A chance to speak up about war with Iran

I have a new addition to my list o' links, and here is the explanation of it from Wes Clark...

All Americans want to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons and interfering on the ground inside Iraq.

Yet, President Bush's continued saber rattling gives the US little additional leverage to engage and dissuade Iran, and, more than likely, simply accelerates a dangerous slide into war. The United States can do better than this.

Whatever the pace of Iran's nuclear efforts, in the give and take of the Administration's rhetoric and accusations, we are approaching the last moments to head off looming conflict. Surely, it is past time to urge President Bush to exercise leadership and start to work now to avoid a widening of the conflict in the Middle East.

That's why today, I'm joining Jon Soltz, Chairman of VoteVets.org, the preeminent organization representing Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans, to launch StopIranWar.com.

Visit StopIranWar.com. today and sign the petition to President Bush. War is not the answer.

StopIranWar.com.

StopIranWar.com is a one-stop resource for all Americans to help stop the looming conflict with Iran. With the latest news on Iran and online tools to contact President Bush, lobby your members of Congress, and write letters to the editor to local and national print media, StopIranWar.com will help us create the groundswell of support needed to stop another dangerous war in the Middle East.

Americans and their elected officials in Congress must work together to demand that President Bush stop the rush to war with Iran. The United States must use every option available to defuse tensions with Iran -- diplomatic, political, and economic -- before even considering military force. Military force must be viewed as the last resort -- not the first option.

Cannot the world's most powerful nation deign speak to the resentful and scheming regional power that is Iran? Can we not speak of the interests of others, work to establish a sustained dialogue, and seek to benefit the people of Iran and the region? Could not such a dialogue, properly conducted, begin a process that could, over time, help realign hardened attitudes and polarizing views within the region? And isn't it easier to undertake such a dialogue now, before more die, and more martyrs are created to feed extremist passions?

Visit StopIranWar.com. today and sign the petition to President Bush. War is not the answer.

http://StopIranWar.com

War with Iran is not the answer. We must work with our allies, talk with Iran, and use all diplomatic, political, and economic options at our disposal. Military force against Iran is not the solution now, and if we adopt the right strategy, perhaps it need never be.

Sincerely,

An Iraq veteran sees the Walter Reed deficiencies as part of a pattern.

On February 19, 2007, Keith Olbermann devoted a segment of "Countdown" to the Washington Post report on conditions at Walter Reed Hospital. He first aired a report from Dana Priest, one of the reporters who wrote the article for the Washington Post. Then Olbermann interviewed Jon Soltz, an Iraq war veteran and co-founder of VoteVets.org, a political action committee whose objective is to help Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans who run for public office. Here is the transcript of that interview.

OLBERMANN: Is the Washington Post account of the outpatient conditions at Walter Reed consistent with the accounts you‘re hearing from around the country?

SOLTZ: You know sir, I think the Washington Post piece speaks for itself. Walter Reed is in a specifically different position than some of the other out patient places around the United States Army and the Department of Defense. You know, last year the Republican Congress decided they were going to have BRAC a lot of military installations around the country, which means Base Realignment and Closure. Walter Reed came up on that list.

I think you're seeing the affects of that policy, which is “Why are you going to fix the paint and clear the mice out of an institution that's closing?” I think the second striking thing about this piece is that this is actually part of the Department of Defense. This is not the Veterans Administration, which we know is woefully underfunded.

The DOD is responsible for these soldiers until they leave active duty. So, basically, the same administration that brought us no body armor and no up-armored humvees [is] the same administration that just brought us mice at Walter Reed, and their support for the war fighter is abysmal.

OLBERMANN: Even if this country had to pay full price at private hospitals so these guys, our neighbors and friends, could get the care that they need, at full price, no insurance, could the cost possibly amount to more than a microscopic fraction of the billions we’ve seen vanish down the rabbit holes in Iraq?

SOLTZ: No sir, not at all. You know, VoteVets.org, we did this big commercial with body armor and we blew up the body armor. It cost me 1,000 dollars on eBay to buy the piece. When my unit went to Iraq, we were cross leveling plates. We didn‘t have up-armored humvees. It took public embarrassment for that.

So, the tactical equipment is actually not that expensive. And what makes it so shocking is the money is there for the Pentagon. They get what they request. They get the supplementals from Congress. So what this is this is an administration that’s dedicated to the high end corporate contractors, you know, the high end weapons systems in the sky, the super duper missile defense systems that alienate our allies. These are the same people that are making 40 million dollars a year on their corporate contracts.

And that money is coming into the political system on one side. And one of the really great things we do at VoteVets.org is we try to fight for the war fighter. In this specific case there's no reason why we can’t spend the small money on the regular war fighter, when we’re spending the large money on weapons systems that aren’t making a difference in the war on terror.

OLBERMANN: Where is the protest over this? I mean, we’ve heard this political nonsense about Iraq veterans being spit on, or symbolically spit at, and claims withdrawn, and a huge political hub-ub made over this, where are the Republicans speaking about the treatment of these maimed Americans? And where are the Democrats in their protest on this? Where is that? Why is there no outrage about this extraordinary circumstance?

SOLTZ: You know, I think there’s a larger issue. A lot of people think supporting the troops right now is putting a three dollar yellow magnet made in Hong Kong on the back of their Hummer, saying they support the troops. So, I think the debate, it’s been absent for a long time.

People would rather flip the channel than deal with the war. You know, as for the Republicans, they just presented another budget—the president just did a new budget that slams the V.A. two years down the road. It was woefully under-funded last year, by two billion dollars.

As for the Democrats, I think we are seeing movements in this direction. You know, Congressman Murtha’s plan here is basically not to let more guys go to Iraq unless they’re trained properly, unless they’re equipped properly. So this is the first time we’re actually seeing oversight from Congress. And I expect to see that.

There’s no reason why the president and secretary of defense, who controls this facility, shouldn’t have an immediate investigation and Congress should demand hearings immediately on this, because our troops deserve the best and they deserve support that’s worthy of the sacrifice they’re making in this war.

(emphasis added). This is just another example of why I get angry when I hear Bush, anyone in his administration, any Republican in Congress, and anyone who supports them say that they support the troops while people who have opposed the war at any time do not support the troops.

You want to support the troops? Well then, send them to war with adequate equipment. Don't force them to spend their own money to buy some of that equipment. Make sure that those who come back injured receive adequate treatment. Show that you value their lives and their service more than the private corporations who have the big contracts. Until then, don't preach about supporting the troops.

The recent scandal about Walter Reed Hospital is just another part of a pattern.

On February 18, 2007, the Washington Post published a disturbing article about conditions faced by wounded troops from Iraq and Afghanistan at some facilities at Walter Reed Hospital. I am not going to discuss the article because I feel that people need to read the entire article. Also, the Post website has a page which contains links to everything the paper has written regarding the conditions at Walter Reed.

In this post I am going to say that this kind of treatment of our troops and veterans is basically par for the course for the Bush administration and the Congress formerly controlled by the Republicans. In late June 2005, I wrote about ways in which these people were disregarding the welfare of our wounded troops and veterans. Here are then links:

George W. Bush and his apparent exclusion of people from the "culture of life"

An update on Bush's exclusion of veterans and active duty personnel from his "culture of life"

No WMD...Burning Bush doctrine not exactly working out...what about the war on terror?

The Bush administration and some Republicans in Congress keep telling us that Iraq is still the central front in the war on terror, that we are fighting the terrorists in Iraq so we don't have to fight them here, and that if we leave Iraq, the terrorists will follow us here.

Before the Iraq war, there was no meaningful connection between Iraq and terrorists that posed a threat to the U.S. There was no meaningful connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Before the Iraq war, Iraq was not the central front in the war on terror. If Iraq ever has been the central front in the war on terror, it became that only after and because of the Iraq war.

And now, the Bush administration can no longer even claim that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror.

There are terrorists who want to harm the U.S., but they are not based in Iraq, and yet Iraq is where our attention and resources are tied down. In fact, the evidence shows that the real threat is based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bush started to concede this fact in his press conference on February 15, 2007, where he spent a great deal of time talking about defeating terrorists in those countries. And a few days later, the New York Times ran an article entitled "Terror Officials See Al Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power," which described what our government's officials have discovered.

Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan have re-established significant control over their once-battered worldwide terror network and over the past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal regions near the Afghan border, according to American intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

American officials said there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan. Until recently, the Bush administration had described Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri as detached from their followers and cut off from operational control of Al Qaeda.

*******

American officials say that the new intelligence is focused on Al Qaeda and points to the prospect that the terrorist network is gaining in strength despite more than five years of a sustained American-led campaign to weaken it.

On February 19, 2007, one of the guests on "Countdown with Keith Olbermann" was Michael Scheuer. Here's a brief bio (with links added by me):

Michael Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He served as the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the once anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror and Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Dr. Scheuer is a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.

In other words, Scheuer has firsthand knowledge and experience. I have not read either of his books, but I have heard numerous interviews he has done since retiring from the CIA. In those interviews, he has been highly critical of both the Bush and Clinton administrations. What follows is the transcript of Olbermann's interview with Scheuer with some commentary.

OLBERMANN: Let‘s get the evaluation of the former head of the CIA‘s bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer. Thank you for some of your time tonight, sir.

MICHAEL SCHEUER, FORMER HEAD, CIA BIN LADEN UNIT: You‘re welcome. Thank you, sir.

OLBERMANN: First of all, the substance of this [New York Times]report, does it sound accurate to you that al Qaeda has regrouped, regained strength, building new training camps in Pakistan?

SCHEUER: Sure. We‘ve always overestimated the damage we did to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, sir. We didn‘t close the borders there. We won the cities, but the Taliban and al Qaeda escaped basically intact, and they‘ve been rebuilding and reequipping over the past five years.

OLBERMANN: How did that happen? I mean, did this administration just sort of declare they it had done all it needed to do about al Qaeda? And last Halloween, the president was saying it was on the run. And now, as of Valentine‘s Day, they‘re back?

SCHEUER: Well, it‘s a—this is a very strange administration, sir, but we really don‘t take the transnational threat seriously, the terrorist threat. We‘re pretty good at nation-states, but on the—on al Qaeda, we still have a government that doesn‘t, as a whole, both parties, don‘t take this threat very seriously.

The idea that we‘re going to try to do with 40,000 troops in Afghanistan what the Soviets couldn‘t do with 150,000 troops is a bit of madness.

(emphasis added). Stated differently, we did not finish the job in Afghanistan, and as a result, the Taliban and Al Qaeda survived. Not only that, but since the fall of the Taliban government we have not had enough troops and other resources in Afghanistan to get the job done. Remember, folks, that when the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, they had one of the most powerful militaries in the world and they completely controlled the government in Afghanistan. And yet, a bunch of rag-tag but devoted resistance fighters eventually wore down the Soviets. The mighty Soviet superpower could never defeat a supposedly vastly inferior opponent. The misadventure in Afghanistan contributed greatly to the fall of the Soviet Union. And now we are facing that same type of resistance--only this time they are better organized and trained and financed. Had we continued the job in Afghanistan after the Taliban was removed instead of then going after Iraq, maybe the Taliban and Al Qaeda could have been eliminated or weakened to the point of not being able to be resurgent.

Also, the U.S. does not completely control the Afghan government. In fact, as recently as October 2006, some U.S. leaders were saying that the Taliban should be allowed back into the Afghan government! [SEE WTF? (What the Frist), WTF, Part 2, and WTF, Part 3.]

Scheuer is correct about our government being more concerned about nation-states than the stateless organizations such as Al Qaeda. We toppled the government that was running the nation of Afghanistan and then apparently thought that was all we needed to do to remove the terrorist threat. As Scheuer discussed later in the interview, that idea was and is wrong. After we toppled the Taliban, we turned all our attention to another nation state, Iraq, which had no connection to Al Qaeda, 9-11, or terrorists that posed any threat to the U.S. We did that instead of finishing off the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

OLBERMANN: Mr. Scheuer, given how often the Republicans said during the debate last week in the House that insurgents in Iraq would follow us home if we left Iraq, which battleground is actually more central to the war against terrorists? Is it al Qaeda starting to rebuild training camps that it had in Afghanistan or the Taliban rebuilding them in the neighboring nation of Pakistan? Or is this the central place still the civil war in Iraq?

SCHEUER: No, the central place in terms of an attack inside the United States is Afghanistan and Pakistan. When the next attack occurs in America, it will be planned and orchestrated out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda values Iraq primarily for the entree it gives them into Jordan, into Syria, into the Arab peninsula, and into Turkey.

We‘ve really signed—for example, we‘ve signed Jordan‘s death warrant by the—through the war in Iraq. But actually, the people who will plan the next attack in the United States are those who are in Afghanistan and Pakistan, sir.

OLBERMANN: So does this emergence of evidence that bin Laden and Zawahiri are regaining strength, individually and collectively, does it diminish, in fact, the justification for the administration now looking over at Iran? I mean, should we be, should we be utterly shifting away from both of those countries and saying, No, al Qaeda, where they are, not where we want them to be, is where we need to look?

SCHEUER: Well, this administration, sir, seems to be afraid of almost anything that moves. And certainly Iraq was a containable country. The Iranians are no threat to the United States unless we provoke them. They may be a threat to the Israelis. They‘re not a threat to the United States.

The threat to the United States, inside the United States, comes from al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If you want to address the threat to America, that‘s where it is.

(emphasis added). So, while we are stuck in the complete mess that is Iraq, we do not have the troops and resources to apply to the area from which any attack on the homeland will come. In other words, Iraq is not the central front in the war on terror.

OLBERMANN: So is this a very deadly serious version of the old joke about the guy who loses his watch on a dark street, (INAUDIBLE) and he‘s seen under a spotlight looking for it, under a streetlight, and the guy, the other guy comes up to him and says, Where did you lose the watch? He said, Down in the dark. And he said, Well, why are you looking here under the lamp? Well, that‘s where the light is. Is that what we‘re doing?

SCHEUER: That‘s where we are, sir. That‘s where we have been for the past 15 years.

Isn't it about time we changed that?

So, can somebody explain why we invaded Iraq before finishing the job in Afghanistan? Can somebody explain why we are still in Iraq? I'm not saying that is no credible reason. What I am saying is that the reason is not to protect our homeland from terrorist attacks. What I am saying is that the Iraq war has not made our country safer, but has in fact kept us from truly doing something about a terrorist threat. I have been saying that for a long time--and there are many others who have been saying it. [Go to the Cosmic Wheel Index and check the links under the heading of "Afghanistan" and the Iraq subheading of "Effect on War on Terror."]

So what do we do now?

Another take on Edwards and bloggers

About two hours after I published the previous post, Katha Pollitt posted her thoughts on the Edwards campaign, Amanda Marcotte, and Melissa McEwan. Her post is entitled "Your Blog Will Come Back to Haunt You."

Pollitt makes some of the same points I do, but explains them a little differently (one might even say--gasp!--more concisely). I highly recommend reading Pollitt's entire post (it's not that long), but I will quote the end of it:

To me, being a writer and being a political operative are very different things, and ought to remain so. A writer should be free to say what she believes, and the reader should know that the writer has that freedom. That is where the honor of a writer lies.

The converse is, you can't expect a politician, or the voters, to disregard your paper (or electronic) trail. They don't care about your honor, they just want to get elected.

John Edwards and bloggers; bloggers and campaigns

Background and basic reactions

This story is now two weeks old, and I actually started writing about it the day after the story broke, but I thought I would let the drama play out first, and by then I had started working on other topics in my usual lightning-fast way. Anyhoo, the story has relevance beyond this moment, so I am going to discuss it.

I am going to give an abbreviated version of the story and some links where you can read more of the details. The Edwards campaign hired two bloggers to work for the campaign, specifically on its website. The bloggers were Amanda Marcotte of Pandagon and Melissa McEwan of Shakespeare's Sister. McEwan was hired as a technical adviser, not a blogger. I'm not sure about Marcotte. The basics of the story can be found here (which has a link to a Salon article that you can read if you watch an ad). Wingers started complaining about some of what Marcotte and McEwan had written in the past on their blogs, claiming that it was vulgar and bigoted.

Before proceeding, I will make some disclaimers and observations. I do not regularly read either Marcotte or McEwan because, while I have at times agreed with their viewpoint in what I have read, it has seemed to me that their primary objective lies not as much in the substantive content as in being provocative and combative in their use of language. They are certainly not alone, as there are plenty of blogs on both the left and right like that. I am not saying that Marcotte and McEwan are wrong to do that. Indeed, I do some of that myself, and there are times when that is useful and/or necessary. However, that is not what I want to write or read on a regular basis. Talking Points Memo and Political Animal are the types of blogs I prefer. But that's me. I am not in any way saying that Marcotte's and McEwan's approach is wrong or that they should be constrained. With that in mind...

Those leading the attack against Marcotte and McEwan and the Edwards campaign were Bill Donahue of the Catholic League and right wing columnists Michelle Malkin and Barbara Jean Lopez. For those three to complain about anyone else using offensive epithets and other language is a freaking joke; however, that is beside the point. Actually there are several points as far as I am concerned, but before discussing those, some of the reactions created by this situation should be mentioned.

There were early reports that the Edwards campaign was going to fire Marcotte and McEwan, and the reactions were swift and predictable: this was just another typical Republican smear tactic; Edwards shouldn't give in to such bullying; it would be a travesty if they were fired; Edwards would be a coward if he fired them, etc. Now, all of those reactions were largely justified and accurate. However, that is still beside what I see as the main points.

And by the way, Marcotte and McEwan were not fired by Edwards; however, they did resign. After the story broke, Edwards released the following statement:

The tone and the sentiment of some of Amanda Marcotte's and Melissa McEwan's posts personally offended me. It's not how I talk to people, and it's not how I expect the people who work for me to talk to people. Everyone is entitled to their opinion, but that kind of intolerant language will not be permitted from anyone on my campaign, whether it's intended as satire, humor, or anything else. But I also believe in giving everyone a fair shake. I've talked to Amanda and Melissa; they have both assured me that it was never their intention to malign anyone's faith, and I take them at their word. We're beginning a great debate about the future of our country, and we can't let it be hijacked. It will take discipline, focus, and courage to build the America we believe in.

Strong stuff, eh?

First point: the Edwards campaign lacks good strategy and tactics.

Edwards either knew or should have known this sort of thing was going to happen. Marcotte and McEwan are well known and widely read in the blogosphere. This means that the Edwards campaign definitely knew or should have known the combative type of writing that Marcotte and McEwan utilize. Thus, the Edwards campaign should have known that hiring them--as in paying them to work for you and represent your campaign--might upset some people that Edwards would otherwise like to support him. Please note this is not a criticism of Marcotte and McEwan.

It is a criticism of Edwards. A few days ago I wrote an email explaining why Edwards was a huge disappointment to me in 2004. To make a long story short, I thought then that Edwards's experience and success as a "trial lawyer" would be positive attributes. I based that view on my own experience as a "trial lawyer" and my observations of other "trial lawyers." I put quotes around the term because it has been wrongfully twisted to mean only "plaintiff's lawyer," but that is another story. I wrote in my email that "Good plaintiff's lawyers are excellent strategists and tacticians." Edwards showed none of that in '04, and the hiring of Marcotte and McEwan shows a continuing lack of strategic and tactical acuity.

Here's another way to look at this. If Howard Dean was running again and using the same demeanor as he did in '04, hiring Marcotte and McEwan for his campaign might be a good fit. In '04, Dean was "in your face" and unapologetic about it, and he was consistent in those regards. However, Edwards is not Howard Dean, and from what I have seen, he is not running his campaign the way Dean ran his. So why did Edwards go out and hire two bloggers that really don't fit with his style? Doing this meant that he was hiring Marcotte and McEwan not just as they are now, but as they have been in the past (and they have been consistent), and that shows a lack of good strategic and tactical thinking.

See, having Marcotte and McEwan as paid staffers could (and did) upset some people that are more middle of the road, and the Edwars campaign should have known that was going to happen. I guess Edwards thought that by hiring Marcotte and McEwan he would gain "street cred" with the lefty side of the party and blogosphere (more on this in the next section). However, by first hiring them and then not completely backing up Marcotte and McEwan, Edwards just might have lost support in the lefty blogoshpere. That is bad strategy and bad tactics. And that leads to the second point.

Second point: Campaigns hiring prominent bloggers does not make much sense.

Candidates paying prominent bloggers and prominent bloggers accepting staff positions on campaigns seem like bad ideas. Why? Because credibility and independence are compromised. Because there are great risks involved for both parties. Because the possible benefits are outweighed by the probable detriments. Because the situation can become a huge distraction to anything else the campaign is trying to do. This very situation with Marcotte and McEwan is a prime example of all of the foregoing.

When people start campaigning for a candidate, they are representing that candidate, and their actions are going to reflect on that candidate. However, for a paid staffer on a campaign, that reflection rate goes up in a big way. I maintain that it goes up to a degree that requires the conduct of the staffer to conform to what the candidate wants. And that could be a big problem for bloggers. I think most bloggers on the liberal/left side of the political spectrum blog so that they can express their views in the way they want to express them with any outside control. The blogosphere has come to prominence during the Bush administration and a Republican-controlled Congress. It was the "opposition" that started using the blogosphere. When the wingers started getting involved, their objective was to maintain the status quo, which meant that they stuck to the party line as controlled by the GOP. As a result, it has been the liberal bloggers who have been more vocal, more creative, and more independent. I'm not sure that most "liberal" bloggers would be willing to change their ways in order to conform to a political campaign, which means that hiring a blogger could be trouble for a candidate. And if the blogger then changes his or her writing and publishing to conform to the candidate, that blogger will likely lose credibility with his or her readers, and then the blogger is not of much use to the candidate. On the flip side, a blogger who does not change her or his public ways runs the risk of harming the candidate's campaign. Indeed, the potential for harming the Edwards campaign was cited by Marcotte and McEwan as a reason for resigning from the campaign.

And if a candidate pays a blogger, anything the blogger does is subject to a charge that the blogger is supporting the candidate only because he or she is being paid to do so. That could be a tough charge to overcome in the eyes of many people, and once again, the blogger is not of much use to the candidate.

While it is fair to say that this post is largely nothing more than my opinion, that assessment is particularly true of this paragraph. Buying bloggers--at least for Democrats--simply is not likely to work out for anyone. This is related to the independent nature of many "liberal" bloggers. Both Howard Dean and Wes Clark had really good websites during the '04 campaign and made very effective use of the internet. None of the other Democratic candidates could really compare. Dean's campaign from the start was built on the internet. The draft movement which resulted in Clark becoming a candidate was started on the internet, and the internet enabled Clark to raise large amounts of money despite not having the organization or infrastructure or connections that other candidates had. The internet became a big player in politics during the '04 campaign, and its role has grown since then. It has spawned a new term. First there were "grass roots," and now there are "net roots." Grass roots and net roots movements spring up on their own, and therein lies their strength. Such movements cannot be manufactured. While Edwards probably wanted and still wants to get some support from the net roots, that support cannot be bought. At least on the Democratic side, people who are part of the net roots are likely to see through such attempts and have disdain for them. And the net roots will likely view bought bloggers with suspicion. If the prominent bloggers out there want to support a given candidate, it will likely be because they believe in that candidate and would believe in that candidate even if they were not prominent bloggers. Trying to buy bloggers presents a significant risk of damaging the credibility of the candidate and those bloggers. I just do not think it is a good idea.

To me, the credibility and honesty must be the top priorities. Thus, I feel the only way a blogger-as-paid-staffer deal can work is if 1) the campaign and the blogger make full disclosure of the relationship; 2) the candidate does not in any way trying to censor or muzzle the blogger; and 3) the candidate must be willing and able to deal with the consequences. Even then many of the other risks discussed above remain, and some perceptions might never be eliminated.

And now Bush remembers Afghanistan.

On January 17, 2007, I noted that Bush, in the course of explaining the "surge" in Iraq, stated that Al Qaeda would not be allowed to establish in Iraq a safe have like they had in Afghanistan. At the time I thus found it rather ironic that Bush had ordered that some of the surge in Iraq would be provided by taking a combat brigade out of Afghanistan. I detailed that irony three days later in a post entitled "Anybody Remember Afghanistan?" That post discussed how the Taliban--who provided Al Qaeda's safe haven--was never completely removed because of resources going to the Iraq war and is now staging a comeback via an armed insurgency. In light of that insurgency, I was only one of many who wondered why a combat brigade would be taken out of Afghanistan at this time.

Almost a month later, good ol' George finally remembered Afghanistan. He held a press conference on February 15, 2007, and he said this about Afghanistan:

So our strategy in this country is robust and important. A lot of attention here in the United States is on Iraq. One reason I've come to address you is I want to make sure people's attention is also on Afghanistan.

Listen up, George...The attention of you and your incompetent administration has been on Iraq to an obsessive and destructive (to U.S. interests) degree. Moreover, while I would like for "people's" attention to be also on Afghanistan, it is primarily you and your administration that need to focus attention on Afghanistan. And I am not convinced that you are truly doing that in spite of other things you said on February 15.

Here's what Bush said he was going to do for Afghanistan:

I'm asking Congress for $11.8 billion over the next two years to help this young democracy survive. I've ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We've extended the stay of 3,200 troops now in the country, for four months, and we'll deploy a replacement force that will sustain this increase for the foreseeable future.

I'm confused...First Bush orders to take troops out of Afghanistan, then four weeks later decides to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. So why take troops out in the first place? I think a possible reason is purely political. As I discussed in the two previous posts cited above, the surge was all about making a showing for political reasons. It had nothing to do with strategic ( as in military) considerations. It was about trying to make Bush look like he was taking charge and doing something and finding a scapegoat for down the road. In order to make that showing, troops had to come from somewhere quickly, and that meant taking them out of Afghanistan. Then after people started questioning that move, Bush realized that he had a problem in Afghanistan and had to do something to make it look like he was addressing that situation.

And what does this troop increase in Afghanistan mean for the surge in Iraq? Is the combat brigade taken out of Afghanistan going to go back to Afghanistan? If so, where are the troops for the Iraq surge going to come from? If that combat brigade stays in Iraq, where are the additional troops for Afghanistan going to come from? And are the additional troops--be they part of the Iraq surge or the Afghanistan increase--going to be properly trained and equipped for combat in whichever theater they are serving? This is an important question for two reasons. First, our troops in Iraq still are not getting the equipment they need (another story for another time). Second, Iraq and Afghanistan present two very different combat environments. The surge in Iraq is focused on urban and desert conditions. The battle in Afghanistan is largely in villages and mountainous environments. Those are not the same. So why take a combat brigade with actual experience in and knowledge of Afghanistan and put it in a completely different environment? And then why send fresh troops that do not have such experience and knowledge to Afghanistan? That makes no sense. And if the combat brigade from Afghanistan that was going to Iraq is now sent back to Afghanistan, why was it ordered to Iraq in the first freakin' place?

Feith's response to the Inspector General's report

Some background on Doug Feith

As shown in the previous post, there is now an official report showing how the Bush administration in general and the Pentagon in particular manipulated the pre-war intelligence regarding possible connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

The man in charge of the intelligence chop shop otherwise known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP), was Doug Feith. As noted in a January 27, 2005, L.A. Times article,

Retired Army Gen. Tommy Franks, U.S. commander during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserved particular venom for Feith in his recent autobiography, "American Soldier."

"No one could deny Feith's academic achievements," Franks wrote. "But Feith was a theorist whose ideas were often impractical."

Elsewhere in the book, Franks wrote that Feith was "getting a reputation around here as the dumbest [expletive] guy on the planet."

This view was echoed by Lawrence Wilkerson, who was Colin Powell's chief of staff at the State Department. In October of 2005, I published a post about a speech Wilkerson delivered at the New American Foundation. In that speech, he described Feith.

...Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, whom most of you probably know Tommy Franks said was the stupidest blankety, blank man in the world. He was. (Laughter.) Let me testify to that. He was. Seldom in my life have I met a dumber man. (Laughter.) And yet – and yet – and yet, after the secretary of State agrees to a $40 billion department rather than a $30 billion department having control, at least in the immediate post-war period in Iraq, this man is put in charge. Not only is he put in charge, he is given carte blanche to tell the State Department to go screw itself in a closet somewhere.

Granted, given the conflicts between the State Department and the Pentagon over Iraq, Wilkerson's opinion could (and some would say "should") be taken with a grain of salt. However, I do not see that Franks had any ax to grind with Feith.

In any event, both men basically called Feith stupid. Feith's reactions to the DoD IG's report provide support for that conclusion. Then again, Feith's reactions also show that he likely suffers from memory loss, delusion, and a problem with telling the truth.

Feith's reactions

• Overview
  

Dougie's reactions were actually rather predictable. Any question about anything the Inspector General or anybody else said was answered with some variation of "That is not true," or "That is incorrect." Most of the time, those statements ring about as true as denying that grass is generally green. And then there was the outright lie, but I'm saving that for last.

I am going to quote primarily from Feith's February 11, 2007, interview on "Fox News Sunday." For further reference, check out Feith's February 9, 2007, interview on NPR's "Day to Day."

• Feith's basic story: "We were just criticising and questioning."

Every time Feith was confronted with the findings of the Inspector General that OSP was performing intelligence activities and turning out intelligence products, Feith flatly disagreed and said that OSP was only reviewing, criticizing, and questioning the work of other agencies, particularly the CIA.

He claimed repeatedly that OSP's "review" was needed because the CIA was doing flawed and sloppy work, and yet the only explanation of such such bad work was always a variation of what he told Fox's Chris Wallace at the start of that interview:

WALLACE: The Pentagon inspector general issued a report Friday that was highly critical of your actions back in 2002. It says your office disseminated what it called, quote, "alternative intelligence assessments about links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that made the case for going to war."

Let's take a look if we can, here. While such actions — this is from the inspector general's report. "While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the intelligence community and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products."

Mr. Feith, were you giving the president, the vice president and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld the ammunition they wanted to go to war?

FEITH: What the people in the Pentagon were doing who were criticized by the inspector general was providing a critical look at the CIA's work on the Iraq-Al Qaeda connection.

And there was a sense on their part that the CIA was filtering its own intelligence to suit its own theory that the Baathists would not cooperate because they were secularists with the religious extremists of Al Qaeda, that they were not doing proper intelligence work, and our people were criticizing them, not putting forward an alternative intelligence analysis.

(emphasis added). See? It was the CIA that had its own agenda (to prove that Baathists would not work with Al Qaeda), and it was the CIA that was ignoring intelligence that did not meet that agenda. The OSP certainly did not have any agenda to promote. And the OSP did not present alternative intelligence assessments. No, those were questions and critiques, not alternative assessments.

• Feith was and is full of shit.
  

Sorry, folks, that is the most concise and accurate way to state the matter.

Actually, I'm going to take a shot at being the first to coin a new phrase inspired by the Bush administration. I was way late with "Burning Bush doctrine" and "vote and run," but maybe I can claim to be the first to use "full of Feith" to mean a certain degree of being full of shit. As one can see from any recent interview with Feith, he is completely full of himself, and his statements are full of shit. And that was the inspiration for "full of Feith." I will try to provide a more specific definition in the near future, but it will have something to do with uttering bullshit that is so obviously wrong that the speaker is completely stupid, delusional, or an outright liar--or all of the above. For an example, do read on...

Review the previous post, and then read Feith's interviews. You will see that, with one exception, Feith did not dispute the facts cited by the IG which formed the basis of his findings. Instead, Feith disputed the application of the term "intelligence" to anything OSP did (insert joke here).

But let's go back to the actual question asked by Wallace in the above excerpt, which was "Mr. Feith, were you giving the president, the vice president and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld the ammunition they wanted to go to war?" Notice that Feith did not directly answer the question; however, I think it is fair to imply that Feith's answer was "no." Wallace got back to this basic topic a bit later with this question:

WALLACE: Okay. Let's talk about it, because the briefing was titled "Iraq and Al Qaeda Making the Case," and here are some of the highlights from your PowerPoint presentation. "Intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories, mature symbiotic relationship." "Some indications of possible Iraq coordination with Al Qaeda specifically related to 9/11."

And you said an alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi agent in Prague in April 2001 was a known contact.

Mr. Feith, all of that — all of that was wrong, wasn't it?

And then Feith actually answered "No, not at all." Folks, that claim is certifiably full of Feith. Every single one of those matters was proven wrong, and there was plenty of evidence of that before the war (and at some point that will be detailed over at Iraq: the missing link in the war on terror?). The 9-11 Commission said Feith was wrong on all these matters, and so did the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Pentagon's Inspector General is just the latest to say so. And Doug Feith still says he was right. Oh, but wait...there's more. Here is the rest of Feith's answer:

There was substantial intelligence. I mean, evidence is a legal term not really appropriate here. There was a lot of information out there. Intelligence is very sketchy, and it's always open to interpretation.

On this issue, there were people who disagreed about the intelligence and the people in the Pentagon were giving a critical review. They were not presenting alternative conclusions. They were presenting a challenge to the way the CIA was looking at things and filtering its own information.

Intelligence certainly is open to interpretation, and the truth is that the Bush administration did not like the CIA's interpretation because it did not support the decision to go to war, so Feith and his OSP came up with their own interpretation which disregarded the intelligence which contradicted OSP's interpretation, intentionally failed to disclose the CIA's analysis, and told government officials to disregard the CIA's analysis. That, ladies and gentlemen, was presenting alternative conclusions. Wallace certainly took that position as the interview continued:

WALLACE: I have to tell you, I mean, when I — I mean, I read these as "mature symbiotic relationship", "known contact" — that sure sounds like conclusions.

FEITH: You're plucking language out of a briefing, the thrust of which was why is the CIA not accounting for information that it had that suggested an Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship when the CIA was excluding that information from its own finished intelligence at the time.

It was a criticism. It's healthy to criticize the CIA's intelligence. What the people in the Pentagon were doing was right. It was good government.

Gee, I wonder if plucking language out of a briefing is anything like plucking only the information you like out of a lot of intelligence that you don't like? What Feith and the rest of the his ilk at the Pentagon did played a significant role in deceiving the public and other government officials and in getting us into a war that has been a complete cluster f#*k that has harmed this country in many ways. That is not good government. Good government would be getting stupid assholes like Feith out of office and holding them accountable.

Moreover, Feith conveniently left out the part where the OSP presented its "challenge" without telling the CIA about it beforehand or giving the CIA a chance to respond.

And now we come to the really good part, which is the topic about which Feith outright lied. In the midst of all his other bullshit, he said the following:

Nobody in my office ever said there was an operational relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda. It's just not correct. I mean, words matter. And people are throwing around loose allegations, vague allegations, based on not reading the words carefully.

*******

There's an enormous amount of misinformation about this subject. Your quote from the 9/11 commission report is significant. That did not contradict my office. Nobody in my office ever claimed there was an operational relationship.

Feith's claims that "Nobody in my office ever claimed there was an operational relationship" between Iraq and Al Qaeda are 100% FALSE. First of all, what is the difference between a "mature symbiotic relationship" and an "operational relationship"? Second, Feith authored a memo that was sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 2003 that said that

Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by The Weekly Standard.

I guess maybe Feith considers himself not to be from his own office. Or maybe he is just an inveterate liar. Or maybe he simply is stupid. He is definitely full of Feith.

Iraq, pre-war intelligence, and the Office of Special Plans

Overview

One my other blogs is Iraq: the missing link in the war on terror? What is currently posted there is largely material that that I wrote before the war and within the first year few months of the war. A great deal of the material which has yet to be posted there will also be comprised of material written in that same time frame. One issue that bogged me down back then bogged me down again after I started that blog. That issue was the role of an office within the Pentagon, the Office of Special Plans (OSP). The short story was (and is) that it looked as if the OSP manipulated and manufactured intelligence to show the alleged connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda and terrorists in general. In turn, this "evidence" was used to sell the war. Since the end of the war, every official investigation into the matter concluded that Iraq had no such connections. What went unanswered was the role and activities of the OSP. As I started to research the matter more, what I discovered was a major soap opera story. I got to the point where I did not have the time and energy needed to sort through information I had and chase down the rest of the information I felt I needed. Thus, I stopped working on that particular "spoke in the Cosmic Wheel."

I will not be able to return to that work for a few months, but in the meantime, another official investigation has revealed much about the OSP, and this post will discuss the findings of that investigation. Those findings show that the OSP did in fact engage of all kinds of outright bullshit.

The source of the recent report

The most recent report on the OSP was disclosed on February 8, 2007, and it came from Thomas F. Gimble, the Inspector General for the Pentagon (DoD IG). According the the DoD IG website,

The military Inspector General in America has traditionally served as "an extension of the eyes, ears, and conscience of the Commander." Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, "the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall . . . be the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department."

The law also requires the Inspector General "to keep the [Secretary of Defense] and the Congress fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies . . . ." In carrying out all of the other statutory duties, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense is obligated by law to "give particular regard to the activities of the internal audit, inspection, and investigative units of the military departments with a view towards avoiding duplication and insuring effective coordination and cooperation."

(emphasis added). Does anyone think it is merely a coincidence that now that Rumskull is no longer Secretary of Defense and there is no longer a Republican majority in Congress we get a report showing that OSP was doing improper things?

A little background

At some point I will cite the sources for what follows in this section, but in the (selfish) interest of time and energy, I am just going to state the basic story. The Bush administration had basically ordered the Intelligence Community (IC) to link Iraq with 9-11 and Al Qaeda, and when all the agencies involved (primarily the CIA) kept saying that either the evidence was weak, unreliable, or nonexistent, George, Big Dick, Rumskull, and the other neocon twits assigned the task to OSP. OSP already existed as part of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and its job was to study, create, and help implement policy. Intelligence-related work was not on its "to do" list originally. Dougie Feith was put in charge of this new assignment. These clowns then "reviewed" all the existing intelligence and found all the "connections" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Much of the information that went to the public, Congress, and other government officials came from OSP. That information was "cherry picked" and otherwise manipulated. OSP relied heavily on all the sources that were seen by the IC as unreliable and which subsequently proved to be incorrect. That would include "Curveball" and all the other sources provided by the Iraqi National Congress and that supreme charlatan, Ahmed Chalabi.

Although every official group who has investigated 9-11, the Iraq war, and terrorism since 9-11 has concluded that there were no meaningful connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda (and 9-11), the question of how intelligence was used (or abused and manipulated) was expressly left unexamined--until now.

The substance of the Inspector's General's findings

The Inspector General's report is entitled "Review of Pre-Iraqi war Activities of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy," and there are two documents available to the public regarding the report: the Executive Summary and the Inspector General's Briefing.

The Executive Summary contains the following:

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on tlie Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community. This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence” to senior decision-makers.

*******

The assessments produced evolved from policy to intelligence products, which were then disseminated. The Deputy Secretary of Defense direction made the action authorized; however, we believe the actions were inappropriate because a policy office was producing intelligence products and was not clearly conveying to senior decision-makers the variance with the consensus of the lntelligence Community.

The Briefing listed ten specific questions which the Inspector General was to investigate and answer. Here are the questions and answers:

1. Did the Office of Under Secretary Feith produce its own intelligence analysis of the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda and present its analysis to other offices in the Executive branch (including the Secretary of Defense and the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President)?

Yes. In our report we discuss that members of the OUSD(P) produced a briefing on terrorism based on intelligence reports and provided to the Executive Branch.

2. Did the intelligence analysis produced by Under Secretary Feith's office differ from the lntelligence Community analysis on the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda ?

Yes. The OUSD(P) analysis included some conclusions that differed from that of the Intelligence Community.

3. Was the alternative OSD Policy intelligence analysis supported by the underlying intelligence?

Partially. The alternative intelligence analysis that OUSD(P) produced was not fully supported by underlying intelligence.

4. Did Under Secretary Feith send CIA ORCON material to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in October 2003 without CIA approval to release it, even though such approval is required by Executive Order?

Yes. However, both the CIA and the OUSD(P) believed that the CIA had approved the ORCON material before sending it to the SSCl in October 2003.

5. Did Under Secretary Feith mislead Congress when he sent to several congressional committees in January 2004 revised ORCON materials that were represented as containing CIA'S requested changes to the October 2003 documents, but which not fully and accurately reflect CIA'S requested changes?

No. The Under Secretary Feith did not mislead Congress when he sent revised ORCON material to congressional committees in January 2004.

6. Did the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prepare and present briefing charts concerning the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda that went beyond available intelligence by asserting that an alleged meeting between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and lraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 was a "known contact?"

Yes. The OUSD(P) produced a briefing, "Assessing the Relationship between lraq and al-Qaida," in which one slide discussed the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta and lraqi Intelligence officer al-Ani as a "known contact."

7. Did the staff of the OUSDP present a briefing on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship to the White House in September 2002 unbeknownst to the Director of Central Intelligence, containing information that was different from the briefing presented to the DCI, not vetted by the lntelligence Community, and that was not supported by the available intelligence (for example, concerning the alleged Atta meeting), without providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment?

Yes. The OUSD(P) presented three different versions of the same briefing, of which some of the information was supported by available intelligence, to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, OVP.

8. Did the staff of the OUSDP undercut the lntelligence Community (IC) in its briefing to the White House staff with a slide that said there were "fundamental problems" with the way the IC was assessing information concerning the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and inaccurately suggesting that the IC was requiring 'juridical evidence to support a finding,' while not providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment.

Yes. We believe that the slide undercuts the Intelligence Community by indicating to the recipient of the briefing that there are "fundamental problems" with the way that the Intelligence Community was assessing information.

9. Did the OSD Policy briefing to the White House draw conclusions (or 'findings') that were not supported by the available intelligence, such as the "intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship," or that there were "multiple areas of cooperation," and "shared interest and pursuit of WMD," and "some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11"?

Yes. The briefing did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by the available intelligence.

10. Did OUSDP staff prepare, and did Under Secretary Feith send to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, a written critique of a report entitled Iraq and al Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship prepared by the DCl's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), stating that the "CIA'S interpretation ought to be ignored," without providing the CIA notice or an opportunity to respond?

Yes, however, there is no requirement to provide an internal OSD document to the CIA for their review.

According to this report, Feith and his intelligence chop shop did indeed manipulate intelligence, create bullshit reports, and intentionally leave out and/or try to discredit evidence that went against their agenda of going to war.

And if you think what Feith did with the pre-war intelligence was bullshit, just wait until you see his reactions to the DoD IG's report (and you will have to wait for the next post).

Some shorter posts from another blog about Jonah Goldberg

For those not interested in my usual lengthy expressions of indignation (and I can't imagine why anyone would not be interested), the blog Nitpicker has two posts on this Goldberg bet story that are more concise than what I just posted. The posts are here and here.

In fact, even those who are interested in my lengthy musings should go read Nitpicker's posts.

Jonah Goldberg: Still a putz, but so much more.

Overview

Let's take a short trip in the wayback machine to the last week of October 2006. I posted a series showing why Jonah Goldberg is putz. Specifically, the series showed 1) why Goldberg's position on Iraq--both past and at that time--was wrong, and 2) the facts as they existed before the war showed that the war was a bad idea. For the links to the series, go to the Cosmic Wheel Index and check the heading of "Goldberg, Jonah." We are about to see that Goldberg is more than a mere putz.

With that in mind, let's take a further trip in the wayback machine to two years ago. Goldberg was embroiled in what has to be called a flame war with Juan Cole, who is Professor of Modern Middle East and South Asian History at the University of Michigan and a well-known opponent of the Iraq war. On February 8, 2005, Goldberg took his last shot in a National Review column. Most of that column was an attack on Cole's credibility, but I am not going to address those arguments because they are pretty much irrelevant to this discussion. What is relevant is Goldberg's credibility and his ridiculous neocon bullshit. And that was on full display in the concluding paragraphs of his screed:

Anyway, I do think my judgment is superior to his when it comes to the big picture. So, I have an idea: Since he doesn't want to debate anything except his own brilliance, let's make a bet. I predict that Iraq won't have a civil war, that it will have a viable constitution, and that a majority of Iraqis and Americans will, in two years time, agree that the war was worth it. I'll bet $1,000 (which I can hardly spare right now). This way neither of us can hide behind clever word play or CV reading. If there's another reasonable wager Cole wants to offer which would measure our judgment, I'm all ears. Money where your mouth is, doc.

One caveat: Because I don't think it's right to bet on such serious matters for personal gain, if I win, I'll donate the money to the USO. He can give it to the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade or whatever his favorite charity is.

Head where your ass is, Jonah.

Of course, Jonah was completely wrong on every one of his predictions, bless his heart. However, this is not among the main points of this story.

The main points relate to Jonah's proposed bet. The main points are that Goldberg, through his reactions to calls to pay this proposed debt, has shown that he is a stupid, whiny little bitch.

The basis winger reaction

As one might expect, on February 7 and 8, 2007, the blogosphere was full of cries for Goldberg to pay the debt represented by the proposed bet and his obvious loss thereon. There is one slight problem, namely that Cole did not accept the bet. This fact was the overwhelming response of the wingerverse. But let's not focus on the entire wingerverse. Instead, let's focus on Jonah.

Goldberg's reactions

• December 15, 2006
  

According to Goldberg on December 15, 2006, there was a lot of "asinine email coming my way from people bugging me to 'make good' on 'my bet' with Juan Cole from two years ago over the future of Iraq." In that same missive, Goldberg noted that Cole did not take the bet and then added

Regardless, I don't see the gotchya here. I've said many times and in many ways that the war hasn't gone well. I've even used the word the "mistake" and admitted I was wrong about much stuff.

My earlier series about Goldberg was based on his October 19, 2006, L.A. Times editorial in which he attempted to "admit" he made a mistake. As shown in that series, Goldberg did not really admit to anything. He in essence said that the war really was not a mistake because we had the best intentions; that the "anti-war crowd" made nothing but shabby arguments, was still wrong, and was anti-American; and that we did not have the information before the war that would have shown it was a mistake. Thus, Goldberg's "admission" claimed that his opponents had always been and still were wrong, that our good intentions justified any mistakes he might have made, and that he could not have known he was making mistakes because no one had sufficient facts before the war. In other words, "I really didn't make a mistake, and even if I did, it's not my fault." Read the whole series to find out in detail why almost every bit of Goldberg's "admission" is a big steaming pile of crap.

On December 15, he went on to say a few things about giving money to charity--which will be detailed later--and concluded that "maybe" he would give money to the USO, but that "I doubt I will jump through the hoops of these people." Remember that remark, for it says quite a bit about Goldberg's real concern, which is not the USO or any charity for that matter.

• January 18, 2007
  

On January 18, 2007, Goldberg felt compelled to again address this situation. It was basically "same song, second verse." Nonetheless, there is some irony to it, so I will quote some of it now:

[V]arious leftwing pests are clogging my email box saying if I have any honor I will pay up for a wager Cole refused to accept and denounced me for offering. Well, guess what? The baiting doesn't work. I will give money to war-related charities, as I have done in the past, on my schedule not that of these goads or Cole or anyone else.

*******

...I'm perfectly willing to admit that, had Cole had the courage to accept the wager, he would have won and I would have made good on it. But, since he didn't, I won't be jumping through hoops for this crowd beyond this post.

Hmmm...in his December 15 response, he said that "maybe" he would give a donation to the USO or a similar charity, and then a month later--after lots of goading--he said "I will" make such a donation. Wow, what courage. What strength! Here again we see Goldberg trying to have it both ways and failing. He defiantly said he would not give in to the asinine demands of the gadflies, and then he starts giving in to their demands while still saying he is not. Notice that on December 15, he said that maybe he would give to the USO and that he doubted he would jump through hoops. Then on January 18, he said that he would give to the USO (or related charity), but that he "won't be jumping through hoops." See, once he started to give in to the demands, he felt it necessary to say definitively that he would not do so. Moreover, in spite of his declaration that he would not be doing anything "beyond this post," he did just that.

• February 7, 2007

On the last day of the two-year period of the proposed (and not accepted) bet, there was a rash of articles, columns, and blog posts about this story, and one appeared on the website of Editor & Publisher. On February 7, E&P asked Goldberg for his response to an article by Jeff Cohen in which Cohen proposed a way for the bet to be paid off. Goldberg's e-mail response began as follows:

I offered the bet in a foolish fit of pique with Cole.

(emphasis added). Now isn't that mature? This is a problem with all these neocon "intellectuals." They engage in name-calling as a substitute for substance, and they react like petulant little children. A bigger problem is that it is not just media types like little Jonah here that engage in such "foolish fits of pique." That pretty much describes how the Bush administration has acted for over six years, and look where that has gotten us.

Specifically regarding Cohen, Goldberg said that "Cohen knows Cole never took the bet, but he's trying to muddy the waters." Well, pot, meet kettle. Goldberg also said that

Cole refused to take the bet...[Now] it seems that his fans want it both ways. They want to extol Cole as a prince for not accepting the bet, but they want me to be held accountable to it even though he never agreed to it. Countless blogs have been dishonest about this suggesting I owe Cole himself $1,000.

(emphasis added). I have not read all of the countless blogs that have posts about this matter, but I have read about 20 articles and/or blog posts, and NOT ONE of them suggested that Goldberg owed any money to Cole. NOT ONE! The reason for that is quite simple: the proposed bet expressly said that Goldberg would pay the USO, not Cole. Goldberg is himself trying to muddy the waters, and thus is once again engaging in part of his and the neocon SOP--define the parameters of any debate in terms that suit only you--especially if you are in trouble (see Parts 2 and 8 of the previous series on Goldberg). In this case, Goldberg in effect redefined the debate in order to shift the focus to Cole, and that redefinition is false, according to how Goldberg defined the proposed bet in the first place.

Goldberg then summed up the facts again:

Indeed, I've admitted that Cole would have won. I've written that the Iraq War was a mistake...I join a long list of people whose expectations about the war and its handling turned out to be wrong in whole or in part.

Again, this is all true, but it does not change my opinion of Goldberg, which will be explained fully in the next section. But before that, let's take a look at another part of Goldberg's February 7 response.

"I will undoubtedly give more money to the USO and to similar charities in the future, as I have done in the past," he replied. "But I am adamantly opposed to jumping through hoops for the likes of Cohen and Co. Intellectual honesty requires that I admit that Cole would have won had he taken the bet. I have done that...I have no obligations to him or anybody else in this regard no matter how hard some people try to claim otherwise."

Again with the hoops and the jumping. And I have to concede that given that Cole did not accept the bet, Goldberg does not have any obligation which must be fulfilled. That being said, the totality of his actions shows that he is stupid, arrogant, and selfish. Oh yeah...and a whiny little bitch.

The explanation for my opinion: Goldberg has no obligation, but...

Goldberg is absolutely right that he has no obligation to pay off a bet that was never accepted.

However, by refusing to do so, he is missing a golden opportunity, and he is stupid for not seeing it and taking advantage of it. It's very simple. Goldberg could say the following:

Even though I have no obligation to do so because Cole refused to take my bet, I will honor the bet. Paying the bet under these circumstances is my way of trying to show that I am enough of a man to admit that my predictions were mistaken. Another reason I am making good on the bet is how I promised to pay if I lost. I promised that if I lost the bet, I would donate $1000 to the USO. In other words, I basically agreed to support our troops if I was wrong. I realized that I should do everything I can to support our troops, and that holds true whether I am right or wrong. And thus I am going to honor this bet in order to honor our troops in Iraq. I would encourage Professor Cole and all other Americans to do the same. Why not make a donation to the USO today?

This sort of response would have accomplished several things for Goldberg: 1) he would have admitted his mistake in a manly way; 2) thus negating all the claims that he was not a man and that he was dishonorable; 3) it would have shown that he was not "jumping through hoops" or buckling under pressure from the lefties, but was acting out of an interest for our troops; 4) it would have turned the situation into a positive thing about supporting the troops; and 5) it really would have put Cole on the spot, at least in much of the public's eye. If Cole really is as sanctimonious and nutty as Goldberg claims, this sort of "admission" could have been used to make his point.

Ah, but little Jonah did not react in any way similar to what I wrote. Instead, he first admitted that proposing the bet was a childish move in the first place ("foolish fit of pique"). Then he repeatedly and adamantly pointed out that Cole never accepted the bet and that therefore he (Goldberg) did not have to do anything for anybody. Then he first said that "maybe" he would make a donation to the USO, then--after being hounded by "asinine e-mails" from "left wing pests"--he said he would make a donation, but that he would not "jump through hoops" for these people.

And what makes all of this look bad is that Goldberg originally said that he would make a donation to the USO--the one group that likely everyone in this country knows exists to boost the morale of our troops. By repeatedly refusing to pay because of 1) a technicality, and 2) his desire to show that he was not "jumping through hoops," Goldberg has come across as making excuses for not wanting to support the troops. In other words, it makes him look like he is far more concerned with making sure that he wins his little spat with Cole than he is about making a donation to the USO.

That Goldberg apparently could not see this ahead of time makes him stupid. What he actually did makes him stupid. And it makes him a whiny little bitch.

The latest Iraq NIE:what happened to the candy and flowers?

Overview

A few days ago, the Key Judgments of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq were made public. Those judgments are contained in a nine-page document (which actually is eight and a half pages). One of those pages is the cover page, and the next four pages explain the process of how the NIE was produced and what some of the terminology means. That means that the Key Judgments comprise three and a half pages, or approximately 40% of the document.

At first I thought I would not discuss the other 60%, but I changed my mind. The explanations in pages 2-5 really underscore the gravity of the NIE’s Key Judgments--and those Key Judgments paint a grim picture. Recall that the NIE on Iraq before the war was used to justify the push to war. Recall also that that NIE was manipulated and twisted to support the Bush administration’s determination to go to war. Thus, it makes sense that the public version of the most recent Iraq NIE would go to lengths to try to show that it is an objective product.

Pages 2-5

Page 2 describes the office of the Director of National Intelligence--DNI ("serves as the head of the Intelligence Community") and the National Intelligence Council--NIC ("The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information ."), then states that "NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events."

Page 3 describes the process by which NIE's are generated, with special emphasis on how the process has been improved since legislation in 2004 which 1) "new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and technical judgments," and 2) "more rigorous standards." This is significant given all the bullshit that occurred with the prewar NIE on Iraq.

Page 4 describes how this particular NIE was produced. In general, that process included "a thorough review of sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis and review by outside experts." Also, "analysts had the opportunity to register “dissents” and provide alternative analysis. Reactions by the three outside experts who read the final product were highlighted in the text." These things were not done in the version of the prewar NIE that went to the full Congress.

Page 5 contains the explanations and definitions of terms (such as "we judge," "likely," "unlikely," "high confidence," "moderate confidence," and "low confidence"). Refer to the report for the specifics.

And then the "Key Judgments" start on Page 6.

The Key Judgments

• Overall
  

Basically, the Key Judgments say that the situation in Iraq is extremely complex, that violence and general deterioration of security could increase, that even reduced violence might not improve the overall situation from a political standpoint, and that while there are some things that might stabilize the country, there are many things that could cause the country to descend into chaos. The key judgments also conclude that American forces are currently a stabilizing force in the country and that Iraq's neighbors--which include Syria and Iran--are not significant factors in the current instability.

With that in mind, let's take a look at some specifics.

• Polarization and deterioration

The first judgment is as follows:

Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.

(emphasis in original). Implicit in the foregoing is the judgment that if efforts to reverse these conditions are successful, there will be hope for the future--at least until one keeps reading to see this:

Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.

(emphasis added). Besides showing just how precarious the situation is in Iraq, this nugget of joy shows why Bush's new plan to add troops is insufficient. Iraq is not going to stabilize until there is a political solution, and Bush's plan does not address that. The Bush theory is that once the security situation is better, the political solution will follow. Yeah--just like every other bullshit dead-ass wrong prediction Bush has made before. This assessment in the current NIE shows that a political solution is paramount AND that controlling the violence in Baghdad is not going to get the job done.

• Challenges are daunting.

On October 26, 2006, I wrote a post about how invading Iraq was always a bad idea because facts known before the war showed that post-war Iraq was going to be a mess. Go read that post and then decide if these portions of the NIE sound familiar:

• Decades of subordination to Sunni political, social, and economic domination have made the Shia deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity leads the Shia to mistrust US efforts to reconcile Iraqi sects and reinforces their unwillingness to engage with the Sunnis on a variety of issues, including adjusting the structure of Iraq’s federal system, reining in Shia militias, and easing de-Bathification.

• Many Sunni Arabs remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state’s Arab character and increase Sunni repression.

• The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation. The Kurds remain willing to participate in Iraqi state building but reluctant to surrender any of the gains in autonomy they have achieved.

• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment.

• Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—particularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.

• Extremists—most notably the Sunni jihadist group al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)—continue to act as very effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.

• Significant population displacement, both within Iraq and the movement of Iraqis into neighboring countries, indicates the hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes, and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. The UN estimates over a million Iraqis are now in Syria and Jordan.

Simply put, not only are the pre-war circumstances still present, they have increased in complexity and intensity.

• "'Civil war' does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict."

In case the foregoing does not convey what a mess exists in Iraq, the NIE puts the matter more succinctly:

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

In other words, in a typical civil war there are two forces fighting for one cause. The NIE is saying that there is that and oh so much more in Iraq today. There are not simply two sides fighting over one matter. There are multiple parties and multiple fights happening all at the same time. One common factor is that our troops are right in the middle of all of these sides and fights.

And leave it to the Bush administration to try to spin this assessment into sunshine. On February 2, 2006, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley held a press briefing in which he discussed this portion of the NIE. Hadley tried to show that while the situation is complex, it really is not as bad as a civil war.

Q: Mr. Hadley, the report also says, the term "civil war" accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict. Is the President ready to embrace that term, as well?

MR. HADLEY: One of the things that is helpful -- and this is on page two -- is a statement that the intelligence community judges that the term "civil war" does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq. And we think that is right. And one of the things that's good about the NIE is it describes the complexity. Iraq right now is a number of different conflicts, and it talks in that paragraph about Shia-on-Shia violence, al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent attacks on coalition forces, criminally motivated violence. I would add one more, and I don't think the analysts would object, and that is efforts by al Qaeda not just to attack coalition forces, but to attack Shia civilians in order to provoke them to attack Sunnis and to encourage the sectarian violence that we've seen.

So I think the thing I would say is, we would agree with the description in that paragraph of the realities on the ground. Now, you get to the issue of labels. Labels are difficult. And of course, everyone is looking at the label of "civil war." Let me read to you what Iraqis say. As we've talked about before, Iraqis do not describe it as a civil war. And it's very interesting -- in a recent interview, the Iraqi Prime Minister* [sic], Abd al Madhi, had the following statement, which I thought was an interesting, different perspective on this issue. He said first, "I don't think we are in a civil war. We are in a war on civilians. That's what Abu Musab al Zarqawi was trying to do. That's what the insurgents are trying to do. Otherwise, what is the meaning of a car bomb in a university or market? You're against a society, against civilians. Or when Sunni militias attack, some Shia militias attack in retaliation. They are not attacking as one army against another, but they are attacking civilians from the other community. That's why I say," and this is Abd al Madhi's comment, "we are in a war against civilians, not a civil war."

And finally he says, "Secondly, the government is still powerful, still feared by the population. Whenever it issues a curfew it is respected all over Iraq. No country in a civil war respects the decision of a government. We have to go and decrease the sectarian violence; we have to go and protect people from car bombs and from insurgent acts that target civilians and institutions."

See? Things aren't so bad because the Iraqi Prime Minister says so, and hey, it's not the Bush administration saying this. No, it's just the U.S. Intelligence Community saying that the situation is worse than a civil war.

• American forces are currently a stabilizing force.

Here is something that surge supporters can point to:

Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.

• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF [Iraq Security Force] would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.

(bold type in original, italics added). I cannot dispute any of this. However, my focus is on "rapid." I am not in favor of an immediate or rapid withdrawal. I never have been (which is reflected in some comments somewhere on the blog). But here's the thing: all of the possible consequences of a rapid withdrawal described above are also likely consequences of any withdrawal in the future. And I am not talking about only the near future. We could wait several years, and a withdrawal could very well result in the same consequences. That's how messed up things are in Iraq. The only way to avoid such a result is for all kinds of political, diplomatic, and economic results to occur. And those matters are so much more difficult to achieve now than they would have been several years ago. These actions should have been undertaken as soon as the war was "over," and they should have been planned for before the war started. None of that happened. None of that has happened since, and Bush's "new plan" ain't making any of it happen now.

• The role of Iraq's neighbors

This is the part of the NIE that really caught my eye.

Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics.

(emphasis added). In other words, Syria and Iran are not major factors. And why is this important? The first link provided in this post is to an April 17, 2006, post about the pre-war Iraq NIE. Given that that post came more than 3.5 years after that NIE, I followed with a post entitled "Why revisiting the Iraq NIE is important," which basically said that the same bullshit that the Bush administration pulled in selling the Iraq war--a large part of which was the pre-war NIE--was starting to be used in building a case for war with Iran. That is still going on (and that discussion will take place in subsequent posts), but the current Iraq NIE puts a big dent in part of the Bush administration's case, namely that Iran is one of the major causes of the violence in Iraq.

• And now for the good news...

The NIE ends with this analysis:

A number of identifiable internal security and political triggering events, including sustained mass sectarian killings, assassination of major religious and political leaders, and a complete Sunni defection from the government have the potential to convulse severely Iraq’s security environment. Should these events take place, they could spark an abrupt increase in communal and insurgent violence and shift Iraq’s trajectory from gradual decline to rapid deterioration with grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences. Three prospective security paths might then emerge:


• Chaos Leading to Partition. With a rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.

• Emergence of a Shia Strongman. Instead of a disintegrating central government producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent strength.

• Anarchic Fragmentation of Power. The emergence of a checkered pattern of local control would present the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes.

If we ever find the WMD, the candy and flowers the Iraqis were going to toss at us might be in the same place.