Iraq, pre-war intelligence, and the Office of Special Plans

Overview

One my other blogs is Iraq: the missing link in the war on terror? What is currently posted there is largely material that that I wrote before the war and within the first year few months of the war. A great deal of the material which has yet to be posted there will also be comprised of material written in that same time frame. One issue that bogged me down back then bogged me down again after I started that blog. That issue was the role of an office within the Pentagon, the Office of Special Plans (OSP). The short story was (and is) that it looked as if the OSP manipulated and manufactured intelligence to show the alleged connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda and terrorists in general. In turn, this "evidence" was used to sell the war. Since the end of the war, every official investigation into the matter concluded that Iraq had no such connections. What went unanswered was the role and activities of the OSP. As I started to research the matter more, what I discovered was a major soap opera story. I got to the point where I did not have the time and energy needed to sort through information I had and chase down the rest of the information I felt I needed. Thus, I stopped working on that particular "spoke in the Cosmic Wheel."

I will not be able to return to that work for a few months, but in the meantime, another official investigation has revealed much about the OSP, and this post will discuss the findings of that investigation. Those findings show that the OSP did in fact engage of all kinds of outright bullshit.

The source of the recent report

The most recent report on the OSP was disclosed on February 8, 2007, and it came from Thomas F. Gimble, the Inspector General for the Pentagon (DoD IG). According the the DoD IG website,

The military Inspector General in America has traditionally served as "an extension of the eyes, ears, and conscience of the Commander." Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, "the Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall . . . be the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department."

The law also requires the Inspector General "to keep the [Secretary of Defense] and the Congress fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies . . . ." In carrying out all of the other statutory duties, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense is obligated by law to "give particular regard to the activities of the internal audit, inspection, and investigative units of the military departments with a view towards avoiding duplication and insuring effective coordination and cooperation."

(emphasis added). Does anyone think it is merely a coincidence that now that Rumskull is no longer Secretary of Defense and there is no longer a Republican majority in Congress we get a report showing that OSP was doing improper things?

A little background

At some point I will cite the sources for what follows in this section, but in the (selfish) interest of time and energy, I am just going to state the basic story. The Bush administration had basically ordered the Intelligence Community (IC) to link Iraq with 9-11 and Al Qaeda, and when all the agencies involved (primarily the CIA) kept saying that either the evidence was weak, unreliable, or nonexistent, George, Big Dick, Rumskull, and the other neocon twits assigned the task to OSP. OSP already existed as part of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and its job was to study, create, and help implement policy. Intelligence-related work was not on its "to do" list originally. Dougie Feith was put in charge of this new assignment. These clowns then "reviewed" all the existing intelligence and found all the "connections" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Much of the information that went to the public, Congress, and other government officials came from OSP. That information was "cherry picked" and otherwise manipulated. OSP relied heavily on all the sources that were seen by the IC as unreliable and which subsequently proved to be incorrect. That would include "Curveball" and all the other sources provided by the Iraqi National Congress and that supreme charlatan, Ahmed Chalabi.

Although every official group who has investigated 9-11, the Iraq war, and terrorism since 9-11 has concluded that there were no meaningful connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda (and 9-11), the question of how intelligence was used (or abused and manipulated) was expressly left unexamined--until now.

The substance of the Inspector's General's findings

The Inspector General's report is entitled "Review of Pre-Iraqi war Activities of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy," and there are two documents available to the public regarding the report: the Executive Summary and the Inspector General's Briefing.

The Executive Summary contains the following:

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on tlie Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community. This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence” to senior decision-makers.

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The assessments produced evolved from policy to intelligence products, which were then disseminated. The Deputy Secretary of Defense direction made the action authorized; however, we believe the actions were inappropriate because a policy office was producing intelligence products and was not clearly conveying to senior decision-makers the variance with the consensus of the lntelligence Community.

The Briefing listed ten specific questions which the Inspector General was to investigate and answer. Here are the questions and answers:

1. Did the Office of Under Secretary Feith produce its own intelligence analysis of the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda and present its analysis to other offices in the Executive branch (including the Secretary of Defense and the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President)?

Yes. In our report we discuss that members of the OUSD(P) produced a briefing on terrorism based on intelligence reports and provided to the Executive Branch.

2. Did the intelligence analysis produced by Under Secretary Feith's office differ from the lntelligence Community analysis on the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda ?

Yes. The OUSD(P) analysis included some conclusions that differed from that of the Intelligence Community.

3. Was the alternative OSD Policy intelligence analysis supported by the underlying intelligence?

Partially. The alternative intelligence analysis that OUSD(P) produced was not fully supported by underlying intelligence.

4. Did Under Secretary Feith send CIA ORCON material to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in October 2003 without CIA approval to release it, even though such approval is required by Executive Order?

Yes. However, both the CIA and the OUSD(P) believed that the CIA had approved the ORCON material before sending it to the SSCl in October 2003.

5. Did Under Secretary Feith mislead Congress when he sent to several congressional committees in January 2004 revised ORCON materials that were represented as containing CIA'S requested changes to the October 2003 documents, but which not fully and accurately reflect CIA'S requested changes?

No. The Under Secretary Feith did not mislead Congress when he sent revised ORCON material to congressional committees in January 2004.

6. Did the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prepare and present briefing charts concerning the relationship between lraq and al Qaeda that went beyond available intelligence by asserting that an alleged meeting between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and lraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 was a "known contact?"

Yes. The OUSD(P) produced a briefing, "Assessing the Relationship between lraq and al-Qaida," in which one slide discussed the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta and lraqi Intelligence officer al-Ani as a "known contact."

7. Did the staff of the OUSDP present a briefing on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship to the White House in September 2002 unbeknownst to the Director of Central Intelligence, containing information that was different from the briefing presented to the DCI, not vetted by the lntelligence Community, and that was not supported by the available intelligence (for example, concerning the alleged Atta meeting), without providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment?

Yes. The OUSD(P) presented three different versions of the same briefing, of which some of the information was supported by available intelligence, to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, OVP.

8. Did the staff of the OUSDP undercut the lntelligence Community (IC) in its briefing to the White House staff with a slide that said there were "fundamental problems" with the way the IC was assessing information concerning the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and inaccurately suggesting that the IC was requiring 'juridical evidence to support a finding,' while not providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment.

Yes. We believe that the slide undercuts the Intelligence Community by indicating to the recipient of the briefing that there are "fundamental problems" with the way that the Intelligence Community was assessing information.

9. Did the OSD Policy briefing to the White House draw conclusions (or 'findings') that were not supported by the available intelligence, such as the "intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship," or that there were "multiple areas of cooperation," and "shared interest and pursuit of WMD," and "some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11"?

Yes. The briefing did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by the available intelligence.

10. Did OUSDP staff prepare, and did Under Secretary Feith send to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, a written critique of a report entitled Iraq and al Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship prepared by the DCl's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), stating that the "CIA'S interpretation ought to be ignored," without providing the CIA notice or an opportunity to respond?

Yes, however, there is no requirement to provide an internal OSD document to the CIA for their review.

According to this report, Feith and his intelligence chop shop did indeed manipulate intelligence, create bullshit reports, and intentionally leave out and/or try to discredit evidence that went against their agenda of going to war.

And if you think what Feith did with the pre-war intelligence was bullshit, just wait until you see his reactions to the DoD IG's report (and you will have to wait for the next post).