The inspiration for the Burning Bush doctrine shows one of its shortcomings

Who is the inspiration?

On the February 14 broadcast of PRI's "The World" I heard an interview with Natan Sharansky. "Who is he?" you might ask. Well, he is the source and inspiration for the Burning Bush doctrine. Sharansky was a prominent Soviet dissident who spent eight years in a Siberian prison. When he was released, he immigrated to Israel, and he is now a member of the Israeli government.

He has also written a book, The Case for Democracy, and the book's biggest fan is George W. Bush. As Reuters reported, Bush's Inaugural Address (in which the Burning Bush doctrine was proclaimed) contained "phrases which could have been taken from the pages of (the) book." And before that--about a week after the November election--Bush had Sharansky come to White House for a meeting. Reuters quoted Bush as telling CNN that "This is a book that ... summarizes how I feel. I would urge people to read it." Bill Kristol wrote that in a January 11, 2005, interview with the Washington Times, Bush said "If you want a glimpse of how I think about foreign policy read Natan Sharansky's book, The Case for Democracy. . . . For government, particularly--for opinion makers, I would put it on your recommended reading list. It's short and it's good." Elisabeth Bumiller of the New York Times wrote

Sharansky's book, a White House must-read that Bush has been recommending for months to friends, his staff and a parade of recent interviewers, was a leitmotif in Bush's Inaugural Address on Jan. 20 about ending tyranny.

"That thinking, that's part of my presidential DNA," Bush said. "I mean, it's what I think; it's a part of all policy."

In short, he concluded, "It is part of my philosophy."

Criticism of the Burning Bush doctrine revisited (briefly)

In America's new calling, I labeled one of the major shortcomings of the Inaugural Address as the "What do we do about current relationships?" problem. I summed up the problem as follows:

The war on terror does present major problems for Bush's "calling." He said in the Inaugural Address that "My most solemn duty is to protect this nation and its people against further attacks and emerging threats. " So if that is his greatest duty, and if that duty is being fulfilled in part because of help from countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan, is Bush going to risk losing that help by trying to establish "democratic movements and institutions" in those countries? If so, is he not meeting his greatest duty?

This problem was addressed in the February 14 Sharansky interview through a discussion about Pakistan.

Sharansky's comments about Pakistan

The interviewer specifically asked Sharansky about the application of Bush's new policy in regard to Pakistan given that the U.S. is relying greatly on Pakistan in the war on terror. Here is part of what Sharansky said:

It is one thing to set up the principle, another thing to start implementing it, and we all have to see that this principle be implemented not only in relations with enemies, but also in relations with friends like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and other places.

*******

The other thing is how and when you apply (the principle) to one or another country. (You) couldn’t expect from the free world to say to Stalin in 1943 that because you are democratic we will not be your allies in struggling against Hitler. But the problem is that the free world did not say it to Stalin also in 1953. I don’t think that at this very moment, when the army of the United States is currently uniting with the army of Pakistan against al Qaeda, that at this very moment you have to say to Pakistan “We stop our relations with you.” But if you are planning at this moment your relations with Pakistan for the next five or ten years, definitely the question of human rights must be part of your relations with Pakistan.

(emphasis added). Thus, it seems that Sharansky is saying that there is no real need to make demands on Pakistan at the moment. Still, he indicates that relations with Pakistan in the long term will require such demands. The question, then, is when those demands must be made--a few months from now, or years from now, etc.? That question was addressed in the rest of the interview:

Q: And there are some who say at this point the Bush administration is giving a pass to Pakistan in terms of its human rights simply because it wants to keep (Pakistan) as a close ally in the war on terror.

A: If America is going to appease a regime like Pakistan for many years ahead, definitely it would be dangerous for the security of the United States of America, but I do hope that in view of the new principles that are established by President Bush, the relations with all fear societies will be reviewed.

Q: Do you see him, though, consistently implementing those principles?

A: Look, we are only in the beginning of this new policy. I do hope he will consistently implement these principles. Again, the principle has to be established immediately. The practical policy–how big should be the steps, how immediate should be the demands–the policy can differ from country to country, but the principle must be the same. Human rights must become part of the equation in international relations.

Q: Okay. So fast forward to Pakistan. After September 11, then, what would be the correct posture...?

A: Well, of course, there are immediate plans for cooperation which you have to follow, but Pakistan has interests for today, it has interests five years from now, ten years from now, and all the strategic plans of operation we should build should include this element of human rights, and if Pakistan is not ready, then there should be no strategic cooperation.

Q: No strategic cooperation at all? That’s pretty black and white.

A: Well, okay. As I said, to establish the principle is very important. How quickly and when you apply one or another step, how broad will be your linkage, that’s another thing, but experience shows that even small steps, even the introducing of some minimal freedoms to a totalitarian regime accelerates the process of building a free society. That’s why we should not be scared by the fact that if in the beginning our demands to Pakistan will be minimal. But it is very important to establish the principle and to come to Pakistan with these demands.

Q: But if you’re saying “take a case by case approach,” it sounds like you’re allowing for some gray area in what otherwise seems like a very black and white approach.

A: Now look...I believe the principle is black and white, but the relative difference...as I said, the fact that Stalin was one of the most awful enemies of freedom in the world doesn’t mean you should not use him as an ally in the struggle against Hitler. But there was a long period of appeasement of Stalin before Hitler and after Hitler, so let’s not repeat this mistake with Pakistan.

(emphasis added).

Conclusion

If Sharansky gave a clear answer as to what must be done and when regarding Pakistan, I missed it. However, Sharansky makes it clear that if Pakistan is not willing to take even small steps in the human rights area, we should not have any strategic cooperation with Pakistan. And at the same time, he concedes that "of course, there are immediate plans for cooperation which you have to follow." And what should we do if a year from now the circumstances which gave rise to the necessity for those "immediate plans" have not changed? What do we do if the only way Pakistan can help us in the war on terror is to maintain the current dictatorship? What do we do if the only way Pakistan can give us that help is by restricting human rights within its own borders? Sharansky gives no help on these questions. Instead, his answers show that implementing his principle requires careful thought, broad understanding and vision, and finesse--all areas in which George W. Bush is woefully deficient.

Sharansky also does not address how his ideas affect what Bush has called his "most solemn duty." Indeed, Sharansky's insistence that if Pakistan does not meet even minimal demands, we should not have strategic relations could very well put this country at greater risk of a terrorist attack. Ah, but then again, we all know that freedom is not free, don't we? The questions Bush has to answer are "Whose freedom?" and "At what price?" Is Bush willing to risk losing American lives through terrorism in order to establish liberty in Pakistan 10 years from now?