A night of master deba...

I had a prexisting commitment in Dallas Thursday night, so I was unable to watch the first Dem debate. Then again, even if I had been home Thursday night, I would not have watched the debate. I generally don't think these "debates" serve much purpose, but definitely not this far out from the primary season. As I was driving home that night, I heard a few news reports about the debate, and I was so glad I did not even have the choice of watching it.

My views on "debates" in general and especially this one were stated so wonderfully in this post by Kevin Drum:

I've got a deal to propose. Here it is: Debate moderators agree to stop asking moronic questions and presidential candidates agree to actually answer the questions they do ask. Wouldn't that be great?

Even more from Phillip Carter on the surge (discussing current strategy)

I just read this post over at Intel Dump, and I think this is a must read for everyone. And make sure to read the comments. The first comment from J.D. Henderson is particularly poignant.

More from Phillip Carter on the surge, a/k/a "Plan FUBAR"

After finishing the previous post, I surfed over to Intel Dump and found a link to an April 18, 2007, column by Phillip Carter. Entitled "Plan FUBAR," the column makes a good companion read to "The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq."

Carter's column in part discusses the surge, noting that some have called it "Plan A" and any other option as "Plan B." Carter takes exception to such labels and then proceeds to list what he thinks was Plan A, then Plan B, then Plan C, and so on until he gets to the surge, which he feels is "Plan F," or "Plan FUBAR." The whole column is worth a read, but the last three paragraphs strike a tone and conclusion similar to what Craig Trebilcock wrote in "The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq."

To sum up, it's more than a bit disingenuous to cast today's debate as one of Plan A versus Plan B. In fact, we've seen at least five major strategies implemented in Iraq, and all have failed, creating a legacy of bad blood that undermines our continuing efforts. Much of this failure owes to the naive belief that we can impose our will on the Iraqi people through our strategies, or win their support with a combination of security and reconstruction.

Gen. Petraeus and his brain trust have devised the best possible Plan F, given the resources available to the Pentagon and declining patience for the war at home. But the Achilles heel of this latest effort is the Maliki government. It is becoming increasingly clear to all in Baghdad that its interests—seeking power and treasure for its Shiite backers—diverge sharply from those of the U.S.-led coalition. Even if Gen. Petraeus' plan succeeds on the streets of the city, it will fail in the gilded palaces of the Green Zone. Maliki and his supporters desire no rapprochement with the Sunnis and no meaningful power-sharing arrangement with the Sunnis and the Kurds. Indeed, Maliki can barely hold his own governing coalition together, as evidenced by the Sadr bloc's resignation from the government this week and the fighting in Basra over oil and power.

Plan F will fail if (or when) the Maliki government fails, even if it improves security. At that point, we will have run out of options, having tried every conceivable strategy for Iraq. It will then be time for Plan G: Get out.

(emphasis added). And by the way, for those of you who do not know, Carter served in Iraq, specifically in Diyala province. You can read about his opinion of the surge when it was announced at this link.

More proof of the Bush administration's stupidity regarding Iraq (or more proof of what was ignored and disregarded)

Overview

On October 25, 2006, I published Part 6 of a retrospective series on why 1) the Iraq war was a bad idea, and 2) Jonah Goldberg is a putz. That post was based in large part on a post I published on September 30, 2004, Wolfowitz's Reason 3 why Shinseki was wrong. The primary point of those posts was to show that "Only someone who is a moron or delusional would not have foreseen what a mess Iraq would become after Saddam was gone."

I discussed many different reasons why Iraq was likely to become a complete cluster f#@!, but I want to reiterate a few of them because now a soldier who served in Iraq has corroborated those reasons. What is even scarier is that those reasons have not only become reality, they have largely spun out of control.

The previously discussed reasons I reiterate now concern the tribal and clan aspects of Iraqi culture. Here's some of what I wrote on October 26, 2006 (which in part quoted what I wrote on September 30, 2004):

"Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath," an October 1, 2002, report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), provided a good general statement of what was known before the war about how post-war Iraq might be.

Indeed, many tensions between opposition groups derive from deeper fault-lines that pre-date Saddam Hussein and are likely to survive him. These divides are principally along religious, ethnic and tribal lines...

*******

For anyone thinking that the ICG must be some sort of crazy leftist group, perhaps this excerpt from a December 11, 2002, artice from the Wall Street Journal will be more credible:

If a U.S.-led force succeeds in ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the victors would inherit a traumatized society full of festering conflicts that didn't start with him and wouldn't suddenly fade with his departure...

*******

tribal allegiances were and are very strong in Iraq. As the December 11, 2202, WSJ article put it,

Another potential powder keg: As civil order unravels, many Iraqis are likely to retreat into the protection of tribal clans. These play a major role in Iraqi society, and their intensely protective tribal codes could bring quick violent retribution for threats or injury to their members.

The October 1, 2002, ICG report explained that "Tribal identities have largely survived modernisation and the growing role of the central state and remain important social and political units in Iraq," and "The tribal ethos...currently is the principal dispenser of people’s identity, of regulation, and of authority." Why does this matter? Well, among other reasons, the Iraqi tribal system was "replete with shifts in allegiances, betrayals, conditional alliances and, above all, men in arms[.]"

The corroboration is an article published in the February 2007 edition of ARMY Magazine. Entitled "The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq," the article explains in detail the impact of 1) tribal and clan society, and 2) our failure to take it into account.

The second paragraph of the article provides a good summation:

There is bipartisan and military recognition that the security atmosphere in Iraq is degrading. Insurgent and criminal violence is on the increase. And yet, continuing the same policies of the past four years, except with a larger force package (a “surge,” as it is popularly described), is the primary course of action being floated by the civilian leadership. Clinging to the belief that more military force is the answer to Iraq’s internal political struggles, despite four years of that policy gradually failing, reveals a fundamental weakness in this administration’s understanding of Iraqi political and cultural priorities.

Background on the author

The author of the article is Lt. Col. Craig Trebilcock, who is in the Army Reserve, a JAG officer (meaning he is a lawyer), and an Iraq veteran. He served in Iraq in the first year of the war. As described in the article,

During a one-year deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Lt. Col. Craig T. Trebilcock was in daily contact with pro-Coalition Iraqi officials, uncooperative Baathist officials, Coalition Provisional Authority bureaucrats and, most importantly, the average Iraqi in the street. His mission to coordinate reconstruction of Iraqi legal institutions required him to lead convoys throughout southern Iraq six days of the week and then travel to Baghdad to report developments to the relatively isolated policymakers in the Green Zone on the seventh. This experience provided him with a unique vantage point from which to observe Iraqi culture and politics. It led him to further deduce that policymakers from Washington, during their short Green Zone tours, had little sense of Iraqi culture and priorities, nor did they significantly consider how such factors might impede the success of their plans.

Now I know what some of you are thinking--It has been three years since Trebilcock was in Iraq, so how can his article be valid? He addressed that question in a response to a letter to the ARMY Magazine:

I have not been in a box since 2003-04, and there was no intent to compare the current Iraqi police forces and the IFF in my article. The IFF reference was simply to show that looking out for one's own best interest is much more of a cultural value in Iraq than is sacrifice for the greater good of the nation...This information comes from civil affairs personnel I remain in regular contact with who are still in Baghdad.

And should anyone think that Trebilcock is or was against the Iraq war, an editorial he wrote in October 2003 should dispel any such notion. With this in mind, let's take a look at Trebilcock's "seven pillars."

The "modern seven pillars" of Iraqi culture and society

Based on his experience, Trebilcock describes seven fundamental aspects of Iraqi society which he says must be the basis of American policy in the country.

1—Iraqi society is based upon a strict patriarchal hierarchy under which a sheikh has absolute power over his tribe. The concept of civil government centralized at the provincial and national level is still relatively new (only a few decades old) to the Iraqis, whose social structure remains tribal. As such, the Western concept of democracy and the value of sharing power is an alien concept within their society. It is only important to Iraqi officials while the U.S. officials coordinating reconstruction efforts are in the room dispensing benefits.
2—The primary concern of Iraqi officials is not democracy or the political evolution of a successful Iraqi nationstate. It is the use of their position in government to gain personal wealth, as well as benefits for their extended family, tribe or sect. This observation is not a character attack, but merely reflects the reality that in a Bedouin society, where the foundational social unit is the tribe, one’s primary loyalty and goals run to that tribe. Saddam’s government was packed with his family and tribal members because they were loyal and because it was expected of him, within the culture, to bring benefits to his tribe by virtue of his prominence. Other Iraqi officials are no different in this regard; it is their cultural norm for the political leader to work in his self-interest and for that of his tribe.
3—If Iraqis do not value something, they will not fight for it. This is one reason why the Iraqi army made such poor showings in the Gulf War and in Operation Iraqi Freedom-1 (OIF-1). They melted away because they were being asked to fight for something in which they did not believe. Yet these same Iraqis are tenaciously fighting the world’s predominant military power tooth and nail in their tribal areas and in their cities. What’s the difference? The insurgents are now fighting for something they believe in—expelling foreign troops and sectarian enemies from the tribal areas and cities that they hold dear.
4—In a society that is evolving from a difficult Bedouin desert existence, where water and other base staples of life have historically been in short supply, the Iraqis have learned that the group that controls the resources of the province or nation lives; he who does not dies. Sharing of resources or power with competing groups outside one’s own tribe is an unfamiliar and foreign concept.
5—Individually, Iraqis are a warm and generous people. As the size of their group grows, however, whether as a family unit, tribe or an entire sect, their generosity to those not within their social circle wanes. The historic sense that one only takes care of his own—borne of their harsh desert life—minimizes their collective willingness to compromise or share resources or power. The lessons they have learned through centuries of desert survival is that only the strong get the resources and survive. As such, armed struggle for power, not compromise and democratic-style debate, is the norm.
6—Trading and bartering for personal or tribal gain is part of the Iraqi/Bedouin culture. Self-sacrifice for the general welfare is not. Accordingly, our frustration with “Why don’t the Iraqis just try to get along for their mutual benefit?” is a Western, culturally based value judgment being applied to an Oriental society for whom violent conflict to gain advantage is the norm. If the current Sunni insurgency is to be stopped, therefore, we must demonstrate to the Iraqi insurgents that the personal benefits of a peace with the Shiites clearly outweighs the possible gain by continuing to fight for dominance. Increased U.S. military operations will inflame this struggle for political dominance, not diminish it.
7—Iraqis do not share Western concepts on the use, passage or value of time. They sincerely believe that if a matter is truly important, Allah will control the outcome, and the personal efforts of individuals are merely tangential to that outcome. This is a source of frustration for U.S. servicemembers who have served in Iraq and seen an apparent lack of resolve, follow-through or reliability from his Iraqi counterpart. The concept of inshallah—”God willing” or “only if God wills it, will it happen”—overshadows all aspects of Iraqi life, including reconstruction and political evolution. As such, the political resolution, if any, in Iraq will be achieved according to the glacial pace of Iraqi society, not based on a U.S. timetable. It is critical to recognize this concept if we wish to set realistic timetables for the continued presence and relevance of U.S. troops in Iraq.

(bold type in original)

Evidence and impact of the Bush administration's disregard for the seven pillars

Every paragraph of Trebilcock's article after listing the seven pillars is important, but I will quote only a few. He succinctly describes the overall problem as follows:

Under these seven pillars, relying upon foreign military forces to impose a lasting political solution upon the Iraqis will not work. In truth, the military victory was won in 2003. It is the peace and the postconflict stability that is being lost daily by our civilian leaders’ attempts to use the wrong tool (military force) to change Iraqi cultural values. Lack of political agility or introspection by U.S. civilian leadership is bringing us back to the brink of losing Iraq politically.

And that's the optimistic paragraph. The remainder paints a not very pretty picture. Trebilcock explains the problems with Bush insisting on "planting the flag of Liberty" in Iraq:

As the concept of democracy does not have significant value in Iraqi culture, the people’s willingness to fight and die for its success is virtually nonexistent. Instead, consistent with their cultural expectations, Iraqis will tend to use their official or security positions to gain personal and family advantage, even if “Rome” burns about them. The daily involvement of corrupt Iraqi police in kidnappings and extortion reflects this. Accordingly, the Iraqi troops we are training now will be enthusiastic to the extent they are being fed and clothed, as opposed to joining the 80 percent unemployment rate among young men in Iraq. It is naïve, however, to believe their willingness to serve is to preserve democracy or the U.S.-backed central government.

This history does not mean that Iraqis are not capable of securing Iraq in the long term. It does mean that it has to be done by Iraqis, on Iraqi terms and over values for which they are willing to fight. Self-preservation may be one of those values—democracy is not. Promoting the integrity and power of their respective tribes within a new Iraq is definitely such a cultural value. U.S. policies built on the premise that Iraqi officials and security forces will rally to Western political values if only we “stick it out a while longer” are naïve in the extreme and underlie our repeated shortcomings in trying to reconstruct Iraq.

What Trebilcock calls naivete I have called and will continue to call delusion and stupidity. Also, on August 16, 2004, I pointed out that Gen. Tommy Franks knew before the war that providing jobs for Iraqis should have been part of the reconstruction program. Instead, we established an 80% unemployment rate.

In analyzing the proposed surge, I wrote on January 17, 2007, that "the whole point of this 'new plan' is for the Bush administration to score some PR points here at home." Trebilcock supports that view and provides additional analysis:

It is against these seven cultural pillars that one can now evaluate the strategic merit of administration policies that rely on U.S. military forces to fight their way to a political resolution. Apparently, the logic runs that the Iraqi forces are not ready yet, but that with a few more months and some additional tens of thousands of U.S. troops all can yet be solved militarily—either by defeating the insurgents through the force of U.S. arms or by buying enough time for a meaningful Iraqi security force to stand up. This supposition, ignoring the seventh pillar, is based on hope, rather than cultural reality, as a cause of action. The policies to perpetuate and increase U.S. military involvement are underpinned with challenging phrases like "cut and run" and "not engaging in defeatism" to quiet critics, but are short on realism or appreciation of Iraqi culture.

(emphasis in original). Again, I say "stupid and delusional." In his next paragraph, Trebilcock provides a different type of explanation as to why the continued use of military force rather than incorporating the seven pillars will continue to fail.

The proposed surge also ignores the lessons of the past four years regarding the limits of what a PFC with an M16 really can and cannot accomplish on a street corner in Baghdad. The U.S. soldier or marine can secure his street corner, but he cannot make the Iraqis who walk past him care about their government. He can engage insurgents or criminals with effective firepower, but he cannot make the Iraqis willing to risk disclosing the locations of known insurgent cells when they do not believe in the U.S. mission. He cannot cause the Iraqis to forget hundreds of years of cultural hatred in order to accept that peace with one’s enemy is better than watching him die. Each of these goals is a necessary component for political stability in Iraq and must come from within, not from additional U.S. combat brigades.

(emphasis added). Or, as Wes Clark put it in a May 2004 article in Washington Monthly, "democracy in the Middle East is unlikely to come at the point of our gun."

Trebilcock then makes a point that Clark stressed repeatedly during the '04 campaign: "And so, while there is not a square inch of Iraq that we cannot occupy and control at any time of our choosing, that fact is largely irrelevant for the long-term stability of a country that requires a political solution, not a military one." (emphasis added). And yet it is beyond dispute that the Bush administration's primary tool has always been the military, and Trebilcock warns of a continuation of that policy:

There is no easy solution in Iraq, but the discourse in Washington that considers no diplomatic or political avenues to resolve a political problem stands an excellent chance of seizing strategic political defeat from the jaws of our 2003 battlefield victory. Clausewitz stated that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." Current U.S. civilian policymakers have morphed this into: "War is the only policy for political means in Iraq." This short-sighted view is the most likely to lead to the very political defeat the administration fears.

"Short-sighted" is defined as lacking foresight. While the term certainly is applicable to the Bush administration, I still maintain that "stupidity and delusion" are more accurate terms. In my January 17, 2007, post, I pointed out that the surge had been done before and had not achieved lasting success, and Trebilcock expounds on that point:

We have been squeezing the balloon with anti-insurgent operations for four years, clamping down on one area only to watch it bulge elsewhere. Today’s theory is that enough kinetic force exerted upon Baghdad and Al Anbar province will win the day or buy enough time for the Iraqis to "stabilize" and provide their own security. The fact that it has been tried before in Fallujah, Najaf and a variety of other Sunni Triangle hot spots, without resolving the long-term political problems, is not deterring the administration’s planners.

What terms accurately describe conduct which keeps implementing the same actions which do not work? Stupidity and delusion.

Signs that Trebilcock is right

"The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq" was written before the surge had had time to accomplish anything, but now there are signs that Trebilcock's views are in fact correct.

Yesterday, the Washington Post ran an article entitled "Top U.S. Officers See Mixed Results From Iraq 'Surge'." The first two paragraphs support Trebilcock's assertions that the surge would not succeed and that a political, not military solution is required.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said the ongoing increase of nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in the country has achieved "modest progress" but has also met with setbacks such as a rise in devastating suicide bombings and other problems that leave uncertain whether his counterinsurgency strategy will ultimately succeed.

Assessing the first two months of the U.S. and Iraqi plan to pacify the capital, senior American commanders -- including Petraeus; Adm. William J. Fallon, head of U.S. forces in the Middle East; Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, commander of military operations in Iraq; and top regional commanders -- see mixed results. They said that while an increase in U.S. and Iraqi troops has improved security in Baghdad and Anbar province, attacks have risen sharply elsewhere. Critical now, they said in interviews this week, is for Iraqi leaders to forge the political compromises needed for long-term stability.

The article goes on to state that while sectarian murders in Baghdad went from 1200 in January to 400 in March, "suicide bombings have increased 30 percent over the six weeks that ended in early April." The U.S. commanders see this as "among the most troubling trends...because they risk reigniting sectarian revenge killings and undermining the government." In other words, while the surge thusfar has arguably reduced sectarian murders, it has resulted in an great increase in another type of murder and violence, which itself could lead to an increase in sectarian murders. What makes the increase in suicide bombings particularly disturbing is the tremendous difficulty in stopping such attacks.

It is virtually impossible to eliminate the suicide bombings, the commanders acknowledged. "I don't think you're ever going to get rid of all the car bombs," Petraeus said. "Iraq is going to have to learn -- as did, say, Northern Ireland -- to live with some degree of sensational attacks." A more realistic goal, he said, but one that has eluded U.S. and Iraqi forces, is to prevent the bombers from causing "horrific damage."

So, the surge really cannot stop suicide bombings, and those suicide bombings present a direct and indirect threat to maintaining whatever success the surge has achieved so far and to the overall objective.

The WaPo article has an explanation from Petraeus about the use of concrete walls and barriers as part of the overall plan:

Another part of the strategy is to wall off communities along their traditional boundaries to control population access and prevent attacks.

"That's part of the concrete caterpillar," Petraeus said, pointing out a barrier going up in a neighborhood in west Baghdad. "That market was shut completely down when I took command -- now it has 200 shops," he said.

Ah, but there is a major problem with this barrier strategy, namely that the Iraqis are upset with it and stopping at least part of it. As explained here, here, and here, the U.S. was building a 3-mile concrete wall between a large Sunni neighborhood and Shia-controlled areas of Baghdad, but the Sunnis protested strongly, and Prime Minister Maliki has ordered that construction be stopped. These events support Trebilcock's assertion that any "solution" is going to have to be something the Iraqis want, and they point out a related fact. We cannot do anything in Iraq that the Iraqis say they do not want. Relying primarily--if not almost exclusively--on military operations is not going to change that simple fact. Ultimately, we are not in total control of the situation--and we never will be. This reality necessitates the use of diplomacy and political (as opposed to military) tactics, just as asserted by Trebilcock. Moreover, for such tactics to be effective, our government must accept Iraqi culture as described by Trebilcock and act accordingly. The Bush administration cannot continue to ignore those matters as if our Western and American customs and mores trump everything else in the world.

What lies ahead

As shown above, Trebilcock says there is no easy solution. Indeed, other parts of his article suggest a course of action that will result in an increase in sectarian violence. However, a major point of his article is that pursuing the same course as the last four years will not and cannot work. The last two paragraphs of his article offer a new course of action as well as a warning if a new approach is not taken:

In light of the seven pillars, if one ties the duration or size of the U.S. military presence to political progress by the Iraqi government, one better strap in for a mission of indefinite duration and perpetual sectarian violence. Conversely, if one wishes to jump-start Iraqi political progress, reducing the presence of U.S. troops or their active involvement in combat operations (accepting that this will lead to greater sectarian bloodshed in the short run) creates a possible incentive for the Shiite and Sunni desert traders to barter terms for coexistence—survival and preservation of their tribal social orders.

Our civilian leadership, desperately seeking to avoid the embarrassment of political defeat in Iraq, proposes to send in its military reserve, calling it “a temporary surge” for political consumption. From a military operational standpoint this will enable us to kick in more doors, kill more bad guys and secure more territory—in the short run. From the strategic political standpoint this will expose the inability of a weak Iraqi government to rule its own people, create more civilian casualties among an already embittered populace and likely become the final straw, rendering open domestic political opposition to our continued military presence in Iraq acceptable to a war-weary citizenry. In the end, by ignoring the cultural and internal political realities of Iraq in favor of a one-dimensional approach based upon military remedies, the civilian leadership of our military will likely win the battle and lose the war.

"Terrible Tuesday" 28 years later

For folks in Wichita Falls, April 10 is a special date. In 1979, April 10 fell on a Tuesday, and that day came to be called "Terrible Tuesday." That was the day that Wichita Falls was struck by one of (if not the) largest tornadoes ever recorded. For all kinds of information, photos, and videos on what happened that day in Wichita Falls and the surrounding area, go to this website.

Shortly before 6:00 p.m., three separate funnels formed on the southwest edge of the city.

And then they joined to make one monster vortex.










I discuss some of the damage below, but for now here are some pictures:





Here's some trivia about the force of the tornado. Canceled checks from Wichita Falls were found in Oklahoma City. A golf driving range was in the direct path of the storm. The range had a large (about 20 ft. in diameter) ball about 150 yards down range with holes in it. Anyone hitting a shot in the holes would win various prizes. Anyway, the tornado swept up that large ball, and when it came to rest, it was approximately 20 miles from its original location.

As a result of the tornado, our local newspaper was not able to publish the following day, and the Dallas Morning News put out a special Wichita Falls edition. Ten years after Terrible Tuesday, I was living in Dallas (and about to move to Austin), and the Dallas Morning News published a special commemorative section about the tornado and what had happened since. That action prompted me to write a letter to the editor which was then published as a guest editorial on April 23, 1989.

After high school, I could not wait to get out of Wichita Falls. And then after staying away for basically 20 years, I moved back and found that many others I knew in high school had done the same. When people ask me (usually in semi-shocked tones) why I freely chose to move from Dallas to Wichita Falls, my standard answer is "It's nice to live in a city that doesn't even have traffic reports on the radio." What I wrote 18 years ago gives some more explanation--and it is still true today.

As a former resident of Wichita Falls and a person whose family still lives there, I want to thank you for the features you ran in the April 9 paper regarding the 10th anniversary of the Wichita Falls tornado. I had been discussing the tornado with several of my Dallas friends. I spoke of the statistical aspects of the storm. However, I said nothing about my personal feelings and memories. Reading the articles in your paper about "Terrible Tuesday" made me want to share some of those memories.

As with most Wichitans who were in the city on April 10, 1979, never an April passes that I do not recall the events of that day and the weeks that followed. My first thoughts are usually about how lucky I was. The tornado did not go through my part of town. Just minutes before the storm hit, a friend of mine and I had been at a shopping mall that was in the direct path of the storm. Only a twist of fate caused us to go home rather than be caught in the impending destruction. Although I came through the tornado unharmed, several of my friends were not so fortunate. Helping them clean up was an experience I will never forget. Mere words cannot convey the extent of the devastation. What had once been neat neighborhoods were bizarre, twisted testaments to nature's fury. One of the officers of the German air force unit stationed at Sheppard Air Force Base commented to my parents that he had witnessed the aftermath of the bombing of Dresden in World War II, and that Wichita Falls looked worse than did Dresden.

The shock and the sight of all the damage will remain with me always. Even so, my most significant memories do not concern such frightening matters, but rather the strength of the human spirit. One would think that in the midst of all the carnage there would have been a sense of despair and hopelessness. However, in front of several wrecked homes signs had been erected that indicated Wichitans were taking a different approach. The signs proclaimed things like "Now Showing: Gone With the Wind," and "Split-level house for sale," and my personal favorite, "Who says the Bakers don't throw wild parties?" Here were people whose lives had literally been blown apart, and yet they could still laugh.

The signs were just indicative of the attitude of the entire city. There was some grief, but it did not consume people. Not once did anyone say, "This is so unfair. Why did this have to happen?" No one complained or wallowed in pity. There was a feeling of gladness just to be alive, and the prevailing spirit was one of hope and an eagerness to pick up the pieces and start over. There was such a strong state of community where everyone was willing to lend a hand.

I hope that my memories will give folks some idea of why Wichita Falls survived and thrived after the tornado and why it is (and has been) a unique city. "The Falls" might not seem like the most glamorous place in the world, but it has something no other place has -- namely, the people who live there. In addition to being courageous, Wichitans care about their city, and they care about people. For me, it has taken leaving Wichita Falls to realize how wonderful that sense of caring and community really is. I am soon moving even farther from Wichita Falls, but I know that regardless of where I live, there is at least one place I can truly call "home." That place is Wichita Falls, and, to me anyway, that makes it a mighty special place.

Wichita Falls is one of those places that does not change much over the years. In some ways that can be frustrating, but in other ways, that is a good thing. Like I said, the qualities I described 18 years ago have not changed, and that is very good thing indeed.

Sampson's "experience"

In my previous post about Sampson, I noted that his actual trial experience consists of trying one criminal case and sitting second chair for several civil trials. I also said that that level of litigation experience was woefully insufficient for someone "in charge of evaluating the performance and future of USAs." A review of Sampson's other experience as a lawyer further shows not just a lack of experience for what he was doing, but an indication of why he was chosen for the job.

The following information was taken from three sources: the Wikipedia page on Sampson; a DoJ press release from February 15, 2005; and a June 2006 report from the Office of Inspector General.

Sampson got his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1996. His first job was clerking for Judge Karen J. Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and then he joined the Salt Lake City law firm of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. From 1999 to 2001 Sampson served as Counsel to Senator Orrin G. Hatch on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Then, thanks to his friendship with Elizabeth Cheney (Big Dick's daughter), Sampson managed to land a job as Associate Director for Presidential Personnel. He was in that job until late September of 2001, when he became Associate Counsel to the President--which meant that his boss was Alberto Gonzales, who was at that time Counsel to the President. From there Sampson moved to DoJ in 2003 where he served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia and Counselor to the Attorney General (John Ashcroft). On February 15, 2005, he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. And then Sampson became Gonzales's Chief of Staff in late September 2005.

Sampson's record shows someone who rose quickly--as in did not spend much time in any job before he moved up the ladder. His record also shows someone who got past the first few rungs only because he was friends with the VP's daughter. From there it sure seems he continued his climb because he was a "loyal Bushie." In other words, it sure looks like Sampson rose so quickly and so high not because of his skill and experience as a lawyer, but because of his connections. He scored political points with the Bush administration and was rewarded with jobs for which he did not have the knowledge and experience.

That's just more of the Bush administration SOP at work.

Should there be any doubt remaining about Sampson's record and why he never should have been in charge of any program which evaluated and fired USAs, consider this story as told in a March 28, 2007, article from the Washington Post:

A devout Mormon born and bred in Utah and educated at Brigham Young University, where he met his wife, Noelle, Sampson coveted the U.S. attorney's job in Salt Lake City and twice approached the man who still had the job, Paul Warner -- now a federal magistrate -- to ask him when he'd be stepping down. The first occurred in a conference room in Utah, Warner said, and the second took place during a lunch in Washington on Pennsylvania Avenue.

Though they shared the same home state, Warner and Sampson followed different public service narratives. A former JAG attorney, Warner had spent 17 years in various capacities in the U.S. attorney's office, saying it "was where I wanted to be, not where I wanted to be from."

In speaking to the eager Sampson, Warner asked him to slow his motor.

"I let him know he would be helped with practical experience as a prosecutor," Warner said. "I told him he should spend some time as an assistant U.S. attorney. If you're going to be chief surgeon, it's nice to do some surgery."

Most people would recognize that Warner's reasoning came straight from the Department of the Bloody Obvious, but not Kyle Sampson. He had the audacity to think he deserved to be a USA. Unbelievable. Instead of becoming a USA (once Warner stepped down, the job went to someone else), he eventually was put in charge of evaluating them and firing them. Let me put this another way: he was not qualified to be a U.S. Attorney, but the Bush administration decided he was qualified to judge them.

Perhaps I'm being too harsh. After all, it certainly appears that Sampson was qualified to judge USAs on the basis of their political allegiance to Bush (rather than their actual performance and competence as U.S. Attorneys). And that's why he was given the job.