Katrina and FEMA: what Brown said was wrong and what he tried to do

Overview

When Mike Brown testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security on February 10, 2006, he claimed that there were multiple problems within the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA which in part caused the failings in the federal response to Katrina. Bush administration apologists have said that Brown was trying to blame others for his poor performance and that Brown's criticisms were inaccurate. The problem for the apologists is that there is plenty of evidence to support Brown's claims.

What Brown told Senators

I obtained the transcript to Brown's February 10 testimony from the New York Times website. CNN also has most of the transcript, as does the Washington Post.

Brown's opening statement expressed his theme:

In 1989, a congressman wrote a letter to The Washington Times, and that letter said that there is a fatal flaw if we separate preparedness from response. That congressman's name was Tom Ridge. We reached that fatal flaw in 2003, when FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security.

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Madame Chairman, I tell you that what occurred after FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security -- there was a culture clash which didn't recognize the absolute inherent science of preparing for a disaster, responding to it, mitigating against future disasters, and recovering from disasters.

And anytime that you break that cycle of preparing, responding, recovering and mitigating, you are doomed to failure. And the policies and the decisions that were implemented by DHS take FEMA on a path to failure, and I think the evidence that we'll have before you today will show the actions that were taken that caused that failure.

Later Brown explained that he felt natural disaster response had been marginalized by DHS in favor of focusing on terrorism:

It's my belief that had there been a report come out from Marty Bahamonde that said, yes, we've confirmed that a terrorist has blown up the 17th Street Canal Levee, then everybody would have jumped all over that and been trying to do everything they could; but because this was a natural disaster, that has become the stepchild within the Department of Homeland Security, and so you now have these two systems operating -- one which cares about terrorism, and FEMA and our state and local partners, who are trying to approach everything from all hazards. And so there's this disconnect that exists within the system that we've created because of DHS. All they had to do was to listen to those VTCs and pay attention to these VTCs, and they would have known what was going on. And in fact, I e-mailed a White House official that evening about how bad it was, making sure that they knew, again, how bad that it was, identifying that we were going to have environmental problems and housing problems and all of those kinds of problems. So it doesn't surprise me that DHS officials would say, well, we weren't aware, you know, they're off doing other things, it's a natural disaster, so we're just going to allow FEMA to do all of that. That had become the mentality within the department.

CNN accurately summarized Brown's views as follows:

In three hours of testimony, Brown argued he faced structural problems stemming from FEMA being made a part of the Department of Homeland Security, which President Bush created after the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Brown contended the reorganization created a bureaucratic nightmare that left a chain of responsibility unclear and set up roadblocks preventing quick action.

Moreover, as will be explained below, Brown did try to find out the problems within FEMA and DHS and implement changes. Brown testified what happened after he presented the results of an independent review of FEMA to his bosses: "We were never given the money. We were never given the resources. We were never given the opportunity to implement any of those recommendations."

A few of the Senators--chiefly Norm Coleman--tried to show that Brown really was to blame by not following procedures, not being proactive, etc. Brown did admit some mistakes and shortcomings, but he also defended himself and pointed out a good deal of evidence to support his defense.

Exhibit 1: concerns of FEMA veterans expressed to Brown

In her opening statement for the hearing, Sen. Susan Collins of Maine, Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, Sen. Susan Collins of Maine, stated the following:

In the year or so preceding Katrina, Mr. Brown was presented with two important and highly critical assessments of FEMA's structure and capabilities. Both included recommendations for improvement.

The first was a memorandum produced by a cadre of FEMA's top professional operatives, known as the federal coordinating officers. Among other things, the memo warns of unprepared emergency response teams that had no funding -- zero funding -- for training, exercises.

(emphasis added). As Collins pointed out later, this memo from the FCOs was presented in 2004. The fact that there was no funding for training exercises supports Brown's claim that FEMA was not given priority by DHS.

Collins further described the content of the memo:

I also mention that earlier, in 2004, that a group of senior FEMA operational professionals, the federal coordinating officers cadre, wrote to you a memo outlining their grave concerns. The memo cautions of unprepared teams and zero funding for training exercises and team equipment. It is -- suggested reestablishing a single response and recovery division at FEMA to facilitate the refocusing that is necessary to regain some of the efficiency that has been lost at FEMA.

Brown testified that he asked for the FCOs to draft that memo. Thus, there is evidence that Brown was aware of major problems at FEMA and was seeking input and recommendations from people more qualified than himself.

The memo from the FCOs was the first assesment referenced by Collins. Let's take a look at the second.

The MITRE study

After receiving the FCOs' memo, Brown commissioned an independent study by the MITRE Corporation, a private, not-for-profit group that does a great deal of research and analysis for various federal agencies.

As reported by CNN,

Then-FEMA director Mike Brown commissioned the study because, he recently told Senate investigators, he recognized the agency had problems responding to the 2004 hurricanes in Florida, even though FEMA was generally praised for its work.

"I wanted to find out what was causing those glitches and those problems so we could fix it, so that we really could live up to the reputation that we had, because behind the curtain, it wasn't all that pretty," Brown told Senate investigators in remarks obtained by CNN. "I mean, our logistics just sucked. It was awful."

Once again, here is evidence that before Katrina, Brown knew there were problems and was trying to address those problems.

The MITRE study was delivered in March 2005. Sen. Collins read the study's summary into the record:

Unclear lines of responsibility lead to inconsistent accountability. There is no deputy to you (Brown) with operational experience, and there are too many political appointees. Not enough senior management emergency experts. Lack of adequate and consistent situational awareness across the enterprise.

CNN highlighted other comments from the study:

* "No one's in charge. Everybody's in charge."

* "The political appointees don't understand business, can't made [sic] policy decisions, and are driven by politics and the latest news clips."

* "If the White House asks, 'Where are the water trucks?' I can't tell them."

All right. So Brown had two reports by March 2005 that there were major problems at FEMA. So what did he do about it? That answer is forthcoming, but before that, there is another assessment of FEMA that must be examined.

The GAO report

On February 1, 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued "Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita." The full preliminary report was issued on March 8, 2006, but here I will show excerpts from the February 1 statement only, specifically those dealing with leadership and organization.

First, prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early hours and days after the event. As we recommended in 1993, we continue to believe that a single individual directly responsible and accountable to the President must be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the overall federal response in the event of a major catastrophe. This person would work on behalf of the President to ensure that federal agencies treat the catastrophe as a top priority and that the federal government’s response is both timely and effective. In cases where there is warning, such as the high probability of a major hurricane (e.g., a category 4 or 5), the senior official should be designated prior to the event, be deployed appropriately, and be ready to step forward as events unfold. Neither the DHS Secretary nor any of his designees, such as the Principal Federal Official (PFO), filled this leadership role during Hurricane Katrina, which serves to underscore the immaturity of and weaknesses relating to the current national response framework.

(emphasis added). Well, this excerpt merely says that no one filled the strong leadership role that was needed, right? Not exactly. It point blank calls the national response framework developed under DHS immature and weak. That supports Brown's claims. The second excerpt shows the failings of Brown's boss, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff:

No one was designated in advance to lead the overall federal response in anticipation of the event despite clear warnings from the National Hurricane Center. Furthermore, events unfolded both before and immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina that made it clear that governmental entities did not act decisively or quickly enough to determine the catastrophic nature of the incident. For example, the DHS Secretary designated Hurricane Katrina as an incident of national significance on August 30th—the day after final landfall. However, he did not designate the storm as a catastrophic event, which would have triggered additional provisions of the National Response Plan (NRP), calling for a more proactive response. As a result, the federal posture generally was to wait for the affected states to request assistance.

(emphasis added). Keep in mind that FEMA used to be a separate, cabinet-level agency prior to the creation of DHS. After that time, FEMA was made part of DHS, which meant that Brown, as FEMA director, was subordinate to Chertoff. In other words, any designation of leadership had to be done by Chertoff, not Brown. And Chertoff seemingly did not know just what he was supposed to do. And now for the good stuff...

Although the DHS Secretary designated a PFO to be the federal government’s representative under the NRP structure and to coordinate the federal response, the efforts of all federal agencies involved in the response remained disjointed because the PFO’s leadership role was unclear. In the absence of timely and decisive action and clear leadership responsibility and accountability, there were multiple chains of command, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and what resources would be provided within specific time frames.

The GAO found pretty much all the problems identified by the FCOs' memo and the MITRE study, AND it identified serious problems in the job that Chertoff did (or rather did not do).

Thus, there is evidence showing that serious problems existed before Katrina, that Brown had identified them, and that those problems went unresolved by the time Katrina hit. This still leaves the question as to what Brown did before Katrina to address these problems.

Apparently, Brown was ignored.

After speaking of the FCOs' memo and the MITRE study, Collins addressed Brown.

SEN. COLLINS: We've received testimony that in response to both of these warnings, which were very explicit in identifying serious problems within FEMA, that you did not take any action. My first question for you is, what action did you take in response to the warnings from the senior career people and the outside consultant?

MR. BROWN: ...As I said, we had to fight to get the money just to do the MITRE study. Once we received the MITRE study, we were in the process of trying to figure out how to complete that, get that into a document that would say, here's what we need to do, A, B, C, so I could present that to Secretary Ridge and then Secretary Chertoff to implement those. We were never given the money. We were never given the resources. We were never given the opportunity to implement any of those recommendations.

SEN. COLLINS: So you're testifying that you were rebuffed in your efforts to remedy these problems by the Department of Homeland Security. Did you ever discuss these concerns about budget authority, organization, personnel, with individuals at the White House?

MR. BROWN: Yes, ma'am, I did.

SEN. COLLINS: And with whom did you discuss those concerns?

MR. BROWN: I discussed these concerns with several members of the president's senior staff.

SEN. COLLINS: And would you identify with whom you discussed those concerns?

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SEN. COLLINS: (Laughs, laughter.) I asked you with whom you talked at the White House about the budget authority and personnel problems that you perceived were hindering your ability to carryout your mission.

MR. BROWN: At various times, I had conversations with the deputy White House chief of staff, Josh Bolten, before he moved over to OMB, and I had numerous conversations with Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin and occasionally conversations with Chief of Staff Andy Card. I've also had conversations with both former White House Homeland Security adviser General John Gordon and with current Homeland Security adviser Fran Townsend.

So, Brown not only solicited frank assessments from FEMA professionals and an independent organization, he did try to get problems rectified and changes made. However, his pleas were ignored by the Bush administration.

Ain't that grand?