Bush and the moral obligation to intervene

In case anyone missed it in the preceding post (Paul Wolfowitz: prime example of everything wrong with the Bush administration), here is a quote from Bush from his weekly radio address on March 15, 2003 (four days before the war started):

We know from human rights groups that dissidents in Iraq are tortured, imprisoned and sometimes just disappear; their hands, feet and tongues are cut off; their eyes are gouged out; and female relatives are raped in their presence.

As the Nobel laureate and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, said this week, "We have a moral obligation to intervene where evil is in control." Today, that place is Iraq.

Well, not only are there other places today (Sudan, for example) in which--by Bush's own terms--we have a moral obligation to intervene, at least one of those places obligated us--again, by Bush's own standard--to intervene before the Iraq war.

And that would be...North Korea. Check out this 60 Minutes report for details of the evil and cruelty that has been going on in North Korea for years. Here's an excerpt from the report:

Dr. Norbert Vollertsen, a German family physician, spent a year and a half in North Korea as a member of a German group that provides medical aid to the country.

Vollertsen told 60 Minutes he was stunned by what he saw and was able to capture on videotape when he managed to travel around much of this secretive country.

“There are little children in Children Hospital. Eight years old, 6 years old, some of them 15 years old but looking like a 10-year-old because they are suffering from malnutrition,” says Vollertsen.

“But what shocked me mainly was how they are looking," he says. "How sad. There's no more emotional reaction in those eyes. They can't cry anymore. They can't laugh anymore.”

This German doctor also said he was struck by the stripes on their pajamas.

“It was nearly the same picture from Dachau, Auschwitz. We, Germans, were accused that we kept silent during Hitler's Nazi regime, that there was nobody who, who spoke out,” he says. “I saw those children and I gave a promise. That I will not keep silent. Silence is killing in North Korea.”

And Bush bases his policy of "moral obligation" on a quote from Elie Wiesel. How's that for irony? I don't know about you, but children that look like they are in Nazi concentration camps strikes me as evil enough to invoke Bush's "moral obligation." However, since Bush has not intervened in North Korea, apparently the plight of these children is not sufficiently evil for him. Perhaps there is more evil that might suffice.

How about life in general for the rest of the population? Turns out life its own self ain't very pretty in North Korea:

While driving his jeep around the country, Vollertsen said he saw hungry, malnourished people everywhere foraging for food: “And I saw little children at the roadside picking up all those little insects and whatever they can eat. Women who are looking for some leaves and special herbs.”

Sadly, no birds were chirping. “The people are killing whatever can run, whatever can fly,” says Vollersten.

Hazel Smith, who recently spent 13 months in North Korea for the U.N., monitoring food aid shipments, confirms his reports. She said it's not just hospitals, but the whole country that lacks the most basic necessities.

Here’s a sampling from her list: No clean running water. Lack of fuel to boil much water. No soap, no disinfectant, no toilet paper. No toothpaste. No sanitary napkins, but many women have stopped menstruating because of malnutrition.

“There is chronic malnutrition throughout the country now. Which means that children and adults don't grow very much,” says Smith.

*******

“Even if you're quite privileged, you're going to live in a cold apartment. Having access to water, to sanitation, to electricity is pretty difficult,” says Smith. “The worst thing about life in North Korea now is that people don't know whether they're going to have enough food to survive.”

*******

“All the shops in Pyongyang empty. No food, no rice, nothing at all but thousands of bottles of sojo, very cheap, produced North Korean liquor,” says Vollersten. “It's real poison. It's toxic, but it will make you drunken immediately and that's the purpose, in order to make people happy.”

*******

“Some of them are dying because they don't have access to income or food. And North Korea is becoming a nation of petty traders because people have to get by,” adds Smith, who says black markets have sprung up where people barter whatever they can for their next meal.

Surely these conditions are evil enough for our own fearless and oh so moral leader to take action? Well, no, they are not.

What about how North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, runs the government in general? Judge for yourself:

During their 50 years of communist rule, Kim Il Sung, and now his son Kim Jong Il, have sealed off North Koreans from the outside world. Their radios and TVs are specially made to receive only government stations.

The government publishes all newspapers and magazines. No foreign media. No internet. Only loudspeakers everywhere praising Kim Jong Il.

From the early childhood, young children are educated to love Kim Jong Il, says Vollertsen. “To worship him like a god. And that's the main point. It's more like a cult. He's using this brainwashing process, with steady propaganda from early in the morning up to the evening.”

*******

The constant indoctrination demands rigid conformity. Ideologically, everyone must be in lockstep - especially at those massive outdoor performances that honor their leader. (Former Assistant Secretary of State Harold) Koh says he's appalled that Kim puts his money into a million-member military, and developing nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles when he can't provide basic necessities for his people.

Food goes first to the military and the elite. For everybody else, Kim force-feeds them propaganda.

“It's a country where there's essentially no freedom, no civil and political rights. People are spying on each other,” says Koh.

A cult leader, forced propaganda and brainwashing, complete government control of information, spending money on weapons instead of feeding the people...That all sounds very evil, and yet Bush has never exercised his "moral obligation." What would he consider to evil enough to require intervention?

How about the equivalent of Nazi concentration camps or Soviet labor camps? North Korea certainly has those.

U.S. officials also told 60 Minutes that North Korea has a dozen such slave-labor camps that together contain perhaps a million people - five percent of the country's population of 22 million.
Any sign of disloyalty can get you sent to slave labor, according to former inmates who say that if one member of a family is arrested, the whole family often has to go, too. Many inmates work 18-hour days in hazardous coalmines.

In some camps, one out of five prisoners die each year from exhaustion or starvation. Others die from being used as guinea pigs for chemical and biological weapons. And guards are encouraged to be brutal and utilize punishment cells.

“The punishment cells that have been described by refugees are very tiny cells which are too small for someone to stand up, but also too short for them to spread their legs out,” says Koh. “So people are in that sort of cramped position. And in those cells they're thrown after they've been beaten or subjected to other kinds of humiliating treatment and they, they're fed or not fed.”

But never fed much. “Human Rights Watch reports that the workers at the labor camp tried to catch rats in their shoes so they can roast them, and have an occasional piece of meat,” adds Koh.

Sen. Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas, has heard similar reports from North Korean defectors who escaped into China. He traveled to China's North Korean border, and told 60 Minutes that tens of thousands of defectors are hiding in China to avoid being sent back to a North Korean prison camp.

“You have horrific, horrific stories,” says Brownback, citing public executions, people eating bugs and rats, the routine killing of babies born in prison – even women feeding their family a bit of food laced with rat poison to kill their children before they starve to death. “I’ve had eye-witness testimony.”

Brownback and Vollertsen believe that, just as in Nazi Germany, when the full scope of horror in North Korea is finally revealed, it will be far worse than the initial reports.

And still, Bush has chosen not to intervene in North Korea.

Am I saying that we should intervene in North Korea? No. I am not taking a stand one way or the other. What I am doing is pointing out the hypocrisy of George W. Bush. Was Saddam evil? Yes. Was evil in control in Iraq? Yes. Was that why we invided Iraq? Not likely. Anyone disagreeing should go back and read Paul Wolfowitz: prime example of everything wrong with the Bush administration, which indicates that the administration did not consider ending such evil in Iraq to be worth sacrificing American lives. George Bush talks about a moral obligation to intervene in order to defeat evil, but the suffering of the Iraqi people was not considered sufficient to put Americans in harm's way, and the extreme evil which has long existed in North Korea has all but been ignored by the Bush administration.

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines hypocrisy as "a feigning to be what one is not or to believe what one does not; especially : the false assumption of an appearance of virtue or religion." George Bush's declaration of "moral obligation" fits this definition. Anyone who thinks otherwise needs to explain their position--especially since Bush his own self has not.

Paul Wolfowitz: prime example of everything wrong with the Bush administration

I concluded my lengthy post on George’s Aircraft Carrier Carnival by asserting that that one event exemplified characteristics typical of the Bush administration. Specifically, I said that “They look stupid, reckless, spineless, manipulative, clueless, or dishonest--or all of the above. If this was an isolated incident, it would be insignificant. However, it is far from isolated. It is typical...They have consistently been vague and dishonest.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has provided much evidence of all of these qualities. It is difficult to know where to start, but I have chosen what he said about the reasons for going to war.

On May 9, 2003, Wolfowitz was interviewed by Sam Tannenhaus for Vanity Fair magazine. In order to prevent any Bush supporters from complaining about the “liberal media,” I am going to cite the official Defense Department transcript of the interview.

Wolfowitz told Tannenhaus that

The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason[.]

Now that's just crystal clear, isn't it? Wolfowitz does not explain what the reasons were or why the government bureacracy caused everyone to settle on the core reason for war. Also, was there agreement because of the evidence on WMD or because everyone felt it was the best way to sell the war to the American public? Due to what I wrote in Franks on the absence of WMD, The NIE, generally speaking, The Air Force's position on Iraq's UAVs, and The DIA and chemical weapons, I think the likely answer is the sales point. Allow me to be crystal clear--Wolfowitz's statement is vague. Then Wolfowitz expounded on the other possible justifications for war:

[T]here have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two.

So the top reason for going to war was WMD, followed by support for terrorism, and then there was an overriding fourth reason--the connection between WMD and terrorism. That means that the last, least compelling reason according to Wolfowitz was freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam's rule. More on that in a moment...

O.K....WMD was the core reason for the war. That certainly was the Bush's administration's most strongly argued case before the war. I will detail this fact in another post for those of you in denial.

What was the second element in the Bush's administration's sales job leading up to the war? That would be the support for terrorism reason (this will also be addressed in a later post). So, if WMD was the core reason because everyone agreed on that issue, then surely the support for terrorism reason had the next highest degree of agreement. That seems reasonable, doesn't it? Well, it might be reasonable, but it is also wrong, according to Wolfowitz:

That second issue about links to terrorism is the one about which there's the most disagreement within the bureaucracy[.]

I'm confused. Why did Bush decide to go with the reason on which there was the most disagreement over relieving the Iraqi people from Saddam's evil treatment? And why was the "fourth reason"--the (alleged) connection between WMD and terrorism--deemed to override freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam's cruelty? Wolfowitz offered this reasoning:

The third one by itself, as I think I said earlier, is a reason to help the Iraqis but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale we did it.

Wait a minute...Wasn't this war called "Operation Iraqi Freedom?" So the Bush Administration named this war for something that was not worth risking American lives? Now I'm really confused. Well, there is one thing about which I am not confused. Once no WMD were found, and once it became impossible to ignore the lack of evidence of Iraqi ties to 9-11 or Al Qaeda, the Bush administration decided to make this war all about liberating the Iraqi people. This is a prime example of how the Bush administration has been dishonest. As the other reasons for going to war were exposed as incorrect, these "leaders" increasingly claimed that the war was justified for a reason that they felt was never worth risking American lives.

Now I know what some of you Republicans are thinking. Wolfowitz was only expressing his own views and was not speaking on behalf of the entire Bush administration. I have several responses. Wolfowitz said the core reason was WMD because everyone agreed on that. No one in the Bush administration has contradicted that. Consequently, on that point it appears that Wolfowitz did speak for the entire administration. Also, there is no question that the administration based it sales job first and foremost on WMD. Furthermore, there is also no question that the administration repeatedly spoke of links between Iraq and terrorism and also tied this to the WMD issue. Thus, it appears that Wolfowitz once again was speaking on behalf of the administration when he said the fourth and overriding reason for war was the connection between WMD and terrorism. As a result of the foregoing, it appears that Wolfowitz did speak on behalf of the administration in listing as the last, least compelling reason for war as freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam's rule.

Yet just four days before the war started, Bush said this in his weekly radio address:

We know from human rights groups that dissidents in Iraq are tortured, imprisoned and sometimes just disappear; their hands, feet and tongues are cut off; their eyes are gouged out; and female relatives are raped in their presence.

As the Nobel laureate and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, said this week, "We have a moral obligation to intervene where evil is in control." Today, that place is Iraq.

We have a moral obligation, but that is not worth risking American lives--at least not until all other reasons for going to war appear shaky.

Iraqi soccer and The Miracle on Ice

The bronze medal match in men's soccer is over. Italy defeated Iraq 1-0. That means Iraq does not win a medal, but that team deserves the highest tribute possible.

As I watched every Iraqi match after the first one, I had memories of the 1980 U.S. Olympic hockey team. In 1980, the best hockey team in the world, bar none, was the Russian national team. That is my opinion, and I'm sticking with it. Even if I am wrong about that, the fact that I believed that in 1980 is central to the rest of this story. That Russian team had tons of talent, including the world's top goalie. Also, the Russian Olympic team was basically the Russian Red Army team, meaning that the Russians played as a team all the time and their job was to play hockey. The U.S. team, on the other hand, was basically a bunch of college kids with dreams of maybe making it to the NHL. They did not have anywhere near the talent of the Russians. They did not have anywhere near the experience of the Russians. They had been together as a team only a few months. All in all, they were hopelessly outmatched. There was simply no way that the boys from the U.S. could even hope to stay close to the mighty Russians.

And then came "The Miracle on Ice." The rag-tag, no-name, didn't-stand-a-chance U.S. team defeated Russia in the semi-finals. To this day, that game is the single greatest thing I have ever witnessed in sports. I was a senior in high school then, and I was home alone that night, watching every second of that game. After it was over, I was thrilled that the U.S. had beaten Russia, but soon another feeling I did not recognize started sweeping through me. Even though it was winter and I was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, I walked out on our front porch. The air was cold and still, the sky clear and the stars bright. And it was quiet. Perfectly, exquisitely quiet.

And then I realized what I was feeling. Sure, the U.S. had defeated the Communists. Sure, it was a great boost to our country in light of everything else going on in the world at that time (such as the Iran hostage crisis) . And yes, I was immensely proud to be an American because of the win. But there was something else that affected me even more. The game and its greatest meaning were not about America beating Russia or feelings of patriotism. In that game, a team that was given no chance, a team that realistically should have been overwhelmed by the clearly more talented and powerful team, instead won the game. And because of that, in that one moment as I stood on my front porch, I did not feel jubilation. I first felt calm, then awe and inspiration. Because of The Miracle on Ice, in that one moment I knew that anything was possible and that nothing was impossible.

Watching the Iraqi soccer team brought that feeling back for me. Here's what that team faced: a war torn home; no money; no possibility of playing home games in Olympic qualifying; no facilities to even train in their own country; a head coach who had to resign in order to escape death threats; and opponents with greater experience and resources. In other words, there was no reason the Iraqis should have had a chance to do anything in the Olympics. Then, in their opening match, they soundly defeated medal favorite Portugal. Then they defeated Costa Rica, which meant that Iraq would advance to the quarterfinals. Even though they lost by one goal to Morocco in the next match, the Iraqis easily won their group--a major accomplishment for any team, much less one facing all the obstacles that Iraq faced. Next came a quaterfinals match with Australia, and Iraq won again! That meant that Iraq would be playing for a medal, possibly gold. A semi-final loss to Paraguay ended the gold dream, but Iraq would still play for a bronze medal against another of the pre-tournament favorites, Italy. In a very close, well played match, Italy prevailed.

So the Iraqis did not win a medal. So what. They were one of the last four teams still playing. Truly, by simply qualifying for the Olympics, the Iraqi soccer team achieved the remarkable. As the games started, most experts were saying the standard "It's a victory just to make the tournament/that shows the Olympic spirit, etc." And then the Iraqis starting winning and kept advancing. The Iraqi soccer team showed the world not just that significant athletic obstacles can be overcome, but that when the circumstances of every day life are harsh and often desparate, triumph can be realized.

As on that winter night in 1980, I am wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and I am going to walk out on the same porch. Since it is an August afternoon in Wichita Falls, Texas, I will not feel any crisp, cold air, nor will I see the beauty of the stars in the night sky. But because of the Iraqi soccer team, I will once again experience awe and inspiration. Once again, I will know that anything is possible and nothing is impossible.

Olympics: Johnson and Hammond owe James Carter an apology

I just watched NBC's coverage of the men's 400M hurdles in Athens. The announcers, Tom Hammond and Lewis Johnson, are experienced and usually do a superb job. However, speaking as a former 400M hurdler, those two men just acted disgracefully. American James Carter was the top qualifier for the final. He was leading as he approached the ninth (of ten) hurdle. The eventual winner, Felix Sanchez, then went by Carter. Carter faded and finished fourth. Lewis Johnson kept saying that Carter gave up the last 15 meters, and then Hammond followed Johnson's lead. They obviously have never run the 400M hurdles. It is quite possibly the most brutal race in track outside of the marathon. While the race can break any man physically, "giving up" is something 400M hurdlers do not do. If a person was susceptible to giving up, he would not be running the 400M hurdles to begin with. Carter did not give up. His body gave out. I know because I've been there. For Johnson and Hammond to even suggest otherwise, much less flat out accuse Carter of quitting, is an insult of the highest order. They owe James Carter a public apology. Period.

George's Aircraft Carrier Carnival

"Mission Accomplished" is to Bush as "sensitive war on terror" is to Kerry.

On May 1, 2003, President Bush, in full action mode, arrived on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln to officially declare an end to major combat operations. His speech was actually pretty good. However, his speech is not the lasting image from that event. The lasting image is the President at the podium while a banner pronouncing "Mission Accomplished" appears above him.

Before I explain why this banner was a bad idea, I'm going to do something to make Republicans happy. I am going to criticize John Kerry. By now most people are aware of at least part of this statement Kerry made in an August 5 speech:

I believe I can fight a more effective, more thoughtful, more strategic, more proactive, more sensitive war on terror that reaches out to other nations and brings them to our side and lives up to American values in history.

Elsewhere on the internet, I wrote this about Kerry's speech:

First off, saying "sensitive war on terror" is just so, SO BAD. Secondly, to name off five adjectives and have the last one--the one people will remember more than any other--be "sensitive" is even worse. Third, to make that statement and not follow it up by what is meant by "sensitive" is even worse yet. Has the comment been taken out of context? Yes, but that is not the point. There are two points: 1) the statement could nonetheless be interpreted to mean "a sensitive war on terror" rather than an effort that reaches out to other nations; and 2) Kerry should have been "sensitive" enough to know that such wording was just asking for ridicule, which he is now getting.

Now that I have made Republicans happy, I am going to make them mad. The same basic reasoning I used to criticize Kerry applies completely to Bush and the "Mission Accomplished" banner.

Saying "Mission Accomplished" is so, SO BAD.

Bush's speech showed that much remained to be accomplished.

As Bush his own self said in his speech,

We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated. We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people.

In other words, when that banner was hung--and placed prominently in the picture--there was still a boatload (pun intended) of work left.

Now I know what you Republicans are thinking..."But Bush never said the mission was accomplished." That is true, but my response--for several reasons--is "BFD." Let's break down that argument into two components.

Component 1: The words "mission accomplished" were not spoken.

Quick...what do you remember the most from this event? Do you remember what Bush said? More importantly, do you remember what he did not say? Or, are your strongest memories 1) the plane landing, 2) Bush in a flight suit, and 3) the "Mission Accomplished" banner? I'll bet most people remember the visuals much more than the spoken words. Anyone who doubts this assertion needs to consider that the only reason anyone--including you Bush supporters-- needs to look closely at what Bush said and did not say is that visual image of the "Mission Accomplished" banner. Moreover, as will be explained, the White House communications team places great emphasis on visual images.

Component 2: Bush was in no way responsible for the banner.

Bush himself certainly took this stand in a press conference on October 28, 2003, when he said "The 'Mission Accomplished' sign, of course, was put up by the members of the USS Abraham Lincoln, saying that their mission was accomplished. I know it was attributed some how to some ingenious advance man from my staff -- they weren't that ingenious, by the way." O.K....so does that mean the ship's crew did everything and the White House had nothing to do with the banner? Well, not exactly. As reported by the Associated Press, immediately after the press conference "a White House spokeswoman said the Lincoln's crew asked the White House to have the sign made. The White House asked a private vendor to produce the sign, and the crew put it up, said the spokeswoman." (emphasis added). In a press briefing the very next day, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan revealed that "We said all along, and we said previously that it was the idea -- that the idea of the banner -- for the banner was suggested by those on board on ship. And they asked -- they asked if we could help take care of the production of the banner. And we more than happy to do so[.]" So the White House did know about the banner in advance of the event and actually played an active role in creating it.

Please note that these statements by Bush and McClellan constituted the first explanation by the administration of the banner. Note further that this initial explanation came six months after the event.

So, we know that the White House was to some degree responsible for the banner, but to what degree? The Navy, through Cmdr. Conrad Chun, said, "The banner was a Navy idea, the ship's idea," and that "The banner signified the successful completion of the ship's deployment." Does this mean that the White House is off the hook? Well, not exactly. As it turns out, the White House played a significant and direct role regarding the banner.

The White House's Media Magicians

On May 16, 2003, the New York Times published an article entitled "Keepers of Bush Image Lift Stagecraft to New Heights." Regarding the event on the Lincoln, the article said this:

The most elaborate — and criticized — White House event so far was Mr. Bush's speech aboard the Abraham Lincoln announcing the end of major combat in Iraq. White House officials say that a variety of people, including the president, came up with the idea, and that Mr. (Scott) Sforza (a former TV producer who works for the White House communications director) embedded himself on the carrier to make preparations days before Mr. Bush's landing in a flight suit and his early evening speech.

Media strategists noted afterward that Mr. Sforza and his aides had choreographed every aspect of the event, even down to the members of the Lincoln crew arrayed in coordinated shirt colors over Mr. Bush's right shoulder and the "Mission Accomplished" banner placed to perfectly capture the president and the celebratory two words in a single shot. The speech was specifically timed for what image makers call "magic hour light," which cast a golden glow on Mr. Bush.

So, the White House had staff on board the ship days before the event, and that staff "choreographed every aspect of the event," which certainly includes the hanging of the banner in a place where it would be seen with Bush. That pretty much tells me that the White House was largely responsible for "bannergate," but I never needed convincing. For those who need convincing, let's look at the White House's SOP for media events.

From the New York Times article:

Officials of past Democratic and Republican administrations marvel at how the White House does not seem to miss an opportunity to showcase Mr. Bush in dramatic and perfectly lighted settings. It is all by design: the White House has stocked its communications operation with people from network television who have expertise in lighting, camera angles and the importance of backdrops.

*******

"We pay particular attention to not only what the president says but what the American people see," Mr. (Dan) Bartlett (director of White House communications) said. "Americans are leading busy lives, and sometimes they don't have the opportunity to read a story or listen to an entire broadcast. But if they can have an instant understanding of what the president is talking about by seeing 60 seconds of television, you accomplish your goals as communicators. So we take it seriously."

The article described one of my favorite examples of the Bush media team tactics:

On Tuesday, at a speech promoting his economic plan in Indianapolis, White House aides went so far as to ask people in the crowd behind Mr. Bush to take off their ties, WISH-TV in Indianapolis reported, so they would look more like the ordinary folk the president said would benefit from his tax cut.

And for those who just know the New York Times cannot be right because it is part of the Liberal Media, surf over to the report on WISH TV's website.

The New York Times gave another example of "the importance of backdrops" in describing a speech Bush gave in Albuquerque on May 15, 2003: "the White House unfurled a backdrop that proclaimed its message of the day, 'Helping Small Business,' over and over. The type was too small to be read by most in the audience, but just the right size for television viewers at home." See the video here. Quoting a Boston Globe article, ABC News reported in July 2002 that "White House officials insist that such frequent branding works, giving distracted television viewers a quick guide to the official message of the day."

According to ABC News and the New York Times article, the man in charge of the backdrops since the summer of 2002 has been the aforementioned Scott Sforza. ABC reported that Sforza "boils down Bush's speeches to their common denominator for almost every important event," and "then considers the placement of the posters, to ensure they do not escape the lenses of television cameras around the room. " Gee, Sforza was on the Lincoln days before Bush's speech, and that "Mission Accomplished" banner was perfectly framed in the lasting image of Bush at the podium. Coincedence? I pretty much doubt it.

Sforza is not the only media wizard working for Bush. There is also Bob DeServi, a former NBC cameraman who is a master of lighting. The New York Times described two events which show the lengths to which the White will go to get just the right light for a single event. The first took place on September 11, 2002.

For the prime-time television address that Mr. Bush delivered to the nation on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, the White House rented three barges of giant Musco lights, the kind used to illuminate sports stadiums and rock concerts, sent them across New York Harbor, tethered them in the water around the base of the Statue of Liberty and then blasted them upward to illuminate all 305 feet of America's symbol of freedom. It was the ultimate patriotic backdrop for Mr. Bush, who spoke from Ellis Island.

You can see a video of this speech on the White House website, but you won't see the Statue of Liberty. For that shot, try the video from the BBC. There you will see Bush centered between the Statue of Liberty and a large American flag. Gee, I wonder why the White House video did not show that? The second event was on November 23, 2002, in Bucharest, Romania. "DeServi went so far as to rent Musco lights in Britain, which were then shipped across the English Channel and driven across Europe to Romania, where they lighted Mr. Bush and the giant stage across from the country's former Communist headquarters." See a picture here.

The New York Times identified one other media magician: "A third crucial player is Greg Jenkins, a former Fox News television producer in Washington who is now the director of presidential advance. Mr. Jenkins manages the small army of staff members and volunteers who move days ahead of Mr. Bush and his entourage to set up the staging of all White House events." Bush hired someone from Fox News? Golly, I never would have figured that.

So what does all this have to do with what Bush said or didn't say or whether he had anything to do with the banner? Let's review the White House SOP for events.

• The White House communications director said "We pay particular attention to not only what the president says but what the American people see."
• Bush's speeches "are boiled down to their common denominator," and then Sforza makes sure that it is part of the backdrop and in the camera shot.
  
• Bartlett, the communications director, said the goal is to give people "an instant understanding of what the president is talking about," and that is done through the visual images, not the spoken words. Anyone disputing that conclusion should keep in mind that Bartlett said the "instant understanding" was to come from" seeing," not hearing, "60 seconds of television." Also, look at the preceding bullet point.
  
• As shown by the September 11, 2002, and Romania events, the White House will spare no effort or expense to get just the right lighting for a single, brief occasion.
  
• The White House has "a small army of staff members and volunteers" who arrive at the site of an event days before it happens in order to set up all the staging.

Conclusion as to Components 1 and 2 (part one)

Review the White House SOP. Review the examples of that SOP in action. Now try to make a plausible argument that the White House did nothing but make the "Mission Accomplished" banner. Two of my favorite bloggers summed up this matter rather nicely. Back when he was Calpundit, Kevin Drum (now of Political Animal) had this to say: "Bush knows perfectly well that his staff managed every last detail of the carrier speech, and he knows perfectly well that every reporter at the press conference yesterday also knows it." Josh Marshall at Talking Points Memo said, "[T]here is no way that the idea was not debated, planned, vetted and everything else in the White House's political and communications offices. No way." In other words, the banner was the idea of the Lincoln's crew, but the White house decided to implement the idea. The White House, not the Navy, decided what to put on the banner. The White House decided where to put the banner. The White House decided to make sure that Bush and the banner were in the same camera shot. The White House was in charge of this event, and the White House did a lot more than just make the banner. For Bush and McClellan to claim otherwise to any degree is not just disingenuous. It is spineless.

Review the White House SOP and the actions of the media magicians one more time. Now try to make a plausible argument that the "instant understanding" Bush intended to convey was not "Mission Accomplished." Given the White House's emphasis on backdrops and the fact that the banner was the backdrop while Bush was at the podium, I conclude that Bush effectively said "Mission Accomplished" even though he did not speak those words.

Conclusion as to Components 1 and 2 (part two)

Part one of my conclusion on Components 1 and 2 is based in large part on facts outside of the event on the aircraft carrier. Part two is based on facts directly related to that event. I'll take them in reverse chronological order. Regarding the banner, Ari Fleischer, who was the White House Press Secretary at the time of the event, was quoted in an April 30, 2004, CBS News report as saying "We put it up. We made the sign." (emphasis added). So there is an admission that the White House did more than just make the sign. As it turns out, there was also some evidence of that back in October 2003. USA Today published an article on October 28, 2003, which said "Military officials agreed that the banner was their idea..." That sounds pretty good for Bush--but wait, there's more to the sentence: "...but said White House aides signed off on it, made it and positioned it prominently behind the spot where Bush made his remarks." Ouch. Looks like Josh Marshall was right. The White House knew about the banner and vetted the idea.

Recall that Bush said "I know it (the banner) was attributed somehow to some ingenious advance man from my staff -- they weren't that ingenious, by the way." In light of that comment, other parts of the USA Today article are particularly interesting:

But Bush's advance staff did have a hand in the banner, said other military officials who asked not to be identified. Personnel aboard the Abraham Lincoln asked the White House to make the banner because there were no art supplies aboard the ship, the officials said. The White House advance team then brought the banner to the ship and positioned it behind Bush.

White House communications director Dan Bartlett confirmed some of those details. "I received a phone call from the ship. They asked if they could have something that recognized that they had accomplished their mission. We agreed and helped develop a banner that reflected that," he said.

The White House communications office, well-known for the care it takes with the backdrops at Bush's speeches, created the "Mission Accomplished" banner in the same style as banners the president uses in other appearances, including one in Canton, Ohio, just a week before the carrier speech. That banner, with the same typeface and soft, brush-stroked American flag in the background, read: "Jobs and Growth."

So, the White House advance team did work on the banner. Again--ouch. Now look at the quote from Bartlett. Apparently, the crew of the Lincoln did not ask for a banner that said "Mission Accomplished." It was the White House that "developed a banner that reflected" the crew's request. Looks like I was correct in saying that the White House decided what to put on the banner. And that means that the White House intended for the message "Mission Accomplished" to be conveyed.

Spineless.

Saying "Mission Accomplished" is bad, but having it be the lasting image is even worse.

I am staying with my assertion that people remember the visual images from George’s Aircraft Carrier Carnival more than Bush’s spoken words. With that in mind, recall the three major visual images: 1) the plane landing, 2) Bush in a flight suit, and 3) the "Mission Accomplished" banner. Of those three, the banner was the last one–just like “sensitive” was the last adjective used by Kerry. “Sensitive war on terror” is what people remember most from Kerry’s speech, and “Mission Accomplished” is what people remember most from this event. That is “even worse” because people do not remember the speech. People do not remember that Bush said there was still a lot of work to do. People do not remember that Bush did not say the phrase “mission accomplished.” People do remember “Mission Accomplished.”

More to the point, people remember “Mission Accomplished” and do not know of or do not remember any explanation for what that meant.

Saying “Mission Accomplished” and not explaining the meaning is even worse yet.

As noted previously, the Bush administration made no attempt to explain what “Mission Accomplished” meant until six months after the speech. This was a bad move because for six months everyone was allowed to speculate on what “Mission Accomplished” meant. One might think that in six months, the White House could come up with one brilliant explanation. Think again.

What's brown and sounds like a bell?

In the case of the "Mission Accomplished" banner, the answer is the “explanation” from Bush and his press secretary Scott McClellan. In a general sense, the answer to the question is "dung." It's a joke from a Monty Python skit--The Visitors, Episode 9, which also has llamas and a lumberjack--but I digress.

According to Bush, “The ‘Mission Accomplished’ sign, of course, was put up by the members of the USS Abraham Lincoln, saying that their mission was accomplished.” So, does that mean that “Mission Accomplished” only applied to the crew of the Lincoln? That seems to be what Bush was saying. And that seems to be what McClellan said the following day:

The President was pleased to personally thank our sailors and aviators and naval officers on board the USS Lincoln for their service and sacrifice after what was a very lengthy deployment. It was the Navy, the people on board the ship who had the idea of this banner and made the suggestion, because they wanted to have a way to commemorate the fact that these sailors and the crew on board the ship had completed their mission, after a very lengthy deployment.

*******

[T]he idea of the banner--for the banner was suggested by those on board on ship. And they asked--they asked if we could help take care of the production of the banner. And we more than happy to do so because this is a very nice way to pay tribute to our sailors and aviators and men and women in the military who are on board that ship for a job well done.

*******

What I'm saying is that this was about paying tribute to our sailors and aviators and naval officers on board the USS Lincoln. That's what this was about. Let's keep that in context.

*******

The mission for those people on board the ship was accomplished.

*******

You had a number of men and women in the military on board that ship, sailors, aviators, naval officers, that were on board that ship, they were returning back to the United States and returning to -- one stop along their way -- to their home port up in Washington, I believe -- the state of Washington, stopping in San Diego. And those on board the ship thought it was nice way to say to all those on board the ship, thank you for a job well done. And the President personally went there to do that.

(emphasis added). O.K., O.K., Scott. We get it. The event and the banner were all about thanking the crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln for the performance of their mission.

But...the banner didn’t say that. It just had two words: “Mission Accomplished.” And the banner was not next to or close to anything indicating that it applied only to the crew of the Lincoln. I guess we will just have to look to Bush’s speech to see if he explained that the banner was all about the crew of the Lincoln. Let’s see...Bush did say this:

In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment -- yet, it is you, the members of the United States military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your country and for each other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.

(emphasis added). Well, here it seems Bush thanked all of the military, not just the crew of the Lincoln. Then again, maybe by "you, the members of the United States military" he meant just the crew of the ship since they were all members of the military. Still, that is not clear. Maybe this statement shows that the banner and the event were about thanking just the crew of the Lincoln:

Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before.

Well, that really does not address just the crew of the Lincoln because they were not the only members of the military that carried out Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bush's next sentence was

From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker.

Hmm...Bases are not naval ships, and "ships" means Bush was not talking about only one ship. Consequently, this sentence indicates that Bush was not talking about just the crew of the Lincoln. Maybe his next sentence did.

Marines and soldiers charged to Baghdad across 350 miles of hostile ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history.

Sailors, who stay on ships, did not charge across 350 miles of land, but Marines do charge across land, and Marines are part of the Navy. However, Bush said Marines AND soldiers, so he adressed more than Navy personnel. Consequently, this sentence does not show at all that Bush was talking about only the crew of the Lincoln. Gee, maybe his next sentence did.

You have shown the world the skill and the might of the American Armed Forces.

Wow, you mean the crew of the Lincoln alone showed the world the skill and might of the entire American military? Now, that's just not possible.

Am I being ridiculous? I actually think so, but I am not doing this analysis to convince myself. I am doing this to explain and show to people--especially Bush supporters--that the Bush administration is just full of crap. The banner did not say it applied only to the crew of the Lincoln. None of the above excerpts from Bush speech thanks or addresses ONLY the crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln. In fact, all of those excerpts thank and address ALL of the US military. And yet Scott McClellan, Bush's official spokesman, told us that "this was about paying tribute to our sailors and aviators and naval officers on board the USS Lincoln. That's what this was about." Now that is a big steaming pile of crap.

Still not convinced? After he said all of the foregoing excerpts, Bush said this:

And tonight, I have a special word for Secretary Rumsfeld, for General Franks, and for all the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States: America is grateful for a job well done.

(emphasis added). So...what's brown and sounds like a bell? The White House's explanation that the "Mission Accomplished" banner and the entire event onboard the Lincoln was just about thanking the crew of that ship.

Still not convinced? Then please answer these questions: Do you really think that the President would make a televised speech to the entire nation and, instead of thanking ALL of the approximately 150,000 people he sent to war and the thousands of other who were part of the war effort, thank only 5000?

Now that I have spewed righteous indignation, I have to concede that part of Bush's speech did specifically address the crew of the Lincoln. Here it is:

Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home. And that is your direction tonight. After service in the Afghan--and Iraqi theaters of war --after 100,000 miles, on the longest carrier deployment in recent history, you are homeward bound. Some of you will see new family members for the first time--150 babies were born while their fathers were on the Lincoln. Your families are proud of you, and your nation will welcome you.

Here would have been a good place to say something like, "This banner behind me is for you, the crew of the Lincoln," but Bush did nothing of the sort. It would have been so easy to say something like that. Such a statement would have clarified things and made life easier for the Bush administration. Why in the world would Bush not make such a statement if the event and the banner were truly all about thanking the crew of the Lincoln? One reason I contend that this excerpt does not verify Bush's and McClellan's "explanation is that moments after he specifically addressed the crew of the Lincoln, Bush said this:

All of you--all in this generation of our military--have taken up the highest calling of history.

(emphasis added). So if anyone wants to argue that the words for the crew of the Lincoln support the "explanation," explain why Bush later said words that expressly, conclusively, and irrefutably addressed the entire military.

So why didn't Bush take the very simple step of saying one sentence explaining that the "Mission Accomplished" banner applied only to the crew of the Lincoln? My answer--and hey, I could be wrong--is that he didn't do that because that was not the meaning the White House intended to convey.

So the "explanation" given for the banner is brown and sounds like a bell. Maybe there is something else in the speech that could give the meaning of "Mission Accomplished."

What other missions might have been accomplished?

Perhaps the banner referred to the war on terrorism. Did Bush's speech mention this? Yes, it did: "The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding." Hey, that sounds like an accomplished mission. However, Bush then said "Our mission continues. Al Qaeda is wounded, not destroyed.," and "The war on terror is not over[.]"

Maybe Bush meant that democracy had been established in Iraq. Well, no he didn't: "The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done."

What other missions were mentioned by Bush? How about Afghanistan? Bush said, "In the battle of Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many terrorists, and the camps where they trained." But then he said this: "Yet we also have dangerous work to complete. As I speak, a Special Operations task force, led by the 82nd Airborne, is on the trail of the terrorists and those who seek to undermine the free government of Afghanistan. America and our coalition will finish what we have begun." In other words, the mission was not completed.

Now I know what you Bush apologists are thinking. The mission that was accomplished was the end of major combat operations. That is a good argument. After all, Bush opened his speech with "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed." Why, then, did Bush not expressly say that "Mission Accomplished" meant the end of major combat operations? Again, this would have been so easy to do, and it would have eliminated any ambiguities.

Recent attempts at an explanation

During an April 30, 2004 appearance with Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, Bush had this to say:

A year ago, I did give the speech from the carrier, saying that we had achieved an important objective, that we'd accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein.

So now the mission which was accomplished was the removal of Saddam. But...but...on October 28, 2003, Bush gave one--and only one--explanation of "Mission Accomplished," and that was that it meant that the crew of the Lincoln had completed their mission. Then on April 30, 2004, he said nothing about the crew of the Lincoln and and that the "accomplished mission" was getting rid of Saddam. Since I am comparing Kerry's recent verbal gaffe to Bush's conduct, I am compelled to say that Bush executed a nice flip-flop.

However, "Bush's Brain," a/k/a Karl Rove, was sticking with the original explanation just two weeks earlier. According to an AP report entitled "Rove Regrets 'Mission Accomplished' Sign," Rove, "speaking at an editorial board meeting with The Columbus Dispatch in Ohio on Thursday, echoed Bush's contention that the phrase referred to the carrier's crew completing their 10-month mission, not the military completing its mission in Iraq."

I don't which is more ridiculous--Rove sticking to the original bullshit explanation or Bush completely abandoning it and making the obvious explanation--which he could have so easily done during his speech on May 1, 2003--a year after the speech. Even so, notice that Bush perhaps did not change his position. On April 30, 2004, he did not say that the banner referred to the removal of Saddam, while on October 28, 2003, he specifically said the banner was for the crew of the Lincoln. Wow, and the Republicans complain about Kerry being nuanced and indecisive. C'mon, George. Find a spine and give us a straight answer.

Why the lack of an explanation is so bad and what that says about the Bush administration.

Multiple interpretations and speculation

The bottom line is that Bush did not provide any explanation in his speech as to the meaning of "Mission Accomplished." As I said earlier, allowing six months to pass without offering any kind of explanation allowed speculation--and criticism. One of the major problems with the banner is that, standing alone, it is open to several interpretations. Some of those interpretations were presented in Scott McClellan's press briefing on October 29, 2003. What I am about to do will be repitition and add to this already very long post, but it will be instructive. I have already reproduced some of McClennan's responses, but I did not reproduce the questions. Those questions present the reasonable interpretations of the "Mission Accomplished" banner, and McClellan's answers show more lack of a backbone.

Q: Are you denying now that the President had the distinct intention at the time of that speech that Americans would see that picture and think the mission in Iraq has been accomplished, the overall mission?
MR. McCLELLAN: What I'm saying is that this was about paying tribute to our sailors and aviators and naval officers on board the USS Lincoln. That's what this was about. Let's keep that in context. And the President was pleased to personally go on board the USS Lincoln and thank our men and women in the military for an outstanding job, for accomplishing their mission, and for -- when they were returning to the United States.
Q: The President did not want Americans to see "mission accomplished" and think, great, the war is over?
MR. McCLELLAN: The idea for the banner and the idea for the sign was suggested by those on board ship. And we were pleased to help them with that.
Q: And he never knew that would be the interpretation, that the mission -- his mission was accomplished?
MR. McCLELLAN: The mission for those people on board the ship was accomplished.
Q: But the President didn't know that this would be interpreted throughout the world that we had -- that the combat mission was over, basically?
MR. McCLELLAN: The major combat operations were over. That's what the President said in his remarks. But he also went on to say that there are difficulties that remain and dangers that continue to exist, and that it's important that we stay the course and finish our work and continue to work with the Iraqi people to help them realize a better future. And that's exactly what we are doing right now.

All of the preceding questions and responses show 1) reasonable interpretations of the "Mission Accomplished" banner; 2) that McClellan didn't have the cajones to address those interpretations, much less explain why they were incorrect; and 3) the White House allowed the speculation to continue because, as shown above, McClellan's explanation was crap.

Has "Mission Accomplished" been taken out of context? Maybe, but that is beside the point.

Now I know what some of you Republicans are thinking. These questions were not reasonable interpretations because Bush's speech shows them to be incorrect. After all, Bush said there was work to be done in Iraq. In other words, you Republicans want to argue that the banner was taken out of context, and that takes us back to John Kerry's "sensitive war on terror." Recall that way up at the beginning of this post I said that Kerry's comment was taken out of context. Ignored were his other comments--which were all strong--as to how he would fight the war on terror. Ignored were his words after "sensitive war on terror" which could easily be intepreted to mean that he would make an effort to get more cooperation from other countries. Consequently, "sensitive war on terror" was definitely taken out of context. Now recall that I said that was beside the point.

I said there were two points, the first one being that Kerry's comments could be interpreted as "sensitive war on terror," especially because Kerry did not explain what he meant. This same reasoning applies to the "Mission Accomplished" banner. Without any explanation, either on the banner or in Bush's speech, and with Bush's declaration that "In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed," it is reasonable to interpret the banner in the manner posed by the questions to McClellan. What absolutely boggles my mind is why Bush did nothing in his speech to explain what the banner meant. If the banner truly was meant to signify ONLY that the Lincoln had accomplished its mission, Bush could have said so in one simple sentence. If the banner was meant to signify the end of major combat operations, Bush could have said so in one simple sentence. If the banner was meant to signify the removal of Saddam, Bush could have said so in one simple sentence. If he had done that, no one would be talking about the damn banner. Instead, he did nothing, and as a result, as noted in this AP article, "The 'Mission Accomplished' boast has been mocked many times since Bush's carrier speech as criticism has mounted over the failed search for weapons of mass destruction and the continuing violence in Iraq."

The second point I made about Kerry's statements was that "Kerry should have been 'sensitive' enough to know that such wording was just asking for ridicule[.]" Stated differently, he should have known better. And Bush and his staff should have known better. They should have known that unless "Mission Accomplished" was explained in the speech, Bush would come under heavy criticism. They should have known that "Mission Accomplished" needed to be explained in the speech given that Bush did say that there was a lot of work left to do in Iraq and that the war on terror had not been won. They should have known that the banner above Bush would be the lasting impression from the event. Let's assume for the time being that they did not realize any of this. First of all, that would qualify all of them as certified morons. Secondly, they could have overcome their stupidity by giving a simple, rational, plausible explanation of the banner's meaning. Instead, they

first said that they had nothing to do with it and that it was all the Navy's idea;

then conceded that they made the sign;

then admitted that they put it up;

then admitted they "developed" the idea;

then--6 months after the speech--come up with the unmitigated bullshit that the banner and the event were a tribute to the crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln ONLY; and

then 6 months after that (one year after the speech) Bush said his speech stated that we'd accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein."

This is the best these guys can do? This is pathetic. It is bad enough that no explanation of the banner was given in Bush's speech. It is bad enough that it took six months to get any explanation. But it is damn near incomprehensible that the first explanation is one that was not only not supported but contradicted by Bush's speech. AND it is damn near incomprehensible that it took another six months before they came up with an explanation that was clearly supported by the speech--and even then did not say that was the meaning of the banner!

Maybe the White House did know better.

There is another way to look at this. It is possible that the White House did "know better," but decided to go ahead with the banner anyway. Look at the statements by Bush, McCelellan, Bartlett, etc. In the law, something is deemed to be unambiguous if there is one--and only one--reasonable interpretation. None of the administration statements can be said to be unambiguous. They are worded in such a way so that they 1) don't really pin down the administration to one position, and 2) permit the administration to justify multiple--and changing--positions. Bush's "explanation" on April 30, 2004, is a good example. Here is what he said:

A year ago, I did give the speech from the carrier, saying that we had achieved an important objective, that we'd accomplished a mission, which was the removal of Saddam Hussein.

On the one hand, he said "we'd accomplished a mission," which is pretty much the same as "mission accomplished," meaning further that Bush could be interpreted as saying that the "Mission Accomplished" banner referred to the removal of Saddam. However, if someone publicly questioned anyone in the administration about why the President had changed his position (as discussed above), they could say that on April 30, 2004, Bush said "accomplished a mission," not "mission accomplished," so therefore Bush was not talking about the banner. Such a position would be aided by the fact that, as pointed out earlier, Bush did not directly refer to the banner. Then again, if someone publicy points out to anyone in the administration that the explanation of the banner being just for the crew of the Lincoln is bullshit, they could say that on April 30, 2004, Bush, by using the phrase "we'd accomplished a mission" clearly meant that the meaning of the "Mission Accomplished" banner was the removal of Saddam. Some would call this clever. I call it dishonest, particularly since Republicans go on and on about what a straight shooter and strong leader George Bush is. I said it before, and I'll say it again: C'mon, George. Find a spine and give us a straight answer.

But back to the banner...I think it is likely that the White House intentionally left the banner ambiguous and intentionally chose not to provide any explanation in the speech. That way "Mission Accomplished" could mean whatever people wanted it to mean. Whatever would make people feel good, that's what the banner meant. Bush's speech was such that if anyone tried to say "Mission Accomplished" was an overstatement, he could say that he never said the whole mission was accomplished. At the same time, if by chance things in Iraq changed very quickly (WMD found, no more insurgency, etc.), then Bush could claim that even the most optimistic (or myopic) interpretation of "Mission Accomplished" was correct.

Recall the discussion of the Media Magicians and how the White House loves loves to put the central, "boiled down" message of Bush's speeches into visual backdrops. Given all of that, I think it is likely that the White House intentionally wanted the central message of the entire event to be "Mission Accomplished" even though they knew that could be very risky. In other words, the White House made a conscious decision to go before the American public and be intentionally vague. Now that's strong leadership, ain't it?

And another thing...the banner was so unnecessary.

Look once again at what John Kerry said. In describing how he would fight the war on terror, he said he would be "more effective, more thoughtful, more strategic," and "more proactive." He could have--and should have--stopped right there. He so did not need to then say "sensitive." That was completely unnecessary. And the same can be said about the "Mission Accomplished" banner. As I said, Bush's speech was pretty good. It described some success, paid tribute to those responsible for it, set out the difficult work that lay ahead, and expressed determination to get that work done. Had it not been for the banner, people would have probably paid more attention to the speech, and thus Bush might not have received all the criticism that has followed. Furthermore, if there had been no banner, the visual images people would be left with were the plane landing and Bush in the flight suit. Those were strong images, and for many people it showed Bush as a rugged, strong leader. I am among those that thought those images were ridiculous, but even I have to say that they were not really dishonest given that Bush was a pilot and is the commander in chief. Now think about the "Mission Accomplished" banner. As I have argued, there is a big dose of dishonesty regarding that banner, both at the event itself and in the months that followed. So instead of being satisfied with visual images of a rugged, strong leader and a good speech, the White House decided to go with the banner. I just do not understand. Before the event, the risks of the banner should have been obvious, and the effectiveness of the other images should have been obvious.

Conclusion

No matter how you look at it, "bannergate" reflects very badly on Bush and his staff. They look stupid, reckless, spineless, manipulative, clueless, or dishonest--or all of the above. If this was an isolated incident, it would be insignificant. However, it is far from isolated. It is typical. The Bush administration has consistently done things that are stupid. They have consistently ignored things that are obvious and should compel action the opposite of what they do. They have consistently been vague and dishonest.

Delays, delays (and I don't mean Tom)

Three days ago, I decided that I would revisit the whole "Mission Accomplished" banner on the USS Abraham Lincoln when Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq. I thought I could address that matter quickly. I should have known better. As with everything else I have researched since February 2003, there is so much more than appears on first glance. As a result, I am still not finished writing about the banner event (or bannergate as it has been labeled by others). I hope to be done tomorrow. I know the world can hardly wait... ;-)

The lasting image from George's Aircraft Carrier Carnival

Welcome to the show! Step right up ladies and gentlemen, boy and girls, and see the ____________________________.

Feel free to fill in the blank. Seriously. Creativity appreciated. Sarcasm adored.

Where this blog is going in regard to Iraq

I thought I would tell the oh so many readers of this blog what to expect in terms of posts on Iraq. In case you haven't noticed, I'm not too keen on the whole friggin' fiasco. This war was not only unnecessary, it was a damn bad idea. Even so, if Bush and his gang had done things right once the war got started, I might not have much to write about. However, the sad truth is that the Bush administration has screwed up just about everything. Seriously--pick any issue, and the facts, not any bullshit spin, will show that BushCo has done one boneheaded (and that's the nicest phrase I can use) thing after another. That's what I want to show. I'll never get to everything, and I might not do as good a job as many others in the blogosphere, but I'm going to give it a shot.

Many bloggers have covered many of these topics in great detail already, and some of these topics are old news. So why I am bothering? I want to make sure that the conduct of the Bush administration is not forgotten. I want people to have this information NOW as the election draws near.

For now I am going to stick with the planning for the post-war period. Actually, "post-war" is a misnomer, for the war is still ongoing. It is more accurate to call this period "occupation and reconstruction" and/or "post-end-of-major-combat-operations period." Part of what I will show is that practically every problem that has been encountered in this period was predicted or known ahead of the war. I will initially broach this topic by focusing on some truly astounding testimony before the war from Paul Wolfowitz.

Actually, the term "end of major combat operations" prompts me to address another subject which shows just how clueless the Bush administration is: the "Mission Accomplished" banner on display when Bush announced the end of major combat operations.

More on the principles in JP 5-00.1

As a lawyer, I am very used to dealing with lots of acronyms. I am also used to change, as laws and rules are constantly changing. I am also used to going down long and intricate information trails. In spite of all my experience, dealing with the morass of information from DoD and the military in general gives me a severe case of tired head.

For instance, there is something called "Stability and Support Operations" or SASO. Here's an example of this alphabet soup process:

First it was SMALL WARS, then it became LOW INTENSTIY CONFLICT or LIGHT INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC). Then the Army moved to OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW). The JOINT community agreed upon MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW) which is the term currently in use. With the redesigning of Army doctrine still being revised under the new FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, new terms and concepts are also being revised and developed. The term STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO) covers two separate and distinct types of missions.

Now that I'm done griping, I'll get to the point. According to the document linked above, "Stability and Support Operations" sounds like what is and/or should be going on in Iraq. However, JP 5-00.1 does not contain the phrase "Support and Stability Operations." This fact raises a question as to the applicability of JP 5-00.1 to an analysis of the planning for post-war Iraq.

I found a recent draft of a working paper, that while not using the term "Stability and Support Operations," nonetheless addresses the same types of operations and utilizes some of what I consider to be the key principles of JP 5-00.1. I summarized these principles as follows:

Military planning must meet the strategic/political goals. Indeed, the strategic/political objectives must dominate in the planning process. The desired end state and the conditions for conflict termination have to be part of the campaign plan. Campaign planning must also address the post conflict situation, including security and restoration of basic services (like electricity and water). These factors must be considered and addressed from the very beginning of the planning process.

The working paper is entitled "Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.06." So, the title does not contain "SASO," but, interestingly enough, the page which contains the link to the working paper identifies it as "Draft-Stability Operations." See why I have tired head? Anyway, the draft working paper was published on June 8, 2004, and the Executive Summary contains the following:

Winning in war consists of securing the desired political aims. To achieve these aims requires both winning in conventional combat operations as well as imposing the security required to facilitate the transition to and reconstruction of a “new” normal once major conventional combat operations cease. The joint force will conduct security, transition, and reconstruction operations in all phases of major conventional combat operations: pre-crisis, during major conventional combat operations, and postwar. The overall purpose of these operations is to achieve the strategic national, or coalition, goals.

In the post-conflict period, security, transition, and reconstruction operations include both security operations and civil-military operations in support of civilian agencies and organizations to complete the achievement of wartime political objectives.

(emphasis added). That certainly sounds like jp 5-00.1's emphasis on the strategic/political objectives. The draft working paper has plenty more that reflects JP 5-00.1:

Successful Case 2 security, transition, and reconstruction operations are inextricably linked to planning and executing war. If combat is required, security, transition, and reconstruction operations will form an essential part of pre-combat activities, combat operations, and post-combat actions.

The civil-military plans for security, transition, and reconstruction operations must be nested in all operational planning then refined and rehearsed in pre-operational wargames and exercises. Planning and rehearsal—with all elements expected to execute the operations, military as well as multiagency—form the foundation of success in execution.

Transition to legitimate civil authority, not actions on the military objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. Before the initiation of combat, the consequences of military action on post-hostility recovery must be considered. Backward planning looks beyond combat operations to encompass consolidation and transition considerations. Combat operations are subordinate to, and are a subset of, a strategic shaping campaign that addresses the nation’s, or coalition’s, ultimate strategic objectives.

Successful security, transition, and reconstruction operations must be inextricably linked to planning, preparing and executing war.

(emphasis added). On the one hand, this draft working paper has no relevance in analyzing the planning for post-war Iraq, for it was written long after the end of major combat operations. On the other hand, this draft working paper dispels any notion that perhaps the principles in JP 5-00.1 were somehow changed between the time of its publication (January 25, 2002) and the start of the war.

A note on the applicability of JP 5-00.1

The website for the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a page which deals with the status of publications. One of the links on that page is to a July 23, 2004, Joint Publication Status Report. The last page of that report shows a notation for JP 5-00.1 of "Cancel upon approval of 5-0." So what does this mean? The previous page of the report and this page show that JP 5-0 1) was originally published on April 13, 1995; 2) is currently under revision; 3) has been through drafts on June 1, 2001, August 24, 2001, and December 2002; and 4) is targeted for approval in October of this year.

My interpretation of this information is that JP 5-00.1 was indeed the publication applicable to the campaign planning for Iraq. My guess is that the final version of JP 5-0 will have some changes from JP 5-00.1, but that does not change my conclusion that JP 5-00.1 presents the doctrine relevant to the Iraq war, and that means I stand by my conclusion that the two people responsible for the planning for post-war Iraq are George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld.

Official campaign planning doctrine and the post-war period

I concluded the previous post by saying that official campaign planning doctrine placed the responsibility for post-war planning on George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, and that official doctrine is found in...

Joint Publication 5-00.1; Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning

Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning was published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 25, 2002. This section is going to include lots of excerpts from the publication. The excerpts will be in block quote format, and the bold type is in the original. Any italics will be added by me. All excerpts printed here will appear in the order in which they come in the original publication.

Preface (p. i)

I begin the excerpts with the entire preface (with emphasis added):

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidance and principles governing the planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint force levels. It focuses on the methodology for translating national and theater strategy into planning actions required to design and synchronize a campaign plan. It describes joint campaign planning across the full range of military operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It discusses campaign planning within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and guides planners to necessary planning references.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN P. ABIZAID

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff

From the preface, it is clear that Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning was supposed to be the template for all planning for the Iraq war, and, as will be shown, that includes the planning for the post-war period as well. Some might argue that the last half of 3.b precludes the primacy of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning for Iraq. I have two responses. First, there is no question that the US was in charge of the “coalition.” Anyone who thinks otherwise–and thinks that US doctrine and policy were going to be compromised--needs a serious reality check. Should anyone doubt this, consider what Tommy Franks wrote on p. 352 of his book regarding the late December 2001 briefing he gave the President and others: "Regarding the end of the briefing, I outlined the three options I'd first presented to Rumsfeld a few weeks earlier--the ROBUST, REDUCED, and UNILATERAL OPTIONS--and the implications of each. 'Even in the Unliateral Option,' I explained, 'the Brits and Australians would be with us.'" (emphasis added). Who were the two countries who provided the significant amounts of troops? Here's a hint: the answer is not Spain and Poland. The answer is Britain and Australia. The point is that Franks considered having Britain and Australia as part of a coalition to still be a "Unilateral Option." This indicates that the US never really considered ceded any amount of control over an invasion of Iraq. Had the UN or NATO had forces in the war, the last half of 3.b would have been relevant. However, Bush and Rumsfeld expressly rejected any participation by NATO, and the UN was in no way involved. The second response is that the US has also been in complete control of the occupation and reconstruction effort. I must concede that I do not know if any “multinational doctrine and procedures” were utilized in Iraq, but my guess, based on the conduct of the Bush administration both before and after the war, is that this was totally an American show.

In any event, my analysis is based on the applicability and primacy of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. With this in mind, let’s take a closer look at this official doctrine.

Excerpts from the Executive Summary (pp. vii-xiii)

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Military campaigns are not conducted in isolation of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power— diplomatic, economic, and informational — to achieve strategic objectives.

Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Combatant commanders and other JFCs may develop campaign plans for peacetime, conflict, or war.

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic aims or objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is commonly referred to as the desired “end state.” The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action; they should address both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. Although it has often been the case in past military operations other than war (MOOTW) situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well.

Take a good look at these excerpts, for they are a summary of the key concepts discussed below. One definitional note: “NCA” stands for National Command Authorities. The definition of that term soon follows--once we get into the details of campaign planning in the next section.

Chapter II: Campaign Plan Design (pp. II-1 -II-20)

The key elements of operational design are: (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objectives(s)); (2) identifying the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic COGs (Centers of Gravity), and weaknesses); and (3) developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s). (p. II-1)

Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning next addresses Strategic Guidance.

In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory,” or success (ends), describe the method of employing military force (ways), and allocate adequate forces and assets (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The NCA or the combatant commander promulgate strategic guidance (see Figure II-1). (p. II-1)

The definition of “National Command Authorities” (NCA) is “The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.” Thus, we see that the President and the Secretary of Defense are responsible for “strategic guidance.” Moreover, even though the last excerpt quoted above also says the combatant commander (who is military) also promulgates strategic guidance, the remainder of Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning makes it clear that it is the civilians who really call the shots in this regard.

For instance, Figure II-1 contains the following sentence: "Before forces are committed, the combatant commander must know how the National Command Authorities intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that stategic design at the operational level." (p. II-2)

The next excerpt from Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning at first seems to place primacy on the military aspects, but then shows a different priority.

Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. (p. II-2)

The fact that the military objectives are just part of the national objectives provides a further indication that the political objectives determine the military objectives. Further indication is seen in the next excerpt:

This focus on the military strategic objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the stakes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the opponent in order to arrive at reasonably attainable national military objectives. The strategic guidance must establish whether the combatant commander is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective. This distinction is absolutely essential to ensure the right match between political and military objectives. (p. II-2)

This excerpt seems to indicate that “strategic objective” = “political objective,” which again indicates that the military plan must serve the political plan and that the civilians determine the political plan.

The next concept is Desired End State:

The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is the desired “end state.” A strategic end state simply means the required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. Normally this constitutes crisis resolution and the disengagement of the military instrument of national power from the contingency. The NCA should clearly describe the desired end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an action. The desired end state should include both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. The desired end state is usually determined at the national-strategic level, preferably with input from the supported combatant commander. Although the combatant commander could define the end state, it would have to be formally approved by the NCA. (p. II-3)

This excerpt shows again the primacy of the civilians (the NCA) in the campaign planning process, but there is another highly significant point established, namely that the campaign plan needs to address desired objectives after the military action has ceased.

The next excerpt is particularly applicable to the Iraq plan given that the operation involved a “coalition” of nations other than the U.S.

It is especially important in multinational situations, therefore, that the combatant commander and planners clearly understand the conditions that the country’s (and/or alliance or coalition) political leadership wants the military instrument to establish in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, geopolitics, and so forth. When objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the combatant commander or subordinate JFC must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the NCA. (p. II-3)

The first sentence establishes that the military planners very much need to know the geopolitical goals of the overall operation, as well as the objectives regarding internal power and security within the theater of operations and that such goals and objectives must come from the political--not military--leadership. In other words, the civilians set these goals which must then be addressed by the military planners. The second sentence shows that the military planners are subordinate to the civilian authorities in that it establishes that the military personnel MUST seek clarification from the civilians (the NCA).

The “desired end state” can also involve what is known as a Military Operation Other Than War, or MOOTW for short.

Although it has often been the case in past MOOTW situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well. In that event, the combatant commander and planners will have to solicit additional guidance from the NCA and through the interagency process to ensure that the intent is clear and an end state is clearly defined. And while there may not be an armed adversary to confront in a MOOTW situation, the combatant commander still has to think in terms of causes and effects that will lead to success. Examples of a military condition that would have to be achieved to support the strategic end state might be something like “restoration of basic services;” “formation of a professional anti-drug force;” or “mitigation of the consequences of a nuclear accident.” While these examples are probably more typical of a major operation with joint forces in a supporting role, they serve to illustrate the link between military and strategic objectives. (p. II-4)

Although all of these principles are applicable to the Iraq plan and circumstances, I want to emphasize that they hold that a campaign plan has to include MOOTW and that “restoration of basic services” is expressly stated as an example of something that needs to be done to reach the desired end state.

Defining the end state — which may change as the operation progresses—and ensuring that it supports the achievement of national objectives are critical early steps in the operational design process. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing the strategic objective(s), clearly defining the end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign. (p. II-4)

The use of the term “national objectives” seems to me to emphasize the political goals of a campaign.

Conflict termination is another term explained in Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.

Just as the combatant commander must clearly understand the desired end state, so too must the termination criteria for the campaign be understood. If the NCA do not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the combatant commander should request further guidance or clarification, as appropriate. The decision as to when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate combat operations is a political decision. (p. II-4)

Once again, here are statements showing that the military planners must have primary guidance from the civilian authorities and that key decisions are to be made by the civilians, not the military.

Campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves. To maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-military end state; i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of combat operations. (p. II-4)

This requirement is important because of the bold face sentence. The reason that sentence is important in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom is seen in the italicized portions of the next excerpt.

When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to postconflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Planners must also anticipate the nature of postconflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to MOOTW; for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones. (pp. II-4-5)

The coalition efforts regarding force protection and postconflict operations have been less than stellar. Why that shows poor planning is that those responsible for the Iraq plan had ample information on what was needed in these areas. These are issues to address in future posts.

In formulating the theater campaign plan, the combatant commander and staff should ensure the following:

•• Conflict termination is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.

•• Emphasizing backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.

•• Defining the conditions of the termination phase. The military objectives must support the political aims[.]

•• Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems. (p. II-5)

In other words, campaign planning must include planning for the post-war operations and the transition thereto, and consideration of those operations (such as restoring basic services, humanitarian aid, etc.) must be done on the front end, that is well before hostilities begin. And, once again, we have a statement that the military aspect of the plan must support the political objectives (that is, the objectives determined by the civilian authorities).

The next concept is Military Conditions.

Strategic (political) objectives describe in broad terms where the United States wants to go. Military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. (p. II-5)

This shows that 1) “strategic objective” = “political objective,” and 2) the political objectives take priority over the military objectives.

However, it is increasingly common that military operations are so closely integrated with other government activities that these nonmilitary actions have to be considered an integral part of the campaign. (p. II-6)

This statement in part reiterates the message of the last group of excerpts under Conflict Termination, but it also establishes another key point regarding the plan for Iraq. Nonmilitary and other government activities have to be factored into and integrated in the campaign plan.

And then Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning gives a summary of the overall Operational Concept:

Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross purposes. (p. II-11)

This excerpt should eliminate any doubt that the political goals must be given priority over the military goals. At another time, there might a discussion of the last sentence...

Corroboration from another publication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In order to conclusively remove any doubt about the political (civilian) goals having priority over the military goals, one only needs to check out another publication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1, November 14, 2000. JP 1 states the following:

National political objectives guide military action. This includes establishment of supporting military objectives, development of strategies and plans to achieve the objectives, conduct of operations, and definition of criteria for cessation of operations. These national objectives also influence requirements for military operations and support to achieve the desired end state and maintain it in the theater following cessation of operations.

Military plans and operations serve to support the attainment of the overarching political objectives that give rise to military involvement. Therefore, military plans and operations must focus both on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. (p. II-5)

Conclusion

Military planning must meet the strategic/political goals. Indeed, the strategic/political objectives must dominate in the planning process. The desired end state and the conditions for conflict termination have to be part of the campaign plan. Campaign planning must also address the post conflict situation, including security and restoration of basic services (like electricity and water). These factors must be considered and addressed from the very beginning of the planning process. And who is responsible for determining and defining these matters? Well, here's a hint: it ain't the military personnel. Official doctrine expressly says that the people responsible for these matters are the National Command Authorities--the President and Secretary of Defense. That means that in terms of the Iraq war, the people responsible for these matters were George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld. Should Tommy Franks be held responsible to some degree for the poor planning for the post-war period, as argued by Phillip Carter? Perhaps, but my point is that the primary and ultimate responsibility for that planning rests with Bush and Rumsfeld.

With that in mind, review the previous post, look closely at what Franks says in his book, and then decide whether there was adequate planning. If your answer is "no," at least now you have some information to help determine who is at fault. There are plenty of other facts that show that Bush and Rumsfeld really screwed the pooch on this (check out "Blind Into Baghdad" by James Fallows for many of the details), but that discussion will have to wait.