in the regional capital of Erbil. But the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement broke down within two years. Today, the Kurdish safe haven is governed in two separate parts, each by one of the two main parties (KDP and PUK). Efforts have been on-going to find how to integrate the two administrations.

To say that the power sharing arrangement broke down is a bit of an understatement. There was civil war between the PUK and KDP from 1994 through 1997. And there's more:

In August 1996 the most serious fighting to date broke out in northern Iraq between the PUK and KDP, ending a US-brokered cease-fire. An escalation of skirmishes between the two main Kurdish factions, the KDP and PUK, occurred between 17-22 August 1996 prompting the KDP to make an unexpected and dangerous move. On 31 August KDP leadership "made a deal with the devil" as it invited the Iraqi army to attack the city of Irbil, under control by the PUK. Claiming that the PUK was receiving active Iranian support, the KDP leader, Marsoud Barzani, appealed to Baghdad for assistance. Saddam Hussein launched his forces into the "Provide Comfort" zone. They quickly turned the tide in favor of the KDP.

Let's see...civil war, involvement of Iran on one side and Saddam on the other...does that sound "reasonably stable" to you?

To be fair, there have been positive--and yes, stabilizing--events. All this civil war led to what is known as the "Washington Agreement:"

Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, leaders of the KDP and PUK respectively, met in Washington on 17 September 1998 for the first time since 1994. The meeting produced a joint agreement, the Washington Agreement, covering most of the main areas of dispute, including power-sharing, revenue sharing and security arrangements. The agreement also proposed an ambitious timetable, which was to culminate in regional elections in July 1999.

Now this was good news, but it was just the start of a process which encountered problems. In June of 1999, representatives from the KDP and PUK again met in Washington, and love was not necessarily in the air. According to this report from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "the two groups remained far apart on many issues." The report then brought up an additional issue between the PUK and KDP:

The KDP representative at the meeting accused the PUK of providing support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), according to the 18 June "Turkish DailyNews." But the PUK representative denied these charges and pledged "it would never back the terrorists." The PUK's alleged support for the PKK has aroused concern in Ankara. Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Sermet Atacanli said that "We had some concerns about that in the past. We are closely watching the developments." An earlier statement by the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, in the context of two seeming PKK attacks on their territory in May, pointed out that these events prove that the PUK is "unwilling to fulfill its obligations evolving from the [Washington] agreement." (see RFERL Iraq Report, 2-22).

The PKK is a Turkish group which had been designated by our government as a terrorist organizationas of the time of Wolfowitz's testimony. So in 1996, the KDP and PUK were at war and both Iran and Saddam were involved. That ended, but now another country, Turkey, and a terrorist group were brought into the mix. More on Turkey later. For now just consider that the interests of another country and the presence of a terrorist group might not contribute to "reasonable stability."Each year the State Department issues human rights reports on individual countries, and the 2001 report on Iraq (covering 2000) said this:

No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations; however, little progress was made at the time toward implementing the agreement. In October 1999, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of measures, including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally displaced persons (IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom of movement between their respective areas. Most of the measures were not implemented (see Section 1.d.). However, during the year, the two main Kurdish parties reported some progress toward full implementation of the Washington Agreement, including the return of 3,000 IDP's displaced since the 1995-96 fighting, improved movement between the Kurd-controlled areas, and the exchange of all prisoners.

The 2002 report said basically the same thing. Maybe these positive signs could be intepreted as "reasonable stability." The O'Leary article mentioned some other positive developments:

Free and fair local elections, under international observation, were conducted in dozens of municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK, particularly in their dealings with the Bush administration and U.S. Congress, as well as with states in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal relationship with the central government under a new constitutional arrangement.

Thus, by the end of 2002, there were tangible signs of "reasonable stability" between the PUK and KDP. However, I point out two matters. First, this stability came after years, meaning that there was not stability between the KDP and PUK for much of the decade following fall 1991. Judging from Wolfowitz's statements, one would think just the opposite was true, meaning that Wolfowitz was wrong and/or misleading. Second, just because there was reasonable stability between the PUK and KDP at the end of 2002 does not mean that everything in the Kurdish region was stable.

• Turkish interests

Turkish interests in northern Iraq when Wolfowitz gave his testimony (February 27, 2003) took two basic forms. The first involves Turkey's own Kurdish problems, many of which are related to the PKK. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the PKK is

a Marxist group seeking an independent state for the country’s Kurdish ethnic minority (which) has conducted a long campaign that has included suicide bombings, kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks on civilians and on Turkish diplomatic offices abroad. Since a harsh military push and the February 1999 arrest of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, Turkey has largely subdued the separatist group, which now says it has renounced violence. While Turkey considers the PKK a terrorist group and the United States formally lists it as a foreign terrorist organization[.]

The State Department's 2001 human rights report on Turkey described Turkey's conflict with the PKK as follows:

From 1984 through 1999, the Government engaged in armed conflict with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey. The level of violence decreased in the second half of 1999, and has remained low for the past 2 years. Although the situation in the southeast remained a concern, the conflict between government security forces and separatist PKK terrorists continued to be at a low level, and according to the military, there were only approximately 45 armed clashes during the year. More than 30,000 persons have returned to their villages or moved to "consolidated villages" near their original homes. Despite the end of the war, a state of emergency, declared in 1987, continued in four southeastern provinces that had faced substantial PKK terrorist violence. Security forces continued to target active PKK units as well as those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK, and conducted operations against villages throughout the region which yielded ammunitions caches.

The state of emergency was completely lifted in late November 2002. So what does this have to do with northern Iraq? Well, here's a brief explanation:

There were repeated military incursions by Turkish security forces into northern Iraq during the year 1999/2000. In late 1999, the Turkish airforce targeted PKK positions in both KDP and PUK controlled areas. In April, May, and August 2000, Turkish troops again were deployed to the region. In one incident, Turkish troops killed 38 Kurdish civilians. In July the PUK attempted to push the PKK out of its territory and fighting ensued. Both the PKK and the PUK suffered a number of casualties. In December 2000, hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed to the region, threatening to intervene on the PUK's behalf. Subsequently, the PUK and the PKK declared a cease-fire.

Stated differently, Turkey might have reduced problems with the PKK within its own borders, but that dispute spilled over into northern Iraq, and that resulted in the Iraqi Kurds having to fight the PKK and Turkish troops being in the area. And why is that significant? Based on his experience in Operation Provide Comfort, a senior U.S. commander said, "If you put Turkish troops on the ground, they will get in a fight with the Kurds. The Kurds have had their own world down there, and they want to keep it, and the Turkish tendency is to solve their own problems with force." Gee, why didn't Wolfowitz refer to this experience from OPC?

The second aspect of Turkish interests concerns an ethnic group other than the Kurds. That group is the Turkoman minority. Melik Kayan, a former senior editor at Forbes and a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal, warned of this issue in a January 5, 2003 editorial:

The Iraqi Turkomans complain that their share of the population is being deliberately underrepresented. They and their neighbors the Christian Assyrians are angry that their urban districts--still under Saddam Hussein's control--are being pre-emptively gerrymandered by the Kurdish factions to carve out a greater Iraqi Kurdistan in a future grab for oil terrain.

It bodes ill for the region's stability that virtually no one outside of Turkey is conscious of the plight of the Turkomans. They, like the Bosnians, are kith and kin to the Turks. They claim to number some 12% of Iraq's total population and the current Iraqi opposition alliance concedes them only 6% of representation.

The Turkomans might be driven to take up arms to protect their rights once the enforced Saddam umbrella disappears. The internal strife could draw in the Turkish military. The last time the Turks waited for international intervention to protect their cousins--the Bosnians--what they witnessed instead was unrelieved slaughter.

O'Leary also wrote about the Turkoman issue:

In the period since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the disposition of the Iraqi Turkoman community has also been of concern to Turkey. In this regard, Turkey and its proxy inside the Kurdish safe haven- the Iraqi Turkoman Front--have called for the establishment of a Turkoman federal unit to include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk if a permanent Kurdistan federal region is created. Turkish leaders have declared that the future establishment of a Kurdistan federal region to include Kirkuk is a casus belli. In fact, the Turks appear to have positioned themselves to intervene militarily in Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a regime change.

When Wolfowitz testified, there was an ethnic group whose circumstances might compel Turkey to invade Iraq. Now that's what I "reasonable stability." Actually, my sarcasm is slightly unfair. On the one hand, Wolfowitz was referring to the area controlled not by Saddam but the Kurds, and Kayan referred to areas which were in Saddam's control. On the other hand, Wolfowitz also referred to the "northern third of Iraq," which would include the areas mentioned by Kayan.

• Other sources of conflict and instability

I will make this section brief (as much as for myself as you), but do not be fooled by the brevity. There had been a great deal of additional conflict in the area by the time Wolfowitz testified on February 27, 2003. Here's a sampling as described in the State Department's 2002 report:

Politically motivated killings by opposition groups and rebel/insurgent/terrorist groups continued. Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the Kurd-controlled north of the country. For example, numerous press reports in November and December outlined several battles in the northeast between PUK forces and fighters of Ansar al-Islam (AAI), an Islamic extremist group. Such fighting continued a pattern of violence in that area. In 2001 assailants assassinated the governor of Irbil, Fransu Hariri. PUK and KDP investigators blamed Islamic groups such as AAI for the killing. In 2000 unknown persons killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan, Sirbit Mahmud. In July 2000, unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy Osman Hassan. Also in July 2000, PUK forces reportedly killed a number of members of the Iraqi Communist Workers Party (ICWP), and KDP forces killed several members of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Neither the PUK nor the KDP released information regarding investigations into the killings.

Ethnic minorities faced some discrimination and harassment by Kurds in the north.

Assyrians continued to fear attacks by the PKK[.] In 2000 Assyrians reported being caught in the middle of intra-Kurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported in 2000 being pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food supplies. There were no reports during the year of the Kurdistan Regional Government's investigation into a series of bombings in 1998 and 1999 that many Assyrian groups believed were part of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north.

Ethnic Turkmen also claimed discrimination by Kurdish groups, including the required use of the Kurdistan flag in Turkmen schools and the assignment of Kurdish teachers to Turkmen schools.

You can see more examples of the other sources of conflict in almost every document mentioned in this post.

Everything described above occurred prior to Wolfowitz's testimony, and all of it was known prior to his testimony. And yet Wolfowitz sat before the House Budget Committee and said under oath that the area had been "reasonably stable" for over a decade. What a putz.

Breakdown 5: Ansar al-Islam

Here's something Wolfowitz partially got right--at least factually speaking. He said that people in the north

"live under daily threat...for the last year and a half, from an al Qaeda cell...called Ansar al-Islam."

While the extent of Ansar al-Islam's connection to Al Qaeda can be argued, it is a fact that Ansar al-Islam was at war with the Kurdish parties, especially the PUK. But ask yourself this: If the people in northern Iraq were under daily threat from a terrorist group based there, would you consider the area to be reasonably stable? If your answer is "yes," feel free to explain it.

At some point, I will make an in-depth post about Ansar al-Islam, but for now I will address two matters. The first is the "poison camp" Colin Powell spoke about in his dog and pony show before the U.N. on February 5, 2003. Recall that he said the camp belonged to Ansar al-Islam, and he used its existence as a justification for going to war. Well, turns out that the Bush administration knew about the camp for many months before Powell's presentation. In fact, according to Knight-Ridder and the Los Angeles Times, the Pentagon and CIA had plans to conduct a covert attack on the camp, but in August, 2002 the Bush administration rejected those plans. At that time, ABC News reported that “officials concluded the operation was not a major threat to the United States and definitely not a sophisticated laboratory.” So why was the camp presented on February 5 as a reason to go to war? As explained in the L.A. Times article, when Powell appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, the day after his U.N. presentation, Sen. Joseph Biden asked the following questions: “Why have we not taken it out? Why have we let it sit there if it's such a dangerous plant producing these toxins?” The only answer Powell gave was that he could not discuss the matter in open session. And this was not the first time such questions had been raised. The Senate Intelligence Committee sought answers and received none. According to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, she and other members of the committee were frustrated in their attempts to get an explanation from administration officials in closed-door briefings (which are not open sessions). “We've been asking this question and have not been given an answer,” Feinstein said. Officials have replied that “they'll have to get back to us.” On February 6, a White House spokesman said he had no comment on the matter. As Greg Miller of the L.A. Times wrote:

The administration's handling of the issue has emerged as one of the more curious recent elements of the war on terrorism. Failing to intervene appears to be at odds with President Bush's stated policy of preempting terrorist threats, and the facility is in an area where the United States already has a considerable presence.

I'm confused. On the one hand, this poison camp never was enough of a threat to warrant taking it out, yet it was apparently a good reason to go to war.

The second matter concerning Ansar al-Islam is the fact that the State Department waited until March 22, 2004 to designate Ansar al-Islam as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. So Ansar al-Islam was a daily threat to the people in north Iraq, we "knew" Ansar was operating a poison factory, and the group was a reason for going to war, but we didn't even designate it as a terrorist organization until March 22, 2004. Once again, I am confised.

So what's my point? Wolfowitz talked about a threat, but if that threat existed, how could there be reasonable stability? And if there truly was a threat, why did we do nothing about it? My point is that these questions cannot be reconciled. If this threat truly existed without "any forces" on the ground from the U.S., doesn't it follow that more forces would be needed to remove the threat? Doesn't this mean Wolfowitz is full of crap?

Here's a hint: the answer to the last question is "yes." And that's the most concise and yet comprehensive summary I can give.