More on the principles in JP 5-00.1

As a lawyer, I am very used to dealing with lots of acronyms. I am also used to change, as laws and rules are constantly changing. I am also used to going down long and intricate information trails. In spite of all my experience, dealing with the morass of information from DoD and the military in general gives me a severe case of tired head.

For instance, there is something called "Stability and Support Operations" or SASO. Here's an example of this alphabet soup process:

First it was SMALL WARS, then it became LOW INTENSTIY CONFLICT or LIGHT INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC). Then the Army moved to OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW). The JOINT community agreed upon MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW) which is the term currently in use. With the redesigning of Army doctrine still being revised under the new FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, new terms and concepts are also being revised and developed. The term STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO) covers two separate and distinct types of missions.

Now that I'm done griping, I'll get to the point. According to the document linked above, "Stability and Support Operations" sounds like what is and/or should be going on in Iraq. However, JP 5-00.1 does not contain the phrase "Support and Stability Operations." This fact raises a question as to the applicability of JP 5-00.1 to an analysis of the planning for post-war Iraq.

I found a recent draft of a working paper, that while not using the term "Stability and Support Operations," nonetheless addresses the same types of operations and utilizes some of what I consider to be the key principles of JP 5-00.1. I summarized these principles as follows:

Military planning must meet the strategic/political goals. Indeed, the strategic/political objectives must dominate in the planning process. The desired end state and the conditions for conflict termination have to be part of the campaign plan. Campaign planning must also address the post conflict situation, including security and restoration of basic services (like electricity and water). These factors must be considered and addressed from the very beginning of the planning process.

The working paper is entitled "Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.06." So, the title does not contain "SASO," but, interestingly enough, the page which contains the link to the working paper identifies it as "Draft-Stability Operations." See why I have tired head? Anyway, the draft working paper was published on June 8, 2004, and the Executive Summary contains the following:

Winning in war consists of securing the desired political aims. To achieve these aims requires both winning in conventional combat operations as well as imposing the security required to facilitate the transition to and reconstruction of a “new” normal once major conventional combat operations cease. The joint force will conduct security, transition, and reconstruction operations in all phases of major conventional combat operations: pre-crisis, during major conventional combat operations, and postwar. The overall purpose of these operations is to achieve the strategic national, or coalition, goals.

In the post-conflict period, security, transition, and reconstruction operations include both security operations and civil-military operations in support of civilian agencies and organizations to complete the achievement of wartime political objectives.

(emphasis added). That certainly sounds like jp 5-00.1's emphasis on the strategic/political objectives. The draft working paper has plenty more that reflects JP 5-00.1:

Successful Case 2 security, transition, and reconstruction operations are inextricably linked to planning and executing war. If combat is required, security, transition, and reconstruction operations will form an essential part of pre-combat activities, combat operations, and post-combat actions.

The civil-military plans for security, transition, and reconstruction operations must be nested in all operational planning then refined and rehearsed in pre-operational wargames and exercises. Planning and rehearsal—with all elements expected to execute the operations, military as well as multiagency—form the foundation of success in execution.

Transition to legitimate civil authority, not actions on the military objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. Before the initiation of combat, the consequences of military action on post-hostility recovery must be considered. Backward planning looks beyond combat operations to encompass consolidation and transition considerations. Combat operations are subordinate to, and are a subset of, a strategic shaping campaign that addresses the nation’s, or coalition’s, ultimate strategic objectives.

Successful security, transition, and reconstruction operations must be inextricably linked to planning, preparing and executing war.

(emphasis added). On the one hand, this draft working paper has no relevance in analyzing the planning for post-war Iraq, for it was written long after the end of major combat operations. On the other hand, this draft working paper dispels any notion that perhaps the principles in JP 5-00.1 were somehow changed between the time of its publication (January 25, 2002) and the start of the war.