I've said it before, and I'll keep saying it: Bush and Rumskull are to blame.

I have made the argument time and again that the two people primarily responsible for the absolute mess that Iraq has become since the end of major combat operations (when Bush declared "Mission Accomplished") are Rumskull and Bush his ownself because those two boneheads were--by the express terms of official campaign planning doctrine--the two people primarily and ultimately responsible for all campaign planning, including the post-war phase. If you want to read the details, go to the Cosmic Wheel Index, scroll down to main heading "Iraq," sub-heading "Planning for the post-war period," and check out the first five links.

I have also argued that the Iraq war was a bad idea right from the start, most recently in the multi-part "Retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz." [Links are under main heading of "Iraq," sub-heading "Bad idea" in the Cosmic Wheel Index.]

Yesterday, Michael Gordon was interviewed on NPR's "Fresh Air," and he provided a concise explanation supporting both of the arguments mentioned above. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for the New York Times and co-author of Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.

The last topic discussed in the interview was Rumskull and his efforts to implement "transformation" of the the military. In short, "transformation" is a policy intended to make the military smaller, more mobile, more flexible, and more efficient. The subject of transformation (also known as "revolution in military affairs" or RMA) is worthy of several books, but here some of the policy's basic characteristics: 1) greater emphasis on and use of high-tech weapons and reconnaissance systems, 2) greater emphasis on and use of special forces, and 3) the removal of bureaucratic and instituional barriers so that all branches of the military can operate in cooperation. As a general concept, I think transformation is a good idea. However, it has its limitations, particularly in relation to Iraq.

Gordon explained these limitations and how Rumskull's and Bush's obstinance made Iraq into a mess:

I mean, getting the services to work together better–what they call “jointness”–I mean that certainly is a good thing, and taking advantage of high-technology weapons and precision weapons and reconnaissance systems that’s good, if you want to be effective. But, you know, the problem was President Bush and Don Rumsfeld were so wedded to this vision of what the military ought to look like in the future that it really led them astray in Iraq. And in fact it is one reason why we have this mess in Iraq, because a force of leaner and meaner, that’s great when the goal is to get to Baghdad quickly, and the precision weapons come in very handy when you’re trying to destroy the Republican Guard, but once you topple the regime, mass has to substitute for speed. And it doesn’t matter whether you got to Baghdad in two weeks, three weeks, or four weeks. Once that regime is toppled, you have effectively taken ownership of that country, and in order to secure that country you just need lots of troops to do that. It’s a very labor-intensive task. Precision weapons can’t compensate for that. The reconnaissance systems can’t compensate for that. All the whiz-bang gadgetry won’t do the job. You need folks to close the borders and seal them so the jihadists don’t get in. You need to provide security in Iraqi capitals so that the people feel they can walk on the street without being molested by criminals and they look on the occupiers at least as a competent force that can protect them. You need to provide enough security that different sects don’t have to create their own militias. Why did the Shiites begin to form Shiite militias? Because they’re being attacked by Sunni insurgents, and we didn’t have enough forces to stop that. It doesn’t fit nicely with Rumsfeld’s vision of a transformed military that’s smaller and relies more on technology.

(emphasis added). These matters are plain common sense, straight from the Department of the Bloody Obvious, and yet Bush and Rumskull either could not or would not acknowledge and accept them. But why???

Before answering that question, I will point out that Gordon's statements show just some of the major challenges an Iraq war presented, and the magnitude of those challenges is a partial explanation of why the Iraq war was a bad idea from the outset.

Part of the answer to the question lies in what Gordon said before making the above-quoted statements:

One thing I would say is that Rumsfeld’s vision of what the American military ought to look like was not Rumsfeld’s alone. It was also President Bush’s vision. People forget that as a candidate, Bush campaigned on a platform that he was going to bring transformation to the American military–essentially create a leaner and more lethal military. And he gave a famous speech–at least famous to people in defense circles, maybe nowhere else–at the Citadel in 1999, where he laid out this vision and in fact he said “I’m going to appoint a strong Defense Secretary to carry this out because I know it’s going to involve changing a lot of the bureaucracy and culture of the Pentagon.” So the President himself chartered this course.

(emphasis added). We have learned that ol' George is "the Decider," and we also have learned that he almost never admits any mistakes. And we also know that Bush went into office with the intention of transforming the military. And, despite what he has said in recent weeks, Bush is all about "staying the course" in general. As I have written before (here and here), the Bush administration places image and loyalty to the administration above everything else. And it appears that the combination of the Iraq war and the policy of transformation of the military is yet another example of this.

Of course, the Iraq war was preceded by invading Afghanistan, which was the first test of the proposed transformation. Precision weapons and special forces were highly successful in overthrowing the Taliban, and that success meant that Rumskull could really cram transformation down everyone's throats when Iraq rolled around. However, note that the same limitations described by Gordon apply equally to Afghanistan, where things have never been fully settled and the Taliban is once again on the rise. But I digress...

Last spring when retired generals started harshly criticizing Rumskull, I had a few things to say, and in one of those posts I cited a Knight-Ridder article which said the following:

Bush, Rumsfeld and other top officials insist that their military commanders were given everything they requested, and Franks wrote in his book, "American Soldier," that Rumsfeld supported his war plan. Technically, that's accurate. However, three top officials who served with Franks at the time said the plan was the product of a lengthy and sometimes heated negotiation between the Central Command and the Pentagon, in which Rumsfeld constantly pressed Franks and other senior officers to commit fewer troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

*******

Central Command originally proposed a force of 380,000 to attack and occupy Iraq. Rumsfeld's opening bid was about 40,000, "a division-plus," said three senior military officials who participated in the discussions. Bush and his top advisers finally approved the 250,000 troops the commanders requested to launch the invasion. But the additional troops that the military wanted to secure Iraq after Saddam's regime fell were either delayed or never sent.

And I repeat what I said regarding this information:

So, the military commanders wanted many more troops, and Rumskull--the civilian leader with no experience at planning a war and occupation--made the commanders change those plans. As a result, we did not have enough troops in Iraq to control the place after Saddam was defeated.

And Rumskull's brilliant decisions continued once the war started. As explained in this New York Times article (cited in Disagreements among military commanders over the war resurface),

Even before the war, Mr. Rumsfeld saw the deployment of United States forces more in terms of what was needed to win the war than to secure the peace.

With the tide in the United States' favor, he began to raise the issue of canceling the deployment of the First Cavalry Division - some 16,000 soldiers. General Franks eventually went along. Though the general insisted he was not pressured to agree, he later acknowledged that the defense secretary had put the issue on the table. "Don Rumsfeld did in fact make the decision to off-ramp the First Cavalry Division," General Franks said in an earlier interview with The New York Times.

*******

Three years later, with thousands of lives lost in the tumult of Iraq, senior officers say that canceling the division was a mistake, one that reduced the number of American forces just as the Fedayeen, former soldiers and Arab jihadists were beginning to organize in what would become an insurgency.

(emphasis added). It was a bad decision, and it seems to me that the decision was based not on any kind of strategic basis, but rather out of obstinance (a determination to prove that "transformation" was the way to go) and arrogance (it worked in Afghanistan, so there was no need to question using it in a completely different combat theater).

So, what we had was President who had predetermined that "transformation" was going to be implemented, a Secretary of Defense brought in specifically to implement that policy, and (in my opinion) a war that these two boneheads saw as the perfect opportunity to prove (note that I did not say "test") the policy. Now add to that an administration that was and still is loathe to admit any kind of mistakes, was and still is obsessed with image rather than substance, and values loyalty above all else (except image), and we had ourselves a recipe for a cluster f#@k of epic proportions--which is exactly what we got.

Bush is the Commander in Chief and in charge of foreign policy. Rumskull, as Secretary of Defense, was second in command of the military. Bush was responsible for giving Rumskull that job and keeping him in that job--even as the number of failed predictions, incorrect statements, and bad decisions grew. Together, they were ultimately responsible for shaping what the military was and how it was used. Under official campaign planning policy, Bush and Rumskull had the ultimate responsibility for all phases of the planning for Iraq. And that is why they are the ones to blame.