Accountability? We don't need no stinking accountability.

The question of accountability and Bush's initial response

I said in I'm throwing a party in your house, and you're paying for it that "In the last week, the Bush administration has done two things that indicate that George thinks he is now bulletproof and invincible." This post addresses "the second thing."

In the previous post, I referenced a January 16 interview with Bush. Here's another excerpt from that interview:

The Post: In Iraq, there's been a steady stream of surprises. We weren't welcomed as liberators, as Vice President Cheney had talked about. We haven't found the weapons of mass destruction as predicted. The postwar process hasn't gone as well as some had hoped. Why hasn't anyone been held accountable, either through firings or demotions, for what some people see as mistakes or misjudgments?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had an accountability moment, and that's called the 2004 election. And the American people listened to different assessments made about what was taking place in Iraq, and they looked at the two candidates, and chose me, for which I'm grateful.

Un-freaking-believable. It seems to me that what he is saying is that since he won the election, nobody has done anything wrong. Even if that interpretation is excessive, Bush clearly is saying that since he was elected, there is no reason to fire or demote anyone. What a bunch of crap.

Just you watch. This is going to be one of the main mantras of the Bush administration from now on. "Since we won the election, we have a mandate and approval for everything we did, and that means we have done nothing wrong."

This is similar to what happens in the wonderful world of law. "Res judicata" is a term that is typically used to generically describe two related concepts. I'll stick to using the terms that are used in Texas law. "Claim preclusion" prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit. "Issue preclusion" prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit. In others words, once a key issue or a entire claim has been decided, it cannot be raised again. This is precisely what Bush is trying to do. "Well, since I got reelected all claims that anybody in my administration has done anything wrong have been decided and cannot be raised again." The problem here is that these matters have not been "fully and finally adjudicated." There can be no such full litigation unless all parties have disclosed all relevant information, and the Bush administration has fallen far short of that standard.

Even so, Bush might get away with this bullshit. In the courts, most of the determinative action takes place away from public view. Judges will make certain decisions that are not based on law, will leave out key facts or make stuff up in their written decisions, etc. These decisions then become the basis for a series of other decisions which control that case and are then used to control others. And the general public does not notice because understanding the subversion of the legal system that takes place requires a knowledge of how everything is supposed to work. Hell, I'm a lawyer, and that subject gives me tired head. In other words, since the public does not have the understanding and likely has no desire or energy to learn all the complexities, this kind of bullshit goes largely unchecked. And it is this kind of bullshit that Bush is attempting here. And because of that, no one in the Bush administration past or present will ever be held accountable. "Hey, look at me! I'm freaking bulletproof!"

What a big steaming pile of crap.

George went on to explain (sort of) three other reasons why no has been fired or demoted.

Explanation 1

Listen, in times of war, things don't go exactly as planned. Some were saying there was no way that Saddam Hussein would be toppled as quickly as we toppled him. Some were saying there would be mass refugee flows and starvation, which didn't happen. My only point is, is that, on a complicated matter such as removing a dictator from power and trying to help achieve democracy, sometimes the unexpected will happen, both good and bad.

(emphasis added). To be fair, much of what he says here is correct. Some thought getting rid of Saddam (notice I did not say "the war") would take longer. The predictions about mass refugees were wrong. And yes, removing a dictator AND establishing a completely different kind of political system is complicated. In fact, it is so complicated that there needs to be some sort of plan--some sort of realistic plan which takes into account a multitude of realities. The problem here is THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH PLAN. I have addressed this in my and particularly in Franks on planning for the post-war period. I will reprint some of that post here in case you do not feel like reading the whole thing.

Did (Jay) Garner (the initial person in charge of the reconstruction) find what he needed in the corridors of Washington? From p. 524 (of Franks's book), here’s how Franks recalls a discussion with someone on his staff, J-5 director of planning, Rookie Robb:

Rookie was discouraged. In several concise sentences, he summarized his concerns about Phase IV, Post-Hostility Operations:

ORHA was understaffed, with fewer than two hundred officers and technical experts on the ground.

They were badly underfunded, and their mission was not clear to everyone on the team.

“Jay Garner is going into this situation badly handicapped,” Robb said. “His organization is behind. They haven’t gathered the financial support and resources they require. And Jay doesn’t have the kind of open checkbook he’ll need to immediately rehire the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis put out of work by the Coalition.”

Well, looks like the answer is not just “no,” but “Hell, no.”

Garner was to be Franks’s subordinate, so maybe CENTCOM, Franks’s command, could help out. And once again, I must say “maybe not.” Franks writes on p. 525 that “CENTCOM had many capabilities–engineering skills and equipment, medical teams, and Arabic-speaking civil affairs specialists. But we had neither the money nor a comprehensive set of policy decisions that would provide for every aspect of reconstruction, civic action, and governance.” (emphasis added).

I also included some analysis from Phillip Carter (of Intel Dump):

Seriously, one can start adding up all of the implicit assumptions in these statements by Gen. Franks, and figure out exactly why the Phase IV plan went so poorly. For starters, there's no discussion of initial security needs, or initial needs for law and order. Second, there's no discussion of institutional responsibility for the key reconstruction projects described as being so essential — something we know now well in the crack between State/USAID and Defense.

This is just the tip of the iceberg, folks. If you want to know more, read the rest of Franks on planning for the post-war period, and if you want to know even more, read "Blind Into Baghdad" by James Fallows.

Explanation 2

And the point is, there has to be a flexible strategy that will enable our commanders on the ground and our diplomats to be able to adjust strategy to meet the needs on the ground, all aiming at an eventual goal, which is a free and democratic Iraq, not in our image, in their image, according to their customs. See, we haven't been -- we've been there -- sovereignty was transferred in June of 2004. So this has been a sovereign nation in its new form for less than a year. I'm optimistic about it, and so are a lot of other people who were there in Iraq --optimistic about that, being optimistic about the emergence of a free government.

Once again, George speaks some truth. Flexibility is important. Sometimes strategy needs to be adjusted. However, as shown above, we went into Iraq with NO strategy for the post-war period. Maybe I am wrong, but only if you call 1) having as the centerpiece of your "plan" the expectation that all Iraqis would worship us as heroes and do everything we wanted; 2) fixng schools while neglecting to provide food, water, electricty, and jobs; 3) not securing the borders; 4) not being able to stop massive sabotage on the oil infrastructure; and 5) shutting out almost all other countries in the contracting process a strategy. It seems that our strategy has been to wait to see what goes wrong, then react to that. In other words, adjustments to our strategy have been efforts to minimize the bad effects of something we just screwed up. But hey--at least we're flexible.

Explanation 3

I'm also mindful that it takes a while for democracy to take hold. Witness our own history. We weren't -- we certainly were not the perfect democracy and are yet the perfect democracy. Ours is a constitution that said every man -- a system that said every man was equal, but in fact, every man wasn't equal for a long period of time in our history. The Articles of Confederation were a bumpy period of time. And my only point is, is that I am realistic about how quickly a society that has been dominated by a tyrant can become a democracy. And therefore, I am more patient than some, but also mindful that we've got to get the Iraqis up and running as quickly as possible, so they can defeat these terrorists.

(emphasis added). So it takes a while for democracy to take hold, does it? Man, there's a catch-all reason for why there is no need to hold anyone accountable. "Listen--it takes time, and unexpected things happen, so how can you blame us for anything?"

The last sentence in Explanation 3 indicates part of that "flexible strategy." See, Iraq was key to the war on terror, or at least that was one of the justifications given for the war. So we were fighting the terrorists in Iraq. But now, the Iraqis are the ones that have to defeat the terrorists. That means that not only is there no need to hold anyone in the Bush administration accountable for Iraq, but if things don't work out, it's not our fault, it's the Iraqis' fault.

Conclusion

Here again is George Bush refusing to take responsibility or concede even the possibility that mistakes have been made. However, he has now added something new: since he won the election, there is no need to even consider if mistakes were made. And from now on, any blame falls to the Iraqis, not us. Never mind that there were no WMD. Never mind that there was no viable post-war plan. Never mind that practically every prediction made by the administration was wrong. And the list goes on and on. None of that is relevant because Bush won the election. Resistance is futile! Or, as it might be said by the Bush administration, "Resistance is a non-starter. Freedom is on the march!"

Say what you want, George, but be aware that many "accountability moments" could be in your future.