Some evidence of Bush basing decisions on politics--and ignoring his generals

In my post about Gerald Ford, I said that Bush had divided the country, and that "In so doing, Bush based most of his decisions and actions on his own political interests."

And then, as if on cue, contemporaneous proof of that statement appeared. On January 3, 2007, NBC's Pentagon reporter, Jim Miklaszewski, made the following report on the NBC Nightly News regarding Bush's plan to send 20,000 more troops to Iraq:

Administration officials told us today that President Bush has now all but decided to surge those additional troops into Baghdad to try to control over the violence there and only then could they accelerate the turnover of territory to Iraqi security forces. Fact is they’re not up to the task yet. The plan would also throw more U.S. money at Iraq for reconstruction and a jobs program. Interestingly enough, one administration official admitted to us today that this surge option is more of a political decision than a military one because the American people have run out of patience and President Bush is running out of time to achieve some kind of success in Iraq. While this plan will clearly draw some stiff opposition on Capitol Hill, the president is expected to announce it a week from today.

(emphasis added). Now I know what some of you are thinking, namely that this cannot be a purely political decision because, after all, Bush has always said that he has made and will make decisions based on what the generals in the field recommend. Well, folks, stop thinking that. My opinion is that claim has always been bullshit, but there is ample proof that on this issue it is bullshit. On November 15, 2006, Gen. John Abizaid testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where John McCain was incredulous that Abizaid was not agreeing that more troops needed to be sent to Iraq. Abizaid responded with the following:

Senator McCain, I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the core commander, General Dempsey, we all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American Troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is because we want the Iraqis to do more. It is easy for the Iraqis to rely upon to us do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.

So, all the generals in the field said that more troops at this time was not a good idea, and yet Bush has decided to go in another direction. But wait, there's more...As reported by the Washington Post on December 19, 2006: "The Bush administration is split over the idea of a surge in troops to Iraq, with White House officials aggressively promoting the concept over the unanimous disagreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[.]" (emphasis added).

Furthermore, Bush's "new plan" as described by Miklaszewski shows that Bush never paid attention to his generals. The "new plan" is to "throw more U.S. money at Iraq for reconstruction and a jobs program." That is needed, but it was needed more than three and a half years ago, and that should have been a fundamental part of the plan before the war. As I have documented extensively, there basically was no plan for the post-war period. Back in August of 2004--the first month of this blog--I wrote a post entitled "Franks on planning for the post-war period." Most of the information for that post came from Gen. Franks's book, American Soldier. There was discussion about the appointment of retired Gen. Jay Garner, the first person put in charge of the post-war period. Here is part of what I wrote:

As stated in the New York Times article about the book, "General Franks writes that he and his staff discussed the postwar phase in Iraq ‘throughout our planning’ for the war itself." However, Franks was not put in charge of the reconstruction effort. That job went initially to retired Army Lt. General Jay Garner...Franks writes (on p. 423) that Donald Rumsfeld called him to ask if he thought Garner could handle the job. Franks said, "Jay could do it if you trust him...and if he could get the right support from every agency of the U.S. government. That’s going to include levels of funding unheard of since World War II."

(emphasis added--and changed from my original post). So Franks--the general in charge of the war when it began--had had discussions with his staff and Rumskull about planning for the post-war period, and he had said that the effort would require huge amounts of money. But wait, there's more:

On designating Garner as the reconstruction leader, Franks says (p. 424) “Naming Jay Garner was a good first step. Washington would be responsible for providing the policy–and, I hoped, sufficient resources–to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people: jobs, power grids, water infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and the promise of prosperity.” (emphasis added).

So, it turns out that Franks specifically told the Bush administration not just that large amounts of money would be needed, but that such money would be needed for reconstruction and jobs for Iraqis. To further emphasize this point, Franks recounted a conversation with a member of his staff:

"Jay Garner is going into this situation badly handicapped," Robb said. "His organization is behind. They haven’t gathered the financial support and resources they require. And Jay doesn’t have the kind of open checkbook he’ll need to immediately rehire the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis put out of work by the Coalition."

(emphasis added). Ain't it nice that approximately four years later, Bush decided to listen?