Yet more pre-war evidence about post-war Iraq that was disregarded.

This matter went largely unnoticed late last week, but it sure caught my eye. On November 4, 2006, the AP published a report that opened with the following:

A series of secret U.S. war games in 1999 showed that an invasion and post-war administration of Iraq would require 400,000 troops, nearly three times the number there now.

And even then, the games showed, the country still had a chance of dissolving into chaos.

In the simulation, called Desert Crossing, 70 military, diplomatic and intelligence participants concluded the high troop levels would be needed to keep order, seal borders and take care of other security needs.

(emphasis added). This is pretty much what the Retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz was all about. But what is shocking to me is that as early as 1999, our military knew that a post-war Iraq would require massive amounts of troops AND that in any event the place could turn into a cluster-f#@!. To that end, here is a great quote from the article:

"The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough troops," said Thomas Blanton, the archive's director. "But the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground."

And that is one of the primary reasons why the war was a bad idea, and why the grotesque lack of planning for the post-war period was and is inexcusable and unforgiveable. And, once again, the blame for that lies with the Bush administration in general and Bush and Rumskull in particular.

The AP article also includes a summary of the lessons taught and completely ignored by the Bush administration:

The war games looked at "worst case" and "most likely" scenarios after a war that removed then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power. Some of the conclusions are similar to what actually occurred after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003:

• "A change in regimes does not guarantee stability," the 1999 seminar briefings said. "A number of factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability."
• "Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the replacement regime could be problematic -- especially if perceived as weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments."
• "Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq," the briefings read. "The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad."
• "The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development."
• "Also, some participants believe that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install and sustain a democratic government."
• "A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners."

(emphasis added). Then again, there never was a true international coalition, was there?

Almost four years before the war, our own military had produced evidence and predictions that turned out to be accurate. And yet, Bush and the rest of the neocon morons in charge disregarded this information because it did not match their predetermined view. Instead, they went with the faulty, twisted, and often downright wrong "intelligence" from charlatans like Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress.