Part 7 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz.
Involvement of two of Iraq's neighbors
This topic is not necessarily directly related to a civil war in Iraq, and thus it is perhaps outside the scope of Goldbrg's editorial, but it is one that nonetheless deals with matters that were known before the war showing that post-war Iraq was going to be a mess.
While this topic could have been included in the preceding section, it addresses more than just the potential for civil war; thus I am devoting a separting section to it. Some of the facts known before the war also showed the strong possibility of two of Iraq's neighbors becoming involved in ways that, to put it mildly, would not be helpful.
However, the bigger issue for Turkey was the Kurds and their drive for autonomy. Turkey has a sizeable Kurdish minority, and any kind of autonomous Kurdish government in Iraq would cause concerns for the Turks that the Kurds in Turkey would want the same thing.
Indeed, there has been a Kurdish group in Turkey fighting for that cause. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is a
Even while the fighting in Turkey decreased greatly, it increased in north Iraq. The PKK established a presence in Iraq, and the Turks followed by making raids in Iraq. There were also allegations that the PUK was aiding the PKK, but the PUK subsequently sought to drive the PKK out and ended up fighting the PKK.
The situation on the ground between the Turks and Kurds--be that Turkish or Iraqi--was described on March 5, 2003, by General Tommy Franks:"[A]ll recognize that there have been frictions between the Kurds and the Turks up in northern Iraq, we certain believe that that is a factor...We're aware of history, and so we'll be working in order to mute whatever problem may arise." Based on his experience in Operation Provide Comfort, a senior U.S. commander said just prior to the war "If you put Turkish troops on the ground, they will get in a fight with the Kurds. The Kurds have had their own world down there, and they want to keep it, and the Turkish tendency is to solve their own problems with force."
I guess that for Goldberg, none of this qualifies as anything that sould have caused any concern.
All of the matters stated in this paragraph, whether put in present or past tense, existed prior to the war. To understand the Iran factor, we have to go back to the Sunni-Shia factor. I think it is fair to say that there is tremendous enmity between the Sunnis and the Shia. That has been the case since the death of Mohammed. Iran's population is 90% Shia, and Iran has the largest Shia population of any country in the world. Also, Iran is the only country in the world wherein the official state religion is Shiism, and it is the only country in the world with a Shia government. Keep in mind that approximately 65% of Iraq's population is Shia, and 30% is Sunni. Also, remember that the Sunni minority dominated Iraq and persecuted the Shia under Saddam. Indeed, some of the top Iraqi Shia religious leaders were exiled to Iran. Now add into the mix the longstanding bad blood between Iraq and Iran. After all, they fought a brutal war for eight years.
Before our Iraq war, what you had was a country, Iran, with motive to meddle in Iraq once Saddam was gone. If Iraq came to be contolled by Iran, or even if Iraq simply became Iran's ally, Iran would expand its power base. Iran then would control or influence as much oil and gas reserves as Saudi Arabia. Iran would also have a geographical buffer between it and the the Sunni-dominated Arab world. I have mentioned this before, but it should be restated. Iran is not an Arab country. It is Persian, and through history the Arabs and Persians have not been the best of friends. Consequently, having a buffer between Iran and the Arab Middle East is highly desireable to Iran. Also, what better way to exact revenge on your country's most hated enemy--Saddam--than basically taking over his country?
Before the Iraq war, what you had was a long repressed majority in Iraq, the Shia, with motive to take control of Iraq and suppress and exact revenge on the Sunni minority. The Iraqi Shia were naturally going to turn to Iran, the lone Shia government in the world and their next door neighbor, for assistance and guidance.
Simply put, there was never any way that Iran was not going to "meddle," and there was never any way the Iraqi Shia were not going to seek and accept help from Iran.
This situation was then accelerated and legitimized by the democratic elections in Iraq. Did anyone think that there was any possible micron of a chance that the Shia would not win a democratic election? Gee...the Shia outnumbered the Sunnis by more than 2-1, so, no, there was never any chance the Shia would not win an election, meaning that there were facts known before the war that should have made the White House anticipate that with the establishment of democracy (more on that later) would come an increased chance for Iran to influence affairs in Iraq. It is true that no one Shia party won a majority of the seats in government, but overall, the Shia won a majority. After that, Iran had a more conventional means of influencing matters in Iraq. After all, now that there had been an election by the Iraqi people, how could America tell the parties elected by Iraqis that they could not deal with Iran?
Up next: Back to the words of Jonah Goldberg as he again tries to limit the debate and rely on good intentions.
This topic is not necessarily directly related to a civil war in Iraq, and thus it is perhaps outside the scope of Goldbrg's editorial, but it is one that nonetheless deals with matters that were known before the war showing that post-war Iraq was going to be a mess.
While this topic could have been included in the preceding section, it addresses more than just the potential for civil war; thus I am devoting a separting section to it. Some of the facts known before the war also showed the strong possibility of two of Iraq's neighbors becoming involved in ways that, to put it mildly, would not be helpful.
- Turkey
The Iraqi Turkomans complain that their share of the population is being deliberately underrepresented. They and their neighbors the Christian Assyrians are angry that their urban districts--still under Saddam Hussein's control--are being pre-emptively gerrymandered by the Kurdish factions to carve out a greater Iraqi Kurdistan in a future grab for oil terrain.Thus, there were known facts about a possible source of ethnic strife in post-war Iraq that would also involve Turkey.
It bodes ill for the region's stability that virtually no one outside of Turkey is conscious of the plight of the Turkomans. They, like the Bosnians, are kith and kin to the Turks. They claim to number some 12% of Iraq's total population and the current Iraqi opposition alliance concedes them only 6% of representation.
The Turkomans might be driven to take up arms to protect their rights once the enforced Saddam umbrella disappears. The internal strife could draw in the Turkish military. The last time the Turks waited for international intervention to protect their cousins--the Bosnians--what they witnessed instead was unrelieved slaughter.
However, the bigger issue for Turkey was the Kurds and their drive for autonomy. Turkey has a sizeable Kurdish minority, and any kind of autonomous Kurdish government in Iraq would cause concerns for the Turks that the Kurds in Turkey would want the same thing.
Indeed, there has been a Kurdish group in Turkey fighting for that cause. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is a
an armed militant group, whose stated aim is to create an independent Kurdish state in a territory (sometimes referred to as Kurdistan) that consists of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. Its ideological foundation is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. It is an ethnic secessionist organisation that uses force and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation internationally by a number of states and organisations, including the USA and the EU, and Turkey blames it for the death of more than 30,000 people.Note that the PKK operated in northeastern Iraq. That is part of the reason why Turkey was very interested in that area. The Turkish government was engaged in open military conflict with the PKK from 1984-1999. Violence decreased after that, and a government-declared state of emergency based on PKK activities was lifted in late 2002. However, according to the link above, fighting never completely stopped and began to increase again in 2004.
Even while the fighting in Turkey decreased greatly, it increased in north Iraq. The PKK established a presence in Iraq, and the Turks followed by making raids in Iraq. There were also allegations that the PUK was aiding the PKK, but the PUK subsequently sought to drive the PKK out and ended up fighting the PKK.
The situation on the ground between the Turks and Kurds--be that Turkish or Iraqi--was described on March 5, 2003, by General Tommy Franks:"[A]ll recognize that there have been frictions between the Kurds and the Turks up in northern Iraq, we certain believe that that is a factor...We're aware of history, and so we'll be working in order to mute whatever problem may arise." Based on his experience in Operation Provide Comfort, a senior U.S. commander said just prior to the war "If you put Turkish troops on the ground, they will get in a fight with the Kurds. The Kurds have had their own world down there, and they want to keep it, and the Turkish tendency is to solve their own problems with force."
I guess that for Goldberg, none of this qualifies as anything that sould have caused any concern.
- Iran
All of the matters stated in this paragraph, whether put in present or past tense, existed prior to the war. To understand the Iran factor, we have to go back to the Sunni-Shia factor. I think it is fair to say that there is tremendous enmity between the Sunnis and the Shia. That has been the case since the death of Mohammed. Iran's population is 90% Shia, and Iran has the largest Shia population of any country in the world. Also, Iran is the only country in the world wherein the official state religion is Shiism, and it is the only country in the world with a Shia government. Keep in mind that approximately 65% of Iraq's population is Shia, and 30% is Sunni. Also, remember that the Sunni minority dominated Iraq and persecuted the Shia under Saddam. Indeed, some of the top Iraqi Shia religious leaders were exiled to Iran. Now add into the mix the longstanding bad blood between Iraq and Iran. After all, they fought a brutal war for eight years.
Before our Iraq war, what you had was a country, Iran, with motive to meddle in Iraq once Saddam was gone. If Iraq came to be contolled by Iran, or even if Iraq simply became Iran's ally, Iran would expand its power base. Iran then would control or influence as much oil and gas reserves as Saudi Arabia. Iran would also have a geographical buffer between it and the the Sunni-dominated Arab world. I have mentioned this before, but it should be restated. Iran is not an Arab country. It is Persian, and through history the Arabs and Persians have not been the best of friends. Consequently, having a buffer between Iran and the Arab Middle East is highly desireable to Iran. Also, what better way to exact revenge on your country's most hated enemy--Saddam--than basically taking over his country?
Before the Iraq war, what you had was a long repressed majority in Iraq, the Shia, with motive to take control of Iraq and suppress and exact revenge on the Sunni minority. The Iraqi Shia were naturally going to turn to Iran, the lone Shia government in the world and their next door neighbor, for assistance and guidance.
Simply put, there was never any way that Iran was not going to "meddle," and there was never any way the Iraqi Shia were not going to seek and accept help from Iran.
This situation was then accelerated and legitimized by the democratic elections in Iraq. Did anyone think that there was any possible micron of a chance that the Shia would not win a democratic election? Gee...the Shia outnumbered the Sunnis by more than 2-1, so, no, there was never any chance the Shia would not win an election, meaning that there were facts known before the war that should have made the White House anticipate that with the establishment of democracy (more on that later) would come an increased chance for Iran to influence affairs in Iraq. It is true that no one Shia party won a majority of the seats in government, but overall, the Shia won a majority. After that, Iran had a more conventional means of influencing matters in Iraq. After all, now that there had been an election by the Iraqi people, how could America tell the parties elected by Iraqis that they could not deal with Iran?
Up next: Back to the words of Jonah Goldberg as he again tries to limit the debate and rely on good intentions.
posted by WCharles @ 10/25/2006 01:59:00 AM
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