Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong

Reason 3: No history of ethnic strife

Recall that Shinseki testified on February 25, 2003, and that he said that “We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems.” Wolfowitz responded specifically to this statement in his testimony two days later:

There are other differences that suggest that peacekeeping requirements in Iraq might be much lower than our historical experience in the Balkans suggest. There has been none of the record inIraq of ethnic militias fighting one another that produced so much bloodshed and permanent scars in Bosnia, along with a continuing requirement for large peacekeeping forces to separate those militias. And the horrors of Iraq are very different from the horrific ethnic cleansing of Kosovars by Serbs that took place in Kosovo and left scars that continue to require peacekeeping forces today in Kosovo.

The slaughter in Iraq, and it is has been substantial, has unfortunately been the slaughter of people of all ethnic and religious groups by the regime. It is equal-opportunity terror.

Wolfowitz was essentially claiming there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, which in turn would mean there would be no need for a large occupation force. Such a claim was largely untrue, and to the extent it contained any truth, it was very misleading.

I said in previous posts that Wolfowitz is a putz. Perhaps “putz” is not accurate. “Certifiably stupid lying scumbag” is actually more accurate. As evidence I turn first to the lead paragraph from the January 5, 2003, editorial from www.opinionjournal.com I quoted in the previous post:

The recent theater of amity among Iraq's opposition factions at a London conference should not beguile anyone. Iraq's interethnic rivalry smolders daily hotter, especially in the northern areas around the strategic oil towns of Kirkuk and Mosul. That area is facing a potential Balkan-style upheaval of pent-up forces, with the most moderate secular Muslim group, the Iraqi Turkomans, cast in the role of the local Bosnians.

Wow! This paragraph talked about all kinds of ethnic strife in Iraq, and it spefically compared Iraq to the situation in Bosnia. Obviously, then, this editorial appeared in some liberal-biased, left-wing rag, and the author is plainly some pinko-commie-freedom-hater. Well, I oh so hate to disappoint all you right wingers out there (and these days saying “right wingers” and “out there” is rather redundant), but www.opinionjournal.com happens to be the web site for editorials from...the Wall Street Journal. And the author is a man named Melik Kaylan, and his resume includes being a senior editor at Forbes magazine and a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal.

Ethnic strife is the only kind of strife mentioned by Wolfowitz.

Before showing more evidence that Wolfowitz is a putz (and so much more) because of his Reason 3, let's look at all the reasons he gave as to why Shinseki was wrong:

1. “First, it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.” (Discussed in this post).
2. “Second, in making predictions, one should at least pay attention to past experience,” namely “Operation Provide Comfort” in northern Iraq after the Gulf War. (Discussed in the previous post).
3. No history of ethnic strife.
4. Many other countries–even those that opposed the war–would send troops for the occupation.
5. Iraqis would provide much of the manpower.
6. The Iraqis would welcome us as liberators.

The point here is that the only type of strife addressed by Wolfowitz is ethnic strife. A reasonable assumption is that Wolfowitz thus thought there was no other possible kind of strife that could require more rather than fewer troops for the occupation. With that in mind, let's see further why Wolfowitz was full of shit.

General statements that Wolfowitz's Reason 3 is brown and sounds like a bell

Go back and read the above excerpt from Melik Kayan's editorial. That's one general statement showing Reason 3 to be bogus. Here's another from a December 10, 2002, article:

If a U.S.-led force succeeds in ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the victors would inherit a traumatized society full of festering conflicts that didn't start with him and wouldn't suddenly fade with his departure. That raises some big questions: How can a stable new order take hold in Iraq? How can the nation avoid being dismembered by its neighbors or breaking up in spasms of violence like the former Yugoslavia?

Unlike the Kayan editorial, this piece surely came from some liberal-biased, left-wing rag, right? Once again, I oh so hate to disappoint you Bush apologists, but this article also came from the Wall Street Journal. Anthony Cordesmann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said this in early March, 2003:

The possibility of ethnic fighting, with Turkish and Iranian complications, cannot be dismissed. There are major tribal and clan fault lines. There are serious Arab-Kurd-Turcoman-Assyrian fault lines. There are Sunni vs. Shi'ite fault lines, and deep fault lines within the Kurdish and Shi'ite populations plus problems like the Iraq-armed Iranian MEK and Iranian-armed Iraqi Badr Brigades. There are cities, agricultural area, and oil to fight over and there are real questions about revenge killings.

Should you think that Cordesmann must be another one of those freedom-haters, check out his bio. And how about a general statement from a general? On March 5, 2003, General Tommy Franks stated "[A]ll recognize that there have been frictions between the Kurds and the Turks up in northern Iraq, we certain believe that that is a factor...We're aware of history, and so we'll be working in order to mute whatever problem may arise." So there's a history of problems between the Turks and the Kurds. But didn't Wolfowitz say there was no history of ethnic strife?

The final group of general statements comes from "Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath," an October 1, 2002, report from the International Crisis Group (ICG).

Indeed, many tensions between opposition groups derive from deeper fault-lines that pre-date Saddam Hussein and are likely to survive him. These divides are principally along religious, ethnic and tribal lines, though class and ideology should not be neglected.

*******

After decades of power imbalance and discrimination, Shiites may seek to settle scores with Sunnis. Ethnic inequities and unresolved political and economic issues could ignite tensions and provoke violence between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans.

*******

Violent conflict between Arabs and Kurds has been a feature of Iraqi politics since the country’s formation as a British mandate in the early 1920s when hopes for an independent Kurdish state were dashed by post-Ottoman-era manoeuvring and double-crosses by the colonial powers.

(emphasis added). Let's see...problems that pre-date Saddam, decades of power imbalance and discrimination, and violence between Arabs and Kurds since the 1920's...well, that cetainly shows there was no history of ethnic stife, right? I believe that these general statements show that Wolfowitz was wrong when he said that Iraq had no history of ethnic strife. Still, these statements are not definitive or conclusive. There is a possibility that Wolfowitz was correct...

Wolfowitz might have been right about ethnic strife.

There might be a way to prove that Wolfowitz was correct in saying there was no history of ethnic strife, but it requires Clinton-esque efforts of definition.

The previous post described in some detail the conflicts between the two main Kurdish parties in the north, the PUK and KDP. Civil war between them certainly constitutes a history of strife, but Wolfowitz would surely argue that it was not ethnic strife because it involved Kurds vs. Kurds. Likewise, to the extent the conflict in north Iraq involved Turkey and Iran, that still would not be ethnic strife because it would involve different nations. See how this works? It's the Bush administration SOP at work.

There is one bit of strife in northern Iraq I have not discussed, namely the "Arabization" of the area. This program included forcing Kurds and Turkmen from their homes and moving Arabs in and forcing non-Arabs to change their names to Arab names. This was definitely ethnic in nature. You can read more about this program in the ICG report and this report from the State Department. However, I am going to exclude this program from further discussion in order to give the Bush apologists a break.

What about the south of Iraq? The December 10, 2002, Wall Street Journal article described the potential perils of South Iraq as follows:

A ground invasion of Iraq probably would include a force pushing northward from the Kuwaiti desert through the vast plains and occasional marshes of southern Iraq to Baghdad. The invading forces would pass through one of the country's most complex and brutalized regions, known for its volatile mix of tribal and ethnic allegiances.

*******

Perhaps the biggest concern in the south would be heading off the sort of brutal revenge-seeking that marked the 1991 uprising. In the course of the rebellion, the local populace viciously attacked loyalists to the regime. While residents of the south don't possess heavy weapons, Mr. Hussein's regime has armed them with plenty of guns to fight the U.S. If central control is smashed by U.S. bombing, in remote places such as this, the weapons could be turned on fellow Iraqis to settle old scores or protect territory.

*******

Another potential powder keg: As civil order unravels, many Iraqis are likely to retreat into the protection of tribal clans. These play a major role in Iraqi society, and their intensely protective tribal codes could bring quick violent retribution for threats or injury to their members. Some worry that Iran might even intervene in the name of protecting fellow Shiite Muslims.

"I am sure there's going to be revenge-taking," says Dr. Azzam al-Wash, an Iraqi exile who maintains ties to southern Shiites. "The problem for the U.S. will be how to establish law and order to prevent this cycle from becoming civil war."

Revenge killings based on religious and tribal connections...Well, that might be strife, but it certainly isn't ethnic strife, now is it? So, maybe there was no history of ethnic strife in north and south Iraq, but what about the central region? From the Wall Street Journal:

The U.S.-led coalition would encounter some of its toughest challenges in the center of Iraq -- in Baghdad and across the heartland occupied by the minority Sunni Muslim population. There the Sunni elite would find themselves threatened as they haven't been since the British took the region away from the Ottoman Turks after World War I. Although Sunni Muslims make up no more than 18% of Iraq's population, they have dominated the country's affairs for centuries. From their ranks have come not only Mr. Hussein but also a long line of sheiks, monarchs and strongmen stretching back through British rule to the administrations of the Ottoman Turks. Sunnis play crucial roles in operating the country day to day, from holding key positions in its military to overseeing public services such as water and health care.

Ah, but once again, this seems to be religious strife, not ethnic strife.

And speaking of religious differences, anyone who has done even meager study of Islam knows that these branches of Islam have been deeply divided and antagonistic for hundreds of years. As the ICG put it:

There is little doubt that a religious schism exists and dates back to the earliest days of Islam when what is now Iraq served as a battle ground for many of the seminal events that have defined the Sunni-Shiite division. The ascendancy of Sunnis during the Ottoman period was perpetuated in modern Iraq, and Sunni political figures and officers have held a disproportionate share of power since independence.

*******

During the 1990s, the rift between Sunnis and Shiites deepened, and overall religious tensions intensified.

Gee...a dispute that goes back centuries and has been fought primarily in Iraq...But hey, once again this is a religious, not ethnic conflict. I also need to point out that the ICG felt that although the differences between the Sunnis and Shiites would have to be addressed, it also felt that "tensions between Shiites and Sunnis arguably are one of the more overstated of Iraq’s fault-lines." Still, when Wolfowitz gave his testimony, there was a long history of strife between the two groups.

Does tribal conflict count? The ICG explained in October 2002 that "Tribal identities have largely survived modernisation and the growing role of the central state and remain important social and political units in Iraq," and "The tribal ethos...currently is the principal dispenser of people’s identity, of regulation, and of authority." Why does this matter? Well, among other reasons, the Iraqi tribal system was "replete with shifts in allegiances, betrayals, conditional alliances and, above all, men in arms[.]" So, there was a system that had long existed in Iraq which presented all kinds of potential for strife. But does tribal conflict equal ethnic strife?

Gee, Wally. I guess maybe I was wrong, and maybe that nice Mr. Wolfowitz was right. There really was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq.

Then again, just what is the definition of "ethnic"?

In the preceding section, I was assuming that "ethnic strife" did not include conflicts based on religion, nationality, or tribal affiliation. Then I decided to check several dictionaries to find the definition of "ethnic." MSN's Encarta dictionary has this definition:

of specified origin or culture: relating to a person or to a large group of people who share a national, racial, linguistic, or religious heritage, whether or not they reside in their countries of origin.

(emphasis added). The Fourth Edition of the American Heritage Dictionary says"ethnic" means "Of or relating to a sizable group of people sharing a common and distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage. " (emphasis added). And the Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines the term as "of or relating to large groups of people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background." (emphasis added). If one chooses to apply any of these definitions, then all of the conflict and strife described above was indeed ethnic strife, and there was an extensive history of ethnic strife in Iraq, meaning in turn that Wolfowitless was completely full of shit.

Regardless of how "ethnic" is defined, Wolfowitz's Reason 3 is garbage.

Review the section of this post entitled "Ethnic strife is the only kind of strife mentioned by Wolfowitz." Assume for a moment that Wolfowitz was actually correct in saying there was no history of ethnic strife. Did that mean that there was no strife which could have been cause for concern? NO. Did that mean that no other forms of strife had occurred? NO. Did that mean there was no other kind of strife which would require more rather than fewer troops in the post-war period? NO. And yet that is precisely what Wolfowitz was trying to convey. And don't even give me the Bush SOP of "Well, he didn't actually say that."

What is most appalling about Wolfowitless's statements is that all of the history discussed above--that is, all of the strife I described--was known at the time he testified on February 27, 2003, and yet he sat before a Congressional committee--under oath--and said things that simply were not true. He either knew or should have known that what he was saying was untrue, and he said those things in an effort to convince Congress and the American people that Shinseki--the general with actual experience in this area--was wrong when he said several hundred thousand troops would be needed for the post-war period. Wolfowitz's testimony thus contributed to the chaos in Iraq--chaos which has cost American lives and billions of dollars. And the Republicans tried to impeach Clinton for lying about a blowjob. Talk about being full of shit.

Wolfowitz's Reason 2 why Shinseki was wrong

Reason 2: Operation Provide Comfort

Wolfowitz’s first reason as to why Shinseki was wrong was the completely unsupported assertion that “it [was] hard to conceive” that Shinseki could be right. After uttering that finely crafted bit of sophistry, Wolfowitz took a stab at explaining a reason why Shinseki was wrong:

Second, in making predictions, one should at least pay attention to past experience. And in the case of Iraq, we have some recent experience to look to. The northern third of Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein’s grasp since Operation Provide Comfort, which we undertook just 1 month after the cease-fire of the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

*******

After that operation, we withdrew our ground forces from northern Iraq completely in the fall of 1991, and in the 12 years since then, we have not had any forces—emphasize, ‘‘any forces’’—on the ground there. And yet the northern third of Iraq has remained reasonably stable even though, sadly, it is subjected to the same economic sanctions that have been applied to the rest of the country, and even though the people there live under daily threat from Saddam’s military, from Saddam’s security forces, and for the last year and a half, from an al Qaeda cell that operates in northeastern Iraq called Ansar al-Islam.

In fact, even the U.S. air presence, which we have maintained over northern Iraq, is not necessary to keep peace among the people of northern Iraq, but to keep Saddam Hussein out.

So, Wolfowitz is saying basically that since there were no troops in Northern Iraq for 12 years after Operation Provide Comfort ended in the fall of 1991 and that region was stable during that time, Shinseki was wrong.

Why has Wolfowitz ever been allowed to speak in public, and why has he ever been entrusted with the defense and security of this nation to any degree? To understand why I ask this question, one first needs to know some facts about Operation Provide Comfort.

The basics of Operation Provide Comfort

So what was Operation Provide Comfort? Here’s a description from www.globalsecurity.org:

Following Desert Storm, the entire Kurdish population of Iraq attempted to flee the country to the north out of fear that Saddam Hussein would attempt to exterminate their entire population. Because of political concerns, Turkish officials refused to allow these desperate people permission to cross the border into Turkey. The result was that hundreds of thousands of Kurds were essentially trapped on barren and rocky hillsides, vulnerable to not only Hussein’s forces, but to the harsh elements as well. Without basic necessities, to include access to water, food and medical supplies, hundreds of Kurds were dying each week. In April of 1991, President George Bush made the decision to provide relief and protection for these beleaguered people...Literally overnight, Operation “Provide Comfort” was born. In less than 48 hours from receiving the order to “do something,” cargo and fighter aircraft were re-deployed to bases in southern Turkey where they began delivering humanitarian supplies. Over a period of a few weeks a US led coalition force was deployed into northern Iraq, resettlement areas constructed and a de-militarized zone established for the protection of the Kurds.

*******

Task force members on the ground built refugee camps and maintained a security zone in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi military. Air units operating from Incirlik enforced a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel while providing air cover for friendly forces on the ground. Aircraft from Incirlik and other bases in eastern Turkey dropped desperately needed supplies to the Kurds.

*******

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) sought the achievement of two goals: To provide relief to the refugees, and to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort. These two goals were maintained from April to September 1991 by the CTF.

From this summary it appears that Wolfowitz was correct in saying that we withdrew our forces from northern Iraq in the fall of 1991. Most of the rest of what he said, however, is basically bullshit. Let's break it down.

Breakdown 1: No forces on the ground in Iraq

Wolfowitz cited Operation Provide Comfort becvause--according to him:

"After that operation, we withdrew our ground forces from northern Iraq completely in the fall of 1991[.]"

It seems that Wolfowitz was saying that Operation Provide Comfort ended in the fall of 1991. Well, that is wrong. As noted by www.globalsecurity.org, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT I ended on 24 July 1991, and PROVIDE COMFORT II began." (caps in original). Now I know what some of you are thinking: Operation Provide Comfort II surely ended in fall 1991, meaning Wolfowitz was correct. Think again as you check out this article at www.globalsecurity.org, which says that "Operation Provide Comfort II, a show of force to deter new Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, began 24 July 1991 and had only limited humanitarian aspects to its mission. It ended 31 December 1996." (emphasis added).

Now I know what some of you are thinking. Surely Wolfowitz was simply saying that all U.S. ground forces were out of northern Iraq by fall 1991. After all, he did say

"in the 12 years since then, we have not had any forces—emphasize, 'any forces'—on the ground there."

The problem is that Wolfowitz was wrong. From the first www.globalsecurity.org article, we learn the following: "By mid-July, the task force pulled out of Iraq but left a residual force in southeastern Turkey to keep the Iraqis in check. A military coordination center remained in Iraq to liaise between the armed forces and civilian relief workers." (emphasis added). But wait--perhaps the "military coordination center" did not have "any forces on the ground." Should any of you want to actually make that argument, then explain how there were no "forces on the ground" on December 21, 1993, when, according to the second www.globalsecurity.org article, "Iraqi troops fired on a patrol from CTF Provide Comfort's Military Coordination Center near Faydah in northern Iraq." Do either of these facts show that there was a significant U.S. military presence in Iraq after fall 1991? No, and under different circumstances I might not even mention them. However, Wolfowitz made a point of stressing that there were absolutely no U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq. The facts I cited show that he was wrong. Either he was ignorant, stupid, or a liar. Take your pick--or just choose all three!

Let's assume for a moment that Wolfowitz was accurate when he said there were no U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq after fall 1991. The implication which follows is that since we had no troops in Iraq after Operation Provide Comfort, there would be no need for troops in northern Iraq after this war. With such an argument, Wolfowitz was once again being disingenuous or stupid or both. There were in fact U.S. and allied troops involved in Operation Provide Comfort, even after most of those forces were pulled out of Iraq in July 1991. Operation Provide Comfort was based at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey. Check out this map to see the location of Incirlik and the north No Fly Zone, which is basically the area covered by Operation Provide Comfort. So, we needed troops to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, and we obviously needed them close to northern Iraq. However, we had just finished a war with Iraq, and keeping large amounts of troops in northern Iraq was not part of the cease fire agreement, meaning that keeping troops in northern Iraq could have started another war. Thus, the reason we did not not have lots of troops in Iraq after the fall of 1991 was not because they were not needed but because we did not have the option of keeping lots of troops in Iraq.

Breakdown 2: Operation Provide Comfort was not an occupation mission.

There is actually another reason why there were not lots of troops in northern Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort (hereinafter referred to as "OPC") did not require them. As noted, OPC I had two goals: "to provide relief to the refugees, and to enforce the security of the refugees and the humanitarian effort." The mission started changing once OPC II began. The second www.globalsecurity.org article contains a timeline of both phases of OPC which shows how the mission changed over time. The timeline's first mention of OPC II says it was "a show of force to deter Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, and had only limited humanitarian aspects to its mission." Above the timeline, the article notes that "In October 1995, the UN assumed the responsibility of the humanitarian portion of OPC while the CTF (Combined Task Force, a/k/a the military) focused solely on the security portion." But what was the "security portion?" Department of Defense Public Affairs official Kenneth Bacon explained in a September 12, 1996, press briefing: "The mandate of Provide Comfort is to administer a no-fly zone north of the 36th Parallel in order to prevent Iraq from using its air power against Kurds. And that's the mandate we are enforcing." All this certainly seems to be in line with Wolfowitz's statement that

"In fact, even the U.S. air presence, which we have maintained over northern Iraq, is not necessary to keep peace among the people of northern Iraq, but to keep Saddam Hussein out."

So, by Wolfowitz's own admission, the objective of enforcing the No Fly Zone was NOT occupation and securing peace and stability in the area. In other words, the objective of OPC II was not the same as the necessary objectives of a post-war occupation--you know, the kind thatwould have to take place after invading Iraq.

The point here is that comparing OPC to a full-scale occupation and reconstruction mission is pretty much an "apples and oranges" fallacy, meaning that Wolfowitz's that the experience of OPC showed that Shinseki was wrong was just more disingenuous bullshit.

Breakdown 3: One third of the coutry was liberated after OPC?

Recall that Wolfowitz said "The northern third of Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein’s grasp since Operation Provide Comfort[.]"

The problem with Wolfowitz's statement is that--once again--he is wrong. Look at this map and then this map. Now tell me that the Kurdish-controlled area comprises one third of the country. Moreover, look at this map again and take note that the Northern No Fly Zone also does not comprise one third of the country. Still don't believe me? Then here it is writing:

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the area of Iraqi Kurdistan under KRG administration (the area "liberated from Saddam Hussein's grasp") amounts to 9% of the total land area of Iraq, which is 437,400 square kilometers. This makes KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan approximately 40,000 square kilometers which is roughly the same area as Switzerland (39,800). To compare with states in the United States, KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is double the area of the State of Massachusetts (20,300 square kilometers).

(emphasis added). One third≈33.3%. 9%≠33.3%. In other words, Wolfowitz's one third was in reality less than one tenth.

Breakdown 4: Reasonably stable? Yeah, right.

Now I know what some of you are thinking...Even if everything I have said is right, Wolfowitz was still right because, after all, he reasoned that few troops would be needed for the occupation because even though there were not any U.S. forces--and I emphasize "any forces"--in northern Iraq after the fall of 1991,

"the northern third of Iraq has remained reasonably stable[.]"

Given that Wolfowitz thinks 9%=on third, I am scared to know what he considers unreasonable. Oh, but perhaps I am just being too negative. Perhaps a review of the history of the Kurdish region since 1991 will prove Wolfowitz right.

• Relations between the ruling parties

Here's an opening summary by Carole A. O'Leary(published in December 2002):

In April 1991, following the March uprising of Kurds in the north and Shi'a Arabs in the south against the central government, Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two parts. Relying on UN Security Council Resolution 688, military forces from eleven countries, including the United States and Turkey, implemented Operation Provide Comfort to give security and humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps along the Iraq-Turkey border. The so-called Kurdish safe haven and northern no-fly zone were established in this context. Under considerable constraint and against strong external and internal opposition, the Kurdish safe haven has been successfully governed for a decade by the Kurds themselves. This part of Iraqi Kurdistan is roughly 40,000 square kilometers, or about half of Iraqi Kurdistan. The rest continues to be directly governed by Baghdad.

In October 1991, the Government of Iraq (GOI) voluntarily withdrew its civil administration and the citizens of the Kurdish safe haven were left to govern themselves. Elections were held in May 1992 and the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were created. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) entered into an equal power-sharing arrangement, with 5 of the 105 KNA seats allocated to members of the Assyrian-Chaldean Christian community. Turkomans boycotted the election, although efforts were made to include representatives from all ethnic and religious communities.

Participatory processes were instituted to develop experience with the requirements, and systems and procedures of democracy. These elections were deemed to have been free and fair by international observers. Regional governance has been based on the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with the GOI. Four provinces were established, each headed by a governor.

The regional government, headed by a prime minister with a cabinet of ministers, was established in the regional capital of Erbil. But the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement broke down within two years. Today, the Kurdish safe haven is governed in two separate parts, each by one of the two main parties (KDP and PUK). Efforts have been on-going to find how to integrate the two administrations.

To say that the power sharing arrangement broke down is a bit of an understatement. There was civil war between the PUK and KDP from 1994 through 1997. And there's more:

In August 1996 the most serious fighting to date broke out in northern Iraq between the PUK and KDP, ending a US-brokered cease-fire. An escalation of skirmishes between the two main Kurdish factions, the KDP and PUK, occurred between 17-22 August 1996 prompting the KDP to make an unexpected and dangerous move. On 31 August KDP leadership "made a deal with the devil" as it invited the Iraqi army to attack the city of Irbil, under control by the PUK. Claiming that the PUK was receiving active Iranian support, the KDP leader, Marsoud Barzani, appealed to Baghdad for assistance. Saddam Hussein launched his forces into the "Provide Comfort" zone. They quickly turned the tide in favor of the KDP.

Let's see...civil war, involvement of Iran on one side and Saddam on the other...does that sound "reasonably stable" to you?

To be fair, there have been positive--and yes, stabilizing--events. All this civil war led to what is known as the "Washington Agreement:"

Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, leaders of the KDP and PUK respectively, met in Washington on 17 September 1998 for the first time since 1994. The meeting produced a joint agreement, the Washington Agreement, covering most of the main areas of dispute, including power-sharing, revenue sharing and security arrangements. The agreement also proposed an ambitious timetable, which was to culminate in regional elections in July 1999.

Now this was good news, but it was just the start of a process which encountered problems. In June of 1999, representatives from the KDP and PUK again met in Washington, and love was not necessarily in the air. According to this report from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "the two groups remained far apart on many issues." The report then brought up an additional issue between the PUK and KDP:

The KDP representative at the meeting accused the PUK of providing support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), according to the 18 June "Turkish DailyNews." But the PUK representative denied these charges and pledged "it would never back the terrorists." The PUK's alleged support for the PKK has aroused concern in Ankara. Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Sermet Atacanli said that "We had some concerns about that in the past. We are closely watching the developments." An earlier statement by the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, in the context of two seeming PKK attacks on their territory in May, pointed out that these events prove that the PUK is "unwilling to fulfill its obligations evolving from the [Washington] agreement." (see RFERL Iraq Report, 2-22).

The PKK is a Turkish group which had been designated by our government as a terrorist organizationas of the time of Wolfowitz's testimony. So in 1996, the KDP and PUK were at war and both Iran and Saddam were involved. That ended, but now another country, Turkey, and a terrorist group were brought into the mix. More on Turkey later. For now just consider that the interests of another country and the presence of a terrorist group might not contribute to "reasonable stability."Each year the State Department issues human rights reports on individual countries, and the 2001 report on Iraq (covering 2000) said this:

No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations; however, little progress was made at the time toward implementing the agreement. In October 1999, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of measures, including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally displaced persons (IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom of movement between their respective areas. Most of the measures were not implemented (see Section 1.d.). However, during the year, the two main Kurdish parties reported some progress toward full implementation of the Washington Agreement, including the return of 3,000 IDP's displaced since the 1995-96 fighting, improved movement between the Kurd-controlled areas, and the exchange of all prisoners.

The 2002 report said basically the same thing. Maybe these positive signs could be intepreted as "reasonable stability." The O'Leary article mentioned some other positive developments:

Free and fair local elections, under international observation, were conducted in dozens of municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK, particularly in their dealings with the Bush administration and U.S. Congress, as well as with states in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal relationship with the central government under a new constitutional arrangement.

Thus, by the end of 2002, there were tangible signs of "reasonable stability" between the PUK and KDP. However, I point out two matters. First, this stability came after years, meaning that there was not stability between the KDP and PUK for much of the decade following fall 1991. Judging from Wolfowitz's statements, one would think just the opposite was true, meaning that Wolfowitz was wrong and/or misleading. Second, just because there was reasonable stability between the PUK and KDP at the end of 2002 does not mean that everything in the Kurdish region was stable.

• Turkish interests

Turkish interests in northern Iraq when Wolfowitz gave his testimony (February 27, 2003) took two basic forms. The first involves Turkey's own Kurdish problems, many of which are related to the PKK. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the PKK is

a Marxist group seeking an independent state for the country’s Kurdish ethnic minority (which) has conducted a long campaign that has included suicide bombings, kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks on civilians and on Turkish diplomatic offices abroad. Since a harsh military push and the February 1999 arrest of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, Turkey has largely subdued the separatist group, which now says it has renounced violence. While Turkey considers the PKK a terrorist group and the United States formally lists it as a foreign terrorist organization[.]

The State Department's 2001 human rights report on Turkey described Turkey's conflict with the PKK as follows:

From 1984 through 1999, the Government engaged in armed conflict with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey. The level of violence decreased in the second half of 1999, and has remained low for the past 2 years. Although the situation in the southeast remained a concern, the conflict between government security forces and separatist PKK terrorists continued to be at a low level, and according to the military, there were only approximately 45 armed clashes during the year. More than 30,000 persons have returned to their villages or moved to "consolidated villages" near their original homes. Despite the end of the war, a state of emergency, declared in 1987, continued in four southeastern provinces that had faced substantial PKK terrorist violence. Security forces continued to target active PKK units as well as those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK, and conducted operations against villages throughout the region which yielded ammunitions caches.

The state of emergency was completely lifted in late November 2002. So what does this have to do with northern Iraq? Well, here's a brief explanation:

There were repeated military incursions by Turkish security forces into northern Iraq during the year 1999/2000. In late 1999, the Turkish airforce targeted PKK positions in both KDP and PUK controlled areas. In April, May, and August 2000, Turkish troops again were deployed to the region. In one incident, Turkish troops killed 38 Kurdish civilians. In July the PUK attempted to push the PKK out of its territory and fighting ensued. Both the PKK and the PUK suffered a number of casualties. In December 2000, hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed to the region, threatening to intervene on the PUK's behalf. Subsequently, the PUK and the PKK declared a cease-fire.

Stated differently, Turkey might have reduced problems with the PKK within its own borders, but that dispute spilled over into northern Iraq, and that resulted in the Iraqi Kurds having to fight the PKK and Turkish troops being in the area. And why is that significant? Based on his experience in Operation Provide Comfort, a senior U.S. commander said, "If you put Turkish troops on the ground, they will get in a fight with the Kurds. The Kurds have had their own world down there, and they want to keep it, and the Turkish tendency is to solve their own problems with force." Gee, why didn't Wolfowitz refer to this experience from OPC?

The second aspect of Turkish interests concerns an ethnic group other than the Kurds. That group is the Turkoman minority. Melik Kayan, a former senior editor at Forbes and a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal, warned of this issue in a January 5, 2003 editorial:

The Iraqi Turkomans complain that their share of the population is being deliberately underrepresented. They and their neighbors the Christian Assyrians are angry that their urban districts--still under Saddam Hussein's control--are being pre-emptively gerrymandered by the Kurdish factions to carve out a greater Iraqi Kurdistan in a future grab for oil terrain.

It bodes ill for the region's stability that virtually no one outside of Turkey is conscious of the plight of the Turkomans. They, like the Bosnians, are kith and kin to the Turks. They claim to number some 12% of Iraq's total population and the current Iraqi opposition alliance concedes them only 6% of representation.

The Turkomans might be driven to take up arms to protect their rights once the enforced Saddam umbrella disappears. The internal strife could draw in the Turkish military. The last time the Turks waited for international intervention to protect their cousins--the Bosnians--what they witnessed instead was unrelieved slaughter.

O'Leary also wrote about the Turkoman issue:

In the period since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the disposition of the Iraqi Turkoman community has also been of concern to Turkey. In this regard, Turkey and its proxy inside the Kurdish safe haven- the Iraqi Turkoman Front--have called for the establishment of a Turkoman federal unit to include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk if a permanent Kurdistan federal region is created. Turkish leaders have declared that the future establishment of a Kurdistan federal region to include Kirkuk is a casus belli. In fact, the Turks appear to have positioned themselves to intervene militarily in Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a regime change.

When Wolfowitz testified, there was an ethnic group whose circumstances might compel Turkey to invade Iraq. Now that's what I "reasonable stability." Actually, my sarcasm is slightly unfair. On the one hand, Wolfowitz was referring to the area controlled not by Saddam but the Kurds, and Kayan referred to areas which were in Saddam's control. On the other hand, Wolfowitz also referred to the "northern third of Iraq," which would include the areas mentioned by Kayan.

• Other sources of conflict and instability

I will make this section brief (as much as for myself as you), but do not be fooled by the brevity. There had been a great deal of additional conflict in the area by the time Wolfowitz testified on February 27, 2003. Here's a sampling as described in the State Department's 2002 report:

Politically motivated killings by opposition groups and rebel/insurgent/terrorist groups continued. Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the Kurd-controlled north of the country. For example, numerous press reports in November and December outlined several battles in the northeast between PUK forces and fighters of Ansar al-Islam (AAI), an Islamic extremist group. Such fighting continued a pattern of violence in that area. In 2001 assailants assassinated the governor of Irbil, Fransu Hariri. PUK and KDP investigators blamed Islamic groups such as AAI for the killing. In 2000 unknown persons killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan, Sirbit Mahmud. In July 2000, unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy Osman Hassan. Also in July 2000, PUK forces reportedly killed a number of members of the Iraqi Communist Workers Party (ICWP), and KDP forces killed several members of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Neither the PUK nor the KDP released information regarding investigations into the killings.

Ethnic minorities faced some discrimination and harassment by Kurds in the north.

Assyrians continued to fear attacks by the PKK[.] In 2000 Assyrians reported being caught in the middle of intra-Kurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported in 2000 being pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food supplies. There were no reports during the year of the Kurdistan Regional Government's investigation into a series of bombings in 1998 and 1999 that many Assyrian groups believed were part of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north.

Ethnic Turkmen also claimed discrimination by Kurdish groups, including the required use of the Kurdistan flag in Turkmen schools and the assignment of Kurdish teachers to Turkmen schools.

You can see more examples of the other sources of conflict in almost every document mentioned in this post.

Everything described above occurred prior to Wolfowitz's testimony, and all of it was known prior to his testimony. And yet Wolfowitz sat before the House Budget Committee and said under oath that the area had been "reasonably stable" for over a decade. What a putz.

Breakdown 5: Ansar al-Islam

Here's something Wolfowitz partially got right--at least factually speaking. He said that people in the north

"live under daily threat...for the last year and a half, from an al Qaeda cell...called Ansar al-Islam."

While the extent of Ansar al-Islam's connection to Al Qaeda can be argued, it is a fact that Ansar al-Islam was at war with the Kurdish parties, especially the PUK. But ask yourself this: If the people in northern Iraq were under daily threat from a terrorist group based there, would you consider the area to be reasonably stable? If your answer is "yes," feel free to explain it.

At some point, I will make an in-depth post about Ansar al-Islam, but for now I will address two matters. The first is the "poison camp" Colin Powell spoke about in his dog and pony show before the U.N. on February 5, 2003. Recall that he said the camp belonged to Ansar al-Islam, and he used its existence as a justification for going to war. Well, turns out that the Bush administration knew about the camp for many months before Powell's presentation. In fact, according to Knight-Ridder and the Los Angeles Times, the Pentagon and CIA had plans to conduct a covert attack on the camp, but in August, 2002 the Bush administration rejected those plans. At that time, ABC News reported that “officials concluded the operation was not a major threat to the United States and definitely not a sophisticated laboratory.” So why was the camp presented on February 5 as a reason to go to war? As explained in the L.A. Times article, when Powell appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, the day after his U.N. presentation, Sen. Joseph Biden asked the following questions: “Why have we not taken it out? Why have we let it sit there if it's such a dangerous plant producing these toxins?” The only answer Powell gave was that he could not discuss the matter in open session. And this was not the first time such questions had been raised. The Senate Intelligence Committee sought answers and received none. According to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, she and other members of the committee were frustrated in their attempts to get an explanation from administration officials in closed-door briefings (which are not open sessions). “We've been asking this question and have not been given an answer,” Feinstein said. Officials have replied that “they'll have to get back to us.” On February 6, a White House spokesman said he had no comment on the matter. As Greg Miller of the L.A. Times wrote:

The administration's handling of the issue has emerged as one of the more curious recent elements of the war on terrorism. Failing to intervene appears to be at odds with President Bush's stated policy of preempting terrorist threats, and the facility is in an area where the United States already has a considerable presence.

I'm confused. On the one hand, this poison camp never was enough of a threat to warrant taking it out, yet it was apparently a good reason to go to war.

The second matter concerning Ansar al-Islam is the fact that the State Department waited until March 22, 2004 to designate Ansar al-Islam as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. So Ansar al-Islam was a daily threat to the people in north Iraq, we "knew" Ansar was operating a poison factory, and the group was a reason for going to war, but we didn't even designate it as a terrorist organization until March 22, 2004. Once again, I am confised.

So what's my point? Wolfowitz talked about a threat, but if that threat existed, how could there be reasonable stability? And if there truly was a threat, why did we do nothing about it? My point is that these questions cannot be reconciled. If this threat truly existed without "any forces" on the ground from the U.S., doesn't it follow that more forces would be needed to remove the threat? Doesn't this mean Wolfowitz is full of crap?

Here's a hint: the answer to the last question is "yes." And that's the most concise and yet comprehensive summary I can give.

Map showing Kurdish-controlled area in relation to the rest of Iraq

Here's another map (from the Washington Post) showing the Kurdish region and its size compared to the rest of the country. Take a close look and decide for yourself whether the Kurdish area comprises a full 1/3 of the country as claimed by Wolfowitz.

Map of northern Iraq showing the Kurdish-controlled area

Here is a map showing the area of northern Iraq which was controlled by the Kurds, or the "northern third of Iraq" Wolfowitz said "has been liberated from Saddam Hussein's grasp since Operation Provide Comfort." Note that the area was divided between the two major Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Note also that there is a line demarcating the Northern No Fly Zone and that part of the Kurdish area is outside of that zone. This map was prepared by the CIA in 2003, and I found it here.

Map relevant to Wolfowitz's Reason 2

Map showing 1) the Northern No Fly Zone, which is basically where Operation Provide Comfort took place, and 2) the location of Incirlik Air Base, the base of operations for Operation Provide Comfort. This map was created by Tom Brown of the Christian Science Monitor.

Time to get back to posting.

I've had to take a bit of a break from posting lately due to a combination of work, musical gigs, and announcing duties. My announcing duties include being The Voice of the Mustang Band, and that has entailed road trips to Fort Worth and Stillwater, OK the last two weekends. SMU lost those games by a combined score of 103-7. Ouch. Thank goodness the Mustang Band has performed well.

Anyway, it's time to get back to posting. I'm going to continue showing how Paul Wolfowitz is either a moron or a liar or both. In my last post I said I would next address "Wolfowitz's Reason 2--there was no evidence of ethnic strife in Iraq like in Bosnia and Kosovo that would require a large occupation force." Well, that was actually the third reason given by Wolfowitz. His second reason was "in making predictions, one should at least pay attention to past experience,” namely “Operation Provide Comfort” in northern Iraq after the Gulf War." That will be the subject of my next post.

And as you read these posts about Wolfowitz--and any other post that shows the mistakes of the Defense Department--keep in mind that the Defense Department was given complete control over everything to do with Iraq. And who gave the DoD that power to the exclusion of all others? That would be George W. Bush.

More on Wolfowitz and the blunders of the Bush administration

In the post Where this blog is going in regard to Iraq, I said the following:

However, the sad truth is that the Bush administration has screwed up just about everything. Seriously--pick any issue, and the facts, not any bullshit spin, will show that BushCo has done one boneheaded (and that's the nicest phrase I can use) thing after another.

*******

For now I am going to stick with the planning for the post-war period.

*******

Part of what I will show is that practically every problem that has been encountered in this period was predicted or known ahead of the war. I will initially broach this topic by focusing on some truly astounding testimony before the war from Paul Wolfowitz.

Well, I managed to sidetrack myself by examining the "Mission Accomplished" banner (George's Aircraft Carrier Carnival), Wolfowitz's explanation for war (Paul Wolfowitz: prime example of everything wrong with the Bush administration), Bush's moral hypocrisy (Bush and the moral obligation to intervene), and Bush's statement that he does not think the war on terror can be won (Bush: Of course we can win, but I don't think we can win, so we will win).

Now it is time to get to the Wolfowitz testimony I referenced back on August 21. The testimony occurred on February 27, 2003, two days after Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the Army's Chief of Staff, testified regarding the number of troops he thought would be needed for post-war Iraq. Wolfowitz treated Shinseki's tesimony with utter disdain, and then he gave several reasons why Shinseki was wrong. Each of those reasons appeared to be more answers to "what's brown and sounds like a bell?" at the time Wolfowitz uttered them. This post will examine the first of Wolfowitz's reasons.

Shinseki's testimony

On February 25, 2003, Gen. Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. On the subject of the occupation of Iraq he said this:

We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so, it takes significant ground force presence to maintain safe and secure environment to ensure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.

(emphasis added). Senator Carl Levin asked him to give a range of the number of troops he thought would be needed for the occupation of Iraq. Here's what Shinseki said:

I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful.

The sources from which I got these quotes are: "Blind Into Baghdad;" this New York Times article; this AP article; and this Washington Times article. I have been unable to find an official transcript of Shinseki's testimony. The Senate Armed Services Committee's website only has Shinseki's prepared statement, and the transcript is nowhere to be found on either the Department of Defense's site or the Army's site.

Before setting out Wolfowitz's response, I will give a little background on Shinseki. He served as the first commander of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, a post he held from June 1997 through November 1998. That means that at the time of his testimony, Shinseki was a general with actual real-world experience in commanding military occupation forces in a country riddled with ethnic strife. On the other hand, Wolfowitz was--and still is--a civilian with no such experience.

At the risk of getting ahead of myself, I note here that by May 22, 2003, Wolfowitz was saying that the U.S. experience in Bosnia could prove helpful in Iraq.

Mr. Wolfowitz also said that the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo underline the importance of forces "so big and strong that nobody would dare pick a fight with us."

"I think there may be something to the notion that the more you have at the beginning, the faster you can draw down," said Mr. Wolfowitz.

With that in mind, let's examine what Wolfowitz said on February 27, 2003.

Wolfowitz's response in general

On February 27, 2003, Wolfowitz testified before the House Budget Committee. Although he did not mention Shinseki by name, Wolfowitz made a point of addressing Shinseki's estimates.

If I might digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman, from my prepared testimony, because there has been a good deal of comment—some of it quite outlandish—about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. That great Yankee catcher and occasional philosopher, Yogi Berra, once observed that it is dangerous to make predictions, especially about the future.

That piece of wise advice certainly applies to predictions about wars and their aftermath, and I am reluctant to try to predict anything about what the cost of a possible conflict in Iraq would be—what the possible cost of reconstructing and stabilizing that country afterwards might be. But some of the higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.

(emphasis added). Even though I am a Red Sox fan and thus reflexively despise the Yankees, I like Yogi Berra. However, when an official that is directly responsible for our national defense bases his policy on Yogi Berra, I get nervous. I guess it could be worse. After all, Yogi Berra usually makes more sense than George W. Bush. For that matter, so does Yogi Bear.

After giving all his reasons for claiming Shinseki was wrong, Wolfowitz said, "[W]e can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark." Look closely at that statement. Now look closely at Shinseki's comments. Did Shinseki say several hundred thousand American troops? NO. He was addressing the overall size of an occupation force, not the composition of that force. He said the size of that force would need to be the size of the forces that had been mobilized--and the U.S was not the only country that had mobilized forces at that time. Furthermore, Shinseki's statement about assistance from others shows he was not talking about American forces only. For Wolfowitz to insinuate that Shinseki was talking exclusively about American troops is just more evidence of the Bush administration's chicanery.

Wolfowitz's Reason 1 why Shinseki was wrong.

After declaring Shinseki to be "wildly off the mark," Wolfowitz gave his first reason for this inescapable conclusion:

First, it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.

That is the full explanation of the first reason. Really. I think even Yogi Berra would be shaking his head over this one. Wolfowitz again mischaracterized what Shinseki said. Here Wolfowitz spoke about more troops than it would take to win the war. However, Shinseki's estimate on troops needed for the occupation was equal to "what's been mobilized to this point." In other words, the same amount of troops needed to conduct the war itself. Furthermore, Wolfowitz offered no evidence, no data, no reasoning. In essence, he asserted that he was right because "I said so."

Hmmm. Something about that seems familiar--seems like someone else recently used similar "reasoning." Ah, yes...now I remember. On June 17, 2004, George W. Bush uttered this intellectual tour de force: "The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda, because there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda."

To quote Yogi Berra, "It's like deja vu all over again."

Prime example of how the Bush Administration operates

I have previously written about the Bush administration's standard operating procedure, and Wolfowitz has provided a great example of the SOP. Notice that while his comments were obviously in response to Shinseki's statements, Wolfowitz did not mention Shinseki by name, meaning that the Bush administration could claim that Wolfowitz was not really talking about Shinseki. Next, Wolfowitz mischaracterized Shinseki's testimony twice, making it appear that Shinseki said things he did not say. Then Wolfowitz proceeded to attack the things that were not said. If he was ever questioned about this, Wolfowitz could fall back on the bogus claim that since he did not mention Shinseki, he did not micharacterize what Shinseki said. Such argument would not change the fact that no one made the statements Wolfowitz attacked (i.e., that several thousand American troops would be needed and that the occupation force would have to be larger than the combat force), meaning that Wolfowitz was knocking down arguments that had not been made. And then came the unsubstantiated bluster. Wolfowitz made bold declarations without providing any evidence or support. This is how the Bush administration has handled and continues to handle its business, and I am damn sick and tired of it. It is dishonest, arrogant, stupid, and reckless, and it has cost lives.

Why is any of this important now? There are at least six reasons:

1. Shinseki turned out to be right.
2. There was plenty of evidence as of February 25, 2003, to support Shinseki.
3. As shown here and in subsequent posts, the reasons given by Wolfowitz were unsubstantiated.
4. The Bush administration ignored relevant opinions and evidence and instead based actions on opinions which at best were not supported by the facts and common sense.
5. This issue of the number of troops needed for the occupation is indicative of the utter stupidity and incompetence of the Bush administration.
6. This issue shows that these fools do not deserve to left in authority. They have to go.
   

Next up: Wolfowitz's Reason 2--there was no evidence of ethnic strife in Iraq like in Bosnia and Kosovo that would require a large occupation force.

More Republican hypocrisy

In the previous post, I quoted a Bush speech from April 13, 2004. The statement immediately after the one I quoted was "They (the Democrats) somehow believe the heart and soul of America can be found in Hollywood," to which the audience responding by booing loudly.

And then the Republican Convention gives us a production number of "There's No Business Like Show Business," and Arnold Schwarzenegger is the featured speaker the second night of the Convention.

I'm not making this up. I wish I was...

Bush: Of course we can win, but I don't think we can win, so we will win.

Many moons ago, Six Flags Over Texas used to have a ride called “Spindletop.” By the way, Six Flags Over Texas was the original Six Flags amusement park. Bonus points for those who can name all six flags which have flown over Texas. Back to Spindletop...People would walk into a circular area and stand with backs against the wall. Then the ride would begin to turn–slowly at first, then faster...and faster...and faster until the floor dropped but the people did not because of the centrifugal force. Well, the rate of spin of Spindletop ain’t nothin’ compared to the spin coming out of the White House the last few days.

The cause of all the commotion is something that good ol’ W. his own self said in an interview with Matt Lauer which aired on Monday’s Today show on NBC. You might want to take a Dramamine or some other motion sickness medicine before proceeding. Now that I have fulfilled any legal duty to warn you, I’ll start slow, just like Spindletop.

In a press conference on April 13, 2004, Bush said this:

One of the interesting things people ask me, now that we're asking questions, is, can you ever win the war on terror? Of course, you can.

Nothing surprising from George there. That seems to have been his position all along. He reiterated his stance in a July 30, 2004, speech:

I have a clear vision on how to win the war on terror and bring peace to the world.

So when does the ride start? Here’s part of the interchange between Lauer and our strong, fearless leader in the battle against terrorism:

Lauer: You said to me a second ago, one of the things you'll lay out in your vision for the next four years is how to go about winning the war on terror. That phrase strikes me a little bit. Do you really think we can win this war on terror in the next four years?

President Bush: I have never said we can win it in four years.

Lauer: So I’m just saying can we win it? Do you see that?

President Bush: I don't think you can win it. But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world--let's put it that way.

(emphasis added). OOPS! There has been a ride malfunction. The floor has already dropped before people are safely pinned to the wall. Just when I thought Kerry’s “sensitive war on terror” was about the dumbest thing I had heard from a Presidential candidate, here comes George with “I don’t think you can win (the war on terror).” This is far worse than Kerry’s gaffe. The Republicans have always criticized Kerry for being soft and weak–a charge Kerry has not aggressively disproven. Thus, Kerry’s “sensitive war on terror” fit right into the Republicans’ attack and Kerry’s less than definitive defense. On the other hand, George W. Bush has always been portrayed as the greatest force in civilized history opposing the evil of terrorism. The very basis for his current campaign is his alleged leadership in the war against terrorism. And now, George W. Bush his damn self says he doesn’t think the war can be won!

There was no time to stop the ride, reset the floor, and start over again. The Republicans tried to fix the malfunction by immediately cranking up the spin to a speed that would flatten Einstein’s hair and turn Schroedinger’s cat into a dog.

Before analyzing the “clarifications” issued by the White House, I want to point out that while the Today interview aired on August 30, the interview was taped on August 28.

At approximately 10:55 a.m. (CDT) on August 30 during a press gaggle aboard Air Force One, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan really got the ride moving:

Well, he was talking about winning it in the conventional sense. That's what he was talking about. I mean, this -- you've often heard him talk about how this is a different kind of war. We face an unconventional enemy. And it's -- I don't think you can expect that there will ever be a formal surrender or a treaty signed, like we have in wars past.

Look back at what Bush said. He first said that he did not think the war on terror could be won. Did he say “in a conventional sense?” Not just no, but hell no. Second, notice that Bush did expound upon his “can’t win” comment. He said, “But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world--let's put it that way.” Is that in any way close to what McClellan said? Again, not just no, but hell no.

Now look closely at what Scotty-boy said. This war was fought against a sovereign nation and its military, which is to say a conventional enemy. It was fought by our military using conventional weapons. It was pretty much a conventional war. Yet I am unaware of any formal surrender by the former regime, and I am unaware of any peace treaty that ended this war. I believe all we have is Bush’s May 1, 2003, declaration of the end of major combat operations and a “Mission Accomplished” banner (see this post for a detailed discussion). By McClellan’s terms, then, does that mean that we never actually won the war, or that the war has never ended?

Meanwhile, back at the ranch (figuratively speaking)...Bush gave a speech in Nashville to the American Legion National Convention on August 31. On the way there, at 8:45 a.m. (CDT) again on Air Force One, Scott McClellan had another chat with some reporters.

Q American Legion speech, something new we haven't heard before?

MR. McCLELLAN: I think some of his remarks will be similar to what you have -- what you heard at the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I expect there will be some new language in the remarks and some contrasts. I also expect the President will talk about winning the war on terrorism. We are winning the war on terrorism and we will win the war on terrorism. The President will make that crystal clear in his remarks, as he has many times before. And that the way -- you know, we will win the war on terrorism by continuing to take the fight to the enemy, and we will win the war on terrorism by continuing to spread freedom. And I expect he'll make that crystal clear in his remarks.

(emphasis added). Yes, Bush has made that crystal clear oh so many times--except when he said "I don't think you can win (the war on terror)."

Q Do you feel like his remarks yesterday to NBC got blown out of proportion, or why does he feel the need to make it crystal clear?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, he's done it many times before. There are some out there that are intent on trying to create a false perception.

(emphasis added). This brings to mind my favorite Vera Carp line: "Glass houses..." FYI, Vera Carp is a character from the Greater Tuna triology, which is a theatrical treasure straight from Texas (created by Joe Sears, Jaston Williams, and Ed Howard).

Q Are these remarks, then, a response to that?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that it's the President making it crystal clear that not only are we winning it, but we will win it.

By the way, I got the transcript from the White House web site, and the transcript says "THE PRESIDENT" instead of "MR. McCLELLAN." So, the President's speech was going to make it crystal clear that what he said in the Today interview was wrong. Or am I missing something?

According to the transcript on the White House web site, at 9:00 a.m. (CDT) on August 31, Bush addressed the American Legion:

In this different kind of war, we may never sit down at a peace table. But make no mistake about it, we are winning, and we will win. We will win by staying on the offensive. We will win by spreading liberty. We believe that liberty can transform nations from tyranny into peaceful nations. And so we'll keep our commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. We will help them become peaceful and democratic countries that are allies in the war on terror.

Wow! That Scott McClellan must be psychic! Just 15 minutes earlier he said that Bush was going to say that. Oh, wait...if McClellan is psychic, then why didn't he know that Bush was going to say something so amazingly stupid in the Today interview? In any event, the day after the broadcast of that interview showed Bush saying he didn't think we could win the war on terror, there he was saying "we are winning, and we will win."

But Georgie wasn't finished. That afternoon, he was interviewed by my favorite pill-popping hypocrite, Rush Limbaugh. Here's how Bush explained his Today comments:

Listen, I should have made my point more clear about what I meant. What I meant was that this is not a conventional war. It is a different kind of war. We're fighting people who have got a dark ideology who use terrorists, terrorism, as a tool. They're trying to shake our conscience. They're trying to shake our will, and so in the short run the strategy has got to be to find them where they lurk. I tell people all the time, "We will find them on the offense. We will bring them to justice on foreign lands so we don't have to face them here at home," and that's because you cannot negotiate with these people. And in a conventional war there would be a peace treaty or there would be a moment where somebody would sit on the side and say we quit. That's not the kind of war we're in, and that's what I was saying.

Maybe I was wrong about Scott McClellan. Maybe he is psychic! I can see it now. On those oh so rare occasions when Bush misspeaks and needs help finding just the right words, he closes his eyes, clicks his heels three times, and says, "Beam me up, Scotty." Seriously, give me a break. George, in the Today interview, you never said "conventional war." You never said "different kind of war." You never said "peace treaty." You never said anything remotely close to what you told Oxycontin Boy. "I should have made my point more clear about what I meant." First of all, you should have said that in some form which is grammatically correct, and secondly, not only should you have been more clear on your point, you had the opportunity to do so as soon as you made the statements in the Today interview. Instead, you said "let's put it that way" and nothing more.

But wait--Bush had even more to say to Rush (that name now has a whole new meaning):

Really what I was saying to Lauer was, is that this is not the kind of war where you sit down and sign a peace treaty. It's a totally different kind of war. But we will win it.

Again, George, you said nothing of the kind to Matt Lauer.

Go back and read what I said about McClellan's comments about conventional wars, peace treaties, and formal surrenders. Bush basically repeated McClellan's words (again). Does this mean that Bush is now saying that we never really won the war in Iraq?

So, Bush is trying to convince us that his statement that "I don't think you can win (the war on terror)" actually means "we will win the war on terror." I can only hope that anyone on this Spindletop ride walks out not feeling dizzy but like something in his or her brain has been awakened--something that allows one to see this spin for what it is: pure bullshit.