Some explanation about "Brent Scowcroft speaks out"
The two posts which are below this one have as their basis an article in the October 31, 2005, issue of The New Yorker by Jeffrey Goldberg entitled "Breaking Ranks." The article profiles Brent Scowcroft and describes his differences with the Bush administration. The article discusses much more than Iraq, but Iraq is the focus of my posts.
"Breaking Ranks" discusses Scowcroft's realism as opposed to the neocons' idealism (which I call delusion). I have to say that I have misgivings about the applications of Scowcroft's realism to all situations, but I feel he was right about Iraq. Aside from trying to show that Scowcroft was right about Iraq, I want to make sure that people understand that he was completely disregarded and dismissed by the Bush administration on the issue of Iraq. Given Scowcroft's vast experience and expertise (as described in the Introduction to Part 1) and personal connections to members of Bush's inner circle (described in "Scowcroft did express his concerns before the war" section of Part 1), this fact is at the least surprising. For me, it is further evidence of the delusion of the neocons (discussed in Part 2), for it shows that they refused to even hear facts and analysis based on experience which in any way went against their own beliefs and ideas.
I must also say that my posts include sources and analysis that go beyond "Breaking Ranks." In so doing, I am not trying to say that Scowcroft would agree with me, nor am I trying to represent my analysis as Scowcroft's. It is accurate to say that I am using Scowcroft's views as expressed in "Breaking Ranks" to support my own views.
"Breaking Ranks" discusses Scowcroft's realism as opposed to the neocons' idealism (which I call delusion). I have to say that I have misgivings about the applications of Scowcroft's realism to all situations, but I feel he was right about Iraq. Aside from trying to show that Scowcroft was right about Iraq, I want to make sure that people understand that he was completely disregarded and dismissed by the Bush administration on the issue of Iraq. Given Scowcroft's vast experience and expertise (as described in the Introduction to Part 1) and personal connections to members of Bush's inner circle (described in "Scowcroft did express his concerns before the war" section of Part 1), this fact is at the least surprising. For me, it is further evidence of the delusion of the neocons (discussed in Part 2), for it shows that they refused to even hear facts and analysis based on experience which in any way went against their own beliefs and ideas.
I must also say that my posts include sources and analysis that go beyond "Breaking Ranks." In so doing, I am not trying to say that Scowcroft would agree with me, nor am I trying to represent my analysis as Scowcroft's. It is accurate to say that I am using Scowcroft's views as expressed in "Breaking Ranks" to support my own views.
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